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ABSTRACT 
This study offers a reassessment of the organisation and management of 
British Railways from 1948 to 1964. In examining the impact of the 1948 
nationalisation, it considers whether the under-studied alternatives proposed 
by the railway companies might have been more successful, and whether 
the Labour government's political imperatives resulted in inadequate 
preparation for public ownership and modernisation of the transport system. 
Using an extensive range of government files, including records not 
available for earlier studies, it argues that the slow process of modernisation 
was less the consequence of government intervention or financial 
restrictions, or of general economic conditions, than of deficiencies in 
railway management- division of authority, weak strategic planning, lack of 
financial control, ineffective implementation of policies, and inability to alter 
entrenched attitudes in the workforce and among managers themselves. 
These management problems resulted in the expensive failure of the 1955 
Modernisation Plan. The Conservative government, previously supportive (if 
with misgivings) of the railway management, now had no option but to 
impose its own review of the railways systems, leading to the controversial 
1964 Beaching Report. The Report and implementation of its 
recommendations are examined with the purpose of assessing whether 
Beaching deserves his continuing denigration. The main conclusions are 
that nationalisation was mishandled, and that thereafter management 
failings made further government intervention inevitable. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 1948 the British main-line railway companies were taken under public 
control. One leading justification was that nationalisation would make the 
railways more efficient and better co-ordinated with other forms of transport, 
and would assist the development of the national economy. While 
nationalisation did have the potential to offer greater efficiency, in practice 
the creation of a giant geographically spread organisation created many 
managerial problems. Furthermore, almost from the start, the expectations 
of financial integrity and efficiency of operation proved difficult to achieve. 
As a result, a range of remedies were proposed with various results: the 
1955 'modernisation plan' failed to cure the problems, and the 'Beaching 
Report' of 1963 led to a major recasting of the railway system. The aim of 
this thesis is to explain what went wrong: how from its inception British 
Railways (BR) 1 faced severe difficulties, some inherent in the character of 
nationalisation; how BR's management was unable to overcome those 
difficulties; and how the government came to impose a solution. 
Within the historical literature there has been an emphasis on political 
and technical issues, but here it is argued that greater attention is needed on 
the relationship between government and railway management. As Terry 
Gourvish in his major study of the nationalised railways concluded, 'scholars 
have always been faced with the task of determining the extent to which 
responsibility with performance rested with the market and the competitive 
environment; with the independent actions of railway managements: or with 
the restrictive conditions imposed by government', and 'although much has 
1 The term 'British Railways' has no legal standing but is generally accepted as meaning the 
national railway industry after nationalisation. 
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been written about the nationalised industries and the nationalised railways 
at a general level, comparatively little has been offered in detail about the 
precise influence of government on the activities of state industries'.2 
Moreover, according to Peter Hennessy, there has probably been more 
fantasy about Britain's railway system than any other issue, apart from its 
royal family and its secret service.3 
Investigation of these issues will start with the arguments made by 
Attlee's Labour government that only through public ownership of the 
railways could post-war reconstruction be successfully achieved. lt was also 
believed that an integrated and truly national transport system would bring 
long-term stability and tangible managerial advantages. The accuracy of this 
perspective will be assessed through an analysis of the Labour party's 
empirical research used to justify railway nationalisation. A natural corollary 
is to question whether reconstruction and modernisation could have been 
managed more effectively by the existing four main-line railway companies 
(the 'Big Four')4 than through a nationalised industry. 
This background provides the foundation for a question central to this 
research: why did the British Transport Commission (BTC) and its successor 
the British Railways Board (BRB)5 operate in the manner they did, and what 
was the response of government to that performance? An essential aspect 
of this will be an assessment of the performance of the BTC and the BRB, in 
order to determine how many of the railway's problems were avoidable and 
2 Terry Gourvish, British Railways 1948-73, a Business History (Cambridge, 1986), p. 568. 
3 Peter Hennessy, Having it So Good: Britain in the Fifties (London, 2007), p. 122. 
4 Comprising: the London and North Eastern Railway, the London Midland and Scottish 
Railway, the Southern Railway and the Great Western Railway. 
5 The British Transport Commission was the governing board of the railways from 1948 to 
1962, after which it was replaced by the British Railways Board. 
9 
which were self-inflicted. A further key question will be considered- why the 
Conservative government considered it necessary to change the institutional 
arrangements embodied in the 1947 Transport Act. Other relevant issues 
surround the BTC's Modernisation Plan of 1955,6 and how this contributed to 
the need to implement far-reaching change to the operation and 
management of the railway as prescribed in the Beaching Report? Full 
explanation of these issues requires a further element: consideration of the 
wider economic, social and cultural contexts, in order to ascertain how far 
they were significant for the attempts by the BTC to modernise and 
restructure the railways. 
11 
In the historical literature there is effectively only one work which has fully 
charted the railways during the period covered in this thesis: for all the 
others concentrate on particular aspects, but not the whole issue. Such a 
wide-ranging investigation is necessary, for many of the specific elements 
are interlinked and interdependent. 8 This single exception is Terry 
Gourvish's extensive and highly detailed account of the organisation and 
management of British Railways between 1948 and 1973. Gourvish had 
almost unlimited access to the records of the BRB, although he found that 
some important classes of records were reported missing and presumably 
destroyed, including files on the Railway Executive (RE)9 and the Central 
Secretariat's files on rail closures. Gourvish was unable to redress that 
6 The Modernisation and Re-equipment of British Railways, BTC, 1955. 
7 The Reshaping of British Railways, BRB, 1963. 
8 Terry Gourvish, Writing the History of British Railways', in A. K. Evans and J. V. Gough 
(eds.), The impact of the Railway on Society in Britain (Aldershot, 2003), pp. 269-278. 
9 The RE was the executive arm of the BTC created under the Transport Act of 1947. 
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deficiency from other sources because under the 'thirty year rule' for 
government records, he was denied access to the majority of the relevant 
Ministry of Transport files, now held in the National Archives at Kew. 10 Many 
were only opened to the public between 1991 and 2002, and these files 
have been exploited here. Gourvish emphasised that his book was 
commissioned by British Railways which exposed him to the culture of the 
railways for five years, and he accepted that it may have eroded his 
independence- 'but only a little'.11 The result is indeed that events, 
personalities and outcomes are considered very much from the perspective 
of railway management, producing some problems of balance which might 
have been corrected from a wider evidence base including, particularly, the 
MOT files. An example is his interpretation of government responses to 
recurrent financial concerns: 'not only did the government call the financial 
tune but it also re-wrote the score on a number of occasions'.12 This verdict 
gives inadequate weight to the responsibility of railway management in 
creating and dealing with the financial position. 
A second difficulty with British Railways is a certain lack of emphasis 
on economic and social contingencies - on the extent to which such factors 
influenced government policy towards the railways, and presented a 
challenge to railway management. Gourvish writes that a distinguishing 
feature of the railway industry is the long-standing influence of government 
in key areas of decision making. Perhaps to reinforce his view of the 
'capricious and intrusive' nature of government intervention, he made the 
cynical observation that 'an organisational change, accompanied by suitable 
10 Gourvish, British Railways, p. xx. 
11 lb"d .. I ., p. XXII. 
12 Ibid., p. 574. 
11 
publicity is tangible, if ephemeral proof that a government is doing something 
about the railways'. 13 However, this perspective fails to give sufficient 
attention to the fact that state-industry relations are invariably multi-faceted: 
policies were driven by political and economic expediency, the need for 
regulation in the public interest, and a constructive response to perceived 
managerial weaknesses. 
British Railways remains an impressive and valuable work of historical 
scholarship, and is certainly more definite than other studies of the subject. 
However, it is over twenty years since its publication and more recent 
studies of politics and government, as well as the railways and other 
nationalised industries, provide opportunities for fresh assessments. 
Within the general literature for the period, there exists a variety of 
interpretations on the causes and attempted remedies for the railways' 
problems, some so schematic as to indicate a need for further and closer 
study. Examples include Barnett's view that any shortcomings in the creation 
and operation of the nationalised industries were a consequence of the 
Labour movement's pre-occupation with public ownership in terms of moral 
rather than practical aims.14 Morgan's argument that for those industries 
planned for nationalisation there was to some degree a clear operative 
model15 will also be questioned. Lamb is highly critical of the Beaching 
Report, inaccurately arguing that it was considered purely in financial terms 
and ignored the social consequences of its recommendations.16 
13 Ibid., p. 570. 
14 Corelli Barnett, The Lost Victory. British Dreams, British Realities (London, 1995), 
p. 212. 
15 Morgan, Labour in Power, p. 96. 
16 Richard Lamb, The Macmillan Years 1957-63(London, 1995), pp. 435-442. 
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In the specialist literature, explanations for and assessments of 
nationalisation - the direct ownership of industrial and commercial 
enterprises - have long been controversial matters. Most of these historians 
tend to focus on the wider socio-political context, or concentrate on general 
economic arguments rather than on consideration of the specific effects for 
the railways. In particular, works by Durbin,17 Tomlinson,18 and Brooke19 
provide the political context and examine the development of the thinking 
behind nationalisation, yet in common with Thorpe (who restates the 
traditional argument for efficiency),20 they do not investigate the quality and 
validity of the data underpinning the implementation of nationalisation. More 
relevant is Chick's archive-based study of the micro-economic effects of the 
planning decisions made by Attlee's governments between 1945 and 1951.21 
However, its specific focus has limited application, for the railways are 
considered only as part of a wider analytical issue. This is also true of 
Cairncross, even though his detailed analysis of the 1945-51 period offers 
some revealing conclusions regarding the success of public ownership as an 
instrument of economic policy.22 Singleton's challenging view that even a 
17 Elizabeth Durbin, New Jerusalem: The Labour Party and the Economics of Democratic 
Socialism (London, 1985). 
18 Jim Tomlinson, 'Planning, debate and policy in the 1940s', Twentieth Century British 
History, 3 (1992), pp. 152-174; idem, 'Mr. Attlee's supply-side Socialism', Economic 
History Review, 46 (1993), pp. 1-22; idem, Democratic Socialism and Economic Policy: 
The Attlee Years 1945-51 (Cambridge, 1997). 
19 Stephen Brooke, 'Problems of socialist planning: Evan Durbin and the Labour 
Government of 1945', Historical Journal, 34 ( 1991 ), p. 11, 'The Labour party and the 1945 
general election', Contemporary Record, 9 (1995), pp. 1-21, Labour's War (Oxford, 1997), 
p. 80-81. 
20 Andrew Thorpe, A History of the British Labour Party (London, 2001 ). 
21 Martin Chick, Industrial Policy in Britain 1945-51 (Cambridge, 1998). 
22 Alec Cairncross, Years of Recovery: British Economic Policy 1945-51 (Cambridge, 1992), 
p. 464. 
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Conservative government would have had to restructure the transport sector 
will certainly need examination.23 
Hannah's work on the electricity industry allows comparison with the 
experiences of a different nationalised industry after public ownership. 
Although this is another sponsored history, and a narrative, it nevertheless 
reveals that the electricity industry, in common with the railways faced 
challenging issues: labour restrictive practices, productivity, and later, 
decentralisation. 24 
Relevant to a full understanding of British Railways is the work by 
Philip Bagwell on the National Union of Railwaymen (NUR).25 This is another 
commissioned study which examines the historical development of the role 
and influence of one of the main railway unions, with interpretations 
invariably supportive of its actions. Understanding of the problems 
encountered by railway management is enhanced through its explanation of 
two key elements: the NUR's unwavering support for nationalisation despite 
its disappointment with lack of representation on the boards of the public 
corporations, and the internecine actions of the three main railway unions: 
the Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen (ASLEF), the 
Transport and Salaried Staffs' Association (TSSA), as well as the NUR. 
A further major contribution is the massive and authoritative work by 
Sir Norman Chester,26 who was not just an academic expert on 
administration, but had wartime experience in the civil service. This 
23 John Singleton, 'Labour, the Conservatives and nationalisation' in Robert Millward and 
John Singleton (eds.), The Political Economy of Nationalisation in Britain 1920-50 
(Cambridge, 1995), pp. 13-33. 
24 Leslie Hannah, Engineers, Managers and Politicians: The First Fifteen Years of 
Nationalised Electricity Supply in Britain (London, 1982). 
25 Philip Bagwell, The Railwaymen (London, 1963). 
26 Sir Norman Chester, The Nationalisation of British Industry 1945-51 (London, 1975). 
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influential study identifies a number of conclusions relevant to this thesis. In 
outlining the implementation of the Attlee government's post-1945 
programme, Chester concludes that the introduction of so much legislation 
placed a heavy burden on civil servants, which inevitably led to 
unsatisfactory drafting of bills. However, perhaps his most revealing 
conclusion is that creation of the nationalised industries demanded the 
establishment of a set of attitudes and conventions for what was basically a 
new form of public administration.27 
Much of the specialist literature on nationalisation is weak in its 
analysis of the railways, or else has a propensity to categorise the industry 
with coal as experiencing common problems requiring similar solutions. For 
example Foreman-Peck and Millward conclude that 'coal and [the] railways 
needed a national rescue act', an interpretation that underestimates the 
strength of the Big Four in 1948.28 Furthermore, as Tookey explains,29 
owners of the coal mines supported nationalisation as a means of achieving 
some financial recompense for their assets, which comprised a scattered 
assortment of small and technically backward units - a great contrast to the 
management and organisation of the railways. Rogow's early analysis30 
identifies the problems associated with power contests between government 
and industry, an issue which in this thesis is re-examined with the benefit of 
access to government and railway archives. Loft contributed the important 
point that the accelerated deterioration of the railway's financial position after 
27 Ibid., p. 387. 
28 James Foreman-Peck and Robert Millward, Public and Private Ownership of British 
industry 1820-1990(0xford, 1994), p. 291. 
29 Mark Tookey, 'Three's a crowd? Government, owners and workers during the 
nationalisation of the British coalmining industry 1945-47' Twentieth Century British 
History, 12 (2001), pp. 486-510. 
30 Arnold A. Rogow, The Labour Government and British Industry 1945-51 (Oxford, 1955). 
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nationalisation was due to the burden of debt created by the need to fund 
interest payments on British Transport Stock, paid in compensation to 
shareholders of the railway companies. This is however by no means a full 
explanation. 31 
There is also a considerable secondary literature specifically on the 
railways, not just historical but also including contributions from economics, 
politics, business, engineering and geography. A complication here is the 
variety of approaches and the divergent analytical purposes. Difficulties also 
exist with the works of specialist railway historians both academic and 
amateur. The majority of amateur works concentrate on description and 
analysis of technical developments, rather than on the structure of state-
business relationships. Some academic historians have been critical of such 
sources; but Strangleman adopts a positive perspective, arguing that they 
can provide valuable insight where other records are open to question or 
incomplete. 32 
Among the works by former railway managers, the most useful are 
those by Michael Bonavia, who joined the LNER in 1945 and eventually 
became a chief officer, and later worked in the BTC, the RE, and the BRB. 
Although his three works provide a valuable source of reference on 
organisational changes, they do not always give sufficient attention to the 
wider influences which prompted them.33 Gerard Fiennes' autobiographical 
account bemoans missed opportunities, which reinforces the case for the 
31 Charles Loft, 'Re-appraisal and reshaping, government and the railway problem 1951-64', 
Contemporary British History, 15 (2001 ), pp. 486-510. 
32 Tim Strangleman, 'Constructing the past, railway history from below or a study in 
nostalgia', Journal of Transport History, 23 (2002), pp. 147-158. 
33 Michael R. Bonavia, The Organisation of British Railways (London, 1971 ); The Birth of 
British Railways (London, 1979); British Rail the First 25 Years (London, 1981 ). 
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consideration of a lack of strategic dynamism of management, undertaken in 
this thesis.34 Richard Hardy also began his career with the LNER and 
thereafter became District Traction Engineer and Divisional Manager at BR 
Headquarters. His book is a helpful analysis of the ideological and technical 
changes associated with the Beaching era, though in places it appears 
overly supportive of Beaching himself. 35 
Yet despite the extent of the literature, gaps remain, Millward is critical 
of its scope declaring 'the literature on the causes nationalisation is a mixed 
bag, rather limited in coverage and depth and taking in students of politics as 
well as political and economic historians' and is 'weak in accounting for the 
incidence of public ownership and the institutional arrangements'. 36 
Tomlinson noted that 'on the general character of British post-war policy, it 
should be emphasised that we are only just beginning to see archivally 
based work on this topic for the 1950s and 1960s, and much remains 
unexplored'.37 This thesis addresses some of the large gaps in our 
understanding of the operation and political economy of the nationalised 
industries, particularly the railways, during the 1950s and 1960s. 
m 
In order to provide a fuller and better explanation of the performance of the 
BTC and the development of government - railway relations, a series of 
subordinate and more specific questions will be addressed. An appropriate 
34 Gerard Fiennes, I Tried to Run a Railway (London, 1967). 
35 Richard Hardy, Beeching Champion of the Railway (Shepperton, 1989). 
36 Robert Millward, 'The 1940s nationalisations in Britain: means to an end or means of 
production'. Economic History Review, 50 (1997), p. 211. 
37 Jim Tomlinson, 'The decline of the Empire and economic "decline" of Britain', Twentieth 
Century British History, 14 (2003), pp. 207. 
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starting point is to question the rationale for public ownership, and to 
investigate the factors responsible for shaping the BTC. This will be done 
through assessing the accuracy and validity of Labour's arguments justifying 
railway nationalisation - notably the 1945 report by the National Executive 
Committee of the Labour party: Post War Organisation of British Transport. 
Linked to this will be an investigation into the managerial and financial 
position of the Big Four railway companies in 1948, in order to test the view 
propounded by the Labour party that post-war railway reconstruction could 
only be achieved through nationalisation. After establishing this background, 
the management performance of the BTC will be evaluated and a series of 
associated questions considered: what was the impact of 'nostalgia', or 
inherited attitudes on its attempts to modernise? How valid was the BTC's 
justification for the demise of the RE? Why was the opportunity to modernise 
the railways through a progressive traction policy not taken? And what 
impact did contextual conditions play in the railway's difficulties? 
The perceived need by 1960 for additional legislation to re-structure 
the railways raises further issues: why was it considered necessary to use 
evidence from the Special Advisory Group (SAG)38and the 1960 Select 
Committee to justify change on the railways? Why did the planned re-
conceptualisation of the character of the railways under Beaching prove to 
be so controversial? Surrounding these questions will be an assessment of 
the proposition that cultural change proved to be a fundamental factor in the 
development and management of the railway industry. 
38 Known as the SAG or 'Stedford Group' after the name of its chairman, Sir lvan Stedford. 
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A further issue -the concept of modernisation - recurs repeatedly in 
this thesis, and attention will be given to determining why it was considered 
so necessary to the performance and financial position of BR. In addition, an 
analysis will be made into the activities of railway management, in an 
attempt to ascertain the extent to which its own actions rather than other 
contextual contingencies affected the progress of modernisation of the 
railway system. 
IV 
This thesis is divided into six chapters; the first will examine key aspects of 
the nationalisation of the railways in the late 1940s. lt will question whether 
the Attlee government's rationale for public ownership of the railways was 
underpinned by adequate research, and assess the consequences for the 
railways of the implementation of the Morrisonian model of the public 
corporation. A corollary will be to consider not wholly hypothetical questions: 
whether the reconstruction and modernisation of the railways could have 
been better undertaken by the existing four main-line railway companies, 
and whether they possessed the necessary management skills and financial 
capability to undertake such a wide-ranging challenge. In addition, the first 
chapter will ascertain why the Transport Act of 1947 produced the 
institutional arrangements that it did. 
The second chapter will concentrate on the operation of the British 
Transport Commission during the first four years of its operation, and assess 
the reasons for its poor performance. This requires an investigation into the 
influence of a new and untried system of management, the effects of 
19 
external constraining factors, and the impact of a nostalgic attitude of the 
workforce upon the management and modernisation of the railway industry. 
Chronologically, the third chapter deals with the first four years of the 
Conservative government of 1951-54. lt will initially seek to establish the 
extent to which national economic issues, including the relative decline of 
the British economy, affected the management of the railways. A further 
element- the nature of state-industry relations and the precise boundaries 
between them - will be analysed in order to provide a base for critical 
examination of the reasoning behind the Transport Act of 1953. One 
particular consequence of that legislation needs to be explained - the 
abolition of the Railway Executive. Finally, in order to appreciate fully the 
competitive position of the railways, an assessment will be made of the 
impact of two other issues influencing financial performance: road transport 
and labour relations. 
An investigation is made in the fourth chapter into the quality of 
strategic planning by railway management in the development and 
implementation of their Modernisation Plan, published at the start of 1955. lt 
will seek to determine whether the BTC was capable of resolving the 
management problems which it faced through a critical examination of 
significant issues. First was traction policy, a subject of great interest to the 
railway enthusiast but almost totally neglected by the academic historian. 
Second were issues pertaining to labour and wages, and third the continuing 
concerns with the financial position of the railways. 
In chapter five, there is an assessment of the Modernisation Plan, in 
order to investigate the reasoning in the Ministry of Transport that this was a 
20 
failure, and to undertake a critical analysis of the re-appraisal exercise 
carried out by the BTC. Also considered is the reasoning behind a series of 
investigations into the operation of the railways, all concerned to resolve 
their continuing and underlying financial and operational problems. 
The sixth and final chapter focuses on the linkages between the 
conclusions of the various investigations and how these led to policies 
contained in the 1961 White Paper, the Transport Act of 1962 and the 
appointment of Richard Beaching. An assessment is made of Beaching's 
plans for the re-conceptualisation of the railways based on his report, The 
Reshaping of British Railways, published in 1963. In considering those 
highly contentious proposals, the role of the MOT will be assessed with 
particular attention on the influence of contextual and other cultural changes 
on the decisions made by the BTC and BRB on labour issues, line and 
works closures, and operating policies. 
V 
The evidence for this study derives from a wide range of primary and 
secondary sources, but particularly relevant are the government records in 
the National Archives at Kew. These include extensive documentation from 
the 'Big Four' railway companies, from the Cabinet, Treasury and Ministry of 
Transport papers, as well as those from the BTC and the BRB. Of particular 
importance to the first chapter are the records of the Cabinet Committee on 
the Socialisation of Industry (CCSI), the body responsible for the 
nationalisation of the railway industry. However, minutes from two of the 
meetings are missing, requiring reference to other MOT papers. Owing to 
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the sheer pressure of other government and parliamentary work the 
Socialisation Committee worked without substantial input from the full 
Cabinet and the Prime Minister. 
Ministry of Transport documents offer a particularly valuable source of 
evidence by revealing the progress and development of state-business 
relations in the railway industry. Together with BTC minutes, relevant 
government bills and white papers, these MOT records provide a wide 
evidence base for assessment of the nationalisation process and the 
operation of the railways. Further sources are the numerous publications 
issued by the BTC and its successor the BRB. In particular, the BTC and 
BRB annual reports contain highly detailed statistics on all aspects of 
operation and financial performance, as well as wide-ranging commentary 
on the activities of British Railways. Despite the immense value of such 
sources, Booth and Glynn have argued that this evidence must not be 
accepted uncritically as these records tend to exaggerate the importance of 
internal government and administrative discussion for decision making and 
related issues.39 They are essentially administrative working papers, yet also 
contain much political rhetoric. Despite such drawbacks the availability of 
this archive material has allowed an analysis of sensitive and confidential 
information which was previously unavailable, and which is significant for 
deliberations in the MOT and the Cabinet regarding the alternatives for the 
railways. When used in conjunction with other previously unpublished 
information, such as the findings of the SAG, a more balanced 
39 Booth and Glynn, 'Public records and recent British historiography', Economic History 
Review, 32 (1979), p. 313. 
22 
understanding is made of the decision-making process and policies directed 
towards the nationalised railway industry. 
The operation, management and regulation of Britain's railways were 
controversial issues during the post-war years and have remained so even 
today. Yet during that history, arguably the most enduring controversy 
surrounded the Beaching era. This attempt to resolve the railway's problems 
through major change cannot be considered in isolation, for its genesis lay in 
the effects of nationalisation, and its evolution influenced by economic, 
social, cultural and political change. In effect, another way of describing this 
thesis is as an explanation of the Beaching Report. 
This will be achieved through an approach which will seek to ask 
fresh questions, and to advance new interpretations, while accepting Dow's 
comment that 'the answers on any important issues do not become clearer 
with the mere passage of time, and remains to some extent a matter of 
opinion'.40 
40 J. C. R. Dow, Management of the British Economy 1945-60 (Cambridge, 1965), p. xvii. 
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CHAPTER 1 
NATIONALISATION 
lt is unthinkable that there should be a reversion to the position of 1939 with the 
measure of foolish competition which then existed. 
(Labour party National Executive Committee report, Post War Organisation 
of British Transport (London, 1945), p. 3.) 
The creation of the nationalised transport industry under the 1947 Transport 
Act established one of the biggest commercial organisations in the history of 
British commerce and industry -the British Transport Commission. There 
had been resistance to the formation of such a large and geographically-
spread business, with its remit to co-ordinate all sectors of transport. 
Various commercial organisations were critical, but opposition was most 
powerfully expressed by the railway companies, which proposed and widely 
publicised their own alternatives to railway nationalisation. Yet the 
companies were effectively ignored, as the Labour government proceeded 
with its plans for public ownership without undertaking widespread 
consultation, or even sufficient enquiry and research into the industry's 
condition and prospects. Subsequently, the alternatives to nationalisation of 
the railways, and the concerns which prompted these criticisms and 
proposals have been submerged by the passage of time, and have received 
scant attention from historians. Yet without critical investigation of the 
controversy over the future of railways, it is difficult to obtain a full 
understanding of the consequent history and development of British 
Railways. 
This chapter will consider three questions. The first is the quality of 
the Labour government's understanding of the issues involved in railway 
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nationalisation. Second is an investigation of the Big Four railway 
companies' proposals for retaining the existing railway structure, and an 
assessment of whether these might have been more effective than 
nationalisation in managing the processes of reconstruction and 
modernisation. Then, third, the institutional arrangements established by 
Labour's Cabinet Committee on the Socialisation of Industry - the 
Morrisonian public corporation model - will be considered, more particularly 
by asking whether this structure led to serious problems in management and 
operation of the railways. 
If the structure and performance of the nationalised railway industry is to be 
fully understood, the extent and validity of the Labour party's and the Attlee 
government's understanding of the industry and its requirements need to be 
assessed. The 1945 government's industrial strategy was based on the 
belief that after a long and destructive war, the railways, in common with the 
whole national economy, required reconstruction of physical assets and 
managerial structures to improve productivity. lt was further believed that 
only through public ownership could these aims be achieved. While the need 
for reconstruction was widely accepted, that nationalisation was the only way 
in which it could be achieved, is debateable. 
As studies of wartime popular political attitudes and the 1945 General 
Election have shown, nationalisation did not have a large public appeal and 
was not a leading element in the Labour party's election victory. 1 The new 
government's determination to proceed with nationalisation derived from 
1 See e.g. Steven Fielding, 'What did the people want? The meaning of the 1945 general 
election', Historical Journal, 35 (1992), pp. 623-39, and Stephen Brooke, 'The Labour party 
and the 1945 General Election', Contemporary Record, 9 (1995), pp. 1-21. 
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practical and philosophical issues, rather than from well-argued and 
effectively-researched economic considerations. This is understandable 
given the Labour party's commitment to public ownership, which had been 
enshrined in Clause Four of its constitution since 1918 and which 
underpinned the Labour party's relationship with the trade union movement. 
According to Singleton, 'the fact that it [Clause Four] did not specify a 
timetable of action or explain what was meant by "popular administration and 
control" was irrelevant': its 'continuance as the sole statement of principle in 
Labour's constitution holds Labour true to its past, true to what its originators 
wanted it to be: for labour and against capital'. 2 lt can be argued that this 
ambiguity was typical of Labour party industrial policy from at least the 
1920s, for according to Thorpe 'for all its innovations it [the party] was still 
keener on panaceas rather than policies when it came to industry', and 'it 
would only be a shade too unkind to say that only the buzzword changed, as 
"planning" replaced "rationalisation" as a widely accepted but little worked 
out or understood policy for dealing with industry'.3 Booth concluded that 
during the 1930s the decisions that mattered were not taken, and that 
'nationalisation remained the same utopian political rallying cry devoid of 
economic content or analysis'.4 Furthermore, Brooke concludes 'it was clear 
in 1944 that there were burgeoning differences between those who saw 
nationalisation as an article of faith and those who perceived it simply as a 
tool of economic policy', and 'Labour's victory in 1945 was one of triumph, 
2 John Singleton, 'Labour the Conservatives and nationalisation', in Millward and Singleton 
(eds.), The Political Economy of Nationalisation in Britain 1920-50 (Cambridge, 1995), 
p. 15. 
3 Andrew Thorpe, 'The industrial meaning of "gradualism": The Labour party and industry 
1918-1931', Journal of British Studies, 35 (1996), p. 113. 
4 Alan Booth, 'How long are light years in British politics? The Labour party's economic 
ideas in the 1930s', Twentieth Century British History, 7 (1996), p. 22. 
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but confusions, and differences over the ends and means of socialism lay 
just beneath the surface'.5 
Debate surrounding this long contentious issue heightened with the 
wider acceptance of Keynesian macro-economics. The result, according to 
Brooke, was that 'innovations in the sphere of financial policy had weakened 
the case for unlimited nationalisation as the basis of a socialist economy', 
and that 'control of the economy and full employment could be achieved 
through subtler means'.6 Francis agrees, considering that 'Labour's 
nationalisation programme was essentially a pre-Keynesian strategy', 
something clearly understood by those revisionists such as Durbin, Gaitskell, 
Crossman and Jenkins, who were 'reluctant to renounce public ownership. 
They were aware of its limitations as an instrument of economic policy but 
they felt it still had a role to play in Labour's egalitarian objectives'. 7 
However, even if some members of the Labour party leadership 
accepted the significance of these new developments in macro-economics, 
they became hamstrung by the commitment to specific nationalisation 
measures imposed on them by the 'Mikardo resolution' at the delayed 
Labour party conference in December 1944. The impact of all these factors 
led Tomlinson to conclude that 'the policy objects of the 1945 Labour 
government were, perhaps like all governments, complex and potentially 
contradictory'. 8 
5 Stephen Brooke, 'Revisionists and fundamentalists: The Labour party and economic 
policy during the second world war', Historical Journal, 32 (1989), p. 175. 
6 Ibid., p. 158. 
7 Martin Francis, Ideas and Policies under Labour 1945-51, (Manchester, 1997), p. 91. 
8 Jim Tomlinson, Democratic Socialism and Economic Policy; the Attlee years 
1945-51 (Cambridge, 1997), p. 263. 
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Arguably, the debate surrounding railway nationalisation had an even 
longer and equally controversial history, for as Gourvish states 'the issue of 
public ownership versus private enterprise for the railways was as old as the 
industry itself'.9 Furthermore, 'nationalisation not only of the railways but also 
of other sections of inland transport was never far below the surface of 
political debate in the inter-war years' .10 However, Crompton's assertions 
that 'before the end of the thirties Morrison and his eo-thinkers had made out 
a strong case for nationalisation as good business for the nation', and further 
that 'they had done so through a coherent analysis of the shortcomings of 
the inter-war transport systems',11 are debatable. As will be argued later, 
Morrison's plans were strong on criticism but less so on analysis and 
understanding of the railways as a commercial operation. The Railway 
Gazette declared in 1945 that 'very few in any of the political parties have 
mastered the technical facts upon which so important a decision should be 
made'.12 
If there was debate on aspects of nationalisation within the intellectual 
element of the Labour party, this did not apply to the railway unions where, 
amongst the leadership at least, public ownership was an act of faith. Since 
1894, well before the acceptance of 'Clause Four', the Amalgamated Society 
of Railway Servants, and its successor the National Union of Railwaymen 
had advocated railway nationalisation. In addition, this view was, at the very 
least, reinforced through the union's provision of substantial financial support 
to the Labour party, and direct sponsorship of a substantial number of 
9 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 13. 
10 Ibid., p. 15. 
11 Gerald Crompton, 'The railway companies 1920-50', in Millward and Singleton, 
Political Economy of Nationalisation in Britain, p. 140. 
12 Railway Gazette, 8 June 1945, p. 558. 
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members of parliament. After the 1945 General Election, the significance of 
this increased, as the new Parliament contained a total of 32 MPs sponsored 
by the railway unions: 15 by the NUR, 15 by the Railway Clerks' Association 
(RCA) 13 and 2 from the Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers and 
Firemen (ASLEF). Altogether some 120 Labour MPs were sponsored by 
trade unions, which expected these MPs to support nationalisation 
measures. For the first time the so-called 'railway interest' in Parliament 
comprised more railway employees than railway company directors (two 
MPs). This radical change transformed the railway interest from strong 
support for the private railway companies, to strong advocacy of 
nationalisation. 
In addition, many more Labour MPs had accepted public ownership of 
the means of production and distribution as integral to their larger aim of 
achieving socialism. More immediately, many believed that nationalisation 
was vital for post-war reconstruction: only by taking the 'commanding 
heights' of the economy into public ownership could the direct controls of the 
wartime economy be converted into successful planning of the peacetime 
economy. However, as Foreman-Peck and Millward point out, 'economic 
planning was to be a means of achieving both justice and efficiency. How 
the nationalised industries were to fit into this was perhaps never spelt out' .14 
This pursuit of justice in the work-place proved to have important 
repercussions, for according to Francis the rhetoric supporting it: 
ensured that the motive for nationalisation remained essentially negative, and 
virtually guaranteed that enthusiasm for public ownership would be dissipated once 
the industries more directly associated with the alleged anti-social record (notably 
13 Now TSSA- the Transport Salaried Staffs' Association. 
14 Foreman-Peck and Millward, Public and Private Ownership of British industry, p. 293. 
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coal and the railways) passed into public hands, and the unemployment and 
poverty that had resulted became an increasingly distant memory'.15 
While this conclusion is certainly true for the coal industry, it is less 
sustainable for the railways where (as will be seen later), the companies 
had, from safety needs, imposed strong discipline, but allied to a definite 
paternalistic approach. 
Nationalisation, it was believed, would be more 'efficient' than private 
enterprise; more particularly, public ownership of the railways would ensure 
a coherent national organisation of transport. But this was very largely a 
matter of assumption and assertion. As the historical literature confirms, 
little evidence or justification was made available to support the case for 
greater efficiency; nor was there much investigation of the most effective 
form of business organisation and management structure. As Kenneth 
Morgan noted, 'the specifics of Labour's proposed public ownership 
schemes remained vague in the extreme, in almost every aspect-
organizational structure, finance, compensation, pricing policy, and relations 
with employees and consumers'. 16 Chester adds weight to this view with: 
Some of the subsequent worries of the Labour government undoubtedly sprang 
from a too simple belief that administrative changes producing very large units 
quickly and readily brought economies which would be reflected in lower prices and 
improved services. None of the reports or the general literature had dealt with the 
problems during the process of reorganisation or with the management of very 
large-scale units. For that matter, none had recommended management units on a 
national scale.17 
15 Francis, Ideas and Policies, p. 91. 
16 Morgan, Labour in Power, p. 97. 
17 Chester, Nationalisation of British Industry, p. 20. 
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In its election manifesto, Let Us Face the Future, the Labour party 
was unequivocal about the post-war challenges facing the transport 
industries, details of which were contained in two statements; 'co-ordination 
of transport services by rail, road, air and canal cannot be achieved without 
unification. And unification without public ownership means a steady struggle 
with sectional interests or the enthronement of a private monopoly, which 
would be a menace to the rest of industry'. 18 Further explanation of these 
key issues was contained in the report from the party's National Executive 
Committee (NEC), Post-War Organisation of British Transport- a highly 
significant document rarely referred to in the historical literature. Yet even 
this report relied very largely upon assertion, and failed to offer adequate 
justification on why the nationalisation of railways 'would make for greater 
efficiency, and co-ordination with other forms of transport would inevitably 
result'.19 A central proposal, the establishment of a National Transport 
Authority- clearly the basis for the British Transport Commission - was 
derived from Morrison's pre-war proposals,20 without serious consideration 
of the changed circumstances resulting from the impact of war. There was 
no explanation for its contention that such an Authority would make fears of 
bureaucratic control and interference groundless - accusations which were 
to be made against the BTC. Some of the report's arguments were 
contradictory. On the one hand, it declared that 'it is unthinkable that there 
should be a reversion to the position of 1939 and the measure of foolish 
18 Let us Face the Future: A Declaration of Labour Policy for the Consideration of the 
Nation (1945), p. 6. 
19 The National Executive Committee of the Labour party, Post-War Organisation of British 
Transport (London, 1945), p. 8. 
20 Herbert Morrison, Socialism and Transport: The Organisation of the Socialised Industries 
with Particular Reference to the London Passenger Transport Bill (London, 1933). 
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competition which then existed'; yet on the other hand it was stated that 'as 
the four railway companies own 96% of the track and 95% of the invested 
capital, competition between the railways has been reduced to small 
proportions'.21 The report used inaccurate information when seeking to 
justify public ownership on financial grounds. lt referred to the operation of 
the Railway Finance Corporation as an example of government financial 
support of the Big Four. Yet although this body was promoted by the 
government- as a scheme to help counteract regional unemployment - it 
was wholly funded by the railway companies (if with government loan 
guarantees).22 The report also offered as a justification for nationalisation, 
the perceived success of the London Passenger Transport Board (LPTB), 
conceived by Morrison under the 1929-31 Labour government, but 
implemented from 1933 by the National Government. Yet comparison 
between the LPTB and a nationalised railway system does not bear scrutiny. 
London and its outlying suburban areas represented a coherent and 
relatively small geographical entity, which was hardly comparable to a wide-
ranging system serving the whole country. The LPTB was also highly 
specialised, concerned only with passenger transport, a high proportion of 
which - commuters - provided a relatively stable customer base. lt had no 
responsibility for freight, which in 1945 was far more important on Britain's 
railways than passenger traffic, both in terms of number of trains operated 
and the revenue generated. 
21 Post-War Organisation of British Transport, pp. 3-6. 
22 The Railway Finance Corporation was established under the 1935 Railway Agreement 
Act. lt allowed borrowing of £27 million by the Big Four through the issue of 2%% 
debenture stock guaranteed by the Treasury, to be repaid in 1951-2. All costs were met 
by the railway companies: see RAIL 1007/628. 
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Much of the argument of Post-War Organisation of British Transport 
depended on claims about the poor performance of the existing railway 
system, with its 'foolish competition' between private companies. Yet the 
railway companies had provided an effective, in the circumstances even 
outstanding, service during the war. Although the NEC report accepted this 
achievement, it emphasised the importance of the administrative 
arrangements, and no credit was given to the railway companies for how this 
success was achieved. Rather, the emphasis was upon the claim that the 
war-time record could not have been met so successfully with the pre-war 
organisation.23 Yet in reality it was the organisation of these companies 
which ensured the wartime operational success, for the Ministry of War 
Transport passed responsibility for fulfilling what it required from the railways 
to the Railway Executive Committee (REC). In effect this was a eo-
ordinating body, comprised of the railway companies' senior officials, usually 
the general managers. lt was essentially a central secretariat for processing 
and publicising instructions and disseminating information, in order to ensure 
effective co-operation between the companies. Together, the Ministry of 
War Transport and the REC generated copious and detailed instructions for 
a staggering range of eventualities. 24 Nevertheless, it was the Big Four 
companies which actually continued to organise almost every aspect of 
direct railway operations. In May 1940, the Minister of Transport, Sir John 
Reith, had directed the main-line companies to 'carry on as usual', and 
despite the great wartime disruptions and dislocations, carry on they did. 25 
Although overall REC control was theoretically extended from late 1940, 
23 Post-War Organisation of British Transport, p. 8. 
24 The directives for 1939-41 are in RAIL475/821. 
25 Reith to the main-line railway companies, 8 May 1940, RAIL424/23. 
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when it came to running the trains little changed. Or to put it another way, 
state control contributed little to the direct working of the railways, because 
their successful operation was a function of efficient co-ordination between 
the four established companies. Yet this success probably confirmed to 
Labour politicians their belief that a fully integrated transport system required 
removal of the railway companies and nationalisation- arguably, the reverse 
of the appropriate lesson to be drawn from wartime experience. 
Throughout the course of the war political interest in the transport 
issue continued, essentially promoted by the Railway Control Agreement of 
1939 (this will be considered later). Prompted by Labour calls for immediate 
nationalisation of the railways, Reith (a former chairman of the BBC), who 
was familiar with the concept of the public corporation, commissioned a 
report on transport. This was produced by Sir Albert Robinson 26 and Sir 
William Coates 27 in October 1940, and essentially focused on planning the 
post-war position. Their report- 'The Transport Problem in Great Britain'28 -
recommended the formation of a national transport monopoly embracing 
road, rail, canal, and air transport. According to Gourvish, the replacement of 
Reith as Minister of Transport by Lt-Col. J. Moore-Brabazon (a Conservative 
MP), resulted in the responsible minister being more hostile to the Coates-
Robinson document and 'in December 1940, having asked for a critical brief 
from his civil servants, he declared that he was frankly frightened by the size 
of the proposed Corporation' with the result that 'planning then came to a 
halt'.29 
26 Deputy-Secretary to the Minister of Transport. 
27 Previously a civil servant and then a director of ICI. 
28 Ministry of War Transport correspondence and papers, MT64/11. 
29 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 17. 
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The appointment of a businessman, Lord Leathers as Minister of War 
Transport in May 1941 resulted in little change until 1942 when, after 
repeated calls for nationalisation from the Labour party, the issue re-
surfaced and Coates was commissioned to produce a second report, 
delivered in July 1942.30 This offered similar proposals to the earlier attempt 
and proved equally controversial, with the result that 'the report was then 
shelved pending further investigation, including an inquiry into the views of 
the main-line railway companies'.31 
Even so, the influence of the Coates Report was to prove enduringly 
persuasive in the Ministry of War Transport. There, the deliberations indicate 
that although the political and administrative difficulties were to some extent 
appreciated, the problems of commercial management of such a large and 
all embracing organisation were not. Evidence of this can be found in the 
wartime proposals of two civil servants in the Ministry of War Transport, who 
would later be important in the nationalisation process as officials assisting 
the Cabinet Committee on the Socialisation of Industry (CCSI). In 1943 Sir 
Cyril Hurcomb (the Ministry's Permanent Secretary), and S. S. Wilson (who 
had been private secretary to Morrison while Minister of Transport 1929-31) 
were charged with developing plans for greater transport co-ordination. 
Despite Gourvish concluding that Hurcomb 'had great experience of 
transport planning', 32 events were later to prove that he lacked any 
commercial understanding. Perhaps of greater importance was that 'he had 
been the Permanent Secretary to the Ministry of Transport from 1927 to 
1937 and had established a close rapport with Morrison during his period of 
30 Secret Report on the Transport Problems of Great Britain, July 1942, MT64/9. 
31 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 19. 
32 Ibid., p. 18. 
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office'.33 lt is likely that this was influential in his appointment as the first 
Chairman of the BTC. 
The results of Hurcomb's and Wilson's early deliberations suggest 
that despite substantial experience in the MOT, their understanding of the 
difficulties of managing a national transport industry was superficial and 
limited. Chester concluded that the TUC reports on nationalisation 
embodied a limited perspective, on the basis that 'their thinking did not seem 
to go much beyond the idea of a national board', while 'Whitehall was 
equally unprepared'. Chester also contends that: 
whereas a great deal of general consideration was given to various aspects of the 
membership of the Boards, the structure and size of the management units were 
settled according to the circumstances of each case. This approach was helped by 
the comforting belief that most of the organisational aspects need not be specified 
in the legislation but could be worked out subsequently.34 
As events later showed, this approach, for transport at least, was seriously 
flawed and proved to be as optimistic as the thinking of the MOT in a secret 
report from Hurcomb, which stated: 
A vast combination of this kind [the formation of a public utility company as a 
transport monopoly] solves the problems of co-ordination in a complete and drastic 
fashion, would embrace one common interest under one central supervisory 
control, the existing railways which would be unified, the canals which would be 
grouped or be unified and long distance road haulage of goods and passengers?5 
Hurcomb accepted that this superficial conclusion essentially restated the 
findings of the Coates Report,36 but it was typical of the times, for as 
Millward and Singleton explain 'there was a growing conviction in informed 
33 Donoughue and Jones, Herbert Morrison: Portrait of a Politician (London, 2001 ), p. 132. 
34 Chester, Nationalisation of British industry, p. 388. 
35 Secret Report for co-ordination of inland transport: Proposals for a public utility 
corporation, July 1943, MT7 4/1. 
36 Ibid., July 1943. 
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circles between 1920 and 1950 that giant enterprises were inherently more 
efficient than smaller firms. The superiority of large planned enterprises was 
in some degree an article of faith rather than a scientifically proven fact'. 37 
The success of the wartime REC added to the optimism of Hurcomb 
andWilson: 
This [the railways] is at once the largest and easiest problem. What is, I think, 
required is the creation of a statutory body on the basis of a glorified Railway 
Executive Committee'. Apart from the question of compensation, the main problem 
is which of the local and light railways should be within the ambit of the Railway 
Board. 38 
Wilson and Hurcomb did accept that a decision should be made on the 
structure of the new transport body. Three options were considered: first, the 
existing main-line companies; second, regional bodies to oversee all forms 
of transport in a particular area; and third, functional, according to type of 
undertaking.39 Gourvish notes that the functional mode was chosen because 
'after all the major argument in favour of a functional system was its ease of 
introduction, an important consideration given the intention to act quickly'.40 
The impact of this was considerable, for as Gourvish adds 'both episodes 
[organisational structure and shareholders compensation] illustrate an 
important - and alarming element - in the framing of the nationalisation 
proposals. What mattered was political and administrative expediency'.41 
Moreover, Gourvish considered that 'there is no doubt that the combination 
of a hostile private interest and a diffident civil service hindered the process 
37 Millward and Singleton 'The ownership of British industry- an explanation', in Millward 
and Singleton, The Political Economy of Nationalisation, p. 319. 
38 Wilson to MOT on discussion with Hurcomb, 26 November 1945, MT7 4/1. 
39 Wilson to Hurcomb, 27 November 1945, MT7 4/1. 
40 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 25. 
41 Ibid., p. 27. 
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of drafting a complex and wide-ranging bill in a relatively short time' .42 As will 
be argued later, the first point is debatable but the second interpretation is 
accurate, for the government's timetable imposed the requirement to draft in 
rapid succession a series of complex nationalisation bills, all without 
precedent. 
Once the Labour Cabinet had decided upon public ownership for the 
railways, the MOT became pre-occupied with the contents of the long and 
complicated legislation, rather than on detailed planning for the new 
organisation. Investigations into the industry centred on administrative 
matters, not on strategic management. All that seems to have been 
produced was a general statement that a board should be created to run the 
industry both on commercial lines and for the benefit of the community. A 
working party was set up to determine policy on relations between the BTC 
and the Ministry. But the resulting guidelines on state-industry relationships 
proved ineffective, mainly because of lack of precision in defining the 
authority of the Minister in relation to the BTC.43 
Only after the CCSI received reports in January 1948 on managerial 
and financial problems in the coal industry was attention focused on the 
management of large-scale organisations.44 As a result the CCSI examined 
the operational responsibility and specialist management functions of four 
large-scale private companies in the US and UK.45 However, this promising 
line of inquiry was not developed, almost certainly because of a 
preoccupation within the CCSI on remuneration and pensions for members 
42 Ibid., p. 24. 
43 Notes on points of policy for the BTC, MOT 14 August 1947, MT74/193. 
44 CCSI, Taking stock, 29 January 1948, CAB134/689. 
45 CCSI, 20 February 1948, CAB134/689. 
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of the nationalised industry boards, and on the debate surrounding 
nationalisation of the Iron and Steel Industry. Nevertheless, the efficient 
operation of the nationalised industries was subsequently raised with the 
CCSI in July 1949 by a concerned Barnes, the Minister of Transport, when 
reporting the serious financial position of the railways, caused by 
uncontrollable cost increases.46 lt was then becoming apparent that some of 
the Commission's activities could not cover their operating expenses, let 
alone contribute to the servicing of its debt and the general costs of the 
Commission.47 Subsequently, the BTC Financial Comptroller, Reginald 
Wilson, circulated to the CCSI a document on efficiency audits for the 
railways. 48 
All of this focused concern upon efficiency; in other words, it had 
become apparent that nationalisation in itself did not create efficiency. Only 
now, after nationalisation, was there realisation that a full understanding of 
the practical organisation of the railway industry was required. As a result, 
Stafford Cripps (President of the Board of Trade) supplied CCSI members 
with that section of Peter Drucker's book on managing big business which 
related to the management and organisation of General Motors49. Aside 
from the irony of Labour ministers seeking to learn how to make British 
public ownership work by studying an American capitalist firm, this might 
have been a significant development: study of a huge, geographically-
scattered company. However, there is no evidence of further research on 
this issue by the CCSI. Instead, the CCSI appeared to accept that the 
46 CCSI, 27 July 1949, CAB134/690. 
47 Chester, Nationalisation of British Industry, p. 1052. 
48 R. H. H. Wilson, Observations on the Process of Efficiency Audits (London, 1949}. 
49 Cripps to CCSI: Peter Drucker, Big Business (London, 1947), 23 July 1949, CAB134/690. 
39 
problems of the newly nationalised industries were the result of no more 
than 'birth pangs', in the belief that 'experience has shown that it takes a 
very long time to secure efficient management of a large and widely spread 
industry'. 50 Nevertheless it is plain that within a year of the creation of the 
BTC, the CCSI already had serious concerns about its management 
capability and financial condition. 
No adequate and detailed consideration had been given to a suitable 
structure for the governance and management of the railway business 
before the enabling legislation was drafted. This had serious consequences. 
There was no comprehensive assessment of the nature of the business to 
be created, or how to manage it effectively. Nor was there meaningful 
consultation with the directors of the four main-line railway companies, 
probably because Labour ministers and their officials simply assumed that 
integration of these companies would automatically result in greater 
efficiency. As will be shown in later chapters, this was not to be the case, 
and the BTC endured severe management and financial difficulties. 
11 
A central Labour argument for nationalisation was that only under public 
ownership could the necessary reconstruction and modernisation of the 
railways be achieved. But could such rebuilding have been undertaken by 
the existing four main-line railway companies? The directors of those 
companies argued that it could, and indeed that this would have positive 
advantages: retaining the existing structure would avoid the probable 
5° CCSI minute: 'Birth pangs', 29 June 1948, CAB 134/689. 
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difficulties of reorganisation, and allow the reconstruction of the system to be 
better managed. lt was also their contention that 'the railways had served 
the public with distinction in war and peace', and that consequently 'prior to 
proposals for nationalisation being laid before parliament there should be a 
public enquiry on the performance of the railways before an independent 
tribunal'.51 
The railway companies' claimed ability to continue to run the system 
has received little historical enquiry. Assessment of the validity of their 
arguments raises five questions. First, were the railway companies' 
proposals workable? Second, what was the physical state of the railways at 
the point of nationalisation in 1948? Third, could the Big Four have offered 
more effective management and strategic expertise than a public 
corporation? Fourth, what was the railway companies' state of preparedness 
for reconstruction? Fifth, did they possess the financial capability to 
undertake the task? 
As Gourvish points out, 'the railway companies, already in 1941 
alerted by rumours that the government was contemplating nationalisation, 
determined meanwhile to undertake some reconstructive planning of their 
own'.52 As a result, in early 1942 the Railway Companies' Association 53 
established a planning committee, under the chairmanship of Sir Ronald 
Matthews, Chairman of the LNER. Accepting the need for change, its terms 
of reference were to consider how in the future greater operating efficiency 
51 The GWR, LMS, LNER and SR, British Railways and the Future (London, 1946}. 
52 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 20. 
53 This body had a long history and was formally constituted in 1869; it then 
continued in operation until nationalisation in 1948. Its meetings were generally 
attended by the Chairmen of the Big Four, but the expertise of the railway company 
General Managers was also used for its sub-committees. 
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might be achieved under private ownership, and to present realistic 
alternatives to nationalisation. This strategy for post-war reconstruction, 
British Railways and the Future, was published in October 1946, and 
achieved wide dissemination by means of an extensive publicity campaign. 
In addition, a planning commission was set up to undertake research 
into ways to promote co-operation between the main-line companies. The 
result was a series of reports (19 in all), 54 covering a number of 
organisational issues which included among others, concentration of 
merchandise traffic, greater integration between rail services and road 
transport, 55 and further collaboration between the four main-line companies. 
Gourvish is critical of these reports, suggesting that 'the [planning] 
commission's activities proved to be disappointingly superficial', that 'its 
reports could only be rather general and platitudinous in nature', and that 
'they were certainly not the basis for a unified approach to the rationalisation 
of the railway system and the improvement of operating efficiency'.56 These 
verdicts are, however, unduly harsh, not least because the purpose of these 
reports was as much to examine potential ways forward as to provide 
definite proposals. Typical is the report on block train-loads which identified 
scope for further development, 57 but in the event this potentially efficient and 
profitable mode of operation was not fully recognised and developed by the 
BRB until the 1960s. Other reports covered various aspects of railway 
operations including station facilities, the design of marshalling yards and 
54 The reports are in RAIL 1098/29-47. 
55 In January 1939 the railway companies had set up a liaison committee with the Road 
Haulage Association with a view to seeking wider co-ordination between road and rail: see 
RAIL424/27. 
56 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 21. 
57 The Railway Companies' Association Planning Commission's, report on the retention and 
development of block train-loads for coal and other traffics, March 1944, RAIL 1098/41. 
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braking systems. As will be shown later, had the Railway Executive 
embraced such strategic thinking and followed the detailed advice on 
braking systems, considerable savings could have been achieved.58 More to 
the point, these reports offered a great deal more in terms of practical post-
war planning than anything undertaken by either the Labour party or the 
MOT. 
The Railway Companies' Association case against nationalisation 
was based upon the claim that allowing the companies to carry out their 
plans would lead to the development of one of the finest transport systems in 
the world. This was to be achieved by further improving the close working 
relationships established between the Big Four during the war, developing 
greater co-ordination between road and rail traffic, and continuing the high 
levels of investment in permanent way and rolling stock. 59 Attention was also 
drawn to the potential problems inherent in creating a single large-scale 
organisation, in particular the anticipated administrative upheaval, resolution 
of which was likely to be prolonged and difficult. This point was reinforced by 
reference to the protracted integration problems experienced after the 1923 
grouping of the railway companies, 5° when the incorporation of different 
traditions, loyalties and even language proved debilitating to the railway 
companies.61 The arguments against public ownership were expressed 
particularly strongly by the chairmen of the Big Four. Lord Royden, Chairman 
of the London Midland and Scottish Railway (LMS) promised to oppose 
58 These reports are in RAIL 1098/30,39,41 ,42. 
59 British Railways and the Future, conclusion. 
60 The Transport Act of 1921 created regional monopolies in the form of the Big Four by 
amalgamations of numerous smaller companies. 
61 Gerald Crompton, 'The railway companies and the nationalisation issue', in Millward 
and Singleton, Political Economy of Nationalisation, p. 117. 
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nationalisation by all lawful means and emphasised the need for the 
nationalisers to prove their case.62 Colonel Eric Gore-Brown, Chairman of 
the Southern Railway (SR), offered to prove the case for private ownership 
before any impartial committee or commission. 53 These attempts to influence 
events were justified by what Sir Ronald Matthews described as 'a certain 
amount of insidious propaganda going on in high places'.64 In effect, the 
chairmen challenged the government to prove publicly, through an 
independent inquiry, that a better or cheaper service could be provided, or 
that railway employees would be better off under nationalisation. This 
challenge was not taken up. 
The extent of support for the railway companies' campaign has been 
underestimated by some commentators. For example, Addison stated for 
each nationalisation scheme (including that for the railways) that 'the 
argument for state control was as much accepted by businessmen as 
Labour politicians', and that 'the industries concerned were either public 
utilities or ailing concerns of little value to their owners and no interest to 
other capitalists'.65 In contrast Morgan declares that 'from 1947 onwards the 
conventional historian's wisdom that public ownership as proposed in 1945, 
was so broadly accepted that it went through with little opposition or protest 
is clearly in need of much modification'.66 If there was little resistance over 
the coal industry, this was not true of all nationalisations. The railway 
companies not only put up their own fight against public ownership; they also 
obtained strong support from other bodies of industrial employers, including 
62 Times, 2 March 1946, p. 97 0 
63 Times, 8 March 1946, po 4o 
64 Times, 9 March 1946, p. 7 0 
65 Paul Addison, The Road to 1945 (London, 1975), po 2730 
66 Morgan, Labour in Power, po 1070 
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the Road Haulage Association, the National Union of Manufacturers, the 
Association of British Chambers of Commerce and the Federation of British 
Industries. 57 All four bodies opposed nationalisation of inland transport on 
the basis of efficiency, flexibility and cost to the taxpayer. The British 
Chambers of Commerce also pointed to the problems experienced by 
nationalised transport systems in other countries. Its report prophetically 
pointed out that public ownership had invariably led to the accumulation of 
large deficits, the funding of which required significant levels of financial 
support from the taxpayer. 68 
Gourvish is critical of the main-line railway companies for their 
'continuing and generally unconstructive opposition'. 69 Yet conversely he 
concludes that 'a closer involvement by the companies in the drafting 
procedure would almost certainly have produced nothing more than marginal 
changes in the basic organisational framework'.70 As Chester indicates, the 
chairmen of the four companies did meet with Bames on 22 January and 6 
February 1946, but as the government's proposals were in the process of 
being formulated, they understandably chose to wait until the scheme was 
finalised before commenting?1 Their thinking was doubtless coloured by 
their opposition to a single nationalised industry, and after all the chairmen of 
the railway companies were hardly likely to promote the demise of their own 
organisation. The companies fully understood the implications of the 
argument outlined by Chester that 'nationalising various forms of transport 
67 Joint Committee of the Association of British Chambers of Commerce and the Federation 
of British Industries, Post-war Transport (October, 1944). 
66 Association of British Chambers of Commerce, Report on the Nationalisation of Inland 
Transport, 1 May 1946. 
69 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 24. 
70 Ibid., p. 25. 
71 Chester, Nationalisation of British Industry, p. 75. 
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was largely inspired by the virtues claimed for a co-ordinated system'. 72 And 
anyway, the Big Four believed that they were well placed to move towards 
greater co-ordination of transport, and indeed all had significant wider 
transport interests. The companies further believed, correctly as it proved, 
that: 
Total nationalisation involving a complete change of ownership and control will 
create many administrative problems, the solution of which would impede the 
efficient modernisation of the transport system and therefore in the interests of the 
nation only those steps be taken that are necessary to solve the problems with 
which the railway industry is faced today?3 
Barnes was sent an advance copy of British Railways and the Future, which 
outlined how the companies expected to achieve further operating 
improvements. However, he proved unreceptive to any of the ideas 
contained in it, and they remained undeveloped. Even so, a further attempt 
to shape the debate came from the LNER in October 1946 with the 
publication of The State and the Railways: An Alternative to Nationalisation. 
This contained a proposal for a new concept in railway ownership through a 
tenant-and-landlord scheme. The scheme offered a partial nationalisation of 
railway assets without dramatic upheaval from the creation of a new and 
sizeable public corporation: the government would purchase the tracks and 
certain lands, which would then be rented back to the companies. In many 
ways the proposal was ingenious. The government could claim that the 
majority of the railways' assets had been nationalised, and that public 
ownership of the infrastructure would allow wider co-ordination and 
integration of services similar to that experienced during war-time. Yet the 
72 Ibid., p. 392. 
73 Matt hews to Bames, 11 October 1946, MT7 4/167. 
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experience and skills of the higher echelons of management in the main-line 
companies would be retained. The proposal appeared radical, but it was 
hardly new: the early railway companies had anticipated that they would 
operate in the same way as canals and turnpikes, with independent 
concerns supplying their own power and wagons then paying a toll for use of 
the line.74 As can be shown by the operating position of the railways since 
1995, this structure could have proved effective and successful. However, 
the response from Barnes was perhaps predictable: 
Whilst I have always been willing to listen to any proposals that the Railway 
Chairmen might make, I am sure that you will realise that your plan for a partial 
nationalisation which you suggest cannot be accepted as a satisfactory alternative 
to the more comprehensive nationalisation proposals. Nor can I agree that it would 
be workable.75 
Although there was further contact between the railway companies and the 
government, none of it related to the vital issues of the proposed structure 
and organisation of the nationalised railway. In July 1947 the Treasury 
sought information from the LMS on its staffing costs, but this was not for the 
purposes of deeper understanding of its cost base. lt was concerned only 
with calculating changes to Civil Service rates of pay, which required 
comparison with good employers elsewhere?6 In January 1947 Barnes 
sought a meeting with the railway companies' management, but only to 
consider such practical matters of implementation as housing loans to staff, 
pension rights, preservation of records and the repayment of debentures. 
Indeed, in requesting this meeting he stressed that 'no consideration would 
74 Terry Gourvish, Mark Huish and the London and North Western Railway: A study of 
Management (Leicester, 1972), p. 31. 
75 Barnes to Matthews, 15 October 1946, MT7 4/1. 
76 Thompson (Treasury) to LMSR, 8 July 1947, RAIL424/29. 
47 
be given to administration or control of the new public corporation, plans for 
which had by then essentially been completed'?7 Barnes' letter made it clear 
to the railway companies that, despite their strong representations, they 
were to be taken into public ownership, and that they would be allowed no 
influence over the new structure of the industry. In reality, from the outset the 
Labour government had no intention of being deflected from a policy of 
wholesale transport nationalisation, however persuasive the contrary 
arguments. Wilson's draft report of November 1945 on the co-ordination of 
inland transport was unambiguous: 'the Government has made it clear that 
they are not prepared to consider solutions not based on the actual transfer 
of ownership of leading transport agencies either to public corporations or 
the state'?8 From then onwards the focus of attention in the MOT changed 
from consideration of possible alternatives for the transport industry to 
planning its nationalisation. 
Notwithstanding the government's lack of interest, it seems likely that 
the railway companies' alternatives to nationalisation were workable. In the 
first place, wartime experience indicated that greater co-ordination could 
increase the capacity of the four systems. Those systems had after all been 
able to maintain operational capability under intense pressures; and, as will 
be argued below, since the end of the war they had made remarkable 
progress in rebuilding. However, as will also be shown later, rapid economic 
and social changes soon made the capacity argument irrelevant. The LNER 
tenant-and-landlord scheme certainly had merits, as shown by its successful 
operation in other countries and indeed, fifty years later, in Britain itself. 
77 Barnes to Chairmen of the Big Four, 16 January 1947, MT74/93. 
78 Wilson, Draft secret report on the co-ordination of inland transport, 12 November 1945, 
MT74/1. 
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Another important indicator is that in the pursuit of greater operational 
efficiency, the nationalised railways were later reorganised on a regional 
basis, not dissimilar from the structure of the Big Four. Had the railway 
companies' alternative proposals been accepted, it seems likely that the 
management structure of the Big Four would have changed relatively little, 
and many of the debilitating upheavals experienced after nationalisation 
could have been avoided. 
One of the Labour party's key contentions was that the railways were 
so run down that reconstruction was only possible under government 
ownership and control. How valid was this argument? Gourvish is critical of 
the railway companies' financial position, yet accepts that their assets 'were, 
it is generally agreed, in relatively good physical shape in 1939'.79 This 
foundation allowed the Big Four to operate effectively during the war with a 
minimum of maintenance. Crompton may be attempting to 'damn with faint 
praise', when he accepts that 'the railway companies achieved a good deal 
between the grouping and nationalisation, including a respectable standard 
of efficiency in routine operations'. 80 Yet, after six years of war the situation 
had changed owing to damage sustained in the conflict and the inability to 
replace destroyed assets. However, the exact state of the railways' assets 
on vesting day, 1 January 1948, was the subject of some debate. The 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, Hugh Dalton, famously described the railways 
as 'a very poor bag of physical assets'.81 Morrison, as chairman of the CCSI 
and the Minister chiefly responsible for nationalisation, argued that many of 
the assets were decrepit and that public ownership would lead to 
79 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 5. 
8° Crompton, 'The railway companies 1920-50', p. 140. 
81 Dalton, HCDeb431, c. 1809, 17 December 1946. 
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improvements in facilities for passengers as well as offer more effective 
management: 
The country will have a splendid opportunity to wield an efficient instrument to meet 
its transport needs. The new concern will be absolutely free to go for sheer 
efficiency right from the beginning and use assets in a way that is best. They will be 
able to write off those miserable rolling stocks in which the middle and lower 
classes have to travel. 82 
How valid are these contentions? Matthews' immediate response to 
Morrison's assertion was to institute a media campaign to defend the railway 
companies' position on the basis that the statistics used were simply 
inaccurate, and that much modernisation had been postponed owing to the 
use of railway workshops for essential war production.83 Furthermore, it can 
be argued that there was a weakness or inappropriateness in the criteria 
used to judge the effectiveness of railway performance and management. 
As Crompton wrote, 'for many critics of the inter-war railway companies one 
of the most appropriate criteria of their financial soundness, managerial 
resourcefulness and commitment to modernisation is their record on 
electrification'.84 This was true of Morrison, for since the Weir Report of 
1931 85 he had consistently advocated electrification as vital for the railways. 
This view was also apparent within the MOT, as indicated by the frequent 
references to electrification in reports on modernisation.86 Yet the common 
comparison with European experience was inappropriate, for there the 
stimulus was either the availability of cheap hydro-electric power and limited 
82 Morrison, HCDeb 431, c. 2076, 18 December 1946. 
83 Times, 24 December 1946, p. 2. 
84 Crompton, 'The railway companies 1920-50', p. 125. 
85 The Weir Committee produced a systematic analysis of the case for comprehensive 
electrification of the railways. 
86 In particular in the secret reports produced between 1943-45 in MT7 4/1 . 
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indigenous fuel supplies, or the provision of government finance. Moreover, 
as will be shown later, when the West Coast main-line was eventually 
electrified, the complexity of its construction and the associated massive 
costs supported the railway companies' arguments that the anticipated low 
returns to many of the electrification schemes made little commercial 
sense.87 According to Leslie Hannah, British railway electrification went as 
far as other countries which did not have the benefit of hydro-electric 
power. 88 Even today much of the railway network has not been electrified 
owing to its high cost and anticipated low returns to capital. 
After a long and destructive war during which maintenance was 
minimal, by 1945 the railways certainly needed massive reconstruction and 
modernisation. This process began almost immediately after the end of the 
war, but progress was constrained by austerity measures. Even so, much 
was achieved between 1945 and nationalisation, with the effect that the 
position was not as extreme as that stated by Morrison. An examination of 
Labour's Cabinet Investment Programme Committee (CIPC) undermines the 
view that the railways were so depleted that only government action could 
resolve the issue. In 1947 investment on permanent way, works and 
structures reached £42·2m, which compared well with the proposed £50·2m 
for the nationalised industry in 1952.89 In addition, the 1948 review of rolling 
stock noted that only 40% of locomotives, 24% of wagons, and 28% of 
passenger coaches were more than 35 years old.90 Given that the design life 
of most rolling stock was a minimum of 40 years, and given also the impact 
B
7 Crompton offers more detail on the debate in: 'The railway companies 1920-50', p. 131. 
BB Leslie Hannah, Electricity before Nationalisation {London, 1979), p. 46. 
B
9 CIPC, Railway Investment 8 April1948, CAB134/439. 
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of war and the understandably severe post-war restrictions, such a record 
appears highly creditable. This view was supported by the Railway 
Executive in its initial Five Year Plan (1948-52) which stated that: 
lt is neither practicable nor indeed necessary to replace all rolling stock over 35 
years of age. There are for example many locomotives over 35 years of age 
engaged on shunting and other work where replacement could not be justified even 
under normal conditions. 91 
Even the Cabinet Investment Programme Committee concluded that there 
was not such an absolute deficiency of capacity on the railways as there was 
in other sectors, and that no irreparable harm would result from a reduced 
locomotive building programme.92 The actual position of the railways was 
less critical than it might appear from ministerial statements, plainly intent on 
justifying their nationalisation plans. 
A further key element of the railway companies' argument against 
nationalisation was that it would require an even more comprehensive 
reorganisation than that experienced in 1923. Yet the Labour government 
confidently anticipated that the newly-created public corporation would not 
just re-organise and reconstruct the railway network, but also, 
simultaneously, undertake the re-organisation and co-ordination of all inland 
transport. The Big Four companies' plans for their own retention would 
plainly have reduced the burden of re-organisation; but could they have 
successfully managed the formidable task of reconstruction and 
modernisation? 
The railway companies certainly appreciated that reconstruction had 
to incorporate modernisation, the implementation of which could only be 
91 The Railway Executive, 'British Railways and the Future', 12 October 1946, MT7 4/1. 
92 CIPC, Investment Programme for 1949: Conclusions p. 23, 16 July 1948, CAB134/439. 
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achieved through detailed planning. The LNEA was typical of the Big Four in 
preparing a comprehensive plan for rebuilding its infrastructure and rolling 
stock, taking into account the problems of post-war shortages. As early as 
1942 a planning committee had been established under the chairmanship of 
the then LNEA Assistant General Manager, 0. H. Corble. Its remit was to 
make proposals on LNEA development after the war, on the basis that it 
would be capable of dealing with traffics of all description in an efficient and 
economic manner. By September 1943 a highly detailed plan had been 
prepared covering air transport, docks, goods terminals, marshalling yards 
and rolling stock. A notable feature was its preference for electrification of 
its high-density lines, listing and costing a number of schemes, including all 
suburban lines into London and from there to Leeds. Perceptively, the 
report also identified the need to counteract road competition by increasing 
the speed of services generally, and consequently proposed that the whole 
character of the operating timetables should be reconsidered and 
reconstructed.93 This plan was further developed at regular meetings of the 
North Eastern Development Area Committee in York from August 1943, to 
consider implementation, review the necessary reconstruction works, and 
assist in deciding on investment priorities.94 
This LNEA plan was not untypical of the Big Four companies. The SA 
was also active in preparing for the post-war position with its 'Proposed 
Extension of Electrification',95 and its plan for 'Electrification and Future 
Development'.96 The SA plans advocated electrification of all the principal 
93 LNER Post-War Development, 8 February 1944, RAIL390/1221. 
94 LNER (NE) Post-war Development Committee, 6 August 1943, RAIL390/2040. 
95 Southern Railway, Proposed Extension of Electrification (1944), RAIL 1188/292. 
96 Southern Railway, Electrification and Future Development (1945), RAIL 1188/290. 
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routes east of a line from Reading to Portsmouth, with all branch lines 
operated by diesel. 97 The SA report found that extensions to electrification 
required high levels of investment, but prophetically warned of the almost 
'prohibitive cost of overhead wiring', 98 owing to high installation and 
continuing maintenance costs. lt calculated that its third-rail system cost less 
than half that of overhead wiring to install, and also created less operating 
problems. Perversely, the BTC was only to discover these facts after its 
highly expensive and problematic West Coast electrification was well under 
way in 1961. In addition, after a fact-finding party toured North America to 
study the advances in diesel traction, the SA ordered three main-line diesel 
locomotives of 1 ,600hp in 1947 (although in the event they were not 
delivered until1950).99 Similarly, on the LMS before and during the war 
there had been an emphasis on developing a centralised management 
structure and incorporating technical research within it.100 lt is likely that this 
development contributed to the LMS planning for dieselisation through the 
production of two prototype diesel locomotives at Derby works in 1947. Even 
the conservative GWR accepted the need for modernisation and decided to 
follow the Swiss railways and experiment with gas-turbine powered 
locomotives. 
lt can be seen that the private railway companies had a clear 
understanding, not simply of the need to embrace modernisation, but the 
directions in which it should proceed. However, the lesson appeared to have 
97 Crompton, 'The railway companies 1920-50', p. 128. 
98 Proposed Extension of Electrification, p. 29. 
99 Anonymous 'Sir Eustace's diesels', British Railways Illustrated, 7 (1998), p. 156-163. 
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been lost on the nationalised Railway Executive. During the whole of its 
existence from 1948 to 1953, it did not order one main-line diesel 
locomotive, and instead expensively perpetuated outdated steam 
technology. Indeed it can be argued that the railway companies' state of 
preparedness for modernisation was unmatched by anything the BTC 
produced before 1955. This deficiency in strategic planning was the result of 
the BTC prioritising the creation of a massive and complex new organisation, 
and raising finance to develop its road transport undertakings. While these 
understandably took priority over railway modernisation, this lost opportunity 
for development was to have significant repercussions. lt was seven years 
after nationalisation before the railways produced a comprehensive blueprint 
for modernisation and development in its Modernisation Plan of 1955. Even 
that effort proved to be superficial, inadequately produced, and poorly 
implemented. In contrast the LNER had by 1945 produced a well prepared 
and highly detailed plan to commence modernisation. 
A final issue in assessing the railway companies' readiness for post-
war reconstruction and modernisation was their financial condition. However, 
a full understanding of the position in 1948 requires comparison with 1938 
and the likely impact of any reversion to full private ownership. According to 
Crompton, the problems of declining traffic and falling receipts during the 
inter-war years created a position of reduced returns to capital to such an 
extent that 'this was a financial performance which inevitably put the future 
independence of the railways in some jeopardy'.101 This conclusion may be 
valid for normal business operations, but allowance should be made for the 
101 Crompton, 'The railway companies 1920-50', p. 125. 
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unusual structure of the railway companies' assets and their depreciation 
practices. Charges for depreciation were made for moveable assets only; for 
land, buildings, permanent way and other works, revenue was only charged 
when an asset was replaced, and those charges were included with 
maintenance expenditure and not readily identifiable in the accounts. 102 As 
so many assets were long-lasting (even today a high proportion of railway 
infrastructure was built during Victorian times), the railway companies were 
able to mitigate the impact of any reduced revenue in a way not available to 
other commercial operations. 
Even so there was a problem for the railway companies from 
restrictions on their revenue, Gourvish estimates that this fell by nearly 25% 
in 1938, and then concluded that 'although the trade depression was 
primarily responsible the railways put some of the blame on the 
government's one-sided control of freight traffic charges' .103 The railway 
companies argued that their financial position had been undermined by 
legislation which imposed a common carrier obligation and the requirement 
to publish all of its rates, and which restricted their ability to increase charges 
in line with increased costs. An attempt had been made to redress the 
perceived unfairness of these restrictions through the Square Deal 
Campaign. This proposal was submitted to the MOT in 1938,104 and then 
passed through the required bureaucratic procedures including the 
Transport Advisory Council, which supported the change. However, the start 
of the war halted further action and new financial arrangements were 
102 MOT memo (undated), MT124/41. 
103 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 2. 
104 Co-ordination of goods transport 1939, Appendix 1, Railway Square Deal Proposals, 
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imposed on the railway companies. During the latter stages of the war it had 
become obvious to the railway companies that they urgently needed to 
formulate alternative financial strategies for the future. lt had also become 
clear that a return to the pre-war position was most unlikely, and that the end 
of the war would lead to the end of the financial arrangements embodied in 
the Railway Control Agreement. The railway companies' ideal was for the 
government to allow greater commercial freedom, similar to that proposed in 
the pre-war Square Deal Campaign. However, this possibility appeared 
remote in the light of the statement from Lord Leathers, Minister of War 
Transport, in 1943: 
I do not believe that the Square Deal proposals put forward by the railway 
companies before the war will by themselves solve the problem. In my view these 
proposals fail to reach the root of the problem and both the Transport Advisory 
Council and the then Ministry of Transport regarded them as merely stop gap 
arrangements. Even if it should be proper in the post war circumstances to proceed 
with the Square Deal proposals, I am firmly convinced that some more radical 
solution has to be found although I am not as yet able to bring forward any precise 
suggestions.105 
In addition to complaining about the impact of pre-war controls, the 
railway companies argued that their financial difficulties were exacerbated by 
the nation not fully paying for their contribution to the war effort. Companies 
in other sectors, particularly in road transport, earned substantial profits 
during the war-time boom in demand for transport, because the terms of the 
Price of Goods Act allowed them to increase prices to reflect cost increases, 
and many did so. The railway companies, however, were not covered by that 
Act, for they were in effect financially controlled by the government under the 
105 Leathers, HCDeb 129, c. 384, 27 October 1943. 
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Railway Control Agreement. Gourvish argues that 'much of the 
contemporary grumbling about the war-time agreement and its effects came 
from an industry which had accepted, all too readily, the opportunity to 
exchange the uncertainty of war-time profits for the security of a guaranteed 
net revenue and maintenance fund'.106 Yet the fact is that the railway 
companies had felt coerced into accepting the control agreement, because 
they believed that otherwise the government would have imposed a form of 
nationalisation on them. Although the companies were dissatisfied with 
these financial arrangements, it was clear from the attitude of Sir John Reith, 
Minister of Transport in October 1940, that there was little possibility of 
change, for he informed the chairmen of the Big Four that under the wartime 
position 'they had no reasons for existence other than the payment of 
dividends etc'.107 The railway companies' frustration with this position 
increased markedly when a revised scheme was imposed on them in 1941. 
Their response was 'dismay at the new arrangements'; they 'considered the 
previous ones were barely satisfactory but these are so much worse'.108 
These new arrangements comprised a system whereby receipts were 
pooled, with £43m going to the railways and revenue between that sum and 
£68 million shared between the government and the companies, although 
they were restricted to a maximum of £51 m.109 All revenue over £68m was to 
go to the government, and the costs of war damage were to be charged to 
working expenses. This effectively blocked the railway companies' 
opportunity to build up a reserve fund to finance post-war reconstruction. 
106 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 4. 
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Despite the companies' opposition, no changes to the scheme could be 
negotiated, and it was retained for the remainder of the war and for some 
time after. The result, as GoUivish points out, was that, 'the government's 
financial arrangements with the railways have been strongly criticised by 
some historians, not only for the restriction on company profits but also for 
the freeze in charges' .110 This is understandable given that in 1941-5 the 
railways earned £412·6m, equivalent to a decade of pre-war profits, but that 
£195·3m or 47% was retained by the Treasury. 111 In addition, the 
government restricted increases to charges during the war and for some 
time after. Wilson calculated that between 1941 and 1945 charges increased 
by 16%%,112 while the Railway Gazette estimated that the average increase 
in railway costs had reached 80% by June 1947.113 The companies were 
allowed modest increases in 1946 and 1947, but even then Gourvish 
estimates that charges were only 55% above the pre-war level.114 The 
railway companies' potential earnings were therefore subjected to a highly 
restrictive regime from the government before, during, and after the war, and 
this damaged their ability to pursue post-war investment to the level they 
wished. 
In addition, there were problems over that part of the Railway Control 
Agreement concerned with war damage, something which should have 
brought the companies some financial assistance. Gourvish outlines what 
he considered to be the two over-riding assumptions implicit in MOT thinking 
in 1943: 'first that the government's accumulating trust fund would be 
110 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 3. 
111 lbid., p. 3. 
112 Wilson to Hill25 October 1945, MT74/1. 
113 Railway Gazette, 15 August 1947. 
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sufficient to meet the bill for replacement at future cost, and, second that 
there were advantages in deferring expenditure in order that it might be 
geared more closely to post-war transport needs and motive power 
policy.'115 
Hurcomb's memos make this perspective clear: 
In restoring the status quo ante bellum, the large sums which have accumulated in 
the maintenance trust fund set up under the Railway Control Agreement together 
with other monies (including war damage compensation) will amount to £150 million 
or more. Whilst much will be needed for ordinary maintenance it is difficult to think 
that the whole or even the major part of this sum need or should be devoted to 
renew the physical assets as they existed in 1939.116 
However, what Gourvish does not stress is the thinking implicit in Hurcomb's 
second memorandum: that the political establishment and 'we', the MOT, not 
the railway companies, would decide on the direction of future expenditure 
financed by the trust fund: 
I have already drawn attention in a previous memo to the very large sums which will 
be available to the railway companies for renewals and overtaking of arrears of 
maintenance. They ought not to be spent merely restoring the status quo ante 
bellum but they should be carefully applied to the system of transport which we 
desire to see established in the future. 117 
This thinking clearly influenced the tardiness with which payments were 
made to the railway companies. From 1945 to 1947 only limited funds from 
the scheme were made available to them, though these sums were quickly 
and effectively used to finance the rebuilding of their systems. The final 
agreement on the level and payment of compensation for war damage was 
115 Ibid., p. 4. 
116 Secret report from Hurcomb, 'The nature of proposals for a public utility corporation', 
July 1943, MT74/1. 
117 Hurcomb, Inland transport, Post-war Policy 15 August 1943, MT74/1. 
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only reached after nationalisation, in prolonged negotiations from March to 
July 1948 involving Hurcomb (now BTC chairman), Wilson, and the 
Treasury. The final agreed figure of £36m was well below the amount 
anticipated by the companies, and suggests that the Treasury's view had 
prevailed.118 lt is likely that if nationalisation had not occurred, the railway 
companies would have sought a considerably larger sum, which if realised 
would have made a substantial contribution towards the reconstruction and 
modernisation of their undertakings. Indeed, it is possible that the financial 
implications of payment of substantial war-damage compensation 
contributed to the hurried pace of nationalisation of the railways. In the event 
Hurcomb presided over much of what the railways received from the trust 
fund, but the effectiveness of this expenditure proved debatable, particularly 
in relation to motive power policy. 
lt has been argued that the railway companies formulated what they 
believed to be realistic and workable alternatives to nationalisation, and that 
they continued the fight to retain their independence until the Transport Bill 
of 1947 was largely complete. That they were unsuccessful in their aim does 
not detract from the argument that continued private ownership did offer a 
feasible alternative to nationalisation. The Big Four were well-established 
companies which possessed the requisite managerial skills and experience 
to handle the changes demanded in the new post-war world. Had the 
companies been free to price their services before and during the war, and if 
they had been properly recompensed for war damage, they might have 
118 War damage claims were paid under the War Damage (Public Utility Undertakings) Act 
1949, MT47/263. 
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possessed the necessary financial reserves to continue operating in the long 
term. However, in the absence of these resources Crompton concludes that: 
Except on improbable conditions (generous State assistance and tight restrictions 
on road transport) private ownership could not have offered the railways much of a 
future after 1945. Investment programmes on the scale actually realised in the 
1950s and 1960s would not have been feasible outside the public sector.119 
Gourvish explains why: by 1938 the railway companies faced severe 
financial difficulties; net revenue had fallen by nearly 25%, the return on 
capital expenditure was a meagre 2·88%, and the economies of scale 
envisaged by the 1923 amalgamations were never fully realised. 120 After the 
war economic pressures became even greater, with the railway companies' 
net earnings falling from £62·5m in 1945 to only £32·5 in 1946.121 Given 
these financial pressures, continued private ownership could have continued 
only if a Labour government had been prepared to offer large scale 
subsidies and the cartelisation of railway operations. Unsurprisingly this was 
not considered. Rather the political rhetoric emanating from the Labour party 
indicated that there was only one way forward, and after the election of 
1945, proposals for the nationalisation of the railways proceeded rapidly and 
without adequate consultation. 
Ill 
The historical literature accepts that the institutional arrangements 
formulated for the railways by the Cabinet Committee for the Socialisation of 
119 Gerald Crompton, 'Good Business for the Nation' The Railway Nationalisation Issue 
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Industry resulted in serious problems of management and operation. As 
events were to prove two inter-related questions created serious problems of 
management and operation, and which might have been resolved with more 
detailed consideration and consultation. The first concerned the 
management structure and the likely influence of the division of authority by 
function. Second was a more complex issue: the status and functions of the 
BTC, the executives and the Minister, and the relations between them. 
The management structure imposed under the 1947 legislation 
created the BTC which comprised: an overarching body the Commission, 
and separate executives for the Railways, Road Haulage, Docks and Inland 
Waterways, and Hotels. This structure encountered serious difficulties owing 
to the conflicting approaches of the Commission and the Railway Executive. 
As Gourvish asserts 'lt may indeed be argued that the organisational 
framework of the Commission and Executives was selected in the full 
knowledge that it was likely to prejudice the co-ordinating aim'. 122 Bonavia 
adds that 'the differences in outlook by the British Transport Commission 
and the Railway Executive were of course fundamental'. 123 Similarly, Pollins 
concluded that the creation of the BTC and separate executives 'was a 
rather curious structure for an organisation whose function was to operate 
an integrated transport system'. 124 
Quite why this structure was established has received little 
consideration, but an examination of the legislation and CCSI records offers 
some explanations. By contemporary standards the 1947 Transport Act was 
a considerable and complicated piece of legislation, owing to the extent of 
122 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 27. 
123 Bonavia, Organisation of British Railways, p. 54. 
124 Harold Pollins, Britain's Railways, an Industrial History (Newton Abbott, 1971 ), p. 168. 
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the railway companies' assets, the number of companies involved, and the 
complexity of its administrative arrangements. Moreover, 'the problem of 
handling the Transport Bill in Committee was aggravated by the fact that the 
Electricity Bill was proceeding through another Standing Committee only 
three weeks behind' .125 
The extent of the assets involved was detailed by Barnes in the third 
reading of the Transport Bill: 
There will be transferred to public ownership some 60 railway undertakings, 52,000 
miles of track, 1 ,200,000 wagons, 45,000 passenger coaches, 20,000 locomotives, 
25,000 horse drawn vehicles, 70 hotels and 50,000 houses which represent the 
main properties of the railway companies. The British Transport Commission shall 
provide or support or secure the provision of an adequate, economical and properly 
integrated system of public transport and port facilities within Great Britain for 
passengers and goods with due regard to safety of operation. The Commission's 
services shall all form one undertaking which shall levy such fares, rated dues and 
other charges as to secure revenue which is not less than for the meeting of 
charges properly chargeable to revenue taking one year with another.126 
This extensive quantity and wide range of assets was one of the major 
factors which contributed to the production of a bill which was over-ambitious 
in its scope and poorly constructed. Yet this is hardly surprising given the 
pressures on ministers and parliament, when a total of 84 bills were passed 
in 1946.127 The Transport Bill was so extensive that after 11 sittings at the 
Committee stage, only the first 5 clauses had been dealt with and the 
government introduced an Allocation of Time order which fixed limits to the 
extent of discussion. The result was that 36 of 128 clauses and 10 of the 15 
schedules were either not discussed in Standing Committee, or else 
125 Chester, Nationalisation of British Industry, p. 58. 
126 Bames, HCDeb437, c. 36,5 May 1947. 
127 Bemard Donoughue and G. W. Jones, Herbert Morrison, Portrait of a Politician 
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64 
discussion was curtailed.128 The Economist commented that entire sections 
of the Bill had been given no detailed discussion and 'the words originally 
employed by the parliamentary draftsmen occasionally modified by the 
second thoughts of the Minister, seem at present to become law' .129 This 
lack of discussion contributed to what Gourvish described as one of the most 
disturbing features of the legislative process surrounding nationalisation.130 
A related issue, the extent of opposition in parliament to railway 
nationalisation, is the subject of some debate. Addison suggests that 
Conservative opposition was only 'token' .131 In contrast, Morgan states that 
the Conservative opposition 'fought the Transport Bill hard in the 
Commons' .132 Chester indicates that while transport nationalisation was not 
as strongly contested as the later iron and steel industry, there was still a 
difficult climate of opinion for the government. Indeed the tabling of 1 ,809 
amendments to the original bill hardly represents token opposition.133 
Although many of the amendments related to compensation for railway 
company shareholders and road transport (particularly contentious was the 
issue of 'C' licences), 134 one impact was the failure to create a state 
transport monopoly. The 1947 Transport Act nationalised those parts of 
transport most easily dealt with (railways, docks, canals and railway interests 
in road transport) with the remaining parts left to be acquired later. While 
some, including road haulage, were acquired, many were not, including a 
number of municipally-owned transport undertakings. Many local authorities 
128 Chester, Nationalisation of British Industry, p. 56. 
129 Economist, 12 April1947, p. 545. 
130 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 28. 
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fought against the loss of these locally owned and controlled transport 
activities and were encouraged, ironically enough, by the lead given by 
Labour-controlled Newcastle.135 This failure to create a transport monopoly 
resulted in an emphasis by the BTC - at the expense of other issues - on 
the process of acquisition of road haulage. Overall, the inadequate 
opportunity for detailed scrutiny and revision of the legislation almost 
certainly contributed to the difficulties which will be considered in later 
chapters. 
Much of the responsibility for the weaknesses in the industry structure 
created in the legislation can be ascribed to the Cabinet Committee for the 
Socialisation of Industry. This seems to have been ill equipped to cope with 
the extent of the demands placed upon it. 136 According to Morgan, 'it was a 
relatively tranquil and harmonious body',137 and once decisions were made 
on creation of the new public corporations, they were rarely reviewed or 
refined as the legislation was drafted. After May 1946 there is no evidence 
of discussion on the proposed transport legislation; instead the Committee 
concentrated on the iron and steel and civil aviation industries. Nor is there 
evidence that the Cabinet introduced any changes to the CCSI proposals, 
perhaps not surprising given the huge volume of minutes and memoranda it 
received from the numerous committees and working parties. The decision-
making structure of the Labour government eventually numbered no fewer 
than 157 Cabinet standing committees, and 306 ad hoc ones, with economic 
policy dealt with by the Lord President's Committee, supplemented from 
135 Bonavia, Organisation of British Railways, p. 42. 
136 The Committee comprised: Morrison, Cripps (President of the Board of Trade), Shinwell 
(Minister of Fuel and Power), Barnes (Minister of War Transport), Wilmot (Minister of 
Supply) and Lord Winster (Minister of Civil Aviation). 
137 Morgan, Labour in Power, p. 110. 
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January 1946 by the Ministerial Committee on Economic Planning which 
Morgan considers was 'a failure'.138 
This lack of rigorous examination and debate in CCSI deliberations 
was to produce some significant consequences. One was that proceedings 
were dominated by Morrison. His influence was most significant and 
substantial not simply because he was chairman, but also because he was 
the Labour party's expert on London government, transport and electricity, 
with much of his experience gained during his tenure of office as Minister of 
Transport from 1929 to 1931. His ideas were used to a great extent as a 
template for developing the structure and management of the new public 
corporations, and his experience with the establishment of the LPTB was to 
influence strategy for their formation. Morrison claimed that he had been 
able to resolve the issue of London Transport in terms of business, 
organisation and technical management, 139 and he believed that it was a 
straightforward matter to do the same for the railways. This proved an 
optimistic assumption with far-reaching impacts. 
There were other significant transport issues which could have 
benefited from proper examination and debate in the CCSI. These related to 
a key CCSI member, Alfred Barnes, the Minister of Transport. According to 
Christopher Mayhew (Morrison's PPS), he in common with other non-cabinet 
ministers was dominated by Morrison.140 Possibly because of this he 
became intransigent on a series of issues, with important consequences for 
the BTC's future. The first was his opposition to the proposal for the creation 
of an all-embracing National Transport Commission- a unitary body 
138 Ibid., p. 49. 
139 Morrison, Socialisation and Transport, p. 1 05. 
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responsible for both policy and operational decisions. At a key meeting on 
transport policy soon after Labour assumed office, Barnes insisted on a 
division of authority in transport on the basis that otherwise 'an organisation 
would be created that would be more powerful than the Ministry of Transport 
itself' .141 As a result, it was decided that two tiers of management should be 
created. A commission -the BTC - would be the controlling, policy-making, 
and co-ordinating body for all forms of inland transport. Below this would be 
executive boards for the various sectors of transport. For the railways, 
departmental and operational functions were to be vested in the Railway 
Executive, charged with the reorganisation and management of the 
railways. 142 This two-tier structure therefore embraced a functional mode of 
operation, rather than the regional structure of the Big Four. Events were to 
prove the weaknesses of this approach in such a big and geographically 
spread organisation, and ultimately railway organisation reverted to a 
geographical basis, reminiscent of the Big Four. Furthermore, as already 
indicated, this functional approach with distinct operating authority for 
particular sectors of transport was unlikely to lead to what for many was the 
whole point of the exercise - transport integration. 
Barnes was instrumental in a second issue with significant 
repercussions: appointments to the RE. Originally the general opinion had 
been that the Minister of Transport would appoint members of the BTC, 
which would then appoint the RE: consequently RE members would be 
subordinate to the BTC. Yet Barnes was insistent that he should appoint the 
members of both the BTC and the executives, a move which as Wilson 
141 Minutes of meeting on transport policy, 8 October 1945, MT74/1. 
142 CCSI minutes, 6 January 1947, CAB134/688. . 
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pointed out to Bames 'involved a fundamental alteration to the conception of 
the [Transport] Bill and it would be odd to make the BTC responsible for 
transport generally then deprive them of the appointment of their chief 
executives' .143 However, this was unacceptable to Barnes, despite warnings 
that his appointment of RE members would give them a status which might 
lead to tension between the two bodies. His argument contained two key 
contentions. Firstly, the functions of the RE were so important that the 
Minister had to retain the power of appointment, 144 and that any anticipated 
problems would be dissolved because 'the personal authority, influence and 
interests of the members of the Commission would manifest itself in matters 
of policy', with the result that it would be able to 'insist upon the co-ordination 
of the different forms of transport if any separatist tendencies should display 
themselves in the Executive'.145 Second, Barnes argued the importance of 
placating the trades unions, who were apprehensive about the BTC 
appointing members of the RE because they feared this would lead to 
dominance by technical experts at the expense of workers' representatives. 
In June 1947 discussion in the MOT Standing Committee on the 
Transport Bill146 saw Hurcomb and Wilson argue that as an administrative 
principle (in the Act the Minister's powers related to the BTC, not the 
Executives which were agents of the Commission), 147 and for the 
constitutional position of the Minister with regard to control of a nationalised 
industry, the Commission be allowed to appoint its Executive. In a stormy 
meeting, Bames disagreed and informed Hurcomb and Wilson that it was 
143 Wilson to Hurcomb, 28 October 1946, MT7 4/19. 
144 CCSI minutes, 21 March 1947, CAB134/688. 
145 CCSI minutes, 6 January 1947, CAB134/688. 
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not part of an official's function to impose their will upon the Minister.148 The 
argument continued even after a House of Commons amendment to the Bill 
had returned nomination of the RE to the BTC.149 Bames remained 
intransigent, despite strong and persistent exhortations from Morrison and 
the Cabinet. Their concern centred on the extent of authority of the Minister 
and his interaction with the Executive. However, Bames eventually won his 
point, and the second schedule of the Transport Bill was altered to support 
his view- with the minor concession that the Minister should consult the 
BTC before making appointments to the RE. As will be shown later, Bames' 
confidence that these arrangements would not cause difficulties was 
misplaced. From the outset competition developed between the two bodies 
and this resulted in relations becoming strained and ineffective, with 
damaging consequences for the whole railway management. Eventually, in 
1953, the problem had to be solved by the abolition of the RE. 
The government also failed to anticipate another problem over 
appointments. lt was quickly discovered that attracting able candidates was 
difficult because of the relatively low salaries offered, and because the 
boards would operate under conditions of public scrutiny, and in all 
likelihood, criticism. According to the CCSI, 'it was difficult to secure the 
services of many individuals who would otherwise have been well qualified 
for the appointment' .150 This is a good example of a problem which might 
have been avoided by consultation with the directors of the railway 
companies, and by consideration of alternative arrangements. 
148 Wilson, file note N118/4, 15 July 1947, MT74/99. 
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Barnes was also central to the debate on worker participation. At a 
meeting on 24 September 1946, the three railway unions asked him to make 
appointments from within their ranks to the BTC. Given the socialist 
expectations raised by Labour party statements, the trade unions' financial 
support both for the party and for many individual Labour MPs, this was 
hardly surprising. As far as a nationalised transport industry was concerned, 
the NUR for instance considered that workers participation in its 
management was an indispensable requisite for the success of a publicly 
owned transport industry.151 This view was not shared by Barnes and his 
cabinet colleagues, who saw the future nationalised industry operating on 
commercial grounds for the benefit of the community.152 As a result they 
prevaricated, arguing a need for further consultation. After a long and drawn-
out process, the proposal for union appointments to the BTC was rejected. 
This was repeated in other nationalised industries: of the 87 
appointments to the nationalised industries' boards, only seven were trades 
unionists. The railway trade unions understandably felt a sense of dismay, 
with the appointments of W. P. (Bill) Alien, General Secretary of ASLEF, to 
the RE, and John Benstead, General Secretary of the NUR, to the BTC, 
being considered as nowhere near sufficient. 
The chief indication of an effort towards a more democratic working 
environment was the guidelines on labour relations issued to the 
nationalised boards. These included a pretentious requirement that these 
labour relations should be a 'model for the rest of industry', and the hardly 
revolutionary injunction that they should move towards 'developing a full 
151 NUR AGM, 1946, Bagwell, The Railwaymen, p. 623. 
152 Notes on Points of Policy for the BTC, 14 August 1947, MT74/193. 
71 
system of joint consultation at alllevels'. 153 The hollowness of such 
statements had an important impact and according to Bagwell, by 1951, 
many railwaymen were disillusioned with the results of nationalisation, 
because they lacked any sense that they had an important voice in the 
industry, or even that railway management was a matter of concern for 
them.154 
Fundamental to effective operation of the nationalised industries was 
their relationship with government, but here there was obfuscation. The 
CCSI anticipated that the BTC would have a substantial degree of 
independence from government, something it considered vital to their 
efficiency as a commercial undertaking. lt was decided that although the 
Minister had a responsibility for the general efficiency of the board, there 
was no responsibility for day-to-day administration.155 Conversely, Section 
Four of the 1947 Act stated that the Minister could intervene directly in 
railway management when required in the national interest, and that the 
BTC could be used as an instrument of general economic policy. Exactly 
how those conflicting requirements were to be interpreted and reconciled 
could not be established, despite considerable discussion in the Cabinet and 
the CCSI. A highly important issue was simply not clarified; instead Barnes 
brought the debate to an end with the statement 'that with good sense on 
both sides there is no reason to anticipate due difficulty'.156 Subsequently, 
this lack of clear demarcation between the Minister of Transport and the BTC 
153 Memo to CCSI from Minister of Labour and National Service (lsaacs), 12 November 
1947, CAB134/2247. 
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156 General Considerations on relations between Ministers and BTC, 14 October 1947, 
MT74/194. 
72 
created considerable difficulties for both. Yet this position contrasted with the 
electricity industry, for according to Hannah, although the relationship 
between Ministers and the new Electricity Boards was 'not rigidly specified, 
but large powers of fuel power coordination, and of oversight of finance and 
general policy were given to the Minister. He could use these to intervene on 
virtually any aspect of policy'. 157 Had this approach been adopted for the 
railways, conflict surrounding a number of issues might have been avoided. 
There was, then, both an absence of meaningful dialogue between 
the government and the railway industry, and a lack of adequate enquiry on 
the most effective and practical institutional arrangements for the railway 
industry. Two factors inhibited consideration of effective management 
structures. First was the belief that public ownership by itself would resolve 
many problems, particularly labour issues. Yet, paradoxically, 
nationalisation initially made labour relations less, rather than more, 
harmonious. In no small part this was an effect of increased expectations 
among the labour force, beguiled by such statements from Morrison who 
visualised public ownership 'not as restrictive, repressive and damping', but 
as 'constructive, enlivening and animating'. Morrison's alternative to the 
'comfortable complacent decay' of the monopoly was the socialised industry 
which was stated to offer 'life, adventure, progresses'.158 
The second factor was the speed and manner by which the CC SI 
formulated the nationalisation scheme, without adequate review by the 
Cabinet. Pressure on time precluded extended debate, with the result that 
the legislation was hastily drafted and key questions not properly addressed. 
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Political considerations dominated at the expense of serious attention to the 
organisational structure, with effects that were almost certainly instrumental 
in creating the later deficiencies in railway management. lt might even be 
suggested that the management structure of the Big Four would have 
proved more effective than the BTC in modernising British Railways. 
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CHAPTER 2 
OPERATION UNDER THE LABOUR GOVERNMENTS 1948-51 
Nationalisation represented a new epoch in transport history that marked an end to 
the phase of a controversy which has raged, sometimes intermittently, but with 
increasing strength since the beginning of the First World War. Although the step 
has been taken, it by no means follows that all controversy has ended. 
(Editorial, Railway Gazette, 2 January 1948, p. 1.) 
Although an extensive literature exists on the state of the post-war economy 
and on Attlee's government's response to the series of crises which 
threatened to engulf it, as Morgan has observed the literature on the Attlee 
administrations is 'in grave danger of retreating from reality into the half 
world of legend and fantasy' .1 Moreover, in many instances where the 
nationalised industries have been studied, the focus has been on the 
political, economic and social reasons for nationalisation, rather than on the 
actual operation of the nationalised industries. In particular there has been 
inadequate consideration of why the re-organisation of the railways proved 
to be problematic and protracted, and why the performance of the British 
Transport Commission in reconstruction, modernisation, and integration fell 
well below the expectations of its creators. 
This chapter seeks to redress these shortcomings by investigating the 
operation of the BTC from 1948 to 1952- the first four years of its operation. 
Three fundamental questions will be raised: first, what factors affected the 
BTC's performance, and what efforts were made to address the underlying 
issues? Second, what was the impact of the external constraining factors 
that the BTC faced? Third, did the existence of a 'nostalgic and backward 
1 Morgan, Labour in Power, p. 1. 
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looking attitude' among the management and the workforce influence the 
modernisation of the transport industry? 
The new organisational structure imposed by the 1947 Transport Act placed 
the BTC as the top echelon of management for the railways, and gave it a 
clear remit to modernise, reconstruct and induce greater efficiency in the 
nation's transport services. Those expectations were publicly and clearly 
stated by Barnes from the outset: 
The BTC will be a small body with time to think and plan the vast resources it will 
have behind it and it will work a revolution in the efficiency of the transport system 
of the country. lt will have to carry out large scale expenditure in rebuilding our 
railway stations to make them centres of transport. Travel in this country is 
becoming a disagreeable thing, something to be endured to get somewhere rather 
than the pleasure it should be. I depend on the Commission with its wide powers to 
radically alter this state of affairs. There are no physical or financial reasons why we 
should not have the most efficient, comfortable, speedy and cheap system of 
transport in the world. 2 
Charged with achieving those aims as founder members of the BTC were: 
Hurcomb (Chairman), Sir William Wood (last President of the LMS), Lord 
Ashfield (Chairman of the LPTB), Lord Rusholme (former General Secretary 
of the Co-operative Union), and John Benstead (former General Secretary of 
the NUR). Wilson described them as 'hardworking, experienced, elderly and 
safe with no questions on the score of established reputation and long 
experience', but he could say nothing for their 'freshness of vision, initiative 
and readiness for change'.3 Given that only one was less than sixty years of 
2 Second Reading of the Transport Bill, HCDeb, 431, c.1623, 16 December 1946. 
3 Ministry of War Transport, Nationalisation: Membership of BTC, 23 May 1949, MT74/141. 
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age and another over 70, the appointment of these men to oversee what 
was likely to be a protracted process to mastermind the long-term 
transformation of the transport industry appears questionable.4 
Wilson's doubts were not unique. Michael Bonavia also expressed 
concern about the membership and character of the Commission, and 
particularly the manner by which it began its existence. Bonavia arrived at 
the BTC from the LNER as assistant to Miles Beevor (the Legal Advisor 
designate), and later he described how he shared his chief's incredulity at 
the amateurish way in which the Commission was being established.5 
Hurcomb's management style was also criticised as alien to railway 
employees. They had long been accustomed to the direct approach in 
which straightforward decisions were made, and were unfamiliar with 
Hurcomb's gradualist attitude in that he 'disliked over-ruling the Executives, 
preferring to let agreement emerge'.6 This approach was to prove costly. 
lt is likely that Hurcomb was appointed as Chairman because he was 
considered a safe pair of hands, and as a reward for his long service in the 
MOT. But after a life-time in the civil service he lacked commercial 
experience, and was unlikely to be familiar with modern business practice. 
He did at least go some way towards fulfilling Morrison's requirement that 
appointments to the boards of the nationalised industries should be based 
on upholding of the best traditions of socialism - in the sense that he had, 
after all, been instrumental in taking the railways into public ownership. 7 
4 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 31-2. 
5 Bonavia, History of the LNER, p. 91. 
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7 Morrison, Socialism of Transport, p. 139. 
77 
Yet it is difficult to understand why the Cabinet, after its wartime experience 
of industry, had so little appreciation of the need for the Chairman of the 
BTC to possess at least some entrepreneurial flair, business acumen and 
understanding of commercial strategy. As Middlemas concludes, Morrison 
and Attlee turned out to be poor judges of managerial ability when it came to 
nominating the boards for transport, coal, and energy.8 
Less than a year after nationalisation it had become clear that the 
BTC had serious management problems. As a result Morrison adapted his 
opinions and accepted that: 
The importance of a strong commission at the present time is obvious and looking 
at the existing members, admirable though they may be in their different ways, I 
should have thought that it could be strengthened by a man of Ashfield's quality 
with wider experience than that of the present members. He would need to be 
carefully chosen and it might not be at all easy to find the right man. The right 
course might be to find a really good business executive.9 
Yet recruitment of an impressive man appeared unlikely, because 
appointments to the public corporations were not popular with those 
employed in business and commercial organisations. As already noted, 
these posts received salaries well below those expected in such quarters, 
attracted greater scrutiny from parliament and the media, and offered less 
commercial freedom. Consequently few businessmen were attracted by the 
particular challenges of the boards. Reporting to Bames and Morrison on 
his attempts to recruit business talent to the BTC, Sir William Wood stated: 
8 Keith Middlemas, Power, Competition and the State, Vol. 1, Britain in Search of Balance 
1940-61 (Basingstoke, 1986), p. 139. 
9 Morrison to Bames, 9 March 1950, MT96/36. 
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I have counselled many people without result. The main reason is that a first-class 
businessman cannot afford to join the Commission at £5,000pa unless he feels that 
his most active days are already over.10 
Given this problem, and because of the ready availability of recently 
demobilised officers from the armed forces, a number of posts within the 
new railway organisation were filled by ex-army personnel. According to 
Bonavia, this contributed to the higher tier of management being named the 
'General Staff', and to a mechanistic organisation which produced a rule 
book akin to the King's regulations - partly a code of discipline and partly a 
code of practice.11 These types of appointments were not confined to the 
railways; the later Chairman of the National Coal Board, Lord Robens, 
considered similar appointments in his own organisation to have been a 
great mistake by Attlee, who was the guiding light in that respect.12 Yet 
blanket criticism of ex-forces officers appears excessive: many clearly were 
capable, and if nothing else they should have offered the railways the 
benefits of organisational experience. 
An unforeseen impact of appointment of ex-civil servants and ex-army 
officers was that management of the railways emphasised a view that 
commercial considerations were secondary to the obligatory public-service 
concept. In addition, experience of war-time convinced many managers and 
employees that the railways were an indispensable component of the 
nation's transport infrastructure, and would remain so despite fundamental 
changes in road and air transport. But even some career railway men did not 
consider this public service requirement incompatible with commercial 
10 Wood to Barnes, 24 March 1950, MT96/36. 
11 Bonavia, Organisation of British Railways, p. 172. 
12 Lord Robens, Ten Year Stint (London, 1972), p. 9. 
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management. They also assumed that the country was unable to do without 
the railways, and so had a special obligation towards its employees.13 
The newly-constituted BTC met for the first time in August 1947. 
Three more meetings were held that month, a further five in September, five 
in October, four in November and two in December. Examination of the 
agendas and minutes of those meetings unsurprisingly reveals a 
preoccupation with administrative issues, for it is understandable that 
creation of a new organisation on the scale of the BTC required many 
decisions to be made on terms of appointment, salaries and titles.14 What is 
remarkable is that the Commission spent a great deal of valuable time in 
discussing what were essentially secondary issues, best discussed by 
subordinate bodies - such as the logos to be used on ships' funnels and on 
rolling stock. 
lt might have been expected that the BTC would have quickly made 
substantial progress in pursuit of its aims. Yet in an era of rapid technical 
development, and despite the confident assertion that a new era would 
begin after nationalisation, for some years the railway's operating mentality, 
structure, and practice remained basically unchanged from that developed in 
the 1930s. In the short-term few changes were apparent to the railway 
traveller, other than the introduction of terms such as 'British Railways' and 
the 'British Transport Commission'. Even the application of this 
nomenclature on rolling stock and the infrastructure took many years to 
complete, adding to the impression that little had changed from the pre-war 
railway system. The RE itself recognised the tardy progress in 
13 Hardy, Beeching, p. 19. 
14 BTC minutes in AN85/1. 
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reorganisation. John Elliot (RE Chairman from 1 February 1951) observed 
to the Commission that 'it was generally felt that the integration of transport 
had not proceeded rapidly enough' .15 That was hardly surprising, because in 
the BTC minutes from 1947 to 1953 there is virtually no evidence of an 
attempt to plan and develop the co-ordination of transport on the basis 
envisaged by the legislators. There are just two references to the Standing 
Conference on the Co-ordination of Inland Transport, but no evidence of 
discussion or other response to its work. 16 Although the BTC properly 
considered major issues such as the costing of the new Woodhead tunnel, 17 
it also spent an inordinate amount of time discussing minor and detailed 
work, such as whether to improve the central heating at the Station Hotel in 
York, 18 and the supply of soap and towels on sleeper trains.19 lt is difficult to 
conceive the experienced directors of the pre-war Big Four railway 
companies becoming so entangled in the minutiae of administration which 
engrossed the BTC during its early years. 
A further aspect of management which proved debilitating to the 
railways was the tension which developed between the Commission and the 
Railway Executive. Problems were apparent from inception, something 
which might not have occurred if the Commission itself, rather than the 
Minister of Transport, had been allowed to appoint members of its 
subordinate body. Perversely, although the BTC was charged with running a 
massive business operation, it was not allowed to appoint its most senior 
15 Elliot to Hurcomb, 25 September 1951, AN6/6. 
16 BTC minute 3/306, 27 March 1950, AN85/3. 
17 BTC minute 4/924, 29 November 1951, AN85/4. The BTC authorised expenditure of 
£1 ,592,699 for this project. lt had been planned by the LNER and contracts were placed 
in 1937, but work was suspended due to the onset of war. 
18 BTC minute 2/845, 30 August 1949, AN85/3. 
19 BTC minute 4/672, 21 August 1951, AN85/4. 
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staff; This represented a lack of proper planning of the new organisational 
structure, for as Gourvish points out 'in practice not only was policy-making 
on this crucial issue [unification of the four main-line companies) conducted 
hurriedly, but discussions took place in an atmosphere of some confusion, 
with the precise nature of the relationship between the Commission and the 
Executive uncertain'.20 Again, much of the responsibility for this confusion 
can rest with Barnes, for when he appointed the Executive he 'failed to spell 
things out in the official letters of appointment'.21 Although a number of 
issues were later clarified after meetings between the two bodies, certain 
problems were never fully resolved. Included in this was the antagonism 
created in the RE towards any direct approach between the BTC and the 
railway regions. Finance also remained 'a particularly tender subject'. 22 
Evidence of serious problems in working relationships emerged as 
early as July 1948 when the Chief Regional Officers (CROs) identified the 
issue of divided responsibility and loyalty as serious complications in 
management. 23 The response from the RE to these concerns was 
unequivocal: 'there must be no misunderstanding on such points, their 
loyalty and responsibility is first and foremost to the RE'. Additionally, after 
agreeing to meet with the CROs more frequently, the RE instructed them to 
discontinue their regular meetings (a policy also applied to the Assistant 
CROs meetings).24 While the purpose of these decisions was probably to 
reduce concerted opposition to the RE's decisions, a further potential impact 
might have been to reduce opportunity for inter-regional co-operation and 
20 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 39. 
21 Ibid., p. 39. 
22 Bonavia, Organisation of British Railways, p. 53. 
23 Memo from CROs to RE, 16 June 1948, AN6/1. 
24 Memo by RE for meeting with CROs, 12 July 1948, AN6/1 . 
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integration. Although the CROs complied by abandoning their formal 
meetings, according to Bonavia they immediately replaced them with 
informal luncheon meetings serving the same purpose.25 
An important indication of the difficult relationship between the two 
management bodies was the strategy inaugurated by the Executive 
seemingly to withhold information from the Commission. lt is likely that this 
resulted from a desire to reduce the likelihood of BTC interference in key 
areas of management which the RE considered its own. As a result, when 
instructed to supply copies of its minutes to the Commission, the RE's 
response from February 1948 was to introduce a system of dual minuting of 
its meetings. Bonavia related that from then onwards, two sets of minutes 
were produced: one, printed on coloured paper which were reserved for 
internal circulation (known as the green minutes), and a further set (the white 
minutes) prepared for submission to the BTC.26 The Commission was not 
informed of this arrangement. According to Gourvish 'it is clear that much 
more important matters were discussed, in an atmosphere of secrecy, if not 
conspiracy, and that few of these were passed on to the Commission in the 
form in which they appeared'. The Executive fed 'its masters a diet of trivial 
operating information'.27 This attempt to exclude the Commission from a full 
understanding of RE thinking and policy formation was hardly conducive to 
management efficiency and good relations between the two bodies. 
A further cause of concern for the Commission was the expansion of 
the RE's staff and its associated costs, for during a time of clear financial 
concerns the numbers at RE headquarters increased rapidly, from 366 in 
25 Bonavia, British Rail the First 25 Years, p. 212. 
26 Bonavia, Organisation of British Railways, p. 54. 
27 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 48. 
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June 1948 to 577 by the end of 1950.28 This unease was generated not only 
for financial reasons, but also because it represented an increase in the 
scope and authority of the RE at the expense of the Commission, and led 
Hurcomb to conclude that 'one thing is clear and that is the intention to avoid 
a statutory body between the Commission and the regions'.29 As will be 
shown later, Hurcomb was instrumental in the demise of the RE. 
During the first years of public ownership there was little evidence of 
progress in operating efficiency, and in the integration of what had been the 
four main-line companies into a single coherent system. These failures 
came to worry the Labour Cabinet, as they had wider implications in that a 
key argument for public ownership was that economic and social problems 
would be tackled more vigorously and effectively. According to Millward, the 
Cabinet's concerns with nationalisation were: reconstruction of the economy 
battered by war, investment generally in physical and human capital, and 
political stability and unity, including debts to Labour voters.30 Millward might 
have added a further point -that public ownership also represented an 
essential aspect of the wider vision of the Attlee government. As M organ 
stated, 'without nationalisation above all, the moral impetus of the 1945 
government could not be sustained. For most members of the party and the 
movement, that was its ultimate justification'.31 Whatever the ideological 
perspective and moral arguments for public ownership, in itself this was only 
the beginning: a comprehensive strategy was required in order to achieve 
effective integration of the nationalised industries into the wider process of 
28 RE to Hurcomb, October 1951, AN6/5. 
29 BTC minutes, 22 July 1952, AN6/6. 
30 Millward, '1940s Nationalisations in Britain', p. 228. 
31 Morgan, Labour in Power, p. 141. 
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economic management. However, as Tiratsoo and Tomlinson conclude, 
'although there were examples of intervention in nationalising the railways, 
coal and electricity, in no way could this be considered an industrial 
strategy'.32 Elsewhere Tomlinson observes that 'ultimately, Labour in 1945-
51 , for understandable reasons, linked to compelling day to day economic 
necessities, failed to establish a clear position on public ownership'.33 This 
failure of an important element of economic policy has been blamed by 
some on the Lord President of the Council- Morrison, who was Labour's 
chief economic minister. According to Booth, 'Morrison lacked an 
understanding of economics' and 'the Lord President's Committee was an 
uncertain instrument of economic planning' with its 'themes varied and 
haphazard'. 34 Morgan was even more critical of the committee: 'this was a 
failure'. 35 
Against that background of political priorities and shortcomings, 
railway nationalisation had - as Chapter 1 argued - created a new and 
untried system of management without sufficient understanding of the 
industry and without effective consultation. The BTC was expected to 
oversee the integration of all inland transport, while its subordinate, the 
Railway Executive, was expected to integrate and manage the railways. The 
sheer magnitude and complexity of those functions had never been properly 
investigated, nor had they been fully understood by the legislators. There 
was also a powerful and widespread assumption that public ownership in 
itself would generate greater efficiency, yet exactly how such efficiency 
32 Tiratsoo and Tomlinson, Industrial Efficiency and State Intervention, p. 5. 
33 T omlinson, Democratic Socialism and Economic Policy, p. 123. 
34 Booth, British Economic Policy, p. 109. 
35 Morgan, Labour in Power, p. 49. 
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would be achieved in practice was never investigated nor debated, and in 
consequence never fully established. 
The weakness in defining the precise role of the public corporations in 
national economic management was accompanied by a similar absence in 
explaining how the management within the corporations was to operate, and 
how its efficiency was to be increased. Bringing the railways into public 
ownership had been the over-riding priority; how they were actually to 
operate was considered a secondary issue, receiving little attention from the 
planners. As Chester commented: 
There was a belief in the need for, and the virtues of co-ordination. This was 
particularly the case with the [Labour] Party's proposals in respect of transport but 
was also present in the case of the fuel and power industries. At its lowest this 
belief sprang from the concerns of railwaymen that their conditions were being 
worsened by the increasing use of road vehicles for passengers and goods. At its 
highest and more abstract the desire for co-ordinated transport reflected the belief 
that the optimum use of national resources could not be achieved by decisions 
taken in isolation by each form of transport but only by some overall view or plan. lt 
was part of the current belief in national economic planning.36 
When applied to some industries, such as coal and electricity, the argument 
that nationalisation would bring efficiency could be accepted as valid. Those 
industries operated in dispersed units, and in the case of coal had suffered a 
long history of conflict in labour relations. Integration appeared to offer the 
advantages of standardisation in operating, and in the case of electricity, of 
securing capital investment. But inclusion of the railways in such a 
category was inappropriate, because the industry was already organised on 
the basis of regional monopolies, labour relations were good, and there was 
a long history of effective control, particularly on pricing. Even so, the 
36 Chester, Nationalisation of British Industry, p. 21. 
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railways had been quickly nationalised, which meant that by the end of 1947 
the Labour Cabinet had fulfilled many of its manifesto commitments. Only 
iron and steel remained to be brought into public ownership; but this was 
highly controversial, and given the difficult economic circumstances and 
much opposition from the Conservative party, especially in the House of 
Lords, it was repeatedly delayed. However, although the Labour party had 
achieved its long-stated aim of public ownership of industries such as the 
railways, a series of problems now required resolution. As a result, any 
celebration of the peak of socialism was tempered by a need to resolve 
fundamental questions in industrial and economic policies. For Brooke the 
very success of the Labour government in enacting its programme marked 
the end of one socialist path, and left the party unprepared for a new 
programme.37 
As previously indicated, the financial position of the nationalised 
railways soon gave rise to serious unease in government. In addition, 
although the management was given the duty and ability to adopt a more 
altruistic approach than the private sector, there was a growing doubt 
whether the public corporation was creating any greater sense of public 
responsibility.38 A particular concern among Labour ministers was that the 
creation of a national monopoly might produce the unforeseen 
consequences of reduced incentives to develop greater efficiency and lower 
costs: 
Although it is accepted that the socialised industries must pay their way, the 
monopoly position makes it possible to extract from the consumer the cost of 
37 Brooke, Labour's War, p. 338. 
38 Jim Tomlinson, 'Mr. Attlee's supply-side socialism', p. 15, and Chick, Industrial Policy, pp. 
92-4. 
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excessive office staffs and unnecessary ancillary services and other manifestations 
of extravagant administration. lt was also considered a matter of opinion whether 
the most effective solutions to management have been found.39 
This issue of monopoly power of the public corporations challenged the 
Labour party's thinking, yet the conflict was never satisfactorily resolved 
during the government's term of office. According to Cairncross, the reason 
was that 'since what was uppermost in their [Labour minister's] minds was 
the idea of social control they welcomed the monopolistic powers that 
nationalisation conferred on the industries concerned without questioning 
whether such powers were in the best interests of efficient production'.40 
A more serious problem was the productivity of the nationalised 
sectors. Productivity had surfaced as a real issue during the war, when in 
1941-42 supply problems of war materials generated 'growing official 
concern with the question of efficiency'.41 These concerns may have been 
submerged by subsequent events, but they were re-ignited by the serious 
coal shortage of 1947, and efficiency and productivity became recurrent 
issues for more than a decade. Such problems were not restricted to the 
National Coal Board, and other nationalised industries also suffered criticism 
of their performance. These included the electricity industry where, owing to 
the Jack of a proper pricing policy demand on the system grew inexorably, 
with sales in 1948 almost double those of ten years earlier.42 On this 
Hannah concludes that the 'major criticism is properly addressed to the 
advocates of nationalisaton, who had given far too little attention to the 
39 CCSI minutes, 19 March 1948, CAB 134/689. 
40 Alec Cairncross, Years of Recovery, British Economic Policy 1945-51 (Cambridge, 1987), 
p. 467. 
41 Tiratsoo and Tomlinson, Industrial Efficiency and State Intervention, p. 21. 
42 Hannah, Engineers, Managers and Politicians, p. 30 
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general question of pricing and investment rules by which the public sector 
should operate',43 and 'Labour politicians, even those with training in 
economics, were in muddles about the issues'.44 
All this taxed the government to such an extent that Tomlinson argues 
that the need to increase productivity lay at the centre of Labour's policies 
between the years 1947 and 1950,45 or more bluntly that 'what the 
government wanted above all from the nationalised industries in this period 
was more of whatever they produced'. 46 
Early unease with the railway's productivity centred on increased 
labour costs, after it was reported to the CCSI that these had increased from 
£120m in 1938 47 to £268m in 1948.48 By then it was clear that any 
automatic achievement of greater efficiency through organisational 
economies and employee pride in public ownership had not materialised. As 
Tiratsoo and Tomlinson argue, those on the left including Shinwell had 
believed that once the stick of unemployment was removed, workers would 
respond positively and intensify their efforts as a mark of gratitude for the 
government's wider reforms. The reality was quite different; apathy rather 
than zeal became apparent.49 
Even so, according to Tiratsoo and Tomlinson 'there was a belief in 
government circles that the key variable in relation to productivity was 
management', and that 'without better management, all other possible 
43 Ibid., p. 33. 
44 Ibid., p. 34. 
45 Tomlinson, 'Mr. Attlee's supply-side socialism', p. 2. 
46 Tomlinson, Democratic Socialism and Economic Policy, p. 1 01. 
47 Figures for the railway companies and LPTB. 
48 CCSI minutes, 22 July 1949, CAB134/690. 
49 Tiratsoo and Tomlinson, Industrial Efficiency and State Intervention, p. 91. 
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reforms would fail'.50 This thinking led to an investigation by the Baillieu 
Committee, which in its 1946 report recommended the setting-up of the 
British Institute of Management (BIM). This was duly implemented, and after 
its inauguration by Cripps on 21 April 1948, it became an element of 
government strategy for the nationalised industries. 
A further aspect of this thinking on ways to improve management 
performance was developed in 1948. Morrison began to organise meetings 
between himself and the chairmen of the boards of the nationalised 
industries in an attempt to disseminate information on good practice. 
However, this move appears to have been ineffective, with Donald 
Fergusson, Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Fuel and Power, 
expressing the view 'that meetings with all board chairmen are useless -
one gets down to the lowest common factor of agreement, which is pretty 
low indeed'.51 Morrison was not deterred. He produced a paper on possible 
ways to improve management, productivity and accountability, which 
included development of a shared efficiency unit for the nationalised 
industries and use of outside consultants appointed through the BIM.52 
Perhaps predictably, the chairmen of the nationalised industries- and 
especially Hurcomb -were hostile to these proposals and 'objected 
strongly'.53 In addition, while they accepted that independent enquiries into 
the workings of the industries were desirable, they felt that these should be 
held at the fairly long intervals of approximately seven years. This response 
effectively negated these proposals, because such an extensive time-lag 
50 Ibid., p. 43. 
51 Fergusson to Morrison, 29 August 1950, CAB21/2322. 
52 Efficiency and public accountability of the socialised industries, 16 October 1950, 
CAB21/2322. 
53 Donoughue and Jones, Herbert Morrison, p. 460. 
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ensured that government priorities, and possibly even the government would 
change, as that time period would contain at least one general election. 
Hurcomb also proved unsupportive to the idea that the BIM could improve 
matters, and initially refused to pay the full subscription to the Institute on the 
grounds of the parlous financial state of the railways. 54 
A further attempt to resolve these issues was through the creation in 
1949 of a Cabinet Productivity (Official) Committee (CPC). This committee 
produced a lavish and extensive report, which argued that the way to 
increased productivity was through an extension of controls and intensified 
publicity. lt also concluded that many workers connected increased 
productivity with 'nigger-driven methods' (sic), but discounted the use of 
such methods as impracticable. Rather, it stressed the need for 
mechanisation, healthy industrial relations, and sound technical 
management. 55 
The CPC also hoped that the development of good management 
practice could be stimulated by using the experience of successful private 
companies, including foreign ones. However this raised certain questions: 
were the models from the private sector relevant to the problems of the 
nationalised industries? and what did this imply about the purposes of 
nationalisation?56 Regardless of these questions, two elements were 
pursued. First, an examination was made of the organisation and 
management of four large companies: General Motors Export Co., Standard 
Telephone and Cables Ltd., ICI, and Unilever. The second was use of the 
United States Technical Assistance and Industrial Productivity in the UK 
54 Hurcomb to Barnes, 24 October 1950, CAB21/2322. 
55 CPC First report, OP (49) 313, September 1949, T229/828. 
56 Tiratsoo and T omlinson, Industrial Efficiency and State Intervention, p. 122. 
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Council, more widely known as the Anglo-American Productivity Council 
(AAPC). This had been set up under the American Economic Co-operation 
Administration (UK Section) under the technical assistance provisions of the 
Marshal! Plan. The overall aim was to persuade management of industrial 
concerns (not just the nationalised industries) to adopt relevant aspects of 
US practice through dissemination of infonnation and a personnel exchange 
programme. 57 Productivity was seen as an important element of this 
approach and various means of achieving it were examined, including the 
use of standardisation and simplification of working practices. However, the 
potential success of these investigations was severely limited from the start 
because the British participants ruled out any inquiry into certain areas, 
notably restrictive practices (by both finns and labour), despite the American 
view that these were likely to be important in explaining Anglo-American 
differences in productivity.58 
Some of the conclusions from this exercise were revealing: it soon 
became clear that the issue of productivity remained relatively unimportant 
to British industrial practice. The US representative of the AAPC (Silberman) 
had discovered that in the UK 'very little is understood about productivity and 
almost nothing is being done by industry to improve things'. 59 According to 
Tiratsoo and Tomlinson, 'the AAPC message was not always received with 
either favour or enthusiasm' and there was also criticism regarding the 
reciprocal visits to America where some delegates 'were impressed as much 
by the USA as by the diesel locomotive industry itself'. 60 The conspicuous 
57 CPC, 22 September 1949, T229/828. 
58 Tiratsoo and Tomlinson, Industrial Efficiency and State Intervention, p. 134. 
59 Nicholson (Board of Trade) 25 June 1948, BT?0/292. 
60 Tiratsoo and Tomlinson, Industrial Efficiency and State Intervention, p. 157. 
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lack of success of the AAPC can be ascribed to the fact that the context of 
Americanism was always ambiguous, for the AAPC was created for a 
political purpose as much as to raise productivity. 61 
Closely related to the productivity issue in the nationalised industries 
were problems with labour relations. lt had been confidently expected by 
Labour ministers that public ownership would promote a sense of 
responsibility and encourage initiative. 62 Certainly before nationalisation the 
rhetoric emanating from Labour politicians suggested the possibility of 
movement towards industrial democracy. This did not occur, 'Cripps had 
been an enthusiast for involving the worker, but other ministers were less 
enthusiastic'.63 The trade unions also had high hopes from public 
ownership, and as Bagwell reported 'exalted hopes had been centred in the 
nationalisation of transport by many of the union's stalwarts and 
disillusionment was perhaps inevitable when the expected improvements did 
not materialize very rapidly'. 64 As a result the NUR consistently opposed the 
Morrisonian concept of the public corporation.65 
Despite these labour problems, there was reluctance by management 
to act decisively on 'human relations' issues. In Tomlinson's words 'as was 
typical of this period, ministerial enthusiasm to do something was not 
matched by the boards of the nationalised industries, where there was 
resistance to any form of inquiry into "human relations" in the industry'. 66 
61 Ibid., p. 142. 
62 Post-War Organisation of British Transport, p. 23. 
63 Tiratsoo and Tomlinson, Industrial Efficiency and State Intervention, p. 91. 
64 Bagwell, The Railwaymen, p. 619. 
65 Tiratsoo and Tomlinson, Industrial Efficiency and State Intervention, p. 119. 
66 T omlinson, Democratic Socialism and Economic Policy, p. 303. 
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These difficulties with the management and performance of the newly 
nationalised industries had not been expected by Labour ministers, and the 
problems they encountered showed them very clearly that public ownership 
was not necessarily the panacea they had previously believed. As a result, 
and as early as 1946, the Labour party NEC called for a review of 
nationalisation policy.67 In 1948, the resulting deliberations on this led the 
architect of nationalisation, Morrison, to 'become attracted to the concept of 
"consolidation", which meant that Labour should not pursue further 
nationalisation, but should devote itself to digesting reforms that it had 
already introduced and especially to creating a better image for the existing 
nationalised industries'. 68 However, in the Labour party this 'revisionist' view 
was not universally shared, and when Morrison first raised the issue at the 
Party Conference in Scarborough in 1948, not all delegates were 
enthusiastic, and not all cabinet colleagues were happy.69 Furthermore, as 
Chick points out, serious disagreements on pricing policy between the 
Minister of Fuel and Power and the British Electricity Authority, made even 
Morrison's faith in the public spirit of the board of a public corporation look 
suspect and fragile?0 The consequence of this and other emerging 
difficulties between ministers and boards led Morrison to conclude in 1950 
that 'the Boards have not fulfilled our hopes and there is a great deal of 
disillusionment even among supporters of the principles of socialism'.71 This 
undoubtedly contributed to the decision to delay further moves towards 
public ownership, and to the Labour leadership's concentration on 
67 Tomlinson, Government and the Enterprise Since 1900 (Oxford, 1994), p. 201. 
68 Donoughue and Jones, Herbert Morrison, p. 442. 
69 Ibid., p. 442. 
7° Chick, Industrial Policy in Britain, p. 97. 
71 Meeting with Chairmen of Boards, June 1950, CAB21 /2322. 
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'consolidation'. lt was this which led M organ to conclude that by 1951 there 
was a 'retreat from Jerusalem'.72 
11 
Management issues were not the only problems facing the BTC. As 
Gourvish notes, 'the early years of nationalisation were a bleak period in 
terms of investment, and many writers have traced some of the railway's 
enduring problems to this situation' ?3 While it may be widely agreed that a 
series of post-war economic crises constrained investment in the railways 
and the other nationalised industries, the real issues are how, why, and-
most important - to what extent? 
Chick accepts that although the early years of Attlee's government 
saw specific failures in the allocation of resources and co-ordination, there is 
no statistical evidence to support the view that economic modernisation was 
sacrificed to the needs of the health and social security programmes?4 This 
argument is supported by Caimcross, who argued that Bamett's 'New 
Jerusalem Thesis' is badly out of focus and that food subsidies cost more 
than any social services and eventually reached £500m by 1949.75 The 
most compelling analysis of the constraints which explain the lack of success 
in economic management and reform, of which the nationalised industries 
were a vital element, is by Tomlinson. He concludes that the Attlee 
government's performance in economic management and reconstruction 
was at best patchy, because of what he calls an 'iron quadrilateral'. This 
72 Morgan, Labour in Power, p. 463. 
73 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 68. 
74 Chick, Industrial Policy in Britain, p. 8. 
75 Alec Cairncross, The British Economy since 1945 (Oxford, 1992), p. 5. 
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represented a combination of political doctrine and assumptions which were 
influenced by forceful micro-economic issues. The four bounding 
assumptions were: commitment to parliamentary sovereignty; consensual 
tripartism between government, employers and unions; free collective 
bargaining over wages, and the Morrisonian form of public corporation?6 
An essential element in Tomlinson's critique is the contention that the 
Labour-designed structure for the public corporation proved inconsistent with 
running the industries more effectively, and at the same time requiring them 
to be central to a planned economy. These inconsistencies were never 
satisfactorily overcome, particularly those between the use of the 
independent expert manager and the need for the industries to remain free 
from day-to-day interference by the relevant minister?7 Within the 
nationalised industries, concern with operating independence became 
secondary when a series of economic crises led to changed priorities, which 
resulted in restrictions on large-scale investment as well as postponement of 
the government's plans for iron and steel nationalisation. 
From the outset investment planning was a major aspect of policy for 
the Attlee governments, not simply to direct the pattern of investment, but to 
encourage exports and prevent employment problems caused by economic 
downturns. In the main, restrictions were imposed through allocations of the 
fifteen main raw materials to the extent of 94% by value in 1947, falling to a 
still significant 47% in 1950, and rising again because of the Korean War to 
64% in 1952?8 
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The Cabinet accepted in 1949 that the railways would benefit from 
'heavy investment not simply for maintenance, but also to take advantage of 
new developments, to reduce operating costs and make up for the ravages 
of war' ?9 Even so, restrictions on steel supplies for the railways continued 
throughout the course of Attlee's governments, largely because the relatively 
positive condition of the railways at nationalisation allowed the Economic 
Planning Board to decide that 'as a temporary measure the railway's 
reconstruction programme should be kept to a reduced level'.80 These 
restrictions could hardly be considered excessive: the 1949 planned 
allocation of 1 million tons of steel was only reduced to 810,000 tons. lt is 
likely that this relative generosity was influenced by the fact that track 
replacement generally recovered well over 70% of its weight in high-quality 
scrap steel, which allowed straightforward recycling. The BTC received over 
80% of its planned requirements, representing a substantial 6· 7% of all 
national steel allocations.81 This allowed the BTC a considerable investment 
resource for reconstruction and modernisation, particularly when the 
decision was taken to concentrate the whole of the shortfall on the wagon-
building programme, where there was already an excess of supply.82 
In practical terms the impact of macro-economic problems became 
more acute after the devaluation of sterling on 18 September 1949, and 
consequent cuts in public expenditure. Understandably, the effect of 
devaluation was a preoccupation with the balance of payments: continuing 
heavy deficits were expected, which could be financed only through an 
79 1PC, Cabinet report on investment, 12 December 1949, p. 45, CAB132/212. 
80 Economic Planning Board Survey 1949, CAB134/212. 
81 Departmental steel allocations 1946-49, CAB134/475. 
82 BTC Annual Report and Accounts 1949, para. 22, p. 17. 
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exceptional export performance generated from increased productivity. 
Uncertainty about the balance of payments was an ever-present limitation on 
policy, particularly as Attlee's government was not prepared to countenance 
mass deflation. Consequently investment remained strictly controlled, 
particularly for steel, as its allocation was a key instrument of economic 
planning. 83 
Constraints on investment continued, and even increased following 
the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, with the need for rearmament and 
the decision to send armed forces to the war zone. This action was 
controversial to such an extent that Morgan considered it 'served to 
exacerbate other divisions opening up in the party and the labour movement 
in the latter months of 1950'.84 Tomlinson concluded that 'the risks taken by 
re-armament were enormous, and the economic arguments seem to have 
been overborne by what can only be called an emotional desire to impress 
the Americans on the part of Gaitskell and the majority of the cabinet'.85 Dow 
concludes that 'the main disadvantage of the defence programme was 
undoubtedly the burden it was to impose on the economy over the next 
decade; and this was to become only gradually apparent.'86 Whatever the 
rationale behind rearmament and the Korean War, it resulted in a further 
policy adjustment -to shift the focus of production towards aircraft, military 
vehicles and ships, generating a reversion to a partial war economy with 
some direct controls. lt also resulted in a ranking system for the allocation of 
resources which gave equal priority to defence requirements and to dollar-
83 Chick, Industrial Policy in Britain, p. 42. 
84 Morgan, Labour in Power, p. 435. 
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earning exports, followed by Commonwealth exports, and leaving domestic 
demand as last.87 For the railways the impact was continued control on 
investment materials earmarked for reconstruction, and, as the defence 
programme took priority, a reduction in previously agreed allocations. Again 
steel supplies were the main casualty, with allocations once again reduced 
by 20%. Overall the Cabinet Investment Committee imposed cuts in capital 
expenditure for the railways of £3m in 1951, £6m in 1952 and £6·4m in 
1953.88 Restrictions on steel supplies could be alleviated through a 
slowdown of investment, but for industry and the railways the coal shortages 
had a more immediate impact upon operating capability. The already difficult 
economic situation of 1947 was aggravated by a winter of almost 
unprecedented severity and length, during which coal supplies were 
seriously restricted. Morgan described the overall effect as 'a year of almost 
unrelieved disaster'.89 Although such weather conditions experienced in 
early 1947 could not have been anticipated, according to Tookey the Attlee 
government's assertion that the coal-supply problems were solely a function 
of the severe weather cannot be sustained. A crisis in coal availability had 
been predicted for some months, and insufficient supplies were producing 
problems for industrial production even before the bad weather began.90 
Whatever the causal factors, the effect upon industrial output was dramatic, 
and the consequent damage to exports exacerbated the existing gold and 
dollar deficits. 
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These coal shortages also impacted on the railways in a more direct 
manner, with the creation in late 1947 of the Winter Transport Executive 
Committee (WTEC), chaired by James Callaghan. Its remit was: 
To consider and keep under review freight transport problems likely in the winter of 
1947-8, and to formulate a general policy designed to ensure that available 
transport is put to the best use and in particular that priority at all stages of transport 
is given to traffic in accordance with its importance in the national interest.91 
Surprisingly, the Committee, apart from its politician chairman, was 
comprised entirely of civil servants with a complete absence of transport 
professionals. Its sole function was to direct transport planning in an attempt 
to avoid repetition of the problems encountered by snow blockages during 
the previous winter in early 1947. Then, the problems with coal supplies had 
been intensified by the railway's inability to offer effective transport services. 
The WTEC solution was to persuade many traders to use road transport 
rather than rail during the forthcoming 1947-8 winter. Numerous companies 
duly obliged, including the Post Office which sent 200,000 tons of 
engineering stores by road, and increased its road fleet by 200 vehicles.92 
However, this attempt to alleviate potential transport problems backfired 
when the winter of 1947-8 was relatively mild, and the resultant loss of trade 
for the railways was considered by the BTC to be a contributory factor in the 
disappointing results for 1948.93 In addition much of the trade persuaded to 
move from railway to road transport was never recovered. 
A further issue accompanying and aggravating these difficulties was 
the impact of a general labour problem. Contrary to all expectations the post-
91 Winter Transport Executive Committee 181 meeting, 14 November 1947, MT6/2828. 
92 Barnes to CCSI, 27 July 1949, CAB134/690. 
93 BTC Annual Report and Accounts 1948, para. 21, p. 12. 
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war period produced not unemployment but a labour shortage, which 
became particularly acute after 1947. Four years later the problem remained 
considerable, with the Cabinet Committee on Productive Capacity reporting 
that 'there are virtually no reserves of labour except within the development 
areas and in a few unemployment pockets elsewhere'. In addition it 
concluded that 'female labour is also scarce in most areas'.94 Consequently, 
in conjunction with the export drive, the government made great efforts to 
expand the labour force through various means. lt encouraged women to 
return to the workforce (many married women had ceased work at the end of 
the war), and promoted immigration from parts of the Empire, particularly the 
West lndies. For the transport industry immigration appeared almost the only 
solution to its labour shortages, and BR and London Transport sponsored 
4,500 immigrants from Barbados. These efforts may have resolved local 
shortages on the railways, but the introduction and deployment of immigrant 
labour raises certain questions about the effectiveness of management. 
Incorporating the new personnel created unforeseen effects, which led to the 
voicing of concerns and the possibility of industrial action from members of 
the railway workforce with ingrained working traditions. This related to the 
expectation that working on the railway was more than a job, but a way of 
life in that the proper development of the requisite knowledge of complex 
safety issues and technical skills could only be achieved through a lifetime of 
service. An additional factor was that traditionally promotion had been 
relatively slow and required the accumulation of extensive experience in 
lower-paid grades. For example, a fireman on a steam locomotive would 
94 Cabinet Committee on Productive Capacity, 7 April 1952, T230/194. 
101 
normally have risen from engine cleaner to passed cleaner,95 and only after 
gaining considerable experience in that role, be promoted to fireman. This 
process allowed young employees to gain both the competence to fire 
locomotives, and importantly time to develop the physical fitness required for 
such a taxing job. The introduction of untried and unfit employees to fill such 
vacancies created problems. For example engine drivers at Stratford 
locomotive depot in east London complained that coloured firemen were 
unfit for their duties, and so placed an unfair burden on themselves. The 
drivers went to great lengths to stress that the issues were fitness and 
competence, not race or colour. But the labour reporter from The Times 
concluded that the real reason for discontent was that few of those involved 
intended to remain in railway service.96 The drivers were unhappy about the 
considerable effort expended on supporting and training the new recruits, 
who were then likely to leave railway service in the near future, requiring the 
process to be repeated. 
During this period of a national shortage of labour, the effect on 
railway recruitment was generally localised, with the main problems 
experienced in attracting sufficient staff in London and other provincial 
centres such as Birmingham. However, the overall impact was far from 
localised, as according to the BTC these labour shortages reduced the 
working capacity of parts of the railway network, due to lack of staff in key 
grades.97 That particular problem was to prove protracted, particularly in 
parts of the country where opportunities existed for alternative employment 
which offered better wages and conditions. This issue of working conditions 
95 Passed to fire locomotives under certain controlled situations. 
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was particularly important to drivers and firemen, for the footplate of a steam 
locomotive was hot and dirty. And being a fireman demanded considerable 
physical stamina - one had to be capable of shovelling tons of coal in 
adverse conditions. These labour issues have wider implications for the 
assessment of the leadership of British Railways in these years. The RE 
might usefully have given more weight to the problems of recruiting and 
retaining footplate staff in its motive power policy. Instead, these problems 
persisted almost until the end of steam traction on BR in 1968. 
Two further questions which faced the BTC in the process of 
adaptation to public ownership were the requirement for public 
accountability, and its relationship with government. Nationalisation had 
altered the mechanics of the relationship between government and railway 
management, from an arms-length regulatory position to one which allowed 
greater opportunity for direct government intervention. In general the precise 
boundaries between the powers of the minister and those of the nationalised 
industries boards became an area of dispute, and 'a cause of rumbling 
discontent'.98 Within transport, this issue appeared to have been clarified by 
a MOT Working Party set up in 1947 to interpret the Transport Act, to clarify 
its requirements and to issue directives to the BTC regarding policy and 
management. lt produced the clear and unambiguous statement that: 
The intention embodied in the legislation has been that the Board should be set up 
to run the industry on commercial lines on behalf of the community. The Minister 
concerned has a responsibility for the general efficiency of the Board which cannot 
be judged from isolated facts but which must be judged as a whole. The Minister is 
98 Tomlinson, 'Iron quadrilateral', p. 107. 
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not responsible for day to day administration. The Government regard this large 
degree of independence as vital to their efficiency as commercial undertakings.99 
So, although government control of the nationalised industries was 
considered an essential element of national economic policy, it was not 
anticipated that this would lead to regular intervention and everyday 
supervision. In addition, parliamentary sovereignty required that industries 
were not run by special interest groups but by experts appointed on grounds 
of competence, and accountable to parliament through the minister. 
However, in practice ministerial and parliamentary responsibility for the 
general direction of the industry led to wider intervention, prompted by 
greater scrutiny, mainly but not exclusively through parliamentary 
accountability. The extent of this was substantial with, for example, 77 
parliamentary questions were raised on some aspect of the BTC's operation 
during the 27 weeks that the House of Commons was in session in 1950. 
Yet complaints from MPs concerning details of fares (other than those which 
affected the whole community), operations and management, were expected 
to be raised directly with the BTC. As a result, during 1948 Hurcomb's office 
replied to over 3,000 letters from representative bodies and members of the 
public.100 Railway nationalisation and its associated accountability therefore 
created an additional heavy administrative burden on both the BTC, and the 
Minister of Transport. 
Initially relations between the Minister of Transport and the BTC 
appeared cordial, something hardly surprising given that Hurcomb had 
worked closely with Bames during the war, and later on the nationalisation 
99 Points on policy for the BTC, 25 August 1947, MT7 4/193. 
100 BTC Annual Report and Accounts 1948, para. 20, p. 11. 
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proposals. That position was reflected in the first BTC Annual Report which 
stated that: 
The Commission received no formal directions from the Minister of Transport under 
powers executable by him under Section 4 of the Transport Act of 1947. 
Nevertheless the Commission has maintained the closest contact with the Minister. 
Personal consultations have taken place with him on many important questions and 
he has been regularly kept informed of the Commission's work. 101 
This initial cordiality soon dissipated, undermined by increasing tension on 
financial issues, notably proposed increases in fares and charges. The 
revenue accruing from those was fundamental to the management of the 
railways, and basic to its financial performance. Another major financial 
concern related to labour costs, because the railways were a major employer 
and concern on this issue had heightened by the end of 1950. By then there 
had been a substantial increase in the number of railway employees - at the 
end of 1950 there were 620,000 compared with 550,000 in 1938. This rise 
was attributed to the introduction of the 44 hour week, increased holiday 
provision, improved conditions and attempts to catch up on arrears of 
maintenance.102 Other costs also contributed to the railway's financial 
problems, which became so considerable that in September 1948 the 
Cabinet were warned that the BTC was in serious financial difficulties. 
Increased costs of coal and steel were identified as further contributory 
factors, the impact of which was exacerbated by lower receipts from 
passenger and general merchandise traffic. As a result Attlee instructed 
Barnes to prepare a paper on making the BTC solvent, even while observing 
that the Economic Section of the Cabinet Office believed it would be 
101 Ibid., para. 16, p. 9. 
102 Financial performance of the BTC 1950, CAB21 /2241. 
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impossible to run the railways at a profit because of the high proportion of 
fixed costs which had to be met.103 Little progress was made, for in July 
1949 Barnes again drew attention to the railway's serious financial situation, 
and indicated that it was expected to deteriorate. 
However, any attempt to mitigate these financial problems through 
raising fares required the BTC to submit its proposals to the Transport 
Tribunal. This body was created under the 1947 Transport Act, and was the 
successor to the Railway Rates Tribunal. lt was designed to protect the 
public interest, tended to be measured and unhurried in its deliberations, and 
was notably slow in reaching decisions. lt might have been thought that 
under all the terms and apparatus of public ownership, railway managers 
would have been trusted to set appropriate fares and charges. Yet 
government requirements continued to impose almost identical financial 
constraints to those experienced under private ownership by the Big Four. lt 
meant that a public corporation argued for fair treatment from government on 
the exact grounds argued by the earlier private railway companies. This 
perceived unfairness was outlined by the BTC in its 1950 Annual Report: 
Experience of the Transport Tribunal has shown that its activities can be prolonged 
and emphasises the public accountability of the Commission to a degree which has 
no parallel in the statutory obligations of the other nationalised industries.104 
Moreover, in government there was concern about the impact of increases in 
fares and freight charges. lt was believed that these would adversely affect 
the export drive, and fall most severely on the basic industries such as coal, 
103 Note from PM's office (CP. (48) 213), 28 September 1948, CAB21/2241. 
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steel and agriculture.105 Even so, an increase of 16% in freight rates was 
allowed in April 1950. This was not sufficient to cover continually increasing 
costs, and in March 1951 the Commission sought to raise fares and rates 
again, this time through the introduction of an integrated system of transport 
charges. Gourvish considered that this was justified: 'there was certainly a 
case for some adjustment to railway fares in spite of the risk of losing traffic 
to the roads', especially given that the level of average fares in 1951 
represented a fall of 23% in real terms since 1948.106 As a result the 
Commission applied to the Transport Tribunal - without prior consultation 
with the Minister of Transport -to implement its new scheme, which 
incorporated increased fares and freight charges. However, these proposed 
increases were vetoed by the Cabinet as they were felt to conflict with the 
national interest. Financial constraints were implicit in the legislative 
framework, given the requirement that charge increases were to be agreed 
through the Transport Tribunal. But beyond that it now emerged that there 
was a ministerial expectation of prior notification and acceptance of those 
increases. Such acceptance was not always forthcoming, because of the 
way the government subordinated the concerns of the railway industry to its 
pursuit of wider economic aims. As a result, it became clear that the BTC 
was unable to act independently on charging issues. In some consternation, 
the BTC defended its actions to MOT officials: 
Your Minister has frequently told the Cabinet that the day was coming when the 
Government would have no direct concern with fares and charges which would be 
settled between the Commission and the Transport Tribunal. This conception also 
appeared in the report of the MOT Working Party on the Socialisation of Industries 
105 PM, 8 March 1950, CAB21/2241. 
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Committee. There seems to be little doubt that some ministers want to exercise a 
right of veto on the applications being made by the Commission to the Tribunal for 
increased fares and charges. There was an even clearer example of the same thing 
at the Cabinet on Monday when the careful assumption of responsibility in certain 
directions was simply brushed aside and the Commission's intention to take certain 
actions on their own responsibility was treated as a form of proposal which 
Ministers could accept or reject.107 
The outcome was a dispute on the boundaries of the powers of the Minister 
in dealing with the railway industry. The dispute took many years to resolve, 
and extended beyond fares and charges to include wage bargaining. 
In addition, the BTC was financially and commercially disadvantaged 
by a further legislative requirement considered to be in the public interest: 
the need to publish all charges, including special rates agreed with traders. 
Historically this had developed to protect the public from the potential abuse 
of railway monopoly power including unfair and excessive charging and 
preferences for certain customers. But it had a further effect: competitors 
such as road transport were aware of the railway charges, and so could 
structure their own charges to be highly competitive. The Big Four 
companies had always maintained that such regulation on fares and 
charges, rather than their operating costs, had been responsible for their 
disappointing financial position. After nationalisation that argument gained 
greater credence, particularly when the railway's financial problems became 
apparent during its first year of operation as a public corporation. 
There was however one area where Barnes was able to report some 
improvement to the railway's financial position: a reduction in pilferage costs. 
The problem of loss of goods through employee stealing had cost the BTC 
107 BTC to MOT, 14 March 1951, Cabinet Office, Transport: Increase in railway freight, 
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£780,000 in the first quarter of 1948, a figure which fell to £548,000 in 1949. 
The scale of such losses was considerable, as the annual sum was 
equivalent to approximately 10% of the interest payable on British Transport 
Stock.108 There was a further cost too, in that the extent of theft persuaded a 
good many traders that road transport offered a more secure means of 
moving their goods. 
As with any business organisation, the railways faced the need to 
balance costs and receipts. However, Bames and the BTC tended to 
emphasise the increase in costs, rather than accept that there was also a 
serious issue with receipts. These had fallen from £349m in 1947, to £336m 
in 1948 and £324m by 1949, with the estimate for 1950 at £319m. A major 
element of that decline was a fall in passenger traffic, 109 something that 
should have prompted the BTC into urgent remedial action. Yet its response 
was almost insignificant: the closure of certain branch lines and stations 
produced savings calculated at only £227,000 pa, against an estimated 
weekly deficit of £500,000 and the loss on Consolidated Revenue Account of 
£28·8m. 110 That it did not act more quickly and effectively to resolve such 
issues only compounded the problem, and later led to the need for more 
extreme action. 
The 1947 Transport Act therefore imposed restrictions and obligations 
on the BTC which resulted in unforeseen complications and consequences. 
During preparations for nationalisation, the CCSI's main concern was not 
with possible deficits so much as expected surpluses; it even considered 
whether the Minister of Transport would need special powers to issue 
108 Barnes to CCSI, 22 July 1949, CAB134/690. 
109 Financial perfonnance of the BTC 1950, CAB21/2241. 
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directions on the disposal of surplus revenues. 111 The reality turned out to be 
quite different, and the financial difficulties of the railways produced a greater 
level of intervention in the affairs of the BTC than had been anticipated. 
Ill 
The creation of the BTC was, then, flawed in terms of both management 
structures and clarity of authority between itself and government. While 
these problems explain why certain issues were unresolved, they do not 
satisfactorily account for lack of progress in other areas such as traction 
policy and labour issues - where restructuring of traditional practices and 
thinking among the railway workforce was necessary. Why the BTC was 
unable to successfully implement these changes is a question of some 
importance, because it had significant long-term repercussions. 
A key aspect of management is to adapt competencies and to 
reconfigure skills in order to compensate for changes in the external 
environment. For the railways at the point of nationalisation, such change 
was vital as the period was one of rapid technical development which offered 
management significant opportunities for fundamental improvement to many 
aspects of operations. lt will be argued that such opportunities for change 
were not taken. For this, various factors were involved. One is outlined by 
Bonavia, that of entrenched loyalty. 'There was still a good deal of nostalgia 
for the old railway companies', with the effect that 'the Railway Executive's 
attempts to impose new standardised practices met in some cases with 
scarcely-veiled opposition'. Bona via adds that the RE's own 'outlook was 
111 CCSI minutes, 11 January 1946, CAB134/687. 
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also felt to be insufficiently progressive' .112 This problem of 'nostalgia' was 
widespread and influential at all levels of management. Aldcroft similarly 
commented that there was 'a reluctance to break with past traditions, a 
result no doubt of the inherent prejudices to new ideas on the part of many 
former railway company staff working in the Commission'. 113 Indeed, 
according to Quail the problem was also apparent in the organisation and 
control of the financial functions of the railway industry. He argues that 
despite the financial crisis which engulfed the railways, and even with strong 
support from the highest level of management, the attempt to introduce 
advanced management-accounting techniques was defeated by the 
railway's organisational structure and culture.114 
This resistance to change was most obvious in the Western Region, 
where a GWR approach endured despite repeated attempts to promote 
reform through a succession of changes in personnel at all levels, reaching 
up to the Regional Manager. GWR policies for locomotive design, signalling 
and operating practices were perpetuated. The Western Region was also 
slow to use a new range of BR standard steam locomotives; after minor 
faults were found in the region's allocation of these locomotives, they were 
stored for many months before completing rectification work. In addition, 
regional management also appeared to adopt a nostalgic approach to the 
Big Four predecessors through the preservation of historical features, 
notably locomotives from those companies. This was not confined to the 
112 Bonavia, Organisation of British Railways, p. 56. 
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Western Region, for a substantial collection of preserved LNER locomotives 
was accumulated in York. 115 Likewise in Scotland, old locomotives were 
restored to their original condition and livery, before use on special trains. 
While such practices could be legitimately presented as good public 
relations, the cost could hardly be justified given the precarious state of the 
railway's finances and a backlog of overhaul of other rolling-stock. 
Nowhere was this lack of forward thinking more apparent than in 
motive power which was fundamental to all aspects of railway operations; 
this effectively defined operating parameters and efficiency. Yet the decision 
made during the early years of the nationalised system to eschew the 
potential benefits of technical change from steam to diesel traction had 
significant long-term repercussions for costs, investment, and operating. This 
decision is all the more surprising given both the pressures of recruiting 
footplate staff, and the earlier movements towards modernised traction. 
Before the war the Big Four had all anticipated widespread dieselisation and 
electrification, and the LMS and SR had both introduced prototype main-line 
diesel locomotives. In addition diesel shunters had been used and built by 
the Big Four since 1934, and these were also widely available from outside 
manufacturers.116 The BTC might have built on that experience, and with a 
forward-looking approach towards motive power begun the process of 
railway modernisation. In April 1948 Wood did submit a paper to the BTC on 
the relative costs and merits of diesel and electric traction.117 But this 
115 In effect the forerunner of the National Railway Museum. 
116 British Railways inherited 54 diesel shunting locomotives from the Big Four and during 
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opportunity to develop a positive strategy was not taken: despite plentiful 
evidence from abroad and in the railway press of the efficiency gains, there 
was no great interest in dieselisation. Instead the BTC prevaricated. 
Hurcomb responded by writing to the RE Chairman, Sir Eustace Missenden 
to request an examination of future traction policy with particular regard to 
economics of operation.118 This did produce an RE committee to 
'investigate from the economic angle, the future balance of advantage 
between the various types of motive power for use on British Railways'. 119 
Yet this committee was not established by the RE until the end of 1948, and 
it then took more than two years (until October 1951) to deliver its findings. 
Moreover, its membership did not include Robin Riddles, the RE member 
with responsibility for traction and effectively Chief Mechanical Engineer of 
the railways, charged with maintaining and improving equipment. Not only 
did Riddles guard his responsibilities obsessively; he was also in a position 
to pre-empt the committee's findings. He was not prepared to investigate 
ideas and experience about locomotive design and traction from France and 
particularly the USA, where diesel traction had become pre-eminent. 
Instead, before the Motive Power Report was completed, Riddles decided to 
continue with the development of steam traction. 
Gourvish, in common with other historians of the subject, considers 
this decision by Riddles and his team 'controversial', 120 but he does not offer 
any explanation on why the BTC sanctioned considerable expenditure on 
this outdated form of traction. lt is indeed the case, as Gourvish did observe 
that 'in such discussions [on motive power], the broader environment in 
118 Hurcomb to Missenden, 13 April 1948, AN88/77. 
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which technical decisions were made has rarely been outlined' .121 Even 
when the RE motive power report became available in 1951, Riddles 
disagreed with its strong recommendation for a large-scale pilot scheme of 
diesel traction, and effectively ignored it.122 One reason was his claim that 
'although diesel traction was ideal for shunting purposes, electrification was 
the natural inheritor of steam for main-line services'.123 Yet this was contrary 
to experience in the USA. His main argument was the cost of importing oil, 
given the ready availability of domestic coal supplies. Yet the experience of 
1947 should have demonstrated the possibility of periods of severe coal 
shortages, and more particularly reduced availability of good-quality steam 
coal. So serious had the 1947 shortfalls in coal supply been that the 
government insisted that the railway companies convert a large number of 
steam locomotives to burn fuel oil. The capacity to provide the required oil 
was available, because resources had been directed towards domestic oil 
refining in the expectation of purchasing the crude oil in sterling, and selling 
the refined product in dollars.124 Nevertheless, this decision to convert coal-
burning locomotives to oil-fired turned out to be a substantial waste of 
resources: only a few locomotives were converted, and the extensive and 
highly expensive infrastructure which had been constructed to support the 
scheme was left unused. 
Despite both the coal-supply problems and government pressure to 
use oil, Riddles insisted that BR was not ready for large-scale dieselisation. 
Consequently he proceeded with the design and development of a range of 
121 Ibid., p. 87. 
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standard steam locomotives of arbitrary power classifications for all regions 
of British Railways. Yet at first nothing was done to stop continued 
construction of designs originating from the Big Four. From 1948 to 1953 a 
total of 1 ,487 steam locomotives were built to these old company designs.125 
Perhaps the most remarkable case was the order in 1951 to supply the 
North Eastern Region with 28 steam-tank shunting locomotives to a design 
of 1899 - even though diesel shunters had a long history of use on the 
region, and were available to a proven design.126 Between 1951 and 1960 
British Railways produced 999 steam locomotives to twelve standard 
designs.127 These were generally accepted as offering nothing in operation 
that could not be bettered or equalled by the former company designs of 
twenty years previously, and incorporated nothing new on US designs of 
forty years earlier. Some were simply a revamp of LMS designs. Moreover, 
the versatility of the steam locomotive was such that it was not necessary to 
have as many as 12 different types in what was supposed to be an 
integrated system. This essential point had been appreciated as early as 
1935 by E. S. Cox, Riddles' chief assistant, when he concluded that no more 
than four or five types could do the whole of the work on the railways. 128 
Yet, inexplicably, fifteen years later, Cox himself was instrumental in 
designing and producing the twelve standard types, using a massive amount 
of technical manpower and other resources. Almost all of these locomotives 
had a very short life: the majority were withdrawn prematurely, when 
eventually dieselisation proceeded rapidly. 
125 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 87. 
126 James Lowe, British Steam Locomotive Builders (London, 1975), p. 83. 
127 Ibid., p. 86. 
128 E. S. Cox, 'The future of the steam locomotive', The LMS Magazine, 1935. 
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Arguably, the standard locomotives represented a waste of valuable 
resources at a time when the railways were facing severe financial problems. 
Moreover, the effect was compounded by the debatable action of purchasing 
surplus locomotives from the Ministry of Defence. These locomotives had 
been crudely and cheaply built for use in theatres of war, with the 
expectation of a short life-span. Yet Riddles recommended their purchase, 
and from 1948 more than 900 were obtained and integrated into BR stock. 
The costs involved proved considerably more than the purchase prices, 
because expensive modifications were required to make them suitable for 
use on British Railways. 129 Alongside all this, the BTC agreed to 
controversial and expensive modifications to update other classes of steam 
locomotives.130 Substantial spending on this continued until the early 1960s, 
despite a short anticipated life of the converted units owing to the rapid 
advance of dieselisation. 
Gourvish argues that the impact of these decisions was not 
significant: only £28m was spent on additions to the steam locomotive fleet 
between 1948 and 1955, and this figure 'represented only a fraction of the 
sums required to undertake a substantial shift to alternative forms of motive 
power, whether diesel or electric' .131 This argument is debatable for two 
reasons. First, had such a sum been spent on purchase and development of 
main-line diesel locomotives at an average cost of even £70,000 each, a 
substantial fleet could have been obtained. Second, this would have 
provided vital operating experience before full-scale dieselisation, and in all 
129 BTC minute 1/962. On 4 November 1948 the BTC agreed to purchase the first 558 
locomotives for £1-5m. They required modifications to couplings costing £114,000 and 
to boilers costing £157,530, AN85/6. 
130 BTC minute 3/971, 9 November 1950, AN85/4. 
131 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 85. 
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likelihood prevented many of the difficulties experienced later during the 
unplanned rush to dieselise. Moreover, the figures provided by Gourvish do 
not include the substantial spending after 1955 on steam locomotives which 
continued to be constructed until 1960, and on others which were 
expensively rebuilt until 1963. Nor do they allow for the considerable 
expenditure on maintaining and improving the infrastructure, the coaling 
plants, watering facilities, ash pits and turntables which were required to 
support steam traction. In addition many depots were expensively rebuilt to 
continue maintenance of steam locomotives.132 
This use of resources is particularly suspect in contrast with the US, 
where 1950 was a record year for the purchase of diesel traction with 2,372 
units placed in service.133 Had the RE fully investigated the relative costs of 
steam and diesel, it would have found that mass-production techniques had 
substantially reduced the costs of producing diesel locomotives. Their 
investigations appear to have ignored the best available information, 
because the wider railway industry was well aware of international 
developments in traction technology. In the December 1947 Presidential 
Address to the Institute of Locomotive Engineers, Julian Triton delivered his 
findings on the progress of dieselisation in the USA based on extensive 
research there. Perhaps his most revealing discovery was that mass-
production techniques had reduced the initial capital cost of diesels 
compared to steam to a ratio of 1·6:1.134 
132 One of the numerous examples of this was Crewe North depot on which the BTC 
agreed expenditure of £900,000, BTC minute 6/380, 5 May 1955, AN85/5. 
133 Railway Gazette, 6 April 1951, p. 369. 
134 Railway Gazette, 6 February 1948, p. 191. 
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Such a remarkable and highly relevant development eluded the RE, 
but its impact was compounded by a further lack of investigation into 
technical developments. The LNER in common with the other Big Four 
railway companies had thoroughly investigated the operating experience of 
dieselisation in the USA.135 As a result, the LNER Board decided in 1945 
that 25 main-line diesel-electric locomotives be purchased, and that new 
purpose-built maintenance depots should be constructed in London and 
Edinburgh. Invitations were then submitted to suitable contractors to submit 
designs and estimates for the locomotives; but following nationalisation the 
tenders were transferred to the RE, and according to Bonavia, 'the project 
dropped like a stone' .136 This decision was almost certainly unwise, as the 
scheme would have provided valuable technical and operating experience 
which could have influenced the more widespread introduction of 
dieselisation. Moreover, the LNER had in its proposed new depots realised 
another vital factor: the need to separate the maintenance of the two types 
of traction, the technically advanced diesel-electric which required a clean 
working environment, distinct from the steam locomotive surrounded by 
smoke, ash, and coal dust. Again, implementation of the scheme would 
have provided valuable experience: when diesel locomotives were 
eventually introduced, a lack of separate maintenance facilities contributed 
to their initially dismal operating performance. According to Bonavia, this 
provision of proper maintenance facilities before delivery of the new units 
was too often overlooked in BR days with serious consequences.137 
135 Examination of diesel-electric traction in the USA, October 1945, RAIL390/2041. 
136 Bonavia, A History of the LNER, Vol. 3, p. 81. 
137 Ibid., p. 81, see also, unattributed, 'New traction, old sheds', British Railways Illustrated, 
11 (2002), pp. 230-231. 
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Also contained in the LNER Report were two other highly significant 
conclusions gained from research in the USA. First, the versatility of the 
diesel meant that only three types of locomotive were required: shunters, 
freight units of not less than 1300hp, and passenger units of not less than 
2000hp. Second, the same types should be able to work in multiple.138 Yet 
when BR finally introduced dieselisation, more than 21 different types of 
locomotive were ordered, including diesel-electric and diesel-hydraulic. No 
account appears to have been taken of the associated high costs of spares 
and training, and many of the classes could not work in multiple. 
Furthermore, many of the types were so inefficient and unreliable that they 
were disposed of, often well before the steam locomotives that they were 
designed to replace. 
The BTC's and RE's approaches to traction policy were then, short-
sighted, and a result of backward and inward-looking perspectives. Even 
the capability of modem steam traction was rarely used to the full. Cox, a 
leading proponent of the Riddles' approach, accepted that the modem 
locomotives introduced by the Big Four had the potential for more intensive 
use, if operating practices had been able to break loose from traditional 
habits and routines.139 Yet they were not, and Gourvish points out that: 
lt is debatable whether a higher rate of investment in the period 1948-53 would 
have led automatically to a substantial change of policy, but it seems likely that 
Riddles would have found it much harder to resist a more enthusiastic experiment 
with both main-line and branch-line diesels as an alternative to electrification.140 
138 Examination of diesel-electric traction in the USA, October 1945, RAIL390/2041. 
139 Cox, Standard Steam Locomotives, p. 208. 
140 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 89. 
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But the important factor remains that a series of decisions on a vital issue, 
the type of traction, were effectively taken in isolation by Riddles, and this 
resulted in a lost chance to assess new opportunities at an early stage in the 
life of BR. Proper and efficient use of expensive capital equipment was only 
achieved in the second half of the 1960s, when the reliability of the new 
diesel traction reached realistic levels. In traction policy, as in financial 
affairs and operating philosophy, a resistance towards new and more 
efficient practices placed severe constraints on the pace and extent of 
railway modernisation, with significant financial costs. Given the acute 
financial position of the BTC it is remarkable that such a state of affairs was 
allowed to continue for as long as it did. 
IV 
Attlee's government had nationalised the railways in the belief that a state-
owned monopoly would confer benefits to the consumer from improved 
operating efficiency, achieved by more effective integration. lt also accepted 
the need for continuing investment in the newly-nationalised industries, but a 
series of economic events had conspired to restrict its provision. While the 
economic and financial constraints from the aftermath of war might have 
been predicted, the onset of the Cold War probably could not. What is not 
beyond doubt is that the British economy had been required to adjust in the 
light of financial problems, international events and, at the same time, the 
introduction of substantial socialist legislation, all during a short period. A 
series of economic crises forced changes in priorities, and resources were 
diverted to areas considered to be in most pressing need. Yet the impact of 
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this restriction on the railways was not as severe as it might have been, as 
its major investment raw material was steel, and of this it received more than 
80% of its planned requirements. A greater problem was the use of these 
resources. The BTC and RE did not use the steel allocation effectively, 
particularly in traction policy - where in contrast to the American and most 
other European systems it persisted with out-dated technology. 
In the early years of public ownership, it appeared to the railway user 
and the railway employee that the improvements so confidently predicted by 
Labour politicians simply did not occur. There was little change to the 
operation and efficiency of the railways, and nationalisation did not alleviate 
cancellations and delays nor stop price increases. These first years of public 
ownership saw little evidence of the promised reconstruction, or even 
change to the operational capability of the railways. Not only had 
management been of questionable quality resulting in mediocre 
performance, but inconsistencies in the legislation created a series of 
conflicts between the various tiers of management and government. These 
problems and similar difficulties in the other nationalised industries led 
Palling to conclude that: 
Morrison must have felt a little bit like the sorcerer's apprentice who conjured up 
spirits which he soon found beyond his control. 141 
Ashworth is less critical, concluding that the industry was subject to 
exceptional constraints which were not of their own making.142 While that is 
true to an extent, substantial investment resources were made available, but 
not used effectively. The disappointing performance of the railways in those 
141 Palling, The Labour Governments 1945-51, p. 96. 
142 William Ashworth, The State in Business (Basingstoke, 1991 ), p. 121. 
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years undermined its competitive position with road transport, and influenced 
its financial performance for future decades. In addition, possibly the most 
persuasive argument in favour of public ownership - increased efficiency-
had clearly not been achieved. According to Morgan the nationalised 
industries 'remained largely autonomous entities, directed by their own 
remote corporate boards. There was a lack of integration even within 
nationalised transport itself with much wasteful competition.'143 
Many labour issues also remained unresolved, for as Tomlinson 
concluded 'Labour faced with unexpected problems in the labour market 
failed to find much in the way of policy innovations to deal with them' .144 
Those employed on the railways found their industry operated in very much 
the same way as it had been under the Big Four and with similar financial 
constraints. Much of the goodwill and idealism of the railwaymen was soon 
dissipated; according to Bagwell many experienced disillusionment with the 
results of nationalisation.145 This response was mainly due to railway wages 
lagging behind the general wage trend, but it also represented the serious 
disappointment that most railway employees felt with the lack of progress 
made since nationalisation. One indication of this disillusionment occurred 
in December 1950 when the Manchester and District Council of the NUR 
requested that the Union's National Executive Committee should 'press for 
the removal of Bames from his post as Minister of Transport'. Rather than 
following the traditional approach and letting the resolution 'lie on the table', 
the executive forwarded it directly to the Minister.146 
143 Morgan, Labour in Power, p. 135. 
144 Tomlinson, Democratic Socialism, p. 184. 
145 Bagwell, The Railwaymen, p. 623. 
146 Ibid., p. 605. 
122 
Such disappointment with progress and performance extended 
beyond the trade unions. There were attacks on the management of the 
railways and other nationalised industries in the media. Headline news was 
made of the mounting financial losses incurred by the BTC, the NCB and 
civil aviation. Although Morgan is critical of the censure which emanated 
from the right-wing media - 'the Beaverbrook and Rothermere press which 
worked to discredit the government and the very name of nationalisation'147 
- the reality was that the evidence of inefficiency was only too apparent to 
the public. This was important because, as Chick puts it, 'the perceived 
performance of the nationalised industries was of particular political 
relevance for the Attlee government, since the nationalisation programme 
formed one of its major political achievements' .148 Given the public 
corporations' disappointing performance in supply and price, it was not 
surprising that by the end of the 1940s nationalisation was tending to 
become unpopular. In August 1949 a Gallup opinion poll on nationalisation 
of the iron and steel industry found only 24% of respondents in favour, a 
figure which had fallen to 23% in November.149 
These problems and the public response to them led Morrison to seek 
to change the tone of socialist rhetoric, and to move towards a strategy of 
'Consolidation'. He first publicly advocated this change at the 1948 Labour 
party Conference in Scarborough, for even then he appreciated the need to 
create a better image for the existing nationalised industries, and 'the need 
to win more votes from the middle ground of politics which could be attracted 
147 Morgan, Labour in Power, p. 137. 
146 Chick, Industrial Policy in Britain, p. 97. 
149 George H. Gallup, The Gallup International Opinion Polls: Great Britain 1937-75 
(New York, 1976}, p. 191. 
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only if the party appeared non-doctrinal and classless in its approach'.150 
The Labour leadership recognised the political problem: in the 1950 General 
Election campaign they attempted to 'present the party as moderate and 
responsible. Consolidation in the Morrisonian sense dominated Labour's 
style' .151 Furthermore, 'Morrison interpreted the government's greatly 
reduced majority in the 1950 General Election as confirming his belief that 
Labour should "consolidate" rather than attempt further nationalisation and 
he argued that this should be made perfectly clear to the electorate' .152 A 
similar approach was taken for the 1951 General Election, for which Labour 
manifesto references to nationalisation were muted - restricted to promises 
to take over concerns which had failed and to start up new enterprises which 
would serve the nation. According to Morgan, the entire document embodied 
Morrisonian caution on the question of nationalisation.153 
At the 1951 General Election the Labour government was defeated, 
and Churchill formed a new Conservative government with a manifesto 
commitment to introduce greater competition, and to reorganise publicly 
owned road and rail transport into regional groups of workable size.154 This 
approach suited both the BTC which sought simplification of the upper 
echelons of management, and the British Railways regions which assumed 
that decentralisation would confer greater commercial authority to them. 
As will be shown in the next chapter, this attempt to create a more 
coherent organisation with a more commercial outlook was to be engineered 
150 Donoughue and Jones, Herbert Morrison, p. 441. 
151 Morgan, Labour in Power, p. 403. 
152 Donoughue and Jones, Herbert Morrison, p. 456. 
153 Ibid., p. 140. 
154 ConseNative Party Manifesto 1951, p. 3. 
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through new legislation which reflected the Conservatives' different 
approach to national economic management. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE CONSERVATIVES AND CHANGE 1951-54 
Nationalisation has proved itself a failure which has resulted in heavy losses to the 
taxpayer or the consumer, or both. lt has not given general satisfaction to the wage 
earner in the nationalised industries. Wage earners are ill content with the change 
from private employers, with whom they could negotiate on equal terms through the 
Trades Unions, to the all-powerful and remote officials in Whitehall. 
(Conservative Party General Election Manifesto, 1951) 
This chapter will seek to establish the effect of the election of Churchill's 
Conservative government on the management of the railways. A series of 
elements will be examined, beginning with the extent to which national 
economic issues, including the relative decline of the British economy, 
affected British Railways management. Then, the nature of state-industry 
relations and particularly the precise boundaries between them will be 
considered, in order to understand the reasoning behind the Transport Act of 
1953, and in particular its abolition of the Railway Executive. Finally, in 
order to appreciate the competitive position of the railways it is necessary to 
assess the impact of two other issues influencing financial performance: 
labour issues and the growth of road transport. 
The 1951 General Election result was very close, indeed the 
Conservative win derived from the vagaries of the party and electoral system 
-on the sharp decline in the Liberal challenge since the 1950 election,1 and 
on the 'first-past-the-post' arrangement for constituency contests: Labour 
won a majority of the popular vote, but lost because it obtained fewer MPs 
than the Conservative party. Yet despite this close outcome, the election 
1 The Liberals put up 109 candidates compared with 475 in 1950: Morgan, Labour in 
Power, p. 486. 
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was a watershed, in that it signified the end of the socialist experiment of 
attempting to extend and make permanent some of the features of war-time 
society.2 More particularly, as the Conservatives' 1951 General Election 
Manifesto made plain, the return of a Conservative government would lead 
to considerable changes in the organisation of the nationalised industries, 
particularly steel and transport. 
The roots of these changes lay in the 1945 General Election, when the 
Conservative party had opposed nationalisation, presented as a matter of 
establishing a 'standardised and identical structure', 'bureaucratic torpor', 
and 'state monopoly', with 'no proper protection for anyone' - consumer 
interests or independent business. Although wartime controls should 
continue 'for a time', like other transport sectors 'road and rail' would be 
'encouraged and helped to develop their own plans' for 'a transport system 
of the highest efficiency', with the public left to choose between them and 
'with protection against any risk of monopoly charges'. 3 
This approach contrasted sharply with the Attlee governments 1945 
manifesto commitment to nationalisation, which was based on the belief that 
public ownership and large-scale industry would automatically generate 
greater efficiency. While the Conservative view accepted that post-war 
reconstruction would require modernisation and greater efficiency, it also 
assumed that such aims were more likely to be achieved under private 
ownership, even if that did require greater state intervention than hitherto. 
That perspective was most apparent in the Conservative party's attitude 
2 Harriet Jones, 'The Cold War and the Santa Claus syndrome', in Martin Francis and lna 
Zweiniger-Bargielowska (eds.), The Conservatives and British Society 1880-1990 
(Cardiff, 1996), p. 242. 
3 Mr. Churchill's Declaration of Policy to the Electors [Conservative/National government 
election manifesto], 1945. 
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towards iron and steel nationalisation, which it fiercely opposed, and in the 
belief that road transport would be more efficient under private ownership. 
According to Nigel Harris, Conservative policy towards public 
ownership had evolved from a tension between two strands of economic 
thought: 'competition', or the economic liberalism of the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries, and the 'corporatism' of the National government's 
response to the weaknesses of capitalism of the 1930s.4 Crompton argues 
that a further inter-war influence on Conservative acceptance of limited 
nationalisations of public utilities was the type of public corporation which 
had developed under Conservative or Conservative dominated 
governments. These included initiatives such as the Central Electricity 
Generating Board in 1926, the London Passenger Transport Board in 1933, 
and British Overseas Airways in 1939.5 This was significant, because as 
Singleton argues 'by the late 1930s there was little difference between the 
proposals of Labour and of the Macmillanite wing of the Conservative party.6 
Conservative acceptance of this particular model owed much to the 
anticipated independence of the management board. This was to be fully 
responsible for everyday operations, with government intervention only on 
long-term issues and wider strategic matters. 
To this were added the considerable impact of the experience of 
management of the wartime economy, and then the post-war election 
defeat. Harriet Jones's alternative view -that war and defeat made little real 
difference, and that the party merely adopted new tactics to confirm and 
4 Nigel Harris, Competition and the Corporate Society: British Conservatives, the State and 
Industry 1945-1964 (London, 1972}, p.149. 
5 Crompton, 'Good Business for the Nation', p. 146. 
6 Singleton, 'Labour the Conservatives and Nationalisation', p. 19. 
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uphold its familiar objectives7 - seems suspect, given the extent and 
intensity of debate within the party. This turned particularly on the extent of 
the role of the state and the boundaries of public ownership of commerce 
and industry. Although this debate on the extent of nationalisation 
continued, the party's economic policy began to be clarified on the 
ideological level with the publication of the 1947 Industrial Charter.8 This 
accepted many of Labour's measures (although proposing improvements), 
and confirmed a commitment to maintain a high and stable level of 
employment. The Charter was unequivocal in its hostility to nationalisation 
as a general principle, and restated the party's opposition to public 
ownership of iron and steel. Even so, it did not consider it desirable to 
restore coal and the Bank of England to private ownership. 9 Nor was it 
proposed to de-nationalise the railways. Rather, the Charter argued for a 
rebuilding of transport arrangements, and promised 'to give the railways and 
shipping a priority' second only to improvements in power suppliers. 10 
Conservative policy was further developed in The Right Road for Britain 
published in July 1949, which declared that 'most of the nationalised 
industries are wrongly organised. They are over centralised' .11 Railways 
were to be decentralised almost on the basis of the 'Big Four': 
British Railways should be reorganised into an appropriate number of regional 
railway systems, each with their own pride of identity, and co-ordinated as to a 
broad policy alone by a central body. The present top-heaviness due to excessive 
central staff should be corrected and each railway system be administered by its 
7 Jones, 'Cold War and the Santa Claus syndrome', p. 252. 
8 The Industrial Charter was drawn up by a committee appointed as a result of a resolution 
at the Conservative party conference at Blackpool in October 1946. 
9 Industrial Charter, p. 39. 
10 Ibid., p. 8. 
11 Conservative and Unionist Central Office, The Right Road for Britain, (London, 1949), 
p. 27. 
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own board of directors, which should include a strong part-time element of persons 
with varied practical experience of serving the public needs.12 
Macmillan was probably typical of a significant element of the Conservative 
party in being prepared to accept existing nationalisations, but to be strongly 
opposed to more.13 This pragmatism accepted that reversing existing public 
ownership was in many cases impracticable; and anyway for a number of 
Conservatives, the salient question was not what had already been taken 
into public ownership, but what might happen subsequently. In effect, the 
real ideological issue was the extent to which public ownership could be 
extended, and might undermine private enterprise in the future. Therefore, 
iron and steel, and road haulage, both profitable and competitive had, as 
observed by Ramsden, 'provided a real ideological divide, for if these 
industries were to go down, then there was no logical line beyond which 
state ownership might not legitimately be extended in years to come'.14 Yet 
even so, although the Conservatives offered greater economic liberalism, by 
the 1950s they had also accepted the necessity of corporatist ideals which 
recognised the state as a major instrument of change.15 
This revised Conservative perspective was embodied in its 1951 election 
manifesto, which emphatically precluded further public ownership: 'We shall 
stop all further nationalisations'. In addition it was proposed that 'the Iron and 
Steel Act be repealed, and the steel industry allowed to resume its 
achievements of the war and post war years'. This change was 
commensurate with the manifesto commitment 'that in normal times there 
12 Ibid., p. 29. 
13 E. H. H. Green, Ideologies of Conservatism. Conservative Political Ideas in the Twentieth 
Centwy (Oxford, 2002), p.171. 
14 John Ramsden, The Age of Churchill and Eden (London, 1995), p.190. 
15 Harris, Competition and the Corporate Society, p. 149. 
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should be the freest competition'. Other industries such as coal, gas and 
electricity would remain nationalised, but it was proposed: 'there will be more 
decentralisation and stimulation of local initiatives and loyalties'. 
Furthermore, the problem experienced by Labour with the monopoly 
elements of the nationalised industries was to be resolved by bringing them 
within the purview of the Monopolies Commission and ensuring strict 
Parliamentary review of their activities.16 
This alternative approach to economic management was also to apply to 
transport, with the manifesto reaffirming the proposed reorganisation of rail 
and road transport into regional groups of workable size. Private road 
hauliers were to be given the chance to return to business and privately-
owned lorries were no longer to be restricted by a 25-mile operating limit. For 
the coal and railway industries, the alternatives to public ownership were 
limited, partly because the financial performance of both appeared to have 
declined after nationalisation. As Seldon points out, given the current 
condition of the railways no private purchasers would have been prepared to 
buy them back.17 Rather, as indicated in the Industrial Charter, the 
Conservative's approach to the nationalised industries would be to 'set up 
efficient and competitive undertakings'. 18 
The contrast between privatisation in road haulage and continued public 
ownership of the railways occurred for two reasons. First, the Labour 
promises of an integration of all forms of transport under nationalisation had 
simply not happened, and now appeared most unlikely to do so. Second, 
16 British Conservative party General Election Manifesto, 1951, p. 3. 
17 Anthony Seldon, Churchill's Indian Summer: the Conservative Government 1951-55 
(London, 1981), p.186. 
18 Industrial Charter, p. 25. 
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the Road Haulage Association and the British Road Federation had waged a 
steadily intensified campaign for the removal of restraints on private 
haulage. And furthermore, as purchasers were available for road haulage, 
this was an aspect of transport in which the Conservatives could most easily 
pursue their belief that greater competition would reduce costs to the benefit 
of commerce and industry. Denationalised road haulage would allow private 
hauliers to enter the transport market without being hamstrung by legal 
restrictions on operating distances. The Conservative hope was that the 
introduction of competition might make all domestic transport, including the 
nationalised railways, more efficient and productive.19 
An appropriate point to begin assessing the performance of the railways 
from 1951 to 1954 is to re-state the most significant issues facing the newly-
nationalised industries - the need to raise capital intensity, develop technical 
progress, and improve productivity.20 As we have seen, the early years of 
public ownership did not achieve these aims; indeed, in common with the 
coal industry the performance of the railways had deteriorated, certainly 
when measured in terms of financial results. Gourvish attempted to calculate 
the 'true financial results' for British Railways between 1948 and 1973. His 
calculations (which excluded drawings on the abnormal maintenance fund), 
found BR to have a deficit at constant 1948 prices of £20·1 m in 1948, 
19 A fuller account of such related productivity issues can be found in Jim Tomlinson, 'The 
British productivity problem in the 1960s', Past and Present, 175 (2002}, p.192. 
20 Robert Millward and John Singleton, 'The ownership of British industry in the post-war 
era: an explanation', in Millward and Singleton (eds.), Political Economy of Nationalisation, 
p. 316. 
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£29·9m in 1950 and £15·3m in 1951.21 Surprisingly, Gourvish estimated that 
total factor productivity for the railways changed from 1 00 in 1948 to 1 0 1·5 in 
1949, to 101·6 in 1950 and 104·5 in 1950, and to 99·9 in 1951.22 The 
accuracy of these figures can be questioned, given BTC's conclusion that 
the railways had under-performed, but that this was significantly influenced 
by contextual constraints over which it had no control. Defending its record 
in its 1952 Annual Report, the BTC declared: 
The effects of limitations upon either capital investment or use of materials have 
been constantly felt since the Commission took over the railways in 1948, and have 
enforced in many directions a policy of 'make do and mend' which while it may 
have been inevitable, has proved harmful to both efficiency and economy.23 
This statement deserves scrutiny, not least because in the immediate 
aftermath of war private railway companies had made substantial progress in 
rebuilding their infrastructure, despite facing even greater constraints. 
Moreover, as the previous chapter argued, the restrictions imposed by the 
Labour government's resource allocation to the railways were not as 
onerous as for some other industries: substantial resources had been made 
available. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that until 1955 wider national 
economic issues did to an extent constrain railway investment. 
The impact of these constraints was fully understood by Churchill's 
incoming government, which accepted the pressing need to formulate 
economic policies which would create an environment for industrial 
modernisation and increased productivity. This had been recognised as a 
crucial issue in the Industrial Charter of May 1947, with its insistence that 'a 
21 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 587. 
22 Ibid., p. 612. 
23 BTC Annual Report and Accounts 1952, p. 3. 
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high rate of productivity must be restored'.24 However, increased productivity 
also demanded investment, and the provision of capital goods was 
problematic given the economic constraints operating in 1951. Churchill 
made no claims to be an economic expert, but he did realise that many of 
the essential issues underlying economic reconstruction were intertwined 
with international events, and therefore with Britain's foreign policy and 
defence strategy. These required adjustment, not simply to preserve 
national security and prestige, but also because they were essential to an 
international stabilisation on which reconstruction of the British economy 
depended. This meant that at least in the short-term, investment for 
transport reconstruction was a lower priority than stimulating overseas trade 
in order to earn dollars for the purchase of capital goods, vital for 
reconstruction. 
Appreciation of those factors underpinned Churchill's belief in the 
need to cultivate the so-called 'special relationship' with the USA, which he 
considered had suffered as a result of Attlee's supposed reticence towards 
America. The importance Churchill attached to international affairs was 
clearly exemplified by his approach to a ministerial group he established to 
re-assess economic policy: he took the chair only when defence or overseas 
commitments were being considered.25 Given the Korean War and the Cold 
War, it is also understandable that the Churchill government followed the 
Attlee government in giving high priority to defence and its associated 
procurement issues. 
24 Industrial Charter, p. 6. 
25 Meeting of ministerial group to review general economic policy, G.52.29, 17 June 1952, 
T273/315. 
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From the perspective of the railways, the crucial issue is whether defence 
procurement was too extensive, and whether its effects on the British 
economy affected the ability of the railways to modernise. In January 1950 
defence spending was estimated to have absorbed just under 7% of GNP, 
and was scheduled to increase to 15% in 1953.26 The impact of this 
increased spending intensified the existing shortage of labour, apparent not 
only on the railways, but also in many sectors of the economy. 
Nevertheless, despite full awareness of this problem, the government's 
emphasis remained centred on resolving defence priorities such as aircraft 
production. When that industry reported output well below target, the 
Ministry of Defence estimated in October 1951 that an additional12,000 
workers were needed to reach production targets; 27 yet attempts to achieve 
this only exacerbated the existing shortages in the wider labour market. 
Related labour shortages in the engineering industry further aggravated the 
problem of new recruitment and retention of existing employees on the 
railways, and additionally caused supply problems with some components.28 
This increased defence spending created new and wider employment 
opportunities in defence-related industries and these generally offered better 
working conditions and higher remuneration than the railways. Alongside 
this, the growth in production of consumer goods generated a further 
expansion of employment opportunities, often in new factories and many 
cases located in South East England. 
26 Cabinet Economic Steering Committee: impact on the economy of the defence 
procurement programme, 7 July 1951, T229/705. 
27 Cabinet Economic Steering Committee Report on economic prospects for 1952. Cabinet 
Office, 22 October 1951, T229/705. 
28 Ibid., para. 9. 
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Many workers, especially younger ones, were happy to exchange the 
hard physical labour and anti-social hours of railway work for the regular 
hours of life in a factory. By the end of 1951 the BTC reported a net loss of 
10,000 men in key grades: train crews, shunters, signalmen and permanent 
way staff. lt was not easy to respond, because in contrast to many other 
competitors, increasing the wage rates of key occupations was considered 
impracticable, given a highly-unionised labour force which would demand 
comparable increases across all grades of workers: the railways could not 
sustain such comprehensive wage increases. Instead, the BTC attempted 
to counteract the problem through certain improvements in conditions of 
service, particularly enhanced lodging allowances for drivers and firemen, 
and the introduction of a five-day week for civil engineering and telegraph 
staff (though with a reversion to a 5% day-week in winter).29 However, 
these changes made little impact, and recruitment and retention of labour 
remained problematic. Even recruitment of Italians and immigrants from the 
Empire - a move agreed with the railway unions - failed to resolve the 
labour shortages. By 1955 the position was such that these labour 
shortages in areas such as Birmingham and London were reported to have 
reached 'epic proportions'.30 
In contrast to shortages where the railway work tended to be 
unpleasant, where the conditions were more favourable there was the 
opposite problem- instances of over-supply of labour. Yet there is no 
evidence that labour efficiency was a management priority. An example is 
Durrant's account of his experience in the drawing-office at Swindon Works 
29 BTC minute 4/421,24 May 1951, AN85/4. 
30 BTC Annual Report and Accounts 1955, paras. 1 0-12, p. 3. 
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in 1955: 'I had very little to do and when others talked about football, I bent 
over my drawing board looking quite industrious and worked on my own 
designs'.31 Similarly, the managers of railway workshops only identified 
labour productivity as a problem after the introduction of the Modernisation 
Plan, when the future of a number of works began to be questioned. 
Consequently, labour difficulties - supply and efficiency - conspired 
with shortages of coal and steel to create operational and investment 
problems, reflecting some basic weaknesses in the national economy. This 
was recognised by the Treasury, which concluded that 'an additional million 
tons of steel in 1952 would revolutionise economic prospects'.32 That 
increased production was not achieved, with the result that steel allocations 
worked to the disadvantage of the railways: despite strongly arguing their 
case in February 1952, they again received 80% of planned requirements. 
Again rolling-stock replacement was restricted, and railway modernisation 
was to some extent hindered. 
Continuing restraints on railway investment resulted from another 
inheritance from the previous government: a balance-of-payments crisis, 
which the Treasury considered worse than that of 1949, and in many ways 
even worse than 1947. With a surplus of £221m in 1950 turning into a deficit 
of £4 72m in 1951 , there was also heavy speculation against sterling in New 
York, and a drain on the gold and foreign exchange reserves. 33 As a result, 
Butler, the new Chancellor of the Exchequer, was forced to accept that it 
was impossible to maintain the rearmament programme without reducing the 
31 A. E. Durrant, Swindon Apprentice (Cheltenham, 1989), p. 138. 
32 Cabinet Economic Steering Committee Report on economic prospects for 1952, 
T229no5. 
33 Sir Edward Bridges, Secret Report on economic prospects for 1952, October 1951, 
T273/315. 
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amount and pace of other government expenditure. He therefore 
implemented a review of all government spending in an attempt to 'hold tight 
on to the essentials and drop the superfluities'.34 The result was that in early 
1952 Butler announced cuts in government expenditure and a tighter 
economic policy,35 including measures to restrict the number of motor 
vehicles (both commercial and private) allowed on the market,36 a policy 
from which the railways obtained some benefit. 
After 1951 , growth in the national economy led to an end of shortages 
and a number of controls were removed. Yet progress in railway investment 
remained relatively low in contrast with European experience, and levels of 
productivity also compared unfavourably, particularly with the United 
States.37 This problem of low productivity was not confined to the railways; it 
was a feature of many sectors of the British economy, and emerged as a 
serious issue which, according to Tomlinson, was particularly apparent in the 
1950s and the early 1960s.38 As a result 'declinism' (with a premise that 
successive governments contributed to decline by their insouciance) 
became the dominant framework for analysing the post-war economy. 39 
Having identified the problem of low productivity in the Industrial Charter, the 
34 Treasury minutes: Impact on the economy of the defence procurement programme, 28 
Sept. 1951 , T229/705. 
35 A reduction from 100,000 in 1951 to 60,000 in 1952. 
36 Chancellor: 'Towards solvency- the next steps', 5 November 1951, T273/315. 
37 An index of real GDP per hour worked showed for 1950 the UK at 100 and the US at 171, 
and by 1960, 1 00 and 17 4: Cairncross, British Economy since 1945, p. 16. 
38 Jim Tomlinson, 'Inventing decline, the falling behind of the British economy in the post-war 
years', Economic History Review, 49 (1996), p. 732. 
39Jim Tomlinson, 'Liberty with order: Conservative economic policy 1951-64' in Martin 
Francis and lna Zweiniger-Bargielowska (eds.), The Conservatives and British Society, 
(Cardiff, 1996), p. 274. 
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Conservatives now had fuller evidence from a range of indices such as 
share of world trade, industrial production and growth in national income.40 
The overall effect of low productivity was to constrain economic 
growth, and particularly investment in key areas such as transport. Kirby 
draws attention to the Elbaum-Lazonick early-start thesis, which contends 
that lower economic growth in Britain can to some extent be attributed to its 
early start in industrialisation which allowed international competition to 
improve techniques and overtake Britain. 41 Kirby further draws on the Olsen 
theory, that political stability and victory in two world wars allowed special 
interest groups to consolidate their position.42 On the railways, there is 
evidence to support this view from the experiences of Richard Hardy during 
his time as shedmaster of Stewarts Lane depot in London: 
In many large passenger and freight terminals, marshalling yards and locomotive 
depots, practices grew up again as a matter of expedience, that would never have 
been tolerated before the war and which should never have been allowed to persist 
when peace returned.43 
Whatever the underlying causes of relatively low productivity, it is undeniable 
that there was a contrast between the re-development of the British 
economy and that of continental Europe and Japan, where war-time 
destruction and occupation led to a radical re-structuring of their economies. 
The result was that West Germany, France and Japan experienced rapid 
growth rates linked to increased productivity after 1945, which allowed the 
financing of earlier and more extensive re-development of their transport 
40 Ibid., p. 27 4. 
41 Bernard Elbaum and William Lazonick, 'The decline of the British economy: an 
institutional perspective', Journal of Economic History, 44 (1984), pp. 567-583. 
42 M. W. Kirby, 'Institutional rigidities and economic decline: reflections on the British 
experience', Economic History Review, 45 (1992), pp. 649-650. 
43 Richard Hardy, Beeching, p. 19. 
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networks than was achieved in Britain. Such programmes were seen as a 
pre-requisite for reconstruction, because their national railway systems had 
been so badly damaged. 
Their post-war transitional processes resulted in more effective and 
rapid modernisation than in Britain for two reasons. The first was, again, 
wartime destruction. In France and West Germany, reconstruction of the 
railway system could incorporate new and improved designs of both 
infrastructure and traction. Second, these railways adopted a more 
commercially-aware strategy towards reconstruction and modernisation. 
Brooksbank identifies an important explanation: 'management staff on 
French and West German railways ... were generally better qualified 
academically and technically than on BR. Furthermore, the standard of 
training on the continent, right through from the bottom ranks to the top was 
much more thorough and rigorous'.44 So, although European countries as 
well as Britain recognised electrification was desirable, in both France and 
West Germany, electrification (and much dieselisation) was introduced in a 
properly controlled manner, with steam traction carefully phased out as 
modernisation proceeded, on either a sector or regional basis. The result 
was that those countries dispensed with steam traction well after Britain, but 
their rundown was more ordered and cost-effective. As will be shown later, 
all this contrasted with an unplanned rush by British Railways to replace 
steam traction with diesel, a departure which proved to be hugely expensive 
and troublesome, as well as being highly embarrassing for public relations. 
44 B. W. L. Brooksbank, Triumph and Beyond, the East Coast Main Line 1939-59, 
(Oidham, 1997), p. 43. 
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The result of this process was to exacerbate the already serious decline in 
passenger and freight revenues. 
11 
Gourvish concluded that 'the nationalisation period got off on the wrong 
organisational foot and the structure erected in 1947 was the first of several 
defective solutions offered in the [following] quarter century covered in this 
book'.45 Even Bagwell, despite his support for nationalisation, accepted that 
'the Transport Act of 1947 had its weaknesses'.46 As has been shown, the 
Labour government had recognised problems arising from its legislation, but 
its attempts at remedial action had been limited to marginal improvements in 
the status quo. In contrast, the Conservative government sought 
fundamental readjustment through the belief in competition, rather than 
control and planning. This was part of a wider policy difference, expressed 
by Peden as suspicion of the machinery of government inherited from 
Labour, and a move towards the use of short-term financial instruments 
rather than planning or direct controls. Central planning was distrusted to 
such an extent that its meaning became restricted to no more than inter-
departmental discussion and co-ordination, aimed at ensuring that 
government economic policy was rational and consistent. 47 
The Conservative's effort to improve performance in transport turned 
upon the organisational changes outlined in the 1951 election manifesto -
the reorganisation into regional groups and the privatisation of road haulage. 
These changes required amendment of the 1947 Transport Act, set out in 
45 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 67. 
46 Bagwell, The Railwaymen, p. 634. 
47 G. C. Peden, The Treasury and British Public Policy (Oxford, 2000), pp. 428, 441. 
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the White Paper, Transport Policy (Cmd. 8538) of May 1952, and 
implemented through the 1953 Transport Act. Understanding the timing, 
content and rationale for this amending legislation requires appreciation of 
three key issues: first, questions about the boundaries of authority and 
power between government and management; second, the immediate 
operating problems created by the practical constraints under which the 
industry operated; and third, how the 1953 Transport Act was expected to 
resolve the issues. 
The Minister chiefly responsible was Lord Leathers, Minister for the 
Co-ordination of Transport, Fuel and Power- a new cabinet post, the 
creation of which recognised the importance of these industries in national 
reconstruction, and the need for improved interaction between them. Also 
initially involved was John Maclay, the Minister of Transport and Civil 
Aviation, but without a seat in the Cabinet. Maclay, however, had poor 
health, and a crisis over fares on London Transport in May 1952 precipitated 
his resignation and replacement by Alan Lennox-Boyd - an unsettlement in 
a key office which hardly assisted solutions to a complex and difficult issue. 
For these ministers and the government generally, the predominant issue 
was creation of more effective and efficient management of transport, to be 
engineered through greater competition and decentralisation. 
As Chapter 2 has shown, the difficulties in the relations between 
government and transport management had been most obvious in pricing 
policy and labour relations, where each had acted with differing and 
sometimes conflicting aims. Steel argued that understanding such conflicts 
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requires a distinction between political intervention and power,48 a question 
that recurs during this analysis of the railway industry. As far as the railways 
were concerned, the intention of the legislators had been clear: the power to 
control the running of British Railways was to be vested in the BTC. This was 
based on the belief that only under such a structure could the industry be run 
on commercial lines for the benefit of the consumer. However, the lack of 
clarity in drafting the legislation resulted in political intervention beyond that 
anticipated in the 1947 Transport Act, thus conflicting with the powers of the 
BTC. 
The issue of political intervention and power was exemplified by a 
further disagreement between the government and railway management 
over fare increases. This arose when the BTC planned to introduce a 
revised scheme of fares on 2 March 1952 in London, and on 1 May in the 
provinces. After the implementation of the increases in London, there was a 
public outcry which raised such serious concern in the Cabinet that after 
strong debate, Maclay was instructed to issue a Direction (under Section 82 
of the 1947 Transport Act) dated 15 April 1952, ordering the BTC not to raise 
fares on 1 May. The proposed scheme of increases was referred back to the 
Central Transport Consultative Committee (CTCC), even though this had 
already pronounced in favour of the railways. The result was serious disquiet 
in the BTC at the Minister's intervention, and the issue created such tensions 
between the two parties that 'subsequent negotiations produced little but a 
continuation of the bitter atmosphere'.49 
48 David Steel, 'Government and industry in Britain', British Journal of Political Science, 12 
(1982), p. 484. 
49 Gourvish, British Railways, pp. 104. 
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A further factor which influenced board - government relations was 
the attitude adopted by Hurcomb. As Seldon puts it, Hurcomb interpreted his 
function as 'a relationship of non co-operation with the MOT' - and as a 
former permanent secretary in that department, he knew how to make things 
difficult for the Minister. 50 
These disputes over the boundaries of authority between the BTC 
and government led to a lack of harmony in relations between them. The 
extent of this can be illustrated by Hurcomb's approach towards fuel and 
traction policy. When continued and serious coal shortages prompted the 
Ministry of Fuel and Power to take measures designed to guarantee supplies 
for domestic (household) consumers, it pressed for reductions in 
consumption elsewhere. Economies were sought from the main consumers 
of coal through more efficient use, and if possible by conversion to 
alternative fuel supplies. The railways appeared to offer much scope for 
economies, through dieselisation and electrification. Yet when the BTC was 
approached in March 1952, Hurcomb's response was both ambiguous and 
unhelpful, managing to argue for both steam and diesel traction. He insisted 
that the low first cost, adaptability, and long life of the steam engine would 
require its continuation in use for some time. He further argued that given 
the current financial position of the railways, diesel alternatives were 
unaffordable. Nevertheless, and somewhat disingenuously, he also insisted 
that nationalisation had not stifled engineering initiative in new types of 
traction, and had made it easier to transfer diesel technology and workings 
between regions. Hurcomb stressed that the BTC had been interested in 
50 Seldon, Churchill's Indian Summer, p. 232. 
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dieselisation since its inception, and had called for a full technical report on 
the future types of motive power from the RE.51 Yet the report had been 
delivered to the RE five months earlier, in October 1951 , and despite its 
recommendations for full-scale trials with diesel traction, none had been 
sanctioned. 52 Moreover, at the same time new designs for steam 
locomotives were being prepared, and additional orders placed for 
substantial numbers of the BR standard types. 53 If Hurcomb was aware of 
the contents of the RE Traction Report, he had clearly misled Leathers; if he 
was unaware of the report, then his working relationship with the RE left 
much to be desired. In either case, Hurcomb had publicly supported the 
views of Riddles, whose response to the RE Traction Report was dismissive, 
and who was very much opposed to its recommendations for diesel trials. 54 
Churchill was not convinced by Hurcomb's response, and prompted 
by the continuing energy problems suggested further investigation. The 
result was detailed correspondence between the Prime Minister and an 
acquaintance of his, the technical commentator Bernard Baruch of New 
York. Baruch confirmed that in the United States, where dieselisation had 
been successfully implemented, one ton of diesel fuel could do the work of 
five tons of coal, and that in the US there were 'large savings due to 
dieselisation'. 55 When confronted with this evidence the RE offered several 
counter arguments. The railway's use of coal kept a number of collieries 
open; the greater cost of imported fuel had to be paid for in dollars, and the 
higher initial expenditure on diesel traction made the option less favourable. 
51 Hurcomb to Leathers, 22 March 1952, MT62/142. 
52 Confidential report on Types of motive power, October 1951, p.179. 
53 A total of 999 were constructed between 1951 and 1960. 
54 Riddles to the RE, 23 January 1952, AN88/77. 
55 Baruch to PM, 25 January 1952, PREM11/289. 
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Its central argument was that a main-line diesel locomotive costing £78,000 
compared unfavourably to its steam equivalent at £20,000. Although the RE 
accepted that the two main-line diesel locomotives built by the Southern 
Railway before nationalisation could do three times the mileage of their 
steam equivalents, 56 management appeared unwilling or unable to roster the 
units effectively, and claimed that there were few turns of duty which could 
justify the higher initial capital costs.57 The reality was that the diesel units 
were simply not used to anywhere near their full capacity, owing to 
unwillingness to alter traditional operational thinking. Furthermore, the 
argument regarding the high cost was undermined by one being sent as a 
display to the Festival of Britain Exhibition in January 1951 ; it did not return 
to service until November of that year.58 This inability to move away from 
traditional working habits and to embrace the potential operating advantages 
of technical change as had been done in the US, resulted in the need for 
more extreme action later. 
This conflict between the BTC and government regarding the power 
to make decisions was accompanied by tensions about the boundaries of 
authority between the three tiers of railway management: the BTC, the RE, 
and the regions, and railway management appeared excessively influenced 
by this. The problems created by these difficult relations between the BTC 
and the RE, led Hurcomb in early 1951 to request a review of railway 
organisation. As a result the RE was pre-occupied with this exercise for 
56 Tests on the SA showed that the two units could replace four steam locomotives, 'Sir 
Eustace's diesels', British Railways Illustrated, 7 (1998), p. 160. 
57 Response to PM's personal minute, 18 April1952, PREM11/289. 
58 
'Sir Eustace's diesels', p. 159. 
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much of 1951, and finally concluded that the only feasible change would be 
all-in transport management.59 
Relationships between the two bodies were not improved when 
Barnes appointed a new chairman of the RE, John Elliot on the retirement of 
Missenden in February 1951. This appointment was controversial- Elliot 
was not Hurcomb's choice, and as Gourvish has explained 'EIIiot was more 
relaxed with Hurcomb than Missenden had been, but relations between the 
two bodies remained chilly'. 60 
In May 1951 , only a couple of months after his appointment, Elliot 
visited the USA to undertake an investigation into organisation and 
decentralisation in American railroads.61 For the new RE Chairman to be 
away for some three weeks at such an early stage indicates the priority 
given to investigating possibilities for the future. Elliot's conclusions 
emphasised that in American practice, control of policy, use of capital and 
other major expenditure, and exercise of final decisions, was securely held 
at the top level of management. He also found that management by specific 
function was used there to a marked degree, and that far fewer committees 
were used than on BR. As a result, the decision-making process was 
quicker, and many issues were settled outright, often by the Chairman of the 
Board who wielded major authority in systems which did not depend always 
on collective responsibility at the top.62 These findings, especially the one 
59 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 62. 
60 Ibid., p. 62. 
61 Visit to the USA by the Chairman of the RE for consultation on top organisation and 
decentralisation in American railroads, May 1951, AN6/4. 
62 Elliot, conclusions from examination of the management structures of: New York Central, 
Pennsylvania, Santa Fe, Baltimore and Ohio Railroads, May 1951, AN6/4. 
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regarding the number of committees, were ignored by the BTC with 
significant management implications. 
Elliot also quickly responded to the operational issues and practical 
constraints facing the railways. His new thinking saw an immediate response 
to the BTC's concern over RE headquarter costs. According to Gourvish, on 
this issue 'EIIiot established another committee, staffed this time by retired 
officers. Their report of June 1951 accepted that the unification drive had 
produced no real savings, and proposed to make cuts of £40,000 a year, 
about 1 0% of headquarter staff costs'. 63 
Although such costs were easily recognisable, they represented only 
a small element of the financial problems facing the railways. This was 
understood by the BTC, with the result that a traffic-costing service was 
formally introduced in October 1951. Part of the stimulus for this move came 
from the findings of A. W. Tait (from January 1950 the BTC's Principal Costs 
Officer), who had concluded 'that British Railways passenger services as a 
whole were being run at a substantialloss'.64 1n addition, the BTC published 
a sample of road and rail passenger costs in its 1950 Annual Report, 
published in June 1951 . These statistics clearly identified the substantial loss 
making problems of passenger services which stopped at most stations, and 
branch line services.65 Also, in 1951 the RE's Working Party on Fares and 
Country Services (when it attempted to rationalise the system of fares), 
found that many rural services could never be competitive with road 
63 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 63. 
64 Ibid., p. 108. 
65 BTC Annual Report and Accounts, p. 71. 
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transport, not only for physical reasons, but for the quality of service 
including comfort, speed and location of stations. 66 
Despite all this evidence and expert advice, the response of 
management to these fundamental cost issues was insignificant. Moreover 
Gourvish noted that 'the most telling demonstrations of the unremunerative 
nature of much of the railways' traffic were not given much publicity. Nor 
were they the subject of much debate at Commission or Executive level 
before 1954'. The reality was that these problems, fundamental to the 
financial position of the railways, were never fully confronted by the BTC 
until the arrival of Beaching. 
In addition to financial problems, there were a string of serious 
operational issues. Elliot identified a number and called for improvements 
from the Chief Regional Officers (CROs), whom he considered vital to 
operational efficiency. In particular Elliot wanted more effective management 
of the workforce: he stressed that the achievement of high standards could 
only be realised through continuous supervision of staff at all levels. Another 
of Elliot's main concerns was the late running of passenger trains. The 
CROs explained this as being the result of labour difficulties, particularly the 
widespread inexperience of station staff, but problems with the quality of 
footplate staff and steam coal also contributed.67 To aggravate the late 
running problems, many train journeys were scheduled to take much longer 
than before the war. Explanations are offered by a former BR employee, 
Peter Caster: 'there was a resistance to cut schedules', and 'while those in 
charge lacked little in experience there was a reluctance to innovate and 
66 MOT, Working paper on fares and country services, RE, February 1951, AN6/40. 
67 Memo from Chairman RE to Chief Regional Officers, 27 April 1951 , AN6/5. 
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accelerate trains'. 68 In addition, the already poor perception of the railways 
among travellers was exacerbated by a significant number of trains being 
cancelled, because of staff failing to report for duty. This led to an RE 
acceptance that stronger disciplinary action was required. Even so, the 
problems continued. Elliot found it necessary to request that the BTC Joint 
Consultative Council and the trades unions should examine the lack of eo-
operation, and the non-acceptance by staff of arrangements previously 
agreed with the unions.69 Yet this too proved unproductive, and labour 
relations continued to deteriorate to the detriment of operational efficiency. 
As for freight services, the position was arguably even worse. 
According to Riddles, freight trains experienced labour and quality of coal 
problems, aggravated by a total of 106,000 axle boxes running hot in 1951, 
which required the stopping of 150 trains a day?0 Surprisingly, Riddles 
anticipated no improvement to the problem in the near future, blaming the 
continuing steel shortages which meant fewer new wagons would be 
available, and that a higher proportion of the existing fleet would require 
repair in the future.71 This was hardly valid in itself, for another significant 
element of this problem was that BR utilised its wagon fleet inefficiently. This 
poor usage placed pressure on operating capability for some time. Although 
steel supplies improved after 1952, financial stringencies determined by the 
Treasury reduced the 1954 wagon-building programme. But this reduction 
from a planned annual 51,000 units to 40,000 still represented a substantial 
68 Peter Caster, The Book of the A4 Pacifies (Cophill, 2005), p. 54. 
69 Meeting of BTC and RE, 15 January 1953, AN13/1088. 
70 The axle box is fundamental to the operation of the wheels for it bears the full weight of 
the truck, and running hot indicates a defective wheel bearing which can ultimately result 
in seizure. 
71 Minutes of meeting of BTC and RE, 17 January 1952, AN13/1 098. 
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improvement to capital stock. Furthermore, Riddles did not adequately 
explain why steel shortages should have had such a severe impact upon the 
repair programme for wagon wheel bearings. 
In addition to the inadequate response to operational failures, another 
example of questionable management included decisions to divert traffic 
from the railways to road or sea transport, even though the experience of 
1947 had been that such diversions lost trade to the railways in the long 
term. The policy was repeated during the winter of 1951-2, when a total of 
180,000 tons of coal, including supplies for railway locomotives, was 
diverted to road transport and coastal shipping.72 Another instance arose 
when the Western Region began to be supplied with steel rails from 
Workington rather than Port Talbot: it was decided to transport them by sea. 
Keith Grand, then Chief Regional Officer of the Western Region, argued that 
this was justified by the availability of cheap coastal shipping rates, the 
existence of a freight bottleneck at Crewe, and the release of wagons for 
other purposes. Even so, given a need to maintain railway business in a 
more competitive transport environment, this was hardly a sound commercial 
policy. lt also indicated a lack of commercial awareness at regional level, in 
that freight-traffic receipts had shown a constantly falling trend and become 
a contributory factor to the precarious financial position of the railways. 
Furthermore, it also raised questions about authority and communications 
within the organisations, for the BTC had earlier decreed that the transport of 
freight by sea, including coal for locomotive purposes was to cease?3 
72 Meeting of BTC and RE, 15 November 1951, AN13/1088. 
73 Minutes BTC and RE, 15 November 1952, AN13/1 088. 
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Against this background Transport Policy was published on 8 May 
1952?4 Its purpose was to outline the government's general principles on 
transport policy and its attitude towards the BTC, in support of the 
Conservative view that 'new and constructive legislation is imperative': 
1. Her Majesty's Government has had under consideration ever since they took 
office the situation resulting from the passing of the Transport Act 1947. In their 
view this Act has not achieved and is not likely to achieve its avowed purpose which 
was 'to provide or secure or promote the provision of an efficient, adequate, 
economical and properly integrated system of public inland transport and port 
facilities within Great Britain for passengers and goods' and 'to provide most 
efficiently for the needs of the public, agriculture, commerce and industry'. 
2. In spite of the efforts made by the BTC and its Executives, integration of its road 
and rail services into a co-ordinated whole has made little progress and shows little 
real prospect of developing into much more than working arrangements between 
separate transport entities. Even if integration were in its fullest sense practicable, it 
would result in an unwieldy machine, ill-adapted to meet with promptitude the 
varying and instant demands of industry.75 
lt was made clear to the BTC that while it might submit observations for 
consideration, no fundamental alteration of policy could be contemplated. 
Nevertheless, while the White Paper was being drafted, the BTC had 
produced its own plans: these sought to secure greater decentralisation of 
authority to the regions, combined with the development of a road-rail 
service for freight under a single commercial management. These were sent 
to the Minister at the end of 1951 , but the government was bound by its 
manifesto commitments and planned alternative arrangements. 
Even so, Hurcomb wrote to Lennox-Boyd in August 1952 asking for 
the RE's abolition and transfer of its powers to the Commission by 
74 Transport Policy (Parliamentary Papers 1951-52, Cmd. 8538, xxv, 821 ). 
75 Ibid., p. 2. 
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October?6 This view was supported in the regions, for when Lennox-Boyd 
raised the issue of re-organisation with three of the CROs; he discovered 
that drastic decentralisation was very popular with them.77 
Hurcomb's request was discussed in the Cabinet Committee on 
Transport Policy, but while Lennox-Boyd was personally convinced that it 
would provide greater flexibility of administration, several of his colleagues 
were strongly opposed to it. This opposition was not based on strategic 
arguments but political: first that the timing of the process would make it 
appear that it had been introduced too late for Parliament to consider, and 
second that only in railway circles was there widespread support for 
decentralisation.78 Despite these misgivings Lennox-Boyd's view eventually 
prevailed, and it was decided to adopt Hurcomb's proposal. The result was: 
The functions previously exercisable by the Executives known respectively as the 
Railway Executive, the Road Haulage Executive, the Docks and Inland Waterways 
Executive and Hotels Executive shall become directly exercisable by the 
Commission?9 
While this particular organisational problem may have been effectively 
resolved there was another issue, arguably more controversial. This was the 
disposal of the Road Haulage Executive (RHE), which had significant 
financial repercussions for the BTC. Even so, the issue was cordially 
discussed between the BTC and MOT, despite conflicts over the exercise of 
authority, and the BTC's complaint at the absence of meaningful dialogue 
with the MOT on preparing the legislation. Although Hurcomb expressed 
76 Hurcomb to Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation, 1 August 1952, PREM11/559. 
77 Lennox-Boyd to Cabinet Committee on Transport Policy, 22 September 1952, 
PREM11/559. 
78 Lennox-Boyd to Cabinet Committee on Transport Policy, 18 September 1952, 
PREM11/559. 
79 The British Transport Commission (Executives) Order 1953, para. 2, MT96/35. 
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appreciation of the 'friendly atmosphere which prevailed at their meeting',80 
he argued that the loss of the RHE would not just undermine the integration 
of transport services, a major objective of the 1947 Transport Act; it would 
also be a considerable blow to the Commission, depriving it of one of the 
most lucrative parts of the transport undertakings. Hurcomb asked that at 
the very least the BTC should retain motor vehicles equivalent to those 
formerly operated by the pre-nationalised railway companies.81 However, 
the possibility of this seemed remote given the lack of any real progress 
towards transport integration, and the starkly contrasting view of Lennox-
Boyd: 'decentralisation must be shown to be a fundamental principle of 
transport policy and the return of road transport to private enterprise is 
decentralisation in its most virile and traditional form'.82 This view was 
influenced by an awareness of discontent with nationalised road haulage by 
many traders, who had been loud in their condemnation of the worsening of 
services since 1948.83 In addition, Churchill stressed to Leathers the 
productivity and cost issues. The road arm of the BTC appeared inefficient 
when 'a million vehicles are restricted and fettered for the sake of 40,000 
nationalised vehicles whose management requires 12,000 men to sit at 
desks at a cost of £6m a year'. 84 
The 1952 White Paper proposed that the BTC should receive 
compensation for the sale of the Road Haulage Executive, financed by a 
levy on road transport: 
80 Hurcomb to Lennox-Boyd, 18 June 1952, MT62/138. 
81 Cabinet Committee on Transport Policy, 9th meeting, 9 June 1952, CAB 134/1186. 
82 Lennox-Boyd to Cabinet Committee on Transport Policy, 11th meeting, 22 September 
1952, PREM11/559. 
83 Birchinall (MOT) to Lennox-Boyd, 19 July 1952, MT62/138. 
84 PM to Leathers, 14 July 1952, MT62/138. 
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First, the sale of the Road Haulage Executive's undertaking is likely to involve the 
Commission in some loss. Secondly, the expansion of road haulage will no doubt 
result in some further transfer of traffic from rail to road which cannot be offset by 
countervailing economies in railway operations, including the closing down of 
redundant capacity. The Government propose that compensation for the losses 
arising from these two causes should be provided by a levy on road vehicles, 
including those of 'C' licensees.85 
In effect, this White Paper accepted the likelihood of further losses of traffic 
by the railways, which were unlikely to be offset by economies of operation. 
The solution envisaged was compensation for the railways, financed by a 
levy on road transport. However, this idea proved to be highly controversial, 
attracting considerable and widespread opposition from organisations which 
made large-scale use of road haulage, including the Road Haulage 
Association and the British Road Federation. The Post Office also strongly 
objected, for its ownership of over 350 long-distance lorries and numerous 
smaller vehicles meant that the financial burden of a levy could be 
substantial.86 lt may also have been significant that the BTC, which had not 
been consulted until Conservative policy had been formulated, indicated 
serious misgivings about the introduction of the subsidy principle into railway 
finance.87 As the Cabinet Committee on Transport Policy (CCTP) stated, 'the 
BTC have never expressed a specific objection to the levy. The RE had 
done so, but it was thought that their opposition was prompted by their 
dislike of a remodelled Commission'.88 
85 Transport Policy, para. 15, p. 3. 
86 Herbrand Sackville (Post-Master General) to Butler, 23 June 1952, MT62/138. 
87 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 138. 
88 CCTP, 22 September 1952, PREM11/559. 
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According to Gourvish, the proposal 'had attracted considerable 
opposition, not only from inside the Cabinet from Butler and Swinton, 89 but 
also on the backbenches and in the press. Yet this view, in part at least; 
conflicts with cabinet records, which indicate that Butler wished to retain the 
levy, on the basis that its abandonment would leave the exchequer with the 
ultimate financial responsibility for the railways.90 Nevertheless the 
government was divided on the issue. Doubt about the impact of the levy 
was raised by Lord Woolton,91 who argued that 'whatever we say, everyone 
else will say (and believe) the levy is a featherbed subsidy and a disincentive 
to the railways to be more efficient and economical. The BTC take this view 
themselves'.92 Woolton's views carried great weight, for he was a highly 
influential figure, as a former Conservative party chairman who had done 
much to mastermind the 1951 election victory. He was thought to 
understand 'popular opinion'. The Cabinet dropped the proposal after this 
warning from Woolton, 'Not only is the levy universally unpopular, 
government supporters as well as government critics strongly believe it is 
wrong .... I do not believe that it will survive debate in the Commons'.93 
As a result the BTC received no financial compensation for the loss of 
road transport- something which it considered to be its most profitable 
activity, and the one with the strongest potential for growth. 
Unsurprisingly, there was opposition to the Conservatives' proposals 
from the trade unions which still strongly supported nationalisation of all 
inland transport, despite their disappointment with union representation on 
89 Viscount Swinton (Commonwealth Relations), 1952-55. 
90 Cabinet Conclusions, 29 November 1952, PREM11/559. 
91 Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster 1952-55. 
92 Woolton to CCTP, 22 September 1952, PREM11/559. 
93 Woolton to CCTP, 2 October 1952, PREM11 /559. 
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the management boards. At the September 1952 TUC Conference, James 
Figgins, General Secretary of the NUR since 1948, moved a resolution on 
behalf of the three railway unions condemning the 1952 White Paper. A 
specific objection was the lack of prior consultation with the unions about the 
effects of the changes. The long-term impact of this trade union opposition to 
private ownership of road transport became apparent later, when the unions 
proved intransigent towards the introduction of new working practices 
designed to improve operating efficiency and greater transport integration. 
The Transport Act of 1953 followed the White Paper and 
encompassed many of its proposals. Its intention was to remedy the 
practical deficiencies in the BTC's management structure, and this was not 
simply a question of the troubled relationship between the BTC and the RE: 
there was also the problem, as the Institute of Public Administration put it, of 
the 'very complexity of the organisation'.94 In order to remedy these 
problems the Minister abolished the RE and the other executives95 (with the 
exception of London Transport which was retained for one year) on 19 
August 1953, with the change to be effected from 1 October. The size of the 
BTC was increased from nine to fifteen, in order to compensate for the 
demise of the other executives.96 Despite the conflict between the BTC and 
the RE, and the BTC's efforts to get the RE abolished, almost all of the RE's 
members were appointed to identical or similar posts in the newly 
94 Institute of Public Administration, 'The organisation of British Railways', Public 
Administration, autumn 1952, p. 280. 
95 The other executives were: Road Transport, Docks and Inland Waterways, Hotels and 
London Transport. 
96 Under the BTC (Railway Organisation Scheme) Order 1579. 
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reorganised BTC.97 This indicates that the BTC considered the management 
problem to have been very much one of structure rather than personnel. 
Even so, the effect was that the government's desire for change in the 
management of the railways was left largely in the hands of the existing 
senior managers. 
The key to reorganisation was: 
Within twelve months of the passing of this Act or such longer period as the Minister 
may allow, the Commission shall prepare and submit to the Minister a scheme for 
the re-organisation of that part of their undertaking which consists the operation of 
the railways. 98 
So within a year the BTC was expected to produce a new organisational 
structure, with new area authorities to manage transport operations in their 
region. In consequence, the CROs submitted proposals to the BTC that 'as 
the RE and all of its links are wholly redundant, the CROs should take over 
all the work of the RE and be judged on results'. 99 Although change to this 
extent was not introduced, the new structure for the management of the BTC 
developed by Robertson did give the new area authorities greater autonomy. 
Gourvish observed that 'to promote efficiency within the new bodies, a 
measure of inter-area competitiveness would be encouraged by the 
publication of regional statistics of operating costs'. These elements were 
mandatory under Clause 16 of the 1953 Transport Act.100 However, the 
BTC strongly opposed this requirement, arguing that it would create a 
straitjacket on the precise operating costs and statistics which they were 
97 Hurcomb and Riddles retired with all other the members of the RE being offered posts 
with the BTC, AN 85/6. 
98 Transport Act 1953, Section 16 (1). 
99 CROs to BTC, 18 May 1953, AN6/49. 
100 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 139. 
158 
required to publish.101 In the event the requirement proved to be impractical, 
owing to the volume of inter-regional transfers. 
The new railway organisation did not come into effect until 1 January 
1955.102 Gourvish described the interregnum between the demise of the RE 
and the introduction of the new arrangements as 'this long and 
uncomfortable interval [which] was very unfortunately timed', adding that the 
'new era of direct control of the railways by the Commission began in an 
atmosphere of pronounced managerial gloom' .103 Bona via accepts that 
these changes presented a real challenge to higher management: 'seen 
from the angle of headquarters the new organisation presented many 
difficulties'. But he also offers an alternative view to Gourvish, as far as the 
regions were concerned, the new Chief Regional Managers welcomed the 
changes, for their status had been greatly improved and regional morale 
rose.104 However, the CRO's hopes of a truly decentralised structure as 
envisaged by the Conservatives proved forlorn. As Gourvish explains, 
The list of former Executive functions which the BTC decided to reserve for itself 
was a long one: labour relations of a major character; the general level of charges; 
broad financial control; commercial policy; the design and manufacture of rolling 
stock; the policies and principles to be adopted in railway operation; the inter-
regional distribution of wagons. The regional managers might well have wondered 
what was left'. 105 
101 Notes by the BTC on the provision of area operating costs and statistics, 28 October 
1954, MT124/70. 
102 Under the BTC (Railway Organisation Scheme) Order 1579, MT124/70. 
103 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 142. 
104 Bonavia, Organisation of British Railways, p. 66. 
105 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 148. 
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Decentralisation, so important to the Conservative's attempts to make 
industry more competitive proved as difficult to achieve on the railways as it 
did in the electricity industry. The Electricity Act of 1957 introduced a new 
Electricity Council and a decentralised system of area boards responsible for 
policy development, economic and engineering performance, and 
commercial behaviour. However, Hannah observes that although this initially 
delighted the area boards and Conservative back-benchers it became 
increasingly clear that this did not work and it is difficult to see any significant 
changes in the policies pursued by the area boards.106 
Crucial for the successful development of this new scheme was the 
Chairman of the BTC. To manage the change, General Sir Brian Robertson 
was appointed as the new chairman on 31 August 1953, on the retirement of 
the 70 year-old Hurcomb. From the outset there were criticisms that 
Robertson was not easy to work with; his minister, Boyd-Carpenter, 
considered that it took six months before he managed to get on human 
terms with him.107 Robertson was nevertheless praised by his minister for 
his outstanding personal influence upon railwaymen and their morale.108 
Gourvish notes that Robertson is reported to have stated that 'when the late 
Prime Minister asked me to take on my present job, he specifically told me I 
should give the railways leadership'.109 Yet, the manner in which Robertson 
gave leadership was not always appropriate, and this caused some 
difficulties. Gourvish identified 'seeds of potential conflict' in that Robertson 
'soon made it clear that he had but scant regard for railway officers and 
106 Hannah, Engineers, Managers and Politicians, p. 208. 
107 Boyd-Carpenter was Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation from 28 July 1954 to 20 
December 1955. 
108 John Boyd-Carpenter, Way of Life (London, 1980), p. 113. 
109 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 143. 
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claimed it was his duty to inject "backbone" into the BTC's organisation. He 
did not see his brief as being merely to preside over decentralised 
management bodies' rather; 'he was required to manage the railways, to be 
their chief executive'. 110 Also, Robertson approached his task with a 
mentality based on his military experience, with its expectation of duty and 
command from above. 
The effectiveness of Robertson's new management structure was 
debatable; Gourvish describes the organisation as complex, cumbersome 
and rather remote.111 Bonavia also found the machinery of management 
unwieldy: 'aspects of the scheme soon evoked criticism. lt was difficult to say 
where the ultimate responsibility really rested for originating policy. Did it lie 
with the General Managers, with the Area Boards or with the Sub:. 
Commission or with the Committees of the Commission?' 112 The new 
structure created the possibility of five additional layers of responsibilities 
above area boards and led to dissatisfaction from the Chief Regional 
Officers, who disliked the loss of autonomy in decision making - a conflict 
later identified by the Special Advisory Group as a major operational 
weakness. 
Introduction of this new structure required abolition of the Railway 
Executive. This important change requires close investigation, particularly 
given a later conclusion from a BTC member: 'what destroyed the Executive 
was a combination of politics, personalities and nostalgia' .113 One might 
reasonably add to this a lack of real progress in modernisation, unification 
110 Ibid., p. 143. 
111 Ibid., p. 157. 
112 Bonavia, Organisation of British Railways, p. 75. 
113 H. P. Barker in 1960, cited in Gourvish, British Railways, p. 67. 
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and efficiency. Aspects of the media were also critical of theRE; the 
Reading Standard described it as 'the bulky excrescence that had grown up 
in the name of the Railway Executive'.114 
The stimulus for the new structure was for the most part the 
management problems between the Commission and the RE, but these 
difficulties had been intensified by the RE's conflict with the Chief Regional 
Officers. Their main complaint turned upon confusion over the decision-
making process and the management responsibility for staff: the CROs' were 
in the invidious position of having their senior staff responsible not just to 
themselves, but also to RE members. They were also highly critical of the 
manner by which major decisions were made by the RE without proper 
consultation with the regions. Gourvish argues that this feature emanated 
from Hurcomb's hostility to the concept of regional general management, 
and his determination to eliminate it from the new organisation. This meant 
that 'in consequence, the Executive was almost encouraged to strip authority 
from men who had been accustomed, in their former positions, to a 
considerable degree of independence' .115 Whatever the cause, it certainly 
rankled with the CROs, of whom the most outspoken was Grand of the 
Western Region. Grand complained that requirements for coach building, 
wagon design, the re-organisation of District Operating Superintendents' 
Offices, and revised signalling arrangements and practices were being 
introduced without any reference to them.116 Ironically the Western Region 
simply ignored many of these new measures, most notably for signalling, 
and continued to perpetuate GWR practice for many years after. 
114 Reading Standard, 2 October 1953. 
115 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 55. 
116 Memo from Chief Regional Officer WR to the RE, 21 September 1951, AN6/6. 
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The CROs also argued that the railways had operated most efficiently 
during the Second World War, when the whole system was directed by a 
Railway Executive Committee composed of the General Managers of the Big 
Four assisted by a small secretariat. While the CROs agreed that central 
control and distribution of freight-rolling stock was essential, they also 
believed that a similar degree of autonomy in the regions would encourage 
competition and distinctiveness, stating that 'individual regional 
characteristics could assist in the development or re-creation of local 
traditions so conducive to operating effectiveness' .117 
The RE achieved only limited success in rationalisation, efficiency and 
modernisation. Furthermore, Bonavia described it as a body 'which 
sometimes seemed to be complacently solving yesterday's problems'. 118 In 
its six-year existence it created 27 committees, each responsible for a 
separate aspect of railway management.119 Yet, despite such apparent 
attention to detail, only 351 miles of uneconomic routes were closed, as 
route mileage fell to 19,222 by the end of 1953.120 The RE seems to have 
laid much of the blame for this on the CROs, as Elliot exhorted them to be 
vigorous in achieving line closures.121 While a number of diesel-shunting 
locomotives were constructed during the same period, 122 not one main-line 
diesel locomotive was ordered. Moreover, the RE staff were criticised for 
being too concerned with purely internal questions of standardisation, 
117 Meeting of CROs and members of the RE, 11 September 1952, AN6/39. 
118 Bonavia, British Rail the First 25 Years, p. 62. 
119 Committees of the RE, AN6/22. 
120 See Appendix 1, p. 340. 
121 Elliot to CROs, 27 April 1951, AN6/5. 
122 The majority of which had been ordered by the Big Four prior to nationalisation. 
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unwilling to embark on integration of road and rail transport and insufficiently 
progressive.123 
Despite such criticisms, Gourvish declares that 'the Railway Executive 
had succeeded in making a unified approach to railway working an 
established fact'. 124 This is a generous and debatable interpretation; and 
he himself accepts that 'the integration of the Commission's freight services 
was also limited' .125 Despite the introduction of a standard form of regional 
organisation and the break-up of the empires of the former Chief Mechanical 
Engineers, local practices and loyalties proliferated until well after the 
Beaching era. Nowhere was this more apparent than in locomotive practice, 
Gourvish suggests that here 'some progress was evident by the end of 
1950. The first standard designs for steam locomotives and carriages were 
introduced'.126 Yet these locomotives were initially disliked and under-used, 
and anyway by the end of 1953 only 345 standard locomotives were in 
service - this in a total BR stock of over 19,000 units - and so were hardly 
likely to have made a real impact on operation and practice. 
The Railway Executive's waste of resources on traction policy was 
matched by its policy on continuous brakes, where there was much 
vacillation and consequent delay. Plentiful evidence existed on the potential 
costs of the various braking systems, and substantial experience of the 
operating principles. A lack of continuous brakes on freight trains had long 
been a major constraint on the ability of the railways to move merchandise 
and minerals quickly and efficiently. The major problem was the need for 
123 Bonavia, Organisation of British Railways, p. 56. 
124 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 67. 
125 Ibid., p. 116. 
126 Ibid., p. 54. 
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heavy freight trains to make frequent stops on steep inclines, in order to pin 
down wagon brakes and avoid runaways. After negotiating the hazard, a 
further stop was then required to release the brakes. This method became a 
serious limitation when advances in traction allowed an increase in line 
average speeds and weight of loads. Two alternatives, the vacuum-brake 
and air-brake systems had been widely tested and used both in Britain and 
abroad .127 Yet initially under the RE there was no effective standardisation 
to ensure use of the more efficient and flexible air-brake system. This had 
been adopted by the Great Eastern, Caledonian and North British Railway 
and several other companies, and for suburban electric trains (because 
compressed air was required for electro-pneumatic control systems).128 But 
vacuum-brakes were standard elsewhere, meaning that British practice was 
out of line with many European countries and the USA. 
Given these circumstances, it is difficult to understand why the RE did 
not take a more determined approach to the adoption of the superior air-
brake system. Riddles had explained that vacuum brakes were not 
sufficiently flexible for heavier trainloads operated by more powerful 
locomotives: if the braking system was effective enough to stop a heavy 
train, it was found to be too strong and incapable of proper control when the 
train was unloaded.129 This lack of decisiveness by the RE hindered 
operational progress, for it was not until the advent of the Modernisation 
Plan in 1955 that a Continuous Brakes Panel 'pronounced itself firmly in 
favour of making the air-brake standard equipment on British Railways'. Yet 
127 lt was first examined by the Royal Commission on Railway Accidents in 1875 which 
after a series of trials found the air-brake to be vastly superior to the vacuum-brake. 
128 A fuller description of braking systems can be found in Jack Simmons and Gordon 
Biddle (eds.), The Oxford Companion to British Railway History (Oxford, 1997), p. 42. 
129 Meeting of BTC and RE, 7 May 1953, AN13/2678. 
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even this position was short-lived, because in February 1956 'the 
Commission in deference to regional opinion, decided to retain the vacuum-
brake', a decision which proved costly before it was finally reversed in 
1964.130 Although the debacle on brakes reflects badly on the management 
of the railways and not just the RE, it was this body which was responsible 
for developing standardisation and technical advance, which in this instance 
it clearly failed to do. 
A further failure to accelerate technical advance occurred with 
couplings, because continuously-braked trains required that all wagons be 
fitted with heavier screw coupling. This change was resisted by the railway 
unions because of the additional time and increased physical efforts required 
to couple and uncouple wagons. As a result, this issue also remained 
unresolved until the advent of the Modernisation Plan. 
In one specific area - the ability to maintain market share by 
improving the standards of service - Gourvish does accept that the 
performance of the RE was disappointing, concluding that 'despite this 
seeming security [share of traffic was 28% of all passenger and 49% of all 
freight in 1947], the Executive's operating performance was dismal from the 
very start' .131 A key reason was lack of emphasis on customer needs for 
bothfreight and passenger traffic, a remarkable deficiency which continued 
under the new organisation with significant repercussions. 
The third element of the 1953 Transport Act related to the legal 
requirements imposed on the BTC with regard to its fares and freight rates 
policy. What changes were required in these in order to improve the 
130 Report of Continuous Brakes Panel, September 1955, AN13/2678 and Gourvish, British 
Railways, p. 157. 
131 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 92. 
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competitive position of the railways, while at the same time protect the wider 
interests of the consumer? Transport Policy had recognised the need for 
change: 
The Commission will be given greater latitude to vary their charges schemes so as 
to improve the ability of the railways to compete with other forms of transport. 
Within prescribed limits they will be free to raise or lower their charges with 
subsequent approval by the Transport Tribunal and subject to the over-riding 
powers of the Minister.132 
As a result the 1953 Transport Act stated that charges were to be left to the 
Commission's discretion, and no conditions or limitations were imposed on 
that discretion.133 These changes included: the ending of the legal 
requirement not to offer any customer preferential treatment in terms of 
charges, and the requirement to publish all freight rates. This amendment 
was tempered by the retention of the common carrier principle - the 
obligation to carry goods presented regardless of the cost or complexity -
and by the fact that other transport users were given the right of objection to 
the Transport Charges Tribunal, which retained jurisdiction over maximum 
charges and rates. This led to criticism from the BTC, because the Tribunal 
had proved to be a severe restriction on both the timing and level of 
increases in charges. For example, in 1955134 a new scheme for freight rates 
was proposed by the BTC and put to the Tribunal. An enquiry was then set 
up, which lasted for 44 working days and produced a transcript of 
proceedings which ran to one and a quarter million words. Such lengthy 
arguments delayed the introduction of the new scheme until July 1957. 
Worse still, the increases were below those applied for almost two years 
132 Transport Policy, para. 14, p. 3. 
133 Transport Act 1953, Ch.13, section 20, para. 2d. 
134 The scheme had been proposed earlier but had been delayed by the 1953 Transport Act. 
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earlier. There were also burdensome bureaucratic demands, such as the 
need for the BTC to provide a statutory classification of commodities 
encompassing over 4,000 individual items in 21 classes, with the 
comparative value of the commodity determining class and standard charge 
per mile.135 
Therefore, although there was a clear intention in the 1953 Transport 
Act to free the railways from restrictive legislation concerning charges, the 
need to protect the public interest effectively precluded real commercial 
freedom. Even so, the BTC was of the opinion that the changes introduced 
had a clear and necessary rationale and that after its first five years of 
existence it had become necessary to review the management structure 
imposed on foundation. As a result it stated in its 1953 Annual Report: 
The year was one of change and stress from which the Commission emerged with 
an organisation considerably remodelled and with renewed confidence in the ability 
of the undertaking to perform the functions assigned to it in the country's economic 
life. The Commission had also reached the conclusion that the three tier 
organisation comprising Commission, Executive and Region was no longer suitable 
to flexible and commercial methods of management.136 
Such confidence was qualified later in the same report, when it was stressed 
that despite the changes further progress was still required, and that this 
could be achieved only after some years of freedom from major 
disturbances. 
Ill 
Arguably the most significant problem facing the management of British 
Railways was the need to control costs to match its revenue. Given that the 
135 Merchandise charging scheme, Appendix 0, MOT 1 0 August 1956, MT132/32. 
136 BTC Annual Report and Accounts 1953, para. 36, p. 7. 
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major cost of providing railway services was wages, it is necessary to 
examine the management performance on this issue. As Gourvish stated, 
'the cause of greatest concern was undoubtedly the cost of labour' .137 The 
BTC estimated that no less than 62% of railway operating costs were made 
up of staff costs, and that the average weekly earnings of railwaymen had 
doubled between the years 1938 and 1948, while a reduction in the working 
week from 48 to 44 hours had been introduced in June 1947.138 As a result, 
the railway's wage bill increased from £222m in 1948 to £265m in 1953, a 
rise of 19%.139 
A second element which influenced the financial state of the railways 
related to the burden of fixed costs, incorporating the initial (for 1948) annual 
payment of £28m 140 of interest charges on BTC Stock. Loft argues that the 
former railway companies' shareholders were the major beneficiaries of 
nationalisation.141 But this view discounts the significant element of British 
Transport Stock issued after nationalisation, to provide finance for the 
purchase of the BTC's substantial road-haulage organisations.142 
Furthermore, although the BTC found these interest costs to be 
burdensome, it accepted they had to be paid, otherwise the public would 
have considered the railways insolvent. 
Bagwell assessed the financial position of the BTC very differently, 
arguing that in the first years of nationalisation, between 1948 and 1952, the 
137 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 98. 
138 BTC Annual Report and Accounts 1950, pp. 54-5. 
139 Gourvish from BTC Reports, British Railways, p. 99. 
140 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 27, calculates the figure at £27-2m, Bagwell, The 
Railwaymen, p. 603 at £31 m. 
141 Loft, 'Re-appraisal and reshaping', p. 72. 
142 The minutes of the meetings of the BTC provide details of such issues in AN85/1 to 
AN85/16. 
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BTC was profitable. However, this interpretation relied on the unusual 
accounting practice of ignoring interest charges on compensation stock, 
capital charges, central administration expenses and freight rebates.143 Even 
so, the fact remains that the BTC, under normal accounting practice 
operated with a substantial deficit, and management paid insufficient 
attention to its reduction. 
These financial deficits forced the government to consider its options, 
and in September 1952 the Cabinet Committee on Transport Policy 
examined the issue. While it accepted the moral and political obligation to 
meet the full interest due on BTC stock, it considered whether it was 
possible and indeed desirable for the BTC to lose some of its financial 
liability.144 If it did, any payment to reduce the burden of fixed costs would in 
effect be a subsidy to the railways, something not at that time politically 
acceptable. As a result, the issue lay dormant until January 1954, when 
finance again became a pressing issue. For, although the annual deficit had 
been reduced by the end of 1953, a cumulative deficit of over £60m was 
predicted by the end of 1955. In response, the BTC requested that the 
proviso enshrined within the 1953 Transport Act of breaking even taking one 
year with another should be liberally interpreted.145 As a result, the extent of 
government involvement in railway affairs further increased, as the Treasury 
understandably needed to be informed of the BTC's plans, because the 
deteriorating financial position might require new borrowing powers. This 
prompted an acceptance by the BTC of a need for Parliament to have fuller 
143 Bagwell, The Railwaymen, p. 634. 
144 Cabinet Committee on Transport Policy, 10th meeting, 19 September 
1952, PREM11/559. 
145 Robertson to Lennox-Boyd, 7 January 1954, MOT 'A' Division Files, MT124/46. 
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information on its activities, and it agreed to supplement the Annual Reports 
with communication through informal channels to 'provide a useful bridge 
across a gulf which is felt to exist' .146 
Attempts to reduce costs in such a labour-intensive industry should 
have centred on labour productivity, but as has already been shown railway 
management too often appeared pre-occupied with labour shortages in key 
areas. Opportunities to link pay rises to productivity were not always taken; 
for example, in the February 1951 wages agreement a 7·5% pay offer was 
accepted by the railway unions without it being made conditional on the 
acceptance of specific proposals to raise productivity.147 Little changed in the 
following years, and Hardy recounted: 
In the 1950s Stratford depot in London was 'riddled with restrictive practices which 
hindered the execution of repairs and planned maintenance', and that 'prior to 
dieselisation salaried supervision of maintenance was non-existent between half 
past five in the evening and eight in the morning'.148 
Productivity was not given the attention it deserved, and as has already 
been shown opportunities for greater labour-efficiency in problem areas such 
as traction were not taken until the advent of the Modernisation Plan. 
The BTC was at least fortunate in inheriting a well-developed 
structure of labour relations, and initially a positive and co-operative labour 
force. Those structures were the result of well over a century of 
development. From the 1840s the numerous railway companies acted from 
necessity, as safety issues were imposed through a combination of iron 
discipline and strong paternalism towards the workforce. This approach 
146 BTC Annual Report and Accounts 1953, para. 70, p. 13. 
147 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 131. 
148 Hardy, Beeching, p. 15. 
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incorporated many features now common in employer-employee relations, 
but which before 1923 were little short of revolutionary. These included: the 
provision of large-scale housing schemes, staff savings banks, sports and 
recreation facilities, welfare services, holidays, cheap travel, pensions and 
sick funds. Initially the disbursement of these benefits by the railway 
companies encouraged loyalty and staff retention.149 
Consequently, industrial relations on the railways did not have the 
extreme adversarial tradition of the coal industry. But with nationalisation 
relationships began to change. One causal factor in the perceived poor 
performance of railway workers reported in January 1948 to the Winter 
Transport Executive Committee was that there had been uncertainty arising 
from the unknown effects of socialisation of their industry.15° Furthermore, by 
the 1950s life-style and economic expectations had altered, and according to 
Hardy 'many [young men] left the railway through an understandable 
antipathy towards constant early and late turns which precluded any social 
life worthy of the name, whilst older men left to take relatively unskilled work 
with no prospects but infinitely better pay'.151 
A further main labour issue concerned the workforce's desire to 
protect and even increase standards of living during a period of inflation, and 
later their response to concerns with job security. As Bagwell concluded, 
'these [railway losses] were the grim realities which made so formidable the 
main task of the NUR in this period- the maintenance of the standard of 
living of the railwaymen' .152 Even so, the railway's industrial relations record 
149 R. S. Joby, The Railwaymen (Newton Abbot, 1984), p. 152. 
150 Linsdell (MOT) to WTEC, 8 January 1948, MT6/2828. 
151 Hardy, Beeching, p. 15. 
152 Bagwell, The Railwaymen, p. 641. 
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remained good and relatively stable. While there were a number of local 
disputes in each year from 1948, there was no national strike action until 
1955, although such action had been threatened during a number of wage 
disputes. A factor in this was that the Churchill and Eden governments 
adopted a more reserved attitude towards labour unrest and strikes than 
Attlee's governments of 1945-51. Also, economic growth increased, 
standards of living began to rise, and labour unrest fell. Relations with the 
unions were generally amicable, and ministers were less likely to blame 
communist agitators than their predecessors.153 The military were involved 
during strike action 14 times under Attlee, but only once each under the 
Churchill and Eden governments. In particular the lesson was learned from 
the docks' oil distribution strike of April 1953 -that deploying the military was 
more likely to increase the impact of industrial action than to resolve it, as 
sympathy strikes could cause even greater damage to the economy and 
society. As a consequence, some powers designed to deal with crises were 
abandoned, but others were retained, notably by the MOT, which continued 
a well-developed regional system under which emergency machinery could 
be used. The disputes in the oil, docks and railway industries in 1955 saw 
the revival of official machinery which had been dormant since 1950. 
Despite such overall stability of industrial relations there were 
pressures on the BTC for wage increases, the implications of which often 
resulted in government intervention. In July 1953 the NUR claimed for wage 
increases of up to 15% and rejected the Wage Tribunal's arbitration award of 
6 December. The NUR then called a national strike on 20 December which 
153 Keir Thorpe, 'Rendering the strike innocuous', Journal of Contemporary History, 35 
(2000), p. 577. 
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led to involvement by Waiter Monckton, the Minister of Labour, who 
mediated to avert the strike threat, and a settlement was agreed on 16 
December. The result was that the BTC was forced to accept a larger 
increase than agreed by the independent wage tribunal, and that a 
precedent of government intervention into railway wage disputes was firmly 
established.154 As Gourvish concludes 'this capitulation to union demands 
and government pressure certainly seems a failure on the part of the BTC in 
the sense that it was scarcely comparable with the railway's declining 
financial position and did nothing to prevent further union demands in 1954 
and 1955' .155 While this is true, Gourvish accepts that the conclusion is 
overly simplistic and 'that the situation was of course more complex than 
that', 156 on the basis that it was the government's attitude rather than the 
BTC's that was the more important in securing a larger wage increase.157 In 
addition there was a further complication - competition between the two 
main railway unions, the NUR and ASLEF, which resulted in the Commission 
being subject to a game of leapfrog between them.158 
There was another feature: although the railway unions enjoyed wide 
worker support and were well organised, they were not always in full control 
of their membership. This can be seen from the unofficial strike of 2,500 
Western Region locomotive drivers and firemen in protest against the re-
introduction of lodging-turns, 159 which had previously been agreed with the 
154 MOT National Transport Division, wage rounds with particular reference to railwaymen, 
undated, MT87/33. 
155 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 219. 
156 Ibid., p. 219. 
157 Ibid., p. 220. 
158 Ibid., p. 221. 
159 The highly unpopular roster of driver and fireman being required to work long distances, 
stay overnight at their destination and return home the next day. 
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unions. This strike took place during May 1954, and resulted in the 
cumulative loss of 194,000 man hours.160 lt was another factor which 
contributed to the loss of business and further undermined the competitive 
position of the railways. 
lt is therefore not surprising that the BTC considered 1954 a difficult 
year in operational and financial terms, as the need to fund the substantial 
wage increases led to a decline in its financial position. By the end of that 
year staff numbers had fallen to a total of 577,183, yet costs continued to 
rise and the wage bill increased by £18m. Allied to this was the difficulty of 
recruiting and retaining staff for footplate duties, and for track and signalling 
maintenance. Also recognised was the need for a concerted drive on 
recruitment in certain areas, although this was not supported by an effective 
policy of re-training and re-deployment of surplus labour. Rather, it was 
hoped that increased modernisation and mechanisation would resolve the 
shortages, and bring about a reduction of staff in other grades.161 This 
approach, defined by Tomlinson as a faith in scale and technology as the 
route to economic success, 162 was to be tested under the Modernisation 
Plan of 1955. 
IV 
During this period when railway management was coming to terms with 
organisational changes and operational deficiencies, a perception began to 
develop in the minds of the public that the railways were old-fashioned and 
inefficient. lt coincided with economic, social, and cultural changes which 
160 Action by the railway unions, Appendix IV Royal Commission on Trades Unions and 
Employers Associations, November 1965. 
161 BTC minute 7/545, 28 October 1954, AN85/7. 
162 Tomlinson, 'Liberty with order: in Francis and Zweiniger-Bargielowska (eds.), 
Conservatives and British Society, p. 285. 
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increased the popularity of motor transport, and contributed further to the 
railway's decline for both passengers and freight. The extent of that decline 
can be seen from Gourvish's calculations of BR share of all passenger 
transport (in an expanding market) from: 1947- 27·6%; 1948- 26·1%, 
1949- 23·9%, 1950- 22·5%, 1951 - 22·1 %, 1952- 21·5% and 1953-
20· 7%. He also shows that the increase in public road transport between 
1949 and 1953 was negligible, 163 in contrast to the rise of private transport 
increased from 26,000m passenger miles in 1948 to 42,1 OOm in 1953.164 
According to Plowden, this increase in private motoring effectively 
began 'with the strikingly abrupt change from austerity to affluence when 
new car registrations reached 190,000 per year and the motor car finally 
ceased to be mere extravagance and became instead one of the most 
characteristic attributes of modern industrial society'.165 The impact was wide 
and multi-faceted, for as the railways had done a century before, the car 
influenced society not only economically, but also in a complex socio-
psychological manner. lt became a cultural icon and a metaphor for 
modernity. Unlike the railway, the impact of the motor car was manifested in 
numerous other ways, perhaps most notably as an indicator of wealth, but 
also in the sensual and sexual dimensions at a time when socialising, 
consumerism, and leisure became intertwined. This process required a 
freedom of movement of greater frequency, something which simply could 
not be offered easily by the railways. At the same time the attraction of 
163 From 49,900m to 50,700m passenger miles. 
164 Gourvish, British Railways, Appendix D, p. 615. 
165 William Plowden, The Motor Car and Politics (London, 1971 ), p. 323. 
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motoring was reinforced through the car being presented in films and 
literature as a symbol for freedom.166 
Freight traffic experienced a decline, although it was not as rapid as 
that to be experienced later. In 1948 rail enjoyed a 48·5% market share of all 
freight ton miles, a figure which had fallen to 44·3% by 1953.167 The growth 
of road transport had started in the 1930s, and for Peter Scott it represented 
nothing less than a second transport revolution, which the railways were 
unable to counter- largely because of the legislative framework under which 
they operated.168 Even after nationalisation the railway's competitive position 
was still hindered by common carrier legislation. 
By the early 1950s the cumulative impact of technical advances had 
transformed the reliability of the internal combustion engine and its 
application to the motor vehicle. Furthermore, increased incomes had made 
private motoring more widely available. The result was a massive 
improvement in the capability of road transport both for private and 
commercial use causing a serious undermining of the competitive position of 
the railways in the transport of goods traffic, other than basic materials. 
Initially, the railways retained the long-distance market, but even that came 
under threat from road competition as the road system improved. While the 
railways enjoyed the advantage of a national system and substantial cheap 
warehousing facilities, they were disadvantaged by the need for expensive 
and time-consuming trans-shipment with the associated high risk of damage 
166 The cultural impact of the car is outlined in Davis Thorns, 'Motor-car ownership in 
twentieth century Britain, A matter of convenience or a marque of status', in David 
Thorns, Len Holden and Tim Claydon (eds.), The Motor Car and Popular Culture 
(Aldershot, 1998), p. 43. 
167 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 616. 
168 Scott, 'British Railways and the challenge from road haulage', p. 1 01. 
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and theft.169 In addition, the road haulier had been able to choose whether to 
accept business or not, but the railways with its common carrier public 
service obligation did not have this freedom. 
In parallel with these developments were technological changes 
affecting manufacturing, making it less reliant on traditional heavy industry, 
more consumer goods orientated, and consequently more dispersed. The 
outcome was a massive increase in the number of licensed commercial 
vehicles operating in Britain.170 This growth can be seen in Appendix 1 
(p. 340), which tabulates the number of all licensed vehicles, with an index of 
change from the base year of 1948. These changes were substantial, rising 
from its 1948 base to reach 189 only 9 years later. Such an inexorable rise 
in motor transport had a significant and deleterious impact on the revenues 
generated by the railways. 
For the advantages of technical advances in vehicles to be fully 
realised, improvements to the road infrastructure were essential, a process 
already achieved in much of Europe and North America. There, motorways 
had been constructed even before the Second World War, and it was simply 
a matter of time before such provision was demanded in the United 
Kingdom. That time duly arrived with the advent of the motorway building 
programme, which Boyd-Carpenter as Minister of Transport announced in 
the House of Commons in February 1955. This was not before time as there 
had been a substantial increase in road transport, and as Scott's study on 
the level of capital spending on Britain's transport infrastructure reveals, the 
169 Barnes reported to the CCSI that pilferage claims were a serious issue of a sufficient 
magnitude to influence trading results, 22 July 1949, CAB134/690. 
170 The 1933 Road Traffic Act created 3 types of licence: 'A' for vehicles which carried 
exclusively for hire or reward, '8' for operators who carried their own goods and also 
carried for others, and 'C' for those who carried only their own goods. 
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level of investment on the road network had been sub-optimal and clearly 
lagged behind other European countries. Government priorities lay in 
different areas, and opportunities to contribute to higher economic growth 
through improved transport facilities were missed, especially as many road 
schemes offered investment opportunities with potentially high returns. 171 
This under investment can be seen in comparison with other European 
countries: in 1955-56 the UK total expenditure on roads was 6·3US dollars 
per capita, compared with Denmark at 14·2, France 12·5, West Germany 
13·0, Ireland 10·0, Norway 17·5 and Switzerland 16·6.172 
Even so, the implementation of the motorway construction 
programme led to increased competition for the railways through the 
speeding up of long-distance passenger coach and road freight services. lt 
also boosted domestic car ownership, and the resultant traffic losses 
conspired to undermine further the financial position of the railways during a 
period of increasing pressures on costs, particularly wages. 
V 
Arguably the single most important justification for nationalisation had been 
that only under public ownership could the railway industry meet the 
necessary objectives of modernisation and reconstruction. Yet the evidence 
from the first decade of the nationalised railways indicates that little had 
been achieved in both areas. Seldon is critical of government policy towards 
the railways on the grounds that not enough was invested in them, 173 but this 
171 Peter Scott, 'Public-sector investment and Britain's post-war economic performance: A 
Case study of roads policy', Journal of European Economic History, 34 (2005), p. 391. 
172 1bid., p. 413. 
173 Seldon, Churchill's Indian Summer, p. 233. 
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argument cannot be sustained in the light of the still substantial resources 
allocated to the railways. The problem was the management's inefficient use 
of them. Although the railways received less than they wanted, the decisive 
constraint on modernisation was a combination of sclerotic and short-sighted 
thinking which dominated management decisions at almost every level. This 
failure to make more efficient use of the not insubstantial investment 
resources made available, meant that the opportunity to provide a proper 
foundation for modernisation had been lost. Much of the responsibility for 
this deficiency can be apportioned to the BTC and the RE, most of whose 
members had been selected on the basis of a common cultural background, 
rather than their commercial understanding and management flair. 
Nationalisation had simply not achieved the anticipated aims of the 
Labour government, with the result that the incoming Conservative 
government sought to develop an alternative approach to management and 
operation of the railways- a process which would be repeated in the future. 
Both the nation and the railway employees had expected much from 
nationalisation, but little real progress had been achieved, and by 1954 very 
little appears to have changed apart from colour schemes and letter 
headings.174 Although the introduction of the new Area Boards in 1955 
enabled the BTC to claim that the benefits of reorganisation had become 
manifest, 175 the extent of such benefits was highly debatable. Yet once this 
series of management changes had been instituted, the political priority 
turned to the resolution of the enduring financial problems through greater 
174 D. Holmes, 'Keeping the records', Steam Days, April1987, p. 30. 
175 BTC Annual Report and Accounts 1955, para. 12, p. 4. 
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operating efficiency. lt was against this background that the Modernisation 
Plan developed. 
181 
CHAPTER 4 
THE MOIDERNISATION PLAN 
Relations between the BTC and the Government 1956-60 are the classic case of a 
government utterly misled- time and time again. 
(R. Kelf-Cohen, Twenty Years of Nationalisation (London, 1969), p. 75.) 
In January 1955 the British Transport Commission published The 
Modernisation and Re-equipment of British Railways. This chapter will 
consider the origins of this 'Modernisation Plan' and its implementation. An 
assessment of the quality of BTC management and strategic planning 
provides the basis for analysing the character and quality of the Plan. The 
effectiveness of the BTC in developing and implementing its own policies will 
then be considered, further developing lines of enquiry already raised: first 
towards traction and operating efficiency, second in labour, wages and 
productivity policies, and third on financial matters. These aspects, relatively 
under-studied in the academic literature, are vital for a proper understanding 
not just of the impact of the Plan, but also why this Plan proved to be the 
precursor to the Beaching Report. 
In 1955, the question of railway modernisation was related to wider 
concerns about national productivity and the relative decline of the British 
economy.1 Underlying the political disquiet was the perceived link between 
productivity and prosperity, because by this period the standard of living had 
become the most important electoral issue.2 As the previous chapter noted, 
the Conservative government adopted a new approach, injecting greater 
1 For greater detail on relative decline see Tomlinson, 'Inventing decline', pp. 743ft.; 
Elbaum and Lazonick, Decline of the British Economy, pp. 567-583; M. W. Kirby, 
'Institutional rigidities and economic decline: reflections on the British experience', 
Economic History Review, 45 (1992), pp. 637-660. 
2 Jim Tomlinson, 'Managing the economy, managing the people: Britain c.1931-70', 
Economic History Review, 58 (2005), p. 556. 
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economic liberalism into the activities of the public corporations in an attempt 
to resolve their structural and financial inadequacies. Where considered 
practicable, the policy was to denationalise and restore competition.3 lt also 
included further reductions in government controls, following through the 
election slogan to 'set the people free'. However, as Tomlinson indicates, 
economic liberalism created its own dilemmas for economic management 
and popular economic understanding;4 and as Francis notes, change was to 
be engineered by an active state, as the Conservatives embraced a 'post-
war settlement' built around the mixed economy and the welfare state.5 
In considering the BTC's performance when preparing and implementing the 
Modernisation Plan, it is helpful to assess the extent to which it was capable 
of turning aspiration into practice, or more bluntly: what capacity did the BTC 
have to run its business? How far had it appreciated the pressing need for 
strategic planning, in order to implement changes necessary for responding 
successfully to a rapidly changing economy and society? 
lt has been seen that the BTC was responsible for management of an 
industry in which a 'nostalgic', conservative approach was ingrained into the 
workforce. The railways did provide specific training for management posts, 
and operate an apprentice scheme which gave its trainees wide experience 
of railway operation. Yet little was done to develop skills and alter attitudes 
through a training and education programme for its wider workforce. This is 
3 Green, Ideologies of Conservatism, p. 245. 
4 Tomlinson, 'Managing the economy', p. 551. 
5 Martin Francis 'Set the people free? Conservatives and the state 1920-60', in Franc is 
and Zweiniger-Bargielowska (eds.), Conservatives and British Society, p. 59. 
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perhaps surprising given the number of senior managers recruited from the 
armed forces, where continual training was an integral aspect of operations. 
In contrast, on the railways the traditional method of training was to learn on 
the job, whether in the signal-box or driving a locomotive. The process for 
footplate staff was to enter as an engine cleaner and after gaining 
experience moving through the ranks, until passed to drive. Although in 
many depots experienced drivers ran voluntary mutual improvement classes 
for off-duty employees, the BTC itself provided no formal training, even in 
rules and regulations: employees were simply issued with a rule book and 
expected to learn the contents. As Ernie Rimmer (who worked on BR during 
this period) recounts: 'generally speaking [engine] drivers taught 
themselves', and 'training as such cost very little and experience, knowledge 
and theory was passed between men on duty'.6 This process continued until 
1958, and was modified only with the introduction of more diesels, plainly 
making traditional methods inadequate. Even then progress was limited and 
it was not until 1961 that each Motive Power District had its own training 
officer.7 lt had taken the BTC ten years before it introduced a proper training 
scheme, and even then it was undertaken not by managerial planning but 
from unavoidable necessity. 
Further evidence of the BTC's lack of urgency in modernisation is 
provided by Fiennes, describing his tenure as the BTC's Chief Operating 
Officer. While working at headquarters, he attempted to introduce the merry-
go-round (MGR) concept to deliver coal to the new power station at 
6 Ernie Rimmer, 'Diesel (and electric) dawn- from the inside', British Railways Illustrated, 
16 (2006), p. 423. 
7 Alec Swain, 'Memories of driver training- the transition from steam to diesel', British 
Railways Illustrated, 16 (2006), pp. 96-1 09. 
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Monktonhall near Edinburgh.8 The initial requirement was estimated at 550 
new (24·5 ton) wagons, but using the more efficient MGR system only 44 
higher capacity (32·5 ton) wagons would suffice. The advantages of 
significantly lower initial capital costs and cheaper and more efficient 
operating should have been plain. Yet the scheme took over five years to be 
agreed by the BTC, because of disagreement with the NCB over which 
nationalised corporation should bear the cost of replacing traditional wagons 
which would not suit the new system.9 This limited thinking and poor eo-
ordination between nationalised industries indicates a lack of managerial 
urgency to introduce newer, more efficient cost-saving techniques. 
A similar problem was encountered by David Blee, the London 
Midland Region General Manager, when in June 1957 he attempted to 
develop a new business opportunity for the conveyance of cement in bulk. 
This required speedy investment in new volume-carrying facilities; otherwise 
it would have been transported by road. Yet initially the BTC appeared 
unimpressed, agreeing only to consider inclusion of the necessary 
investment in a later building programme - a delay which would almost 
certainly have lost the traffic. Blee was not deterred and made a strong 
special submission to the Commission, which eventually authorised the 
investment.10 
Not only did understanding of changing market conditions and the 
gains from swift commercial action largely elude the BTC; it also failed to 
grasp the problems of an unwieldy organisation structure, developed by 
8 Merry-go-round trains operate in fixed blocks of wagons and travel directly between 
colliery and power station. 
9 Fiennes, I Tried to Run a Railway, p. 80. 
10 Blee to BTC, 27 June 1957, AN6/56. 
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Robertson in response to the 1953 Transport Act. As we have seen, this 
created poor lines of communication and so an absence of strong 
managerial focus. This created management problems, for according to 
Bonavia the structure was cumbersome. The General Managers had to deal 
with their own Area Board, the Central Staff, the General Staff, the Railways 
Sub-Commission and the Committees of the Commission.11 
Gourvish is also critical of the new management structure: 'it is clear, 
for example, that Robertson's organisation, while providing for 
decentralisation to Area Boards and General Managers, was in practice 
designed to leave much of the policy initiative at the centre', and 'the 
railways, the Commission's largest element, lacked any such focus and were 
caught up instead in the administrative tangle at Headquarters, with its 
Committees, Sub-committees, General Staff and British Railways Central 
Staff' .12 These arrangements, and particularly the terminology in which they 
were expressed, led to criticism, even from members of the Commission, 
and Robertson found it necessary to defend his position and to clarify certain 
aspects of his management scheme: 
I have had discussions with various members of the Commission about the co-
ordination of staff work at headquarters. I am aware that the use of the word "staff' 
is not always understood here. If any of you are in any doubt as to what I mean by 
"staff work" I would refer you to the pamphlet on the subject issued by the American 
Management Association. While I do not regard the pamphlet as the perfect 
exposition of the subject, it does at least explain what is meant by "staff work", and 
it is written not by a soldier for soldiers, but by a business consultant who has never 
been a soldier in his life.13 
11 Bonavia, Organisation of British Railways, p. 75. 
12 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 156. 
13 Appendix to BTC minute 7/186, 8 April1954, AN87fl. 
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This statement indicates the concern towards what was perceived as the 
military style of management created by Robertson. Furthermore, his 
response hardly suggests coherence among the top echelon of 
management. In practice, the reformed railway organisation did not achieve 
greater efficiency, and Robertson presided over a greatly expanded BTC 
headquarters and an unwieldy hierarchy of management with the 
Commission at the head. 
Among the contemporary critics was Elliot, formerly Assistant General 
Manager to Missenden on the Southern Railway, who after nationalisation 
became CRO of the Southern Region, then Chairman of the RE and after its 
demise Chairman of the LPTB. He was therefore well placed to offer 
Robertson advice on the manner by which the BTC should manage the 
large-scale investment contained in the Modernisation Plan. Elliot, no doubt 
influenced by his examination of management structures in American 
railroads, recognised the weaknesses implicit in the cumbersome 
organisational structure developed by Robertson, and warned of the 
consequences if effective management was not maintained. He stressed the 
need for organisation to be thoroughly sound, and for every phase of the 
major schemes to be carefully programmed, properly costed, and driven 
through to completion quite ruthlessly. He concluded that without that 
discipline all kinds of difficulty would arise, which might cause estimates to 
be exceeded sometimes to an alarming extent - a remarkable anticipation of 
what did happen when the Modernisation Plan was implemented. 14 
14 Elliot to Robertson, 25 June 1955, AN6/2. 
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Elliot's concern with costing was also raised and later given a high 
profile after the appointment in June 1955 of E. L. Gethin to the post of 
Supplies and Production Adviser to the BTC. According to Gourvish, Gethin 
'had been extremely critical of the railway's procedures [in procurement] and 
was alone [in the working party set up to examine the problem] in proposing 
a separate Progress Section at headquarters under his control' .15 Gethin 
was forced to resign after a new supplies organisation was introduced, but 
'he refused to lie down'16 and his charges of inefficiency were raised in the 
Commons by the Labour Opposition spokesman on transport, G. R. 
Strauss.17 The result was an investigation into the issue by Sir Harold 
Howitt. 18 This proved generally supportive to the BTC, but even so in 
Gourvish's words 'the episode not only publicised obvious organisational 
difficulties in the railway industry but exposed to full glare a vital area of 
control which nearly all interested parties from Robertson downwards 
considered in need of tightening up'.19 This issue was not new and should 
have been addressed earlier, particularly given the state of the railway's 
finances. 
Other knowledgeable commentators also expressed concern. The 
editor of The Economist observed that: 
For at least 15 years the railways have been starved of capital but the fruitful 
investment of capital is a very skilled job; it requires a boldness of judgement, a fine 
discrimination between alternatives, great elasticity of mind and an instinct to 
imagine what customers will pay for a long time in the future. But for a generation 
past the railways have not been run on the principles of imaginative capitalism. 
15 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 159. 
16 Ibid., p. 160. 
17 G. R. Strauss, HCDeb, 573, c.484, 10July 1957. 
18 Report on the purchasing procedure of the British Transport Commission (Parliamentary 
Papers 1956-7, Cmnd. 262, xix, 483). 
19 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 160. 
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Since the railways were turned into a 'corporate mastodon', the men who run the 
railways have been turned into bureaucrats and administrators who spend their 
lives in committees.20 
Similarly the editor of The Financial Times commented: 
The managerial standards of the nationalised industries are deplorably low and 
British Railways are technically one of the most backward in the world although in 
1939 the British system was one of the most efficient. 21 
Despite the reforms initiated under the 1953 Transport Act, management of 
the railways remained a good deal less effective than it could have been. 
Gourvish's verdict seems accurate: 
The overall impression of the BTC must remain that of a large and cumbersome 
body which failed to react quickly enough to the competitive challenge of road 
transport and the difficulties thrown up by the need to modernise the railways. The 
responses it offered in key areas were all too often ad hoc in character with only the 
retirement of senior officers to provide stimulus for action.22 
Such management weaknesses did not augur well for the BTC's ability to 
supervise the complexities of the considerable investment programme 
contained in the Modernisation Plan. 
11 
During the first seven years of public ownership the railways had made only 
limited progress in the creation of a modern cost-effective and integrated 
system. The BTC had consistently argued that failure to achieve those aims 
was due to a lack of sufficient investment to finance change on the required 
scale. Here it has been argued that the deeper problem was that the 
available funds were used ineffectively. In any event, the BTC's claims about 
20 Millions for Cinderella, Economist, 29 January 1955, p. 34. 
21 Financial Times, 13 June 1956. 
22 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 162. 
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insufficient investment ceased after 1955, when the government accepted 
that substantial funds should be allocated for railway modernisation. 
Gourvish argues that 'it is clear that the antecedents of the 
Modernisation Plan lie in the period of the Railway Executive',23 though we 
have already seen that detailed strategic planning for the post-war 
reconstruction and modernisation had an even earlier history - with the four 
main-line companies. Lobbying by the BTC for additional capital investment 
began after the election of the Conservative government in October 1951 . 
Reginald Wilson, the BTC's Financial Comptroller, 'was firmly of the opinion 
that something should be put down on paper and shortly after the dissolution 
of Parliament he encouraged Elliot and the Railway Executive to prepare a 
report on the railway's long-term capital needs'. 24 However, it was not until 
April 1953 that the RE produced the report: 'A Development Programme for 
British Railways'. Gourvish considers that it 'bore all the signs of having been 
hastily put together',25 yet much of the 1955 Modernisation Plan appeared to 
have been closely based on this RE report. Elliot certainly considered that 
the report had provided the foundation for the Modernisation Plan. He 
expressed disappointment that the RE had not received any credit for it in 
Robertson's submission of the Modernisation Plan to Boyd-Carpenter.26 The 
disappointment is understandable given that Gourvish found that of the 
planning team's 16 members, 13 had been at headquarters prior to 1954, 
and these included 5 of the team which had drafted the 1953 programme.27 
23 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 257. 
24 Ibid., p. 257. 
25 Ibid., p. 258. 
26 Elliot to Robertson, 25 January 1955, AN6/2. 
27 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 264. 
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Despite the weaknesses in the management structure of the reformed 
BTC, this acceptance of the need for investment planning and consideration 
of the means to obtain the necessary funds did indicate signs of greater 
strategic thinking. This became further apparent in autumn 1953, when the 
newly appointed Robertson raised the issue of additional capital expenditure 
with Lennox-Boyd, and particularly the need to discuss how it would be 
financed. Developing this theme of investment for modernisation was the 
April 1954 BTC publication, Reorganisation of the Railways, which stressed 
that the 'Commission are of the view that there is great scope for an 
improvement in the railway system'.28 Moreover, by mid 1954, with a 
stronger national economy, the government was able to contemplate making 
more investment funds available on the scale which the BTC indicated as 
necessary. As a result the Treasury were informed that the BTC wished to 
come forward with a big programme of additional capital development 
covering the next 10 to 20 years. The extent of this investment prompted 
the Treasury to argue, successfully, that wider national objectives should be 
secured in return. 
First and understandably, the Treasury sought to reduce the railways 
financial dependency on the taxpayer, by elimination or substantial reduction 
in the railway's financial deficits. Second, it sought greater use of diesel and 
electric traction, in order to reduce coal consumption and so help to 
overcome the continuing national energy shortages and pressure on the coal 
industry. Third, was concern about employment policy, and that the railways 
26 Reorganisation of the Railways, BTC, April 1954. 
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investment programmes should provide a reserve of economically 
acceptable works to protect against future unemployment.29 
Pollution was a further element in the government's support for major 
investment in the railways. Smoke pollution had long been a problem: it was 
widespread in most industrial areas, and its impact was emphasised by its 
contribution to incidents of London smog. The worst was from 5 to 9 
December 1952, when an estimated 4,000 people died and cattle were 
reported as being asphyxiated at Smithfield Market.30 As the health risks 
became better understood and as public criticism grew, there was concern 
about the smoke and soot emitted from over 19,000 steam engines, 
especially near locomotive depots and main-line stations which were often 
located in urban areas. The November 1954 Report of the Beaver 
Committee on Air Pollution estimated that the railways were responsible for 
a seventh of all smoke discharged into Britain's atmosphere. lt 
recommended that diesel locomotives replace steam and this changeover 
should be 'accelerated on the widest possible scale'.31 Unsurprisingly, 
pressure on the railways then became serious; indeed after the passage of 
the Clean Air Acts from 1956, a number of local authorities took legal action 
against the railways. 
This was the context in which the BTC prepared its comprehensive 
plan for development of the transport infrastructure, with the Chief of 
General Services (and former Quartermaster General), General Sir Daril 
Watson, being instructed in May 1954 to assemble a planning committee. 
29 Treasury to MOT, R29/1/06, Railways 'A' Division, 1 July 1954, MT124/46. 
30 The Meteorological Office website, www.metoffice.gov.uk 
31 [Beaver] Committee on Air Pollution, Report (Parliamentary Papers 1953-4, Cmd. 9322, 
viii, 663), para. 58-60. The estimate was somewhat crudely based on the fact that the 
railways burned the same proportion of total national coal consumption. 
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The Modernisation Plan was to be based on the assumptions that it should 
be spread over a period of years, be capable of being launched in five years, 
and completed in fifteen. Initially it was intended that the Plan would be 
funded by a government loan at a low rate of interest.32 
In November 1954 the Plan was further developed when the BTC 
appointed three of its number- Pope, Ryan and Valentine- to assist 
Watson in drafting the chapters, particularly those dealing with the forecasts 
of traffic and the scope of economies. 33 Gourvish considers that the 
deliberations of this group 'seem to have been hasty, if not to say slap-dash. 
lt removed nearly all the forecasting figures which had appeared in the 
Planning Committee's report and merely inserted a new estimate that gross 
freight revenue would rise by about one-sixteenth over a 15-20 year 
period'.34 These aspects of the Plan did indeed prove to be weak in 
conception and analysis, but this is hardly surprising given that such 
complex chapters were completed and submitted to the Commission in less 
than a month. Bonavia considered it 'no more than the lumping together of a 
large number of projects, which on first examination appear desirable', and 
Gourvish accepts that 'plan' was a misnomer and that 'Modernisation Policy' 
would have been a more apt description of what was put together'. 35 On 16 
December 1954, the Commission made some amendments and approved 
the Plan for despatch by Robertson to the Minister of Transport, John Boyd-
Carpenter. 36 
32 BTC minute 7/200, 14 May 1954, AN85n. 
33 BTC minute 7/583, 18 November 1954, AN87n. 
34 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 266. 
35 Gourvish citing Bonavia, British Railways, p. 265. 
36 Boyd-Carpenter replaced Lennox-Boyd on 28 July 1954. 
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Boyd-Carpenter's initial response was to consider whether, before he 
permitted the BTC to publish the Plan, there should be a more wide-ranging 
inquiry into the affairs of British Railways. His concerns centred on how the 
BTC would improve the deployment of manpower and reduce the labour 
force to control the ever-increasing wage costs, an issue which received 
scant attention in the Plan. Concern was also expressed in the Cabinet. 
According to Gourvish, 'at its inception [the Plan] received the warm support 
of the Conservative Government'.37 Yet the Cabinet minutes show that 
ministers were cautious even in giving general approval, because they 
considered the long-term future of the railways doubtful given the 
development of road and air transport. Again, particular concern related to 
labour costs after the recent Court of Inquiry into the railway wages dispute, 
and the related question of man-power efficiency of the railways. The 
Cabinet considered whether to initiate an independent inquiry into the use of 
manpower on the railways, based on Lennox-Boyd's proposals for an 
investigation which he had already made to the Cabinet Economic Policy 
Committee.38 A decision on this was deferred on the basis that labour 
efficiency in the short term was the concern of the BTC, and anyway should 
be considered separately from the manpower implications of the 
Modernisation Plan. 39 Even so, it is clear that the Cabinet recognised the 
importance of labour costs and efficiency as a key to modernisation and 
financial management. 
37 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 256. 
38 Lennox-Boyd proposed a committee comprising: a production engineer, a railwayman, a 
charted accountant, and a trade unionist, preferably one associated with the British 
Productivity Council to investigate the use of manpower on the railways. Lennox-Boyd to 
Cabinet Economic Policy Committee, 14 January 1955, MT124/46. 
39 Cabinet Conclusions, C.C. (55) 5, 20 January 1955, MT124/46. 
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After considerable debate, the Cabinet agreed that the BTC could 
publish the Modernisation Plan, with the proviso that Lennox-Boyd should 
discuss with Robertson the question of an inquiry into the use and 
deployment of the labour force, agree the form it should take, and how it 
would be initiated and announced.40 Yet little progress was made on the 
labour inquiry, because Robertson was insistent that substantial labour 
savings would become apparent very quickly. His rationale was based on 
the expectation that the introduction of scientific application to work-study, 
the greater use of mechanical and electronic equipment and modem office 
methods would lead to an improvement in net revenue of £5m a year. 
Robertson also wrongly predicted that any issue of staff reduction could be 
achieved by normal wastage, although he agreed to full consultation with the 
unions on the issues of redundancy. 
The Modernisation and Re-equipment of British Railways, published 
on 25 January 1955, declared that its primary objective was 'to produce a 
thoroughly modem system, able to fully meet both current traffic 
requirements and those for the foreseeable future'.41 A central element of 
this strategy was to remodel passenger services in order to provide fast, 
clean, regular, and frequent services, using electric or diesel traction in all 
the great urban areas. Inter-city and main-line trains were also to be 
accelerated and punctuality improved, and services on other routes either 
made more economic or transferred to road. However, unlike the earlier RE-
produced document, the Modernisation Plan contained some highly 
optimistic conclusions, including a statement that 'marked improvements in 
4
° Cabinet Economic Policy Committee, January 1955, MT124/46. 
41 The Modernisation and Re-equipment of British Railways, p. 5. 
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the quality of passenger services offered to the public' would lead to an 
improvement in working results for passenger services of £35m a year. 42 A 
complete re-orientation of freight services was also planned, with modern 
technical developments equipping the railways to exploit its advantages as 
bulk carriers, to speed up movement, reduce costs and provide direct 
transits for main streams of traffic. lt was anticipated that these 
improvements would attract a proportion of full-load merchandise traffic that 
would otherwise use road transport.43 This predicted revolution in freight 
services would be achieved through using fewer wagons with higher 
capacity and faster turn-round, to generate improvements in the order of 
£60m a year.44 Overall the Plan anticipated an increase of working expenses 
by £1 Om a year, but predicted that the improvement in the BTC's financial 
position would be 'of the order of £85m a year'.45 
Yet the impact of these far-reaching changes was not fully calculated. 
The Plan contains no appraisal of costs of implementation, or any use of 
cost-benefit analysis to quantify the benefits from a total investment of 
£1240m.46 Pollins described it as 'little more than a draft',47 and Bagwell, 
while conceding that it was a constructive, if long overdue, reform, 
considered that it was probably accepted by the Ministry of Transport and 
the government on the basis that 'anything was better than nothing'.48 1n 
contrast, Gourvish implies that at least some of the responsibility for the 
Plan's shortcomings lay less with the management than with government. 
42 Ibid., p. 33. 
43 Ibid., p. 7. 
44 Ibid., p. 34. 
45 Ibid., p. 35. 
46 Ibid., p. 7. 
47 Harold Pollins, Britain's Railways an Industrial History (Newton Abbot, 1971 ), p. 191. 
48 Bagwell, The Railwaymen, p. 641. 
196 
The 'acceptance of the Plan owed much to the fact that the Treasury was 
still feeling its way with all the nationalised industries', and 'in the absence of 
clear guidelines [on the vetting of expenditure and its profitability], it is not 
surprising that the Treasury should have decided to handle the Commission 
gently'.49 
No attempt was made to assess the impact of expanding road 
transport, which continued to take an increasing share of freight traffic. 
Indeed, road improvements were set to generate even more competition for 
the railways in the future. Demands for road building and development were 
increasingly articulated by the rapidly-developing motoring organisations, 
which represented both the private motorist and commercial vehicle 
operator. Their opinion was of an inadequate road system, particularly in 
comparison with American freeways, German autobahns and Italian 
autostradas. This weight of public opinion was such that as early as 1950 
Bames, the Labour Minister of Transport, had seriously considered 
motorway building. 50 Eventually the decision to build motorways was 
announced in February 1955, within weeks of publication of the 
Modernisation Plan. Yet there is no evidence that either the MOT or British 
Railways investigated the implications of these two different types of major 
capital-intensive schemes upon each other, for example the electrification of 
the London-Midland main-line and the construction of the M1 motorway. 
The financial position of the railways and the likely implications of the 
Modernisation Plan upon it were such considerable issues that in March 
1955 Boyd-Carpenter raised with the Cabinet the possibility of altering the 
49 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 272. 
50 Boyd-Carpenter, Way of Life, p. 11 0. 
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financial parameters under which the BTC operated, justifying change on the 
basis of the national interest. The stimulus for this was that costs - including 
maintenance and central charges- had increased by £52·5m since the start 
of 1954, and the Commission estimated that it was adding to its deficit at the 
rate of £1 m per week. 51 However, the Attomey-General52 advised that the 
Minister himself did not have the power to alter the financial arrangements 
still required under the terms of the 1947 Transport Act. These required the 
BTC to conduct its undertakings so as to secure an income that was 
sufficient to meet expenditure taking one year with another.53 
The appointment of Harold Watkinson as Minister of Transport in 
December 1955 appeared to herald a new approach, when he 'welcomed 
the chance of introducing a more realistic and vigorous climate into my 
section'.54 His tenure at the MOT did lead to re-thinking on the BTC's 
finances which ultimately led to the publication of a White Paper, Proposals 
for the Railways, in October 1956 and the subsequent Transport (Railway 
Finances) Act 1957. Incorporated into the White Paper was the 
Commission's strategy including pricing, productivity and the elimination of 
unprofitable services; and a key section was devoted to modemisation.55 
Despite its previous misgivings about the future of the railways, the 
government expressed public support for this perspective: 
Although forecasts indicate substantial deficits for some years, the Commission 
have, in the Government's view, presented a convincing case showing that, by 
measures such as the acceleration of the schedule for modernisation and 
rationalisation of the railways, the use of greater freedom in charging policy and the 
51 Cabinet conclusions, 16 March 1955, PREM11/1049. 
52 Sir A. Manningham-Buller. 
53 Memo from Attorney-General22 March 1955, PREM11/1049. 
54 Watkinson to PM, 17 February 1956, PREM11/663. 
55 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 294. 
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steady development of greater productivity, they should be able to overcome their 
present financial difficulties reaching a state of current balance by 1961 or 1962 and 
eventually a position of considerable strength. lt is clear that the Commission have 
spared no effort to lay before the nation as full and detailed an explanation of the 
position, proposals and assessment of the future as is possible. 56 
Gourvish is critical of these remarks (attributed to Watkinson): 'they did not 
of course, fool any of the more knowledgeable critics. This revised 
justification of the Modernisation Plan was little more than a dressing-up of 
the hurried calculation made earlier'.57 Bagwell is also critical of the 
implications of the White Paper, describing it as 'a millstone round the neck 
of the Transport Commission which put severe limits on its ability to pay 
adequate wages to its staff'.58 Yet in reality the measure led to greater 
financial support for the railways, as the Minister was allowed to advance 
sums equivalent to railway deficits in 1956-62, up to a maximum of £250m, 
and to cover interest on these advances for a period of five years after the 
year of borrowing. 59 
The 1956 White Paper and the 1957 Transport Act not only 
recognised the need for greater financial support for the BTC; according to 
Gourvish they were 'used to justify an acceleration of the Plan and ... should 
not have convinced anyone that the Commission would achieve a net 
revenue surplus in 1970 let alone in 1961 or 1962'.60 Even so Robertson 
remained optimistic about the effect of these changes, and stressed to 
Watkinson that 'we are turning over a fresh financial page, that the effect of 
56 Proposals for the Railways, Cmd. 9880 (1956), p. 3. 
57 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 294. 
58 Bagwell, The Railwaymen, p. 644. 
59 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 176. 
60 Ibid., p. 296. 
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legacies from the past is being segregated in our accounts'.6~ Nevertheless, 
despite this optimism and the increased financial support, the financial 
position of the railways continued not simply to deteriorate, but increasingly 
so, as can be seen from Table 1. Eventually, as Loft states, 'the railway's 
financial problems dwarfed those of the other nationalised industries in the 
late 1950s'. 62 
TABLE 1: TRUE FINANCIAL RESULTS FOR BRITISH RAILWAYS 1952-62 
(Excluding drawings on abnormal maintenance funds 1948-53 and maintenance 
equalisation account 1954-62). 
Year Revised deficit (constant 1948 prices) £m 
1952 -16·6 
1953 -18·6 
1954 -16·1 
1955 -29·5 
1956 -40·9 
1957 -52·5 
1958 -67·3 
1959 -64·9 
1960 -84·5 
1961 -96·1 
1962 -105·6 
Source: Gourvish, British Railways, Appendix A, page 587. 
The Modernisation Plan also raised the continuing and contentious 
issue of the boundaries of ministerial authority. This revolved around the 
MOT's concern over the BTC's lack of investment appraisal, which led Boyd-
Carpenter to insist that Robertson kept him informed of the progress of the 
Plan by means of a constant interchange of views. lt was also stressed that 
while the Government had given its blessing to the general lines of the Plan, 
61 Robertson to Watkinson, 31 August 1956, MT132/32. 
62 Loft, 'Government and the railway problem', p. 75. 
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it must be consulted on the exact nature and timing of major items.63 
Robertson was prepared to accede to the extent of keeping the Minister fully 
informed and producing 'reasonable assessments of the character, cost and 
incidence of our projects'. However, he insisted that responsibility and 
initiative for the Plan must rest with the Commission.64 This view was 
eventually accepted within the MOT; indeed under the terms of the relevant 
legislation it had no other option. But the episode signified the beginning of 
strained relations with the BTC, and created unease among senior officials. 
They had earlier identified anxiety on the part of members of the 
Commission (particularly Wilson), who wanted to avoid detailed ministerial 
control of the Plan.65 lt also had later repercussions, when the MOT stood 
accused of lack of response to the continuing financial problems of railway 
investment, an approach described by Gourvish as 'notably feeble.' 66 
These financial problems also resonated in the Cabinet, where it was 
accepted that the increasing financial burden of the railways would make it 
difficult to resist growing political pressure for increased parliamentary 
control over the nationalised industries. One solution -further time for 
debates and questions- was considered, but the appointment of a standing 
committee was considered as likely to be more effective. 57 As will be seen 
later this process was adopted with significant consequences. 
Notwithstanding these MOT doubts, the BTC expressed confidence in 
its plans for the future in its 1955 Annual Report: 
63 Boyd-Carpenter to Robertson, 6 July 1955, MT124/46. 
64 Robertson to Boyd-Carpenter, 1 8 July 1955, MT124/46. 
65 Wild (MOT), 31 March 1955, MT124/46. 
66 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 293. 
67 Cabinet minutes, 8 May 1956, PREM11/3440. 
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Thanks to the easing of former restrictions on expenditure and with approval given 
for the Modernisation Plan, capital development in the Commission's undertakings 
gathered momentum in 1955.68 
In addition, belief in the Plan's effectiveness continued to grow throughout 
1956: at the end of the year the BTC reported that the Plan had 'accelerated, 
was gathering momentum and its financial expectations were beginning to 
improve'. lt further predicted that the railways did not require a subsidy, 
would emerge from their financial difficulties to be in balance by 1962, and 
would generate a surplus of £50m in 1970.69 
Despite such bold expectations, the Plan contained little recognition 
of labour issues- including a need to reduce costs and improve productivity. 
The BTC believed that introduction of technically-advanced equipment would 
automatically generate increased productivity, and that the main labour issue 
would be recruitment of technically-qualified staff, of whom a substantial 
increase was required?0 Perhaps because of this, the railway unions 
greeted the Plan positively, even if with a degree of scepticism as to its 
future prospects. The NUR Annual General Meeting on 6 July 1955 
unanimously passed a resolution welcoming the proposals, but warned that 
the response of railwaymen would be 'conditioned by the attitude of 
management in the matters of adequate safeguards and reasonable 
incentives' .71 For the NUR the issues of job security and achievement of the 
40-hour week were higher priorities than implementation of the Plan. Even 
so, it was not until 1962 that a reduction in the working week from 44 to 42 
hours was achieved. 
68 BTC Annual Report and Accounts 1955, para. 74, p. 25. 
69 BTC Press Office: Re-assessment of BTC Finances, 2 December 1956. 
70 The Modernisation and Re-equipment of British Railways, p. 28. 
71 Bagwell, The Railwaymen, p. 641. 
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Public opinion also appeared sceptical. This was exemplified by a 
letter to The Times responding to a report that implementation of the 
Modernisation Plan had led to such improvements in passenger services 
that the 'Talisman Express' could now travel from London to Edinburgh in 6 
hours 40 minutes. A knowledgeable commentator pointed out that in 1895 
the same journey, with stops at Grantham, York and Newcastle to change 
locomotives, had taken 6 hours 19 minutes.72 Furthermore, despite the BTC 
claim of progress and improvements, slow travel and poor punctuality 
remained unresolved problems, as they had been since nationalisation. The 
public's tendency to use alternatives to the railways was exacerbated by 
frequent cancellations of train services, resulting in harmful criticism in the 
media. However, when the BTC discussed this problem in February 1956, all 
it seemed able to offer was to introduce an annual award for the region 
which showed the best timekeeping, and once again to exhort General 
Managers to tighten discipline of the front-line workforce. 73 This made very 
little difference. Several episodes generated particularly adverse publicity. 
There was the debacle over the Glasgow suburban electrification scheme, 
when a transformer in one of the new trains blew up and seriously injured 
passengers. As a result all the new trains (72 four-carriage sets74) were 
withdrawn for rectification and replacement by an all-steam hauled service 
between 18 December 1960 and 1 October 1961.75 Still more embarrassing 
was the breakdown on 11 January 1961 of a new diesel locomotive which 
was hauling a train carrying the Queen from Liverpool Street to 
72 Mr. Turner letter, Times, 26 September 1956, p. 11. 
73 BTC minute 9/80, 16 February 1956, AN85/9. 
74 
'Electric blues', British Railways Illustrated 12 (2003), pp. 250-3. 
75 BTC minute 14/20,19 January 1961, AN85/16. 
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Sandringham?6 Slow progress was also evident in other aspects of railway 
operation. Remarkably, horses continued to be used for shunting duties as 
late as 1967,77 while Shipley and many other stations retained gas lighting 
until1974.78 In other words, examples of old practices remained until well 
after the Beaching era. Yet detailed examination of BTC minutes reveals 
few references to the quality of services for passengers, and how these 
might be improved. A notable exception was the debate on prices charged 
in restaurant cars for table d'h6te luncheons and dinners, an issue hardly 
likely to be of significance to the majority of potential railway users.79 So 
despite the expenditure under the Modernisation Plan, many of the public 
perceived the railways as unreliable, inefficient and anachronistic, with an 
inevitable further decline in both passenger and freight traffic. 
Ill 
Fundamental to the success of the Modernisation Plan was the need to 
ensure proper returns in terms of productivity and efficiency for the new 
investment made in the railways. This was considerable: the Commission's 
investment over the years 1954-62 averaged £120·6m, with a peak of over 
£167m in 1959, and a total of over £1085m.80 However, the effectiveness of 
many elements of this large-scale investment was questionable: as Gourvish 
concludes, 'it is not sufficient to blame the government for the adverse 
76 BTC minute 14/8, 19 January 1961, AN85/16. 
77 Bryan Holden, 'Dobbins yard, Halifax- a tribute to the railway horses', Railway World, 48 
(1987), p. 338. 
78 Peter Kay, 'A Station survey: Shipley 1846-1992', British Railways Illustrated, 3 (1993), 
pp. 87-97. 
79 BTC minute 14/338, 28 September 1961, AN85/18. 
80 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 274. 
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effects of modernisation spending from 1956. The Commission itself must be 
criticised for failing to control the investment programme properly'. 81 
One of the areas where criticism can justifiably be made is traction 
policy. This was the single most important element of the large-scale 
investment, and the BTC considered it fundamental to the creation of a more 
efficient, cost-effective, and cleaner railway, and for the improved quality of 
service required by the industry and travelling public.82 lt was also an issue 
on which the Commission had been constantly questioned by the MOT, 
particularly in relation to the comparative costs of steam and diesel units.83 
Although the BTC eventually accepted that only through widespread 
conversion to electric and diesel power could proper modernisation be 
achieved, as we have seen that decision came late when compared with 
other European railways, and even when taken, the pace and quality of 
implementation was questionable. Cost constraints allowed electrification 
only on selected, high-density routes. Additionally, the BTC remained 
cautious in its winding down of steam-locomotive building. Included in the 
Modernisation Plan was the target to cease construction of new steam 
passenger locomotives after completion of the 1956 building programme, 
with all other construction ceasing as soon as possible. The first decision 
was hardly revolutionary, because the railways had an adequate stock of 
express passenger locomotives, while cancellation of the order for fifteen 
Class 6 standard types 84 was sensible in view of their disappointing 
performance. Yet even so the BTC continued to sanction expenditure on 
81 Ibid., p. 286. 
82 The Modernisation and Re-equipment of British Railways, p. 11. 
83 MOT to BTC, 30 June 1954, MT124/46. 
84 BTC minute 8/250, 26 May 1955, AN85/8. 
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steam locomotives: the railway workshops constructed 17 4 steam 
locomotives in 1955, 138 in 1956 and 144 in 1957, with the final ones 
produced at Swindon in 1960 - at a time when large-scale withdrawal of 
steam traction had already begun. 
From nationalisation, motive power policy was characterised by the 
lack of direction from the BTC. Initially this led to policies which perpetuated 
outdated steam technology, through the introduction of a new range of 
standard steam locomotives and resulted in a waste of resources. Moreover, 
despite references in the Modernisation Plan to dieselisation in the USA and 
electrification in Europe, little account was taken of experience and practice 
there.85 In particular, it soon became clear that the BTC did not draw on the 
American operating experience. Nor does it appear that advice was sought 
from the one British manufacturer with substantial experience in construction 
of technically advanced forms of traction - Brush Bagnall. This company had 
produced diesel locomotives for export since 1950, an impressive 
achievement given the dominance of steam traction on Britain's own 
railways at that time. The benefits of such experience with advanced 
traction became apparent later, when the company's products were 
considered to be amongst the most successful diesels used by British 
Railways. Brush locomotives experienced a long life (some remain in 
service in 2008).86 
Gourvish estimates that in the period 1954-62 nearly 3,500 diesel 
locomotives, 4,000 diesel multiple units, and 3,800 electrical multiple units 
were put into service. Yet in the same period, 744 steam locomotives were 
85 Modernisation and Re-equipment of British Railways, p. 11 . 
86 
'Diesel Dawn, A Brush with fate', British Railways Illustrated, 4 (1996), p. 147. 
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acquired and despite an anticipated useful life of 40 years all were scrapped 
prematurely. 87 The rush to modernise plainly led to a lack of effective 
planning in traction policy, and a substantial and continued waste of 
investment resources. Gourvish outlines two major elements of this: 'an 
unnecessary variety of locomotive types and a commitment to relatively 
large orders without the testing in service of a prototype'. 88 And there were 
others: too many new locomotives were underpowered and less powerful 
than the steam engines they replaced, while the implementation of proper 
maintenance facilities and effective training was often inadequate. 
Evidence to support this verdict of poor strategic managerial control 
and ineffective planning by the BTC can be seen from Table 2, which lists 
the initial orders placed in late 1955 for diesel locomotives by type and 
manufacturer. 
TABLE 2: DIESEL LOCOMOTIVES ORDERED BY THE BTC 1955 
Manufacturer 
English Electric 
N. British Loco. Co 
English Electric 
Birmingham RCW 
Brush Bagnall 
N. British Loco. Co 
Metropolitan Vickers 
English Electric 
Thompson Houston 
N. British Loco. Co 
Total Types 
Horsepower 
2000 
2000 
1100 
1160 
1250 
1000 
1200 
1000 
800 
800 
10 
Number ordered Region 
10 E 
5 w 
10 E 
20 E 
20 E 
16 Wand E 
20 LM 
20 LM 
10 LM 
10 E 
141 
Source: Railway Gazette, 25 November 1955 (based on information from the BTC 
Press Office, 22 November 1955). 
87 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 275. 
88 Ibid., p. 275. 
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Although these orders were designed as a pilot scheme, they nevertheless 
represented significant expenditure, as 141 main-line locomotives were 
ordered. As many as ten different types were ordered, from six different 
manufacturers. Even this total number grew, first to 174 and then more were 
added.89 In the event further substantial orders were placed without proper 
evaluation and experience of these new types of locomotives. As will be 
shown later, this had serious repercussions. This pattern of purchasing 
different types from numerous manufacturers was contrary not just to 
overseas experience with diesels, but even to the BTC's own experience in 
introducing the standard designs of steam locomotives. Furthermore, the full 
impact of these purchases had not been fully investigated in terms of 
provision of spares, technical training for maintenance purposes, and driver 
instruction. These were to prove expensive omissions. From 1957 to 1962, 
a total of 1 ,668 main-line diesel locomotives were acquired, and as the 
railway workshops were unable to convert quickly and easily to constructing 
the new form of traction, 74% of these units were brought in from outside 
contractors. 90 The result was that the railway workforce expected to maintain 
the new units were unfamiliar with their design and construction. 
More particular cases can be produced. As part of the process of 
dieselisation, the Eastern Region planned to dispose of 240 steam 
locomotives and replace them with 160 diesels, a saving estimated at 
£250,000 pa.91 However, the rush to introduce the diesels without adequate 
evaluation and testing soon resulted in substantial and expensive 
operational problems. A further complication was the Western Region 
89 Bonavia, British Rail- the First 25 Years, p. 107. 
90 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 276. 
91 BTC Annual Report and Accounts 1956, p. 135. 
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management's decision to diversify further and introduce diesel-hydraulic 
traction. The rationale for this move, so out of line with the rest of British 
Railways, was articulated by R. F. Hanks, Chairman of the Western Region 
Board, in a somewhat contradictory statement: 
lt is no reflection on British industry that the Western Region should favour a design 
evolved on the continent. Indeed working for the Commission and British Railways, 
they would be failing in their duty if they did not explore fresh avenues of design in a 
determination to get the very best. Obviously they could not yet claim that this type 
of locomotive was the best, but it had done very well in Germany and they were 
confident that mileages between stoppages would make our faithful old friend the 
steam engine look silly by comparison.92 
The BTC was persuaded to sanction the Western Region's purchase of 
three sets of diesel engines and transmissions from the Maybach Company 
in Germany, with the locomotives to be constructed at Swindon Works as 
part of the 1957 building programme - but only on the clear proviso that the 
work was of an experimental nature, and carried no commitment for the 
future.93 Yet this decision was soon overturned, as the Western Region 
insisted that it be allowed to proceed with its own programme. Not only was 
the Western Region allowed to introduce a range of non-standard 
locomotives; these then proved to be under-powered, to suffer severe 
problems of reliability, and to be highly expensive to maintain. Introduced 
from 1959, they proved so unreliable that all were withdrawn from service by 
1967, a year before steam traction ended on British Railways. 
To compound the problems, the BTC itself in 1960 authorised the 
construction of an additional 50 different Type 3 diesel-hydraulics.94 This 
92 Railway Gazette, 18 July 1958. 
93 BTC minute 8/250, 26 May 1955, AN85/8. 
94 BTC minute 13/110, 17 March 1960, AN85/15. 
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was now in contradiction of BTC's own policy, because in order to resolve 
unsatisfactory time-keeping and avoid excessive maintenance and stocks of 
spares, Robertson had in the previous November issued an instruction for a 
programme of standardisation, by means of premature condemnation of 
diesel locomotive types where performance was unsatisfactory and unlikely 
to improve. 95 Nearly a year later, after it was discovered that many of the 
new diesel locomotives would have to be expensively re-engined, Robertson 
had to issue an almost identical statement. 96 Once again the BTC had failed 
to offer adequate strategic management in the pursuit of traction 
standardisation. 
There was the general problem of many new locomotives being 
under-powered for their anticipated roles. This also contradicted the 
Commission's purchasing policy, because in order to fulfil the requirements 
of the Modernisation Plan, the BTC had argued for more powerful 
locomotives: units of 3,000hp for passenger traffic were required pending 
electrification, and the possibility of obtaining that type was to be urgently 
pursued.97 Yet in December 1959 H. P. Barker, a part-time member of the 
BTC expressed concern that 'a large fleet of diesel locomotives was being 
built which would not be capable of hauling trains of the weight and high 
speeds laid down in the Modernisation Plan'. Despite this warning, over the 
next three years the BTC agreed expenditure of £37m for the provision of 
under-powered diesel hydraulics in the 1961 and 1962 building 
programmes.98 This meant that until1961 all the diesels delivered for BR 
95 Robertson to BTC, minute 12/479, 26 November 1959, AN85/14. 
96 BTC minute 13/363, 22 September 1960, AN85/15. 
97 BTC minute 9/384, Traction Policy for BR, 26 July 1956, AN85/9. 
98 BTC minute 12/510, 17 December 1959, AN85/14. 
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passenger services were less powertul than the steam engines that they 
replaced, some significantly so. Moreover, soon after introduction many of 
the new diesels suffered constant breakdowns, which resulted in their 
rosters being frequently and successfully undertaken by steam locomotives. 
That such successful substitutions were made is indicative: it provides clear 
evidence that even before the introduction of diesel locomotives, existing 
motive power could have been used in restructuring strategies to deliver 
improved services. 
Ultimate responsibility for the Western Region's waste of resources 
lies with the BTC. A strategic policy for traction should have aimed to 
achieve standardisation in the procurement of locomotives of appropriate 
and tested efficiency, yet this was postponed for a decade. The effect was a 
costly and wasteful use of the public funds allocated to the Modernisation 
Plan. To compound this costly error, as Gourvish points out, 'the evidence 
suggests that the Commission surrendered the [commercial) advantage too 
readily, allowing manufacturers to pass on additional production costs and to 
insist upon long-term contracts, with heavy penalty clauses'. 99 An example is 
the BTC's dealings with the North British Locomotive Company (NBL), which 
unilaterally raised its tender prices for 52 main-line diesels by 20% on the 
basis of general price increases.100 The NBL was failing to meet its delivery 
dates, and the design and quality of the locomotives was so poor that they 
experienced constant failures, and required costly rectification. Despite this, 
surprisingly, the BTC accepted the price increases and decided to take no 
action against the NBL believing that it would cause the company to fail, lead 
99 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 288. 
100 Price of main-line diesels, November 1957, AN6/56. 
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to unfavourable publicity, and offer little financial gain.101 The decision to buy 
from the NBL seems to have owed something, at least, to the fact that it 
satisfied the government's concern to assist the areas of high 
unemployment.102 As the majority of locomotive manufacturers were located 
in the north of England and Scotland, support for these producers accorded 
well with regional development policy. 
Gourvish confirms the view that government 'took an interest in 
certain aspects of the Commission's purchasing policy, and at times exerted 
informal pressure to influence the placing of orders', notably in encouraging 
the purchase of diesel locomotives from private British contractors.103 There 
is certainly evidence of strong lobbying from the British Electrical and Allied 
Manufacturers' Association, which held the view that BR workshops should 
concentrate on regular servicing and essential maintenance, and leave 
construction of new locomotives as the preserve of the manufacturers. This 
was argued on the grounds that new diesel traction was of increased 
technical complexity, and that the advantage lay with the wide resources and 
experiences of the locomotive building industry rather than with the railway 
workshops. 104 In addition, lobbying by the Locomotive Manufacturers' 
Association was based on their argument that 'a larger and steadier home 
market would assist the industry's export performance'.105 This view was 
considered favourably by the Minister of Transport and was passed on to the 
Commission. The BTC had long worked with private locomotive building 
101 BTC minutes: 14/316, 27 July 1961, 14/329, 28 September 1961, AN85/16. 
102 Gourvish British Railways p. 286. 
103 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 285. 
104 British Electrical and Allied Manufacturers' Association, memo to SAG, 29 July 1960, 
AN13/2739. 
105 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 285. 
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firms, fully appreciated the difficulties they faced, and according to Boyd-
Carpenter were not unsympathetic to them.106 This is understandable in the 
light of the need for the large-scale procurement of new equipment 
envisaged in the Modernisation Plan. Yet whatever the degree of external 
influence, the BTC remained determined to pursue what it considered to be 
a sound commercial strategy through the use of its own workshops wherever 
possible. However, it was also fully aware of the need to purchase externally 
in order to maintain progress with the delivery of diesel traction and, perhaps 
more importantly, to maintain continual advances in technical expertise.107 
But the process of motive power procurement was plainly highly 
questionable, and as Gourvish concluded 'there is little doubt that had the 
initial policy of a three year trial period been followed many of these 
expensive mistakes could have been avoided'. 108 
A further problem with the rapid purchase of numerous types of 
diesels related to training for their maintenance and use in service. Effective 
use of the new equipment required proper training of footplate staff and 
maintenance staff, something which proved difficult to achieve. Moreover, 
even the limited experience gained from running the experimental units 
introduced by the SR and the LMS was ignored when full-scale dieselisation 
was implemented. lt was found that almost all serious problems were the 
result of ineffective maintenance, with one major exception, the steam 
heating boiler.109 The majority of maintenance issues were eventually 
resolved through more effective training and by the accumulation of 
106 Boyd-Carpenter to Peter Thorneycroft MP, 17 January 1955, MT 124/46. 
107 BTC minute -Works Equipment Committee, 5 December 1955, AN6/56. 
108 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 288. 
109 Minutes, BTC and RE, 30 October 1952, AN13/1 098. 
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experience by the former steam-locomotive technicians; but the steam-
heating problem was not given the necessary attention. Riddles had 
identified the lack of success in remedying this weakness as early as 
1952,110 yet despite this warning the problem remained unresolved. As a 
result, problems continued to be experienced for another ten years or so, 
and in the severe winter of 1962-63 numerous diesels failed in traffic owing 
to defective train-heating boilers. That debacle resulted in another significant 
loss of business, because it further reinforced the view in the minds of the 
travelling public and business user of an outdated and ineffective railway. In 
all, the proliferation of diesel types from a variety of different manufacturers 
meant that it took a decade before the railways could properly maintain its 
diesel fleet. 111 This also had significant financial repercussions. The BTC 
had built its initial financial projections that the average cost of a main-line 
diesel at £80,000 would be reduced to less than £50,000 based on the 
economies expected from long production runs. But these did not materialise 
until much later.112 Bonavia concluded that 'the BTC seemed unable to 
shape any firm diesel policy'. 113 
Bonavia also accepts that 'the Modernisation Plan ran into deep water 
on the freight side'.114 Gourvish confirms this view: 'large sums of money 
were committed to freight modernisation without a clear statement of future 
policy'. 115 Problems were encountered in strategies for the replacement of 
freight wagons, the introduction of power-braking systems, and for 
110 Riddles to RE, 23 January 1952, AN88/77. 
111 H. Rodgers, Thompson and Peppercorn Locomotive Engineers (London, 1979}, p. 135. 
112 Beazley (MOT) to Gregory (Ministry of Fuel and Power), 20 February 1955, MT124/46. 
113 Bonavia, British Rail the First 25 Years, p. 107. 
114 1bid., p. 107. 
115 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 289. 
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marshalling yards. The MOT found it alarming that it took so long to make 
fundamental decisions on important issues such as wagon braking.116 To 
compound this, with contracts to supply wagon brake equipment, the 
Commission 'embarked on a spending programme before the technical and 
commercial implications had been fully investigated',117 a move which was 
particularly expensive and wasteful. According to Bonavia 'the marshalling 
yards national plan fell into deep trouble, because of the decline in total 
tonnage, and the changes in the traffic flows which overtook the railways 
even while the new yards were under construction'.118 Most of these proved 
to be too big and under-used becoming expensive 'white elephants' as the 
BTC failed to recognise the shift towards train-load movements and away 
from single wagonloads. A particularly bad case was the expensive and 
massive yard constructed at Carlisle: this was located well away from 
industrial centres and experienced very little use. 
Despite greater expectations from the travelling public, even the 
progress in modernising passenger facilities was derisory. As Gourvish 
points out, 'when the BTC reported to the Select Committee of 1960 on the 
progress made by the end of 1959 it could point to only 14 modernised 
passenger stations and parcels depots, most of these being relatively small 
projects'. 119 
Rather too much of the new infrastructure continued to be designed 
with steam traction in mind. Had Riddles at the time of nationalisation opted 
to move towards dieselisation rather than continue with steam, many of the 
116 Bannister (MOT), 23 January 1956. 
117 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 291. 
118 Bonavia, British Rail the First 25 Years, p. 109. 
119 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 277. 
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problems could have been avoided. Even as late as 1963, when Sweden 
dispensed with steam traction after introducing 3,600hp diesel-electrics 
through a carefully planned and piloted implementation plan, 120 BR was still 
investing in expensive steam locomotive facilities. These included new 
turntables and water supplies installed in the latest marshalling yard at Healy 
Mills near Wakefield. Another example of misplaced investment is the 
construction in late 1961 of the last coaling plant built by BR, at Mexborough 
depot on the Eastern Region. This huge and expensive concrete monolith 
was only in use for a little over three years, as the depot closed in 1965. 
Even without introducing more advanced traction, productivity might 
have been improved by better use of existing equipment. Yet as shown in 
Table 3, by the standards of other European railways BR performed poorly 
in the use of its rolling stock. 
TABLE 3: INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON OF ROLLING STOCK USE 1957. 
COUNTRY PASSENGER FREIGHT 
BRITAIN 100 100 
FRANCE 220 414 
W.GERMANY 178 457 
BELGIUM 200 229 
NETHERLANDS 450 400 
SWITZERLAND 200 343 
SPAIN 267 271 
Passenger- passenger kilometres per carriage per annum. 
Freight - ton-kilometres per wagon per annum. 
Wagon turnround - average wagon turnround time in days. 
Index constructed from UN Transport Statistics for Europe 1957. 
WAGON 
TURN ROUND 
100 
69 
42 
62 
47 
32 
84 
120 
'The end of steam on the Swedish State', Modern Railways, 16 (August, 1963), p. 100. 
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Throughout its existence, the BTC had argued that a major constraint on 
operations was a shortage of rolling stock, particularly wagons. Yet since 
nationalisation this stock had been replaced by at least 40,000 new units a 
year, but even that had not resulted in any greater operational efficiency. 
Although the Modernisation Plan had identified the need for improved wagon 
usage as a priority, this could and should have been implemented before 
1955, but adherence to traditional operating strategies appeared to preclude 
this. 
lt was not only in traction policy and rolling-stock usage that the BTC 
compares badly with other national railways. The contrast with French 
experience is especially revealing. There, management adopted a very 
different style and had embraced detailed planning with greater efficiency as 
the objective. In 1962 the French National Railway System (SNCF) 
embarked on its fourth modernisation plan, to be achieved at least in part by 
the introduction of 100 more powerful new locomotives, of up to 4,000hp.121 
Had the BTC adopted a similar analytical and forward-thinking approach, its 
progress towards modernisation could have been much more rapid. lt is 
also likely that the decline in its business would have been less severe. 
IV 
Only by substantially raising both labour and capital productivity could the 
changes specified in the Modernisation Plan deliver the benefits outlined by 
its authors. Yet the Plan makes only cursory reference to the complex labour 
issues which faced management in its plans for modernisation: 
121 
'A report on French railway modernisation', Modern Railways, 15 (May, 1962), p. 326. 
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The Commission will accordingly embark upon the recruitment of trainees to 
strengthen the traffic staff, and will at the same time train men already in service for 
the special work which will flow from the requirements of the plan. 122 
Given the extent of the workforce in the railway industry (573,499 workers, 
including 33,842 women, at the end of 1957),123 and the introduction of new 
and complex equipment with a need for radically changed working 
conditions and practices, the Commission's comments on the requirements 
represents a distinct understatement. In addition, it failed to identify the 
difficulties and complexities of dealing with a workforce which was highly 
structured and almost totally unionised. Moreover, the attitudes of the trade 
union leadership and that of the workforce were conditioned by a history 
which meant that they were not always in total harmony. In particular, as 
Gourvish indicates, 'union leaders were often far in advance of their 
members in their preparedness to collaborate with management to effect 
higher productivity'. 124 While nationalisation had introduced some 
institutional and attitudinal changes, the paternalism of the Big Four railway 
companies had to a certain degree carried over to the BTC, assisting what 
were initially relatively peaceful industrial relations. However, from 1953 this 
began to change, as railway employees perceived that they were lagging 
behind other workers as: 'Conciliation grade'125 wages were 90% of the 
manufacturing average in 1953, and fell to 88% in 1959.126 The strength of 
this opinion can be judged from Bagwell's account of the NUR Executive 
Committee, a body he described as having a well-deserved reputation for 
122 Modernisation Plan, para. 113, p. 29. 
123 Facts and figures about British Railways 1958, p. 5. 
124 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 252. 
125 Wage grade traffic staff. 
126 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 217. 
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moderation and sense of responsibility. That it should reach unanimous 
decisions in favour of national rail strikes in December 1953, December 
1954, and January 1960, and a majority decision in May 1958, is a measure 
of how serious the wage problem on the railways had become.127 The further 
difficulty, the lack of co-operation between the three railway unions, added to 
and interacted with an environment of almost continuous wage bargaining 
and of government activity in major negotiations.128 
As Gourvish has explained, the 'demise of the Railway Executive in 
1953 and the expanded role of the Commission did not lead to any radical 
alteration to the pattern of labour relations in the railway industry', with the 
interaction between management and the unions described as the 'same 
long-running play' .129 Nor did the development of the Modernisation Plan 
alter 'the disillusionment of the rank and file membership with the realities of 
nationalised management, which had not delivered the "new age" of job 
security and workers' control' .130 This perspective was apparent from a 1955 
statement by the General Secretary of the NUR, Jim Campbell: 131 'what has 
to be done is to convince the staff that their interests are adequately 
protected and, indeed that the fulfilment of the [Modernisation] plan is to their 
advantage' .132 In effect this meant that co-operation with management to 
implement the Plan was dependent upon there being no fear of redundancy 
or reduction in grade, or a worsening of conditions of service. 133 
127 Bagwell, The Railwaymen, p. 644. 
128 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 215. 
129 Ibid., p. 214. 
130 Ibid., p. 215. 
131 Campbell replaced Figgins in March 1953. 
132 Campbell, NUR AGM, 6 July 1955. 
133 Bagwell, The Railwaymen, p. 641. 
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In addition to these factors, as the BTC floundered in dealing with 
wages and productivity issues, the government became more active in 
labour issues. This led to greater regulation and more direct intervention, 
often in the wish to avoid costly national stoppages. These tactics to some 
extent contradicted the Conservative's ideological position, which Tomlinson 
described as neo-liberal in emphasising the need for competition in the 
labour markets as much as in that for products. But this was offset by 
another set of considerations: the Conservative ministers accepted that any 
attack on collective bargaining and the trades unions was also likely to be 
electorally damaging.134 
While Conservative rhetoric against restrictive practices on the railway 
may have been restrained, these nonetheless remained a serious concern 
for the government, for two reasons. First, unless the wage settlements for 
well over half a million railway employees were controlled, they could 
contribute to cost-push inflation. Second, there was increasing scepticism 
about the BTC's ability to handle labour issues effectively, as Robertson had 
made only limited progress towards increasing productivity and was 
considered unduly sympathetic towards the unions. Consequently, although 
the government was committed to an economic policy centred on demand 
management, and on seeking, where politically feasible, to withdraw the 
state from direct intervention, 135 it felt obliged by circumstances to intervene 
more directly in the railways. And as Pollins concluded: 'as far as the 
nationalised industries were concerned, the government was inevitably 
134 Tomlinson, 'Liberty with order', p. 278. 
135 Green, Ideologies of Conservatism, p. 175. 
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involved in wage settlements. In the final analysis it would have to find the 
money'.136 
Central to this question of labour costs was productivity, an issue 
which should have been at the forefront of BTC's management priorities, not 
simply for financial reasons, but in response to the railway industry's labour 
shortages. Although a major argument for nationalisation had been that it 
would secure greater operational efficiency, this was not supported by the 
evidence on labour productivity. When the RE in 1953 compared 
employment levels with those under the Big Four in 1938, some surprising 
conclusions were revealed. On the North Eastern Region it was discovered 
that total engine hours worked had declined by 2·1 %, yet the numbers of 
working firemen had increased by 23%, engine coalmen by 26%, cleaners 
by 17%, and leading shed-men by 50·4%. For staff other than those 
engaged on motive-power duties, the results showed even greater 
increases: workshop numbers had increased by 28% and ticket collectors by 
188%. In addition, since 1951 the average staff turnover in many 
departments was over 33%.137 These figures indicated much scope for 
improving the financial position of the railways by means of a substantial 
shedding of labour. This continued into the 1960s. As Gourvish concluded, 
'existing estimates of productivity in the period to 1962 do paint a somewhat 
cheerless picture'.138 Aldcroft found that labour productivity measured in unit 
terms per worker increased by only 2% from 1955-62.139 
136 Pollins, Britain's Railways, p. 201. 
137 RE Review of staff position, 29 August 1953, AN6/47. 
138 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 248. 
139 D. H. Aldcroft, Britain's Railways in Transition, p.162. 
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Evidence to support the view of considerable scope for increased 
productivity can be found in the BTC and NUR evidence presented to a 
special Court of Enquiry established to arbitrate on a wage dispute in 
January 1955: 
lt is not denied by Mr. Alien or Mr. Campbell that there is room for further 
economies and further improvements in the provision of services, methods of 
charging, in re-equipment of the undertaking and in methods of operation; nor was 
it claimed that problems over staffing or of restrictive practices had been wholly or 
satisfactorily resolved. Indeed Mr. Campbell reported a lack of enthusiasm on the 
part of his members for co-operation to improve productivity as long as they 
regarded what were just claims, had not been met.140 
The findings of the Court of Enquiry were accepted by the government, and 
a settlement reached by which the NUR agreed to participate in the British 
Railways Productivity Council (BRPC), created in July 1955. According to 
Gourvish this body was created 'largely to forestall government threats of a 
public inquiry into railway efficiency and the use of manpower'.141 The BRPC 
was designed to allow the BTC to negotiate with the unions on the 
introduction of work-study, reduction in restrictive practices, and introduction 
by December 1957 of single-manning of diesel locomotives and railcars. For 
Gourvish this agreement 'decisively punctured traditional practices, although 
it was recognised that savings would be prospective rather than 
immediate'.142 Yet it can be argued that the BTC was out-manoeuvred by the 
unions, because despite ostensible agreement on new working practices, 
little actually changed and increased productivity continued to be difficult to 
14
° Final Report of the Court of Enquiry into a dispute between the BTC and the 
NUR (Parliamentary Papers 1954-55, Cmd. 9372, v. 657), para. 74, p. 24, Alien 
represented the BTC and Campbell the NUR. 
141 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 251. 
142 Ibid., p. 251. 
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achieve. Even by January 1961, after the introduction of a large number of 
diesel locomotives, there was still relatively little progress in operational 
efficiency. Robertson was forced to admit that the implementation of single-
manning was disappointingly slow, because most freight trains ran between 
hours not covered by union agreements.143 Progress towards improved 
labour productivity was also slow in other areas. When attempting to reach 
agreement on the operation of fully-braked freight trains, W. P. Alien, the 
chief officer for labour relations, found negotiations with the unions 
prolonged and difficult.144 Numerous practical issues seriously delayed 
implementation of this and other productivity agreements, with the result that 
by the end of 1957 less than 5% of the total railway staff were covered by 
work-study schemes.145 As Gourvish himself accepts, progress in 
productivity was neither as swift nor as straightforward as it might have 
been, due to muddled management thinking and the imprecise definition of 
objectives, with some potential gains lost through a lack of vigour in 
evaluating the actual work.146 
According to Bagwell the wages settlement of January 1955 had been 
secured through the unilateral action of the NUR after a rise of several 
shillings was awarded by the Railway Staff National Tribunal (RSNT).147 
However, ASLEF then demanded a greater rise which the BTC and the 
government resisted in order to avoid instituting a process of 'leap frogging 
143 Robertson to BTC, minute 14/26, 25 January 1961, AN5/16. 
144 Alien to the BTC, 28 December 1957, AN13/2678. 
145 Re-appraisal of the Plan for the Modernisation and Re-equipment of British Railways, 
(Parliamentary Papers 1958-59, Cmnd. 813, xix, 777) p. 4. 
146 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 252. 
147 Bagwell, The Railwaymen, p. 650. 
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up an endless staircase' by the three railway unions.148 The ASLEF 
demands were also put to the RSNT which found against the union and in 
favour of the BTC. As a result ASLEF informed the Commission that the 
findings of the tribunal were unacceptable, and called a strike of its members 
from midnight 1 May 1955.149 The resulting strike was not supported by the 
two other railway unions, but it nevertheless had a profound impact upon the 
railways. Gourvish estimates that it cost an estimated £12m in lost revenue, 
and the combined pay awards of October 1954 to January 1956 added a 
further £45m to the railway's wage bill.150 The long-term impact proved to be 
greater, even though the disruption caused during the seventeen-day strike 
had been much less severe than anticipated. According to Bonavia coal, iron 
and steel, electricity and London commuters were all affected, and a 
substantial proportion of the traffic diverted to the roads never returned to 
rail. In addition, the loss of public confidence resulted in a further decline in 
business which eventually meant 'employment on the railways was seriously 
affected'. 151 Patrick Spens, who worked on the railways during this period, 
summarised the impact of this and other industrial action: 'the truth is [the 
railway strikes] were ruinous and it gave the lorry firms a way into the heart 
of BR's freight traffic that otherwise might have taken them years to 
foster' .152 
Against this problematic background, the question of proper and 
effective use of the public funds made available under the Modernisation 
Plan came increasingly to the fore. Within the MOT it was concluded that 
148 Monckton (Minister of Labour 1951-5) quoted in Gourvish, British Railways, p. 230. 
149 BTC minute 8/182, 18 April 1955, AN85/8. 
150 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 231. 
151 Bonavia, British Rail the First 25 Years, p. 148. 
152 Patrick Spens, 'Backs a'gin the wall', British Railways Illustrated, 9 (2000), p. 365. 
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the BTC was able to increase productivity only very slowly, if at all, and had 
failed to manage labour costs. Government attention to labour and wage 
issues was amplified as constant demands for pay increases coincided with 
falling traffic levels and reduced revenue, and also because of wider 
economic concerns. The continued pressure for wage increases of railway 
workers was not just a response to inflationary pressure and desire to 
protect the standard of living, but a deliberate attempt to increase living 
standards. Such growing expectations generated wage pressure across all 
the nationalised industries; yet the achievement of these expectations was 
hindered both by their contribution to inflation and low rates of economic 
growth. Consequently, faster growth- also important to reduce balance of 
payments problems - and containment of inflation became higher priorities 
for government than maintenance of industrial peace. 
Within the BTC itself, however, there were conflicting attitudes. As 
Gourvish comments, the Commission's policy was confused: it was 'torn 
between resisting union claims, in the face of its financial problems, and 
yielding to demands which a number of officers inside the organisation felt 
were fair and reasonable'. 153 The outcome was that wage negotiations 
tended to become protracted and difficult. In April 1958, owing to the difficult 
financial position of the BTC, Robertson felt unable to agree to increases 
sought by the unions and suggested to them that a direct approach to the 
government might be made to resolve the dispute. As a result a meeting was 
arranged with Macmillan on 22 April 1958, when he stressed that any 
153 Gourvish, British Railway, p. 231. 
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increases in wages would have to be justified by higher productivity.154 This 
did not resolve the issue, but agreement was eventually reached on 15 May 
when the unions accepted a 3% interim pay increase on the understanding 
that an independent inquiry would make a full examination of wages and 
comparability with other industries. The Commission gave an undertaking to 
set this up and sensibly also pushed for cost-saving measures, including 
service cuts, and these were endorsed by the unions.155 This process 
prompted Gourvish to claim that both the BTC and the unions were 
manipulated by Macmillan and Macleod.156 He is critical of the government 
as 'being involved at all stages of the negotiations' .157 But given the nature of 
the problem, the potential impact on public spending and an apparent lack of 
progress in productivity, the approach of the government was not surprising. 
lt led to the establishment of a special committee of enquiry, under the 
leadership of C. W. Guillebaud, Emeritus Reader in Economics at 
Cambridge University, and had the remit: 
To conduct an investigation into the relativity of pay of salaried and conciliation staff 
of British Railways with the pay of staff in other nationalised industries public 
services and appropriate private undertakings, where reasonable and useful 
comparisons can be made.158 
To the annoyance of the unions, the Committee was not set up until 
December 1958, some five months after the interim pay increase. lt then 
took a further fifteen months of deliberations before it reported on 2 March 
1960, when it recommended increases up to 18% where special skills and 
154 Ibid., p. 235. 
155 See also Gourvish, British Railways, p. 235. 
156 Minister of Labour and National Service 1955-59. 
157 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 235. 
158 Guil/ebaud Report, Terms of reference, T311/24. 
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responsibilities merited additional payment. The government's response 
came on 10 March, when in the House of Commons, Macmillan publicly 
accepted the underlying objectives contained in the report: that a fair and 
reasonable wage should be paid to those engaged in the industry.159 
However, later, in private discussion with Ernest Marples, the new Minister of 
Transport, Macmillan concluded that implementation of the Guillebaud 
Report would necessitate an increase in fares and charges; but that these 
would not be enough to overcome the railway industry's problems and more 
radical action would be necessary.160 lt was clear by then that the increasing 
financial problems of the railways, its continued and costly wage 
settlements, and an apparent lack of progress in productivity precluded a 
continuation of the status quo. 
Consequently, the Guillebaud Report and its costly implications was a 
watershed in stimulating government into re-thinking its policies towards all 
the nationalised industries, not just the railways. First, it was realised that the 
only way to reduce the financial burden on the taxpayer was to secure 
fundamental changes in the size of the railway network, the extent of the 
labour force, and the level of service offered. In order to manage this, the 
government accepted the need to persuade the public that the railways had 
to adapt to a size and pattern suited to modem conditions and prospects. 
Those working in the industry would also have to accept the need for 
change, not least to create the financial conditions necessary to ensure 
better conditions and pay. In addition, it was recognised that the Guillebaud 
Report had enunciated the principle of comparability, regardless of ability to 
159 Macmillan, HCDeb, 619, c. 643, 1 0 March 1960. 
160 Macmillan to Marples, 10 March 1960, PREM11/3147. 
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pay. This was not counterbalanced by links to productivity and staff 
reductions, although it did recommend a simplification of the wage structure 
by reducing the number of grades from 150 to 14. This simplification should 
have been pursued by the BTC much earlier, because at the very least it 
could have produced considerable administrative savings. Moreover, it 
further offered a potential strategy to simplify the complexity of labour 
relations on the railways, by reducing the opportunity for comparison 
between various grades. 
The annual cost of implementation of the Guillebaud award was 
estimated at £29·5m, but other consequential increases added a further 
£1 Om. Little of this was likely to be recouped through greater efficiency, and 
it would add to a BTC deficit which now exceeded £90m. 
After the Guillebaud Report was accepted by the government, 
Robertson was given detailed instructions by Marples to negotiate a 
settlement on the basis that the award should not be back-dated. Given the 
poor financial condition of the BTC, some in the MOT thought that Robertson 
should resign, but Marples concluded that this was not yet practicable given 
the extent of further negotiations that were required. However, he did accept 
that he should exercise oversight over Robertson through the next stages of 
negotiation, and agreed that he should be replaced once a new 
management scheme was put in place.161 
The BTC Annual Report for 1960 emphasised the importance of the 
settlement: 
161 Marples to Macmillan, 16 February 1960, PREM 11/3147. 
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lt is right to record that the Guillebaud Report and its acceptance by Government 
transformed the situation from one of near breakdown to one of greatly improved 
stability and morale. As against this all ranks throughout the Commission's 
undertakings, not only were BR, conscious of the fact that two major inquiries of 
political origin were taking place and their future employment and conditions might 
depend on the recommendations which might emerge. 162 
While the impact of the Guillebaud Report may have stabilised industrial 
relations for a time, it also exacerbated the BTC's already difficult financial 
position. The fact is that while a number of large-scale changes were being 
introduced through the Modernisation Plan, progress in productivity and 
labour efficiency remained slow and too often changes created as many 
problems as they solved. As Gourvish writes the Commission's aim was 'to 
drag a leviathan of an industry, with working practices based on Victorian 
precepts, into the mid-twentieth century. But its chosen methods did not 
necessarily guarantee success, and sometimes action merely created fresh 
problems'.163 This was recognised in government circles, and had been 
instrumental in the appointment of Marples in October 1959. He introduced a 
more critical and analytical style to managing his department, and this had 
far-reaching repercussions for the railways. 
V 
lt did not take long before there was disquiet about the ability of 
the BTC to implement the Modernisation Plan effectively and efficiently. 
Criticism in parliament, 164 and the media increased as a number of essential 
weaknesses appeared, in particular the lack of any real cost-benefit analysis 
162 BTC Annual Report and Accounts 1960, para. 1, p. 5. 
163 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 255. 
164 In 1956 over 200 questions about the railways were raised in parliament. 
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on the major areas of expenditure. This was hardly surprising given that the 
Commission was keen to make rapid progress with implementation of the 
Modernisation Plan, and was therefore prepared to accept 'shot' (educated 
guess) estimates for urgent cases of new works submissions.165 There was 
also little evidence of strong management from the Commission, despite the 
acceptance by Robertson in March 1955 of the need for firm co-ordination at 
the centre in carrying out the works in the Modernisation Plan.166 
Even so, the optimistic perspective of the BTC continued. lt reported 
that 1956 had been a year of considerable progress despite reduced freight 
carryings, a decline attributed to a down-turn in the coal and steel industries. 
Nevertheless the 1956 Annual Report indicated the scale of the financial 
problem facing the BTC, when it detailed that the closure of the 189 route 
miles of the Midland and Great Northern Joint Railway was predicted to save 
only £640,000pa.167 This reinforced the MOT view that only through a more 
radical approach to the size of the railway network could savings of the 
required level be achieved. However, the BTC itself continued to offer a 
different perspective, claiming in its 1959 Annual Report to have made 
considerable progress despite a continued growth in its deficit, a further 
decline in the level of freight traffic, and problems with industrial relations. 
Unsurprisingly such a positive assessment was not shared in the MOT, 
where existing concerns about the management of the railways were 
exacerbated by the seeming indifference of the BTC to its worsening 
financial position. These concerns were considered so serious that L. J. 
Dunnet, permanent secretary at the MOT, argued 'that it was becoming 
165 BTC minute 8/553, 24 November 1955, AN85/8. 
166 BTC minute 8/392, 24 March 1955, AN85/8. 
167 BTC Annual Report and Accounts 1956, para. 7, p. 1. 
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urgently necessary that we here and the government as a whole determine 
future policy with reference to the railways'. 168 The railways' financial position 
had deteriorated to such an extent that it was unlikely to be able to meet its 
interest charges after 1963, when the full impact of interest payments on 
recent capital expenditure would be fully felt.169 Dunnet therefore argued that 
the basis on which the Modernisation Plan had been constructed was no 
longer valid. The MOT's view was that capital re-organisation would not 
resolve the issue, because even if the railways were relieved of all 
outstanding interest payments they would still not be financially viable. 
Dunnet also concluded (accurately in retrospect) that the railways would 
require additional funds for modernisation indefinitely. Given that the BTC 
was unable to generate sufficient funds to maintain its position, some 
officials in the MOT considered it to be effectively bankrupt.170 Indeed, had it 
not been a public corporation then it would undoubtedly have been so. 
The major weakness of the Modernisation Plan had been the lack of 
critical thinking behind its proposals. There is no evidence within the Plan of 
strategic planning regarding the future extent of the network. Nor was there 
consideration of the future demand for rail services in an era of rapid 
development in air transport and in road haulage and car ownership, 
underpinned by further road building. Although the railway management 
168 MOT note RIW 29/1/021, 4 January 1960, MT115n7. 
169 Until the passing of the Finance Act 1956 (Section 42), the BTC obtained money for 
capital purposes through the issue of British Transport Stock guaranteed by the 
Treasury. Subsequently funds for capital purposes were advanced to the MOT (with 
agreement from the Treasury) from the Consolidated Fund. The purpose was to give 
greater control to the MOT and Treasury over BTC expenditure. The amount of BTC 
Stock outstanding by 1959 was £1 ,443m requiring an annual interest payment of 
£45·7m. Amounts advanced to the BTC under this scheme were: 1956- £40m, 
1957 - £64m, 1958 - £117m, 1959 - £123m, Financial Position of the BTC, 4 January 
1960, MT115n7. 
170 Dunnet (MOT), 4 January 1960, MT115n7. 
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understood that the national transport system was in the process of change, 
there was insufficient appreciation of how fundamentally and rapidly that 
process was proceeding. lt had also become clear at an early stage that the 
Modernisation Plan was not producing the financial changes required, in part 
at least because of insufficient investment appraisal. Within government the 
level of concern with financial issues was such that the BTC was instructed 
to submit to the Minister of Transport a 'Re-Appraisal of the Modernisation 
Plan for British Railways', which was later published as a White Paper in 
1959. The implications of this were significant, and will be considered in the 
next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 5 
RE-APPRAISAL AND RE-ASSESSMENT 
Modernisation of British Railways made remarkable strides in 1958 and the twin 
processes of modernisation and rationalisation are creating a railway system 
attuned to the needs of tomorrow as well as today. Unfortunately the great 
advances made in 1958 were marred by losses in revenue with a total deficit for the 
year of £89 million. 
(Facts and Figures about British Railways, BTC 1959 ed.) 
According to Gourvish 'soon after the new railway organisation had been 
established, in the mid 1950s, the railways' economic fortunes changed 
dramatically, and in some cases irrevocably', and their 'overall financial 
position deteriorated to an alarming extent' .1 Bonavia similarly observed that 
the late 1950s were 'a period of struggle in every way - struggle to 
implement the Modernisation Plan, struggle between the regions and the 
central organisation, struggle to discover whether the railways could 
continue to be financially viable or must become State pensioners'.2 
These historical judgements were well represented in contemporary 
opinion. lt was widely felt that the opportunity for radical change provided by 
the Modernisation Plan had been lost. Within the Ministry of Transport the 
verdict on the Plan was unequivocal: it had been a failure. This chapter will 
consider the implications for the MOT, and for its relations with the BTC. One 
effect for the BTC was that it was obliged to undertake a re-appraisal 
exercise - an attempt to overcome the weaknesses in the original plan, and 
in the efforts to implement it. This chapter will explain why this re-appraisal 
was also judged to be inadequate, and how the railway's accelerating 
1 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 173. 
2 Bonavia, British Rail- the First 25 Years, p. 99. 
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financial problems exacerbated government dissatisfaction with railway 
management and led to the imposition of a series of investigations into the 
operation of the railways. 
Aldcroft's perceptive comments on the Modernisation Plan - that it came 
too late, was not properly thought out, and did not result in an all out attack 
on the many fronts of the problem, 3 has stood the test of time. Gourvish 
accepts that 'there is much for which the Commission must be directly 
criticised in its approach to the challenge of modernisation': 'all too often the 
BTC's organisation and planning mechanisms were unequal to the task' .4 
Moreover, the financial and political support for the Modernisation Plan 
represented a definitive government commitment to the rebuilding of the 
railways and was hardly in line with what Francis described as the 
Conservative party's ambiguous response to the role of the state.5 Certainly 
there was no ambiguity in the 1955 Conservative General Election Manifesto 
which promised continuing financial support for the railways: 
We shall make it possible for the BTC to push on with its comprehensive plan of 
modernisation and re-equipment, so that the railways may earn their own living and 
a good wage for those who work on them. The public and industry are entitled to 
such a service.6 
Acceptance of the Guillebaud Report was further government recognition of 
its responsibility for long-term financial support of the railways. Yet these 
commitments were dependent upon the railways providing a good service, 
3 Aldcroft, British Railways in Transition, pp. 9, 175. 
4 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 293. 
5 Francis, 'Set the people free?' p. 64. 
6 Conservative General Election Manifesto, 1955, p. 1 0. 
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and - more pressingly - becoming financially solvent. Accordingly they did 
not preclude government attempts to force the BTC itself to undertake 
further major reorganisation, and if necessary to reduce its activities to a 
level at which its expenditure would match its income. 
We have already seen that a key contributor to this dire financial 
position was the issue of labour efficiency. To be fair to railway 
management, this problem was widespread in the British economy, and by 
the late 1950s there was a perceived need to achieve greater labour mobility 
between occupations, and workplace flexibility by reducing restrictive 
practices. However, the complication for BR was that productivity had 
different significance for different actors. 7 
Greater productivity through the reduction of workforce inflexibility 
proved difficult for railway management to achieve, and proceeded much 
slower than was required to stem the financial problems. Even when new 
capital equipment was introduced, the process of introducing more modern 
operating practices was slow. A major cause was the reluctance of an 
increasingly intransigent railway workforce to accept change. On the 
operating side, Coster observes that 'trade union negotiation and 
consultation were now part and parcel of managing and operating the 
railway'. His conclusion on the effect is revealing: 'the intervention of trade 
unions could have been a force for the good and there were many cases 
where they were, but it was something which caused the railway 
management immense frustration, and the cost of the regular adversarial 
7 Tomlinson, 'The British productivity problem in the 1960s', p. 207. 
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charades throughout the system and over the years must have run into tens 
if not hundreds of millions of pounds'. 8 
The highly unionised labour force in the railway workshops was 
equally resistant towards change, perhaps understandably in view of the 
likely consequences. Bagwell found that the NUR shopmen9 at their Annual 
Grade Conference 'expressed great alarm at the policy of the BTC in relation 
to the closing of shops and depots and the treatment of staff concerned' .10 
Even so there were opportunities during this period to relieve some of the 
unfortunate human consequences of change, because national economic 
trends were favourable to a policy of reduction in the labour force. According 
to Cairncross, between October 1958 and October 1959 industrial 
production increased by 10% and unemployment fell by 100,000. 
Unemployment fell by another 50,000 in 1960 and continued to fall during 
the first half of 1961 .11 
Nevertheless, change to the required extent was not implemented, 
with the result that productivity gains were slight. Indeed Deakin and 
Seaward estimated that productivity of all factor inputs combined may have 
declined slightly between 1952 and 1962.12 So the railway management had 
been offered the opportunity for fundamental restructuring strategies by both 
the substantial funds provided under the Modernisation Plan, and the 
relatively positive condition of the national economy and labour market- yet 
this opportunity was not grasped. The effect was to increase government 
scepticism about the ability of the railway management to create a railway 
8 Peter Coster, The Book of the A 1 and A2 Pacifies (Ciophill, 2007), p. 61. 
9 Shopmen was the name for employees in the railway workshops. 
10 Bagwell, The Railwaymen, p. 641. 
11 Cairncross, The British Economy Since 1945, p. 112. 
12 B. M. Deakin, and T. Seaward, Productivity in Transport (London, 1969), p. 115. 
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system which responded to market forces, and to improve its competitive 
position through increased productivity. In short, the government understood 
that the BTC's policies on restructuring and productivity were feeble. 
lt was against this background that the first serious questioning of the 
Modernisation Plan began as early as 1956, when it became clear from the 
published 1955 accounts that despite high levels of investment, both the 
annual operating loss and the accumulated deficit of the railways were 
rising. 13 In March 1956 Eden expressed concern to Watkinson about the 
BTC's competence, particularly its ability to handle labour issues, and asked 
whether it could be strengthened.14 The concern had particular force 
because although the BTC was making efforts on modernisation, it seemed 
unwilling or unable to implement the concomitant element- retrenchment. 
Between 1954 and 1958, during the early stages of implementation of the 
Modernisation Plan, railway route miles had been reduced by only 303 
miles.15 
More could have been done to control costs, and not just in those 
aspects already indicated. There were possibilities for economies in 
reducing the size of the network, and more easily in motive-power policies. 
Many other opportunities for economies were not taken, particularly with 
regard to labour utilisation. An example includes the heavy increases in 
working expenses because of rising staffing costs, identified by the BTC in 
late 1957. These were reported as being most acute in the 'many small 
parcels offices which had no opportunity for increasing trade and should 
13 The British Transport Commission, Proposals for the Railways, Cmnd. 9880 
(Parliamentary Papers, 1955-56, xxvi, 419), p. 3. 
14 Eden to Watkinson, 1 March 1956, MT96/36. 
15 See Appendix 2, p. 341. 
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have been closed years ago'. Yet nothing was done: there were no 
instructions to pursue this promising line of cost savings. A further example 
is the lack of action taken to reduce the extensive and under-utilised wagon 
fleet, despite reports of excess units.16 
Questions about the BTC's approach to the Modernisation Plan arose 
from research on merchandise traffic undertaken in 1959. This useful and 
revealing exercise was undertaken at the behest of Watkinson, who was 
evidently aware of a need to prod the BTC towards more strategic thinking. 
In 1959 he arranged a series of meetings between Robertson, and the 
leading members of the Federation of British Industries, the Association of 
the British Chambers of Commerce and the National Union of Manufacturers 
(NUM), which resulted in a joint investigation by the NUM and the BTC to 
determine the reasons for the decline in rail traffic, and to suggest ways that 
traders could be persuaded to return to rail. 17 
Table 4: GENERAL MECHANDISE TRAFFIC CARRIED BY BR 1948-1958 
Year 
1948 
1949 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
Tons (million) 
55 
54 
53 
53 
50 
49 
47 
43 
43 
42 
36 
Index 
100 
98 
96 
96 
91 
89 
85 
78 
78 
76 
65 
Source: NUMIBTC Report based on BTC Annual Reports. 
16 BTC minute 10/440, 24 October 1957, AN85/11. 
17 Report on Industrial Rail Traffic by a joint Committee of the President of the NUM and the 
Chairman of the BTC, 24 March 1959, MT115/248. 
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As Table 4 indicates, its findings showed a serious decline in merchandise 
traffic, despite the overall expansion of national industrial and economic 
activity which was occurring during this period. Moreover, the decline had 
accelerated after 1955, exacerbated by the national rail strike of that year. 
Even the Modernisation Plan's heavy investment, which had generated 
technical improvements to freight operation, had been unable to attract 
custom back to the railways. 
In its joint report, the NUM considered that the decline was caused by 
road transport offering a service which was more reliable, speedy and free 
from damage and loss than that provided by the railways. In addition, it 
argued that the railways had not marketed their services effectively, and 
appeared not to appreciate the needs of modern manufacturing industry. lt 
identified a specific concern: an inability to ascertain where a consignment 
was, or its progress once it had left a station. Only when this weakness was 
resolved and reliability improved could there be a restoration of confidence 
in the railways. The NUM further believed that the railways could benefit 
from improved public relations and better salesmanship. Unsurprisingly, in 
view of this and other strong criticisms, Robertson insisted that the report 
remain confidential.18 Yet the real significance of the report lies not just in its 
contents but in the fact that the Minister of Transport had felt it necessary to 
intervene and broker a meeting between the BTC and its customers, and to 
prompt an investigation into what was a well-known problem. lt had simply 
not occurred to the BTC itself that such enquiries would be helpful. The 
report's conclusions indicated a disturbing lack of emphasis on quality of 
18 Robertson to Watkinson, 15 July 1959, MT115/248. 
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service and on business relations - matters which should have been 
fundamental considerations in the development of the Modernisation Plan, 
for both freight and passenger traffic. However, the Plan had concentrated 
instead on technical improvements as the way to retain and increase 
business. 
11 
As shown in Chapter 4, the 1956 revision of the Modernisation Plan, while 
appearing more comprehensive than the original, remained overly optimistic 
and concentrated on aspects of physical planning.19 Even so, publicly at 
least, government rhetoric towards the Commission continued to be positive 
and the financial support continued. However, by 1958 there was growing 
unease in the MOT as the railway's financial position deteriorated. The 
working deficit increased from £16m in 1956, to £27m in 1957, and to £48m 
in 195820 - this before the addition in 1958 of central charges of around 
£41 m, or approximately 8·5% of gross receipts. 21 To compound this 
concern, there were serious questions on other aspects of management, 
including the system of financial control, monitoring of capital expenditure, 
and attitude towards investment appraisal. As a result, in December 1958 
Watkinson asked the BTC to justify its strategy through 'a full, detailed and 
urgent review of the whole Modernisation Plan'.22 The BTC's response was: 
Re-appraisal has shown that the original plan was soundly based; that no need to 
make fundamental changes to it has been discovered; and that it is a sound 
investment from the country's point of view. Subsequent events have made 
desirable some modifications, but these are not many, and are principally in the 
19 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 295. 
2
° Facts and Figures about British Railways, 1956-59 editions. 
21 Facts and Figures about British Railways 1959, p. 7. 
22 Re-appraisal of the Plan for the Modernisation and Re-equipment of British Railways: a 
Report by British Railways, (Parliamentary Papers 1958-59, Cmnd. 813, xix, 777), p. 1. 
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direction of accelerating its execution. Where the financial forecasts of 1956 have 
not been realised, the causes lie predominately in forces which were expressly 
excluded as being outside the scope of the commission. 23 
This was hardly the reaction envisaged within the MOT, the more so 
because of Robertson's confident assertion that the railway's financial 
performance would rapidly improve, and was expected to generate a 
working surplus of between £50m and £1 OOm by 1963.24 The Re-appraisal 
Report declared that this would be achieved through some limited revisions 
to the Modernisation Plan, including a more compact and economic system 
engineered through a programme of station closures and a review of all lines 
west of Exeter. In addition, a re-assessment had been made early in 1959 of 
the 22 railway works engaged in the repair and manufacture of locomotives, 
which concluded that only 12 would remain by the end of 1963, with some of 
the older works closed by the end of 1959.25 Even so, little was added to 
what was already obvious, and as Gourvish comments 'the financial 
calculations in the 1959 Re-appraisal were extremely vague'. 26 In effect the 
Re-appraisal Report simply restated much of the original Modernisation Plan 
and its five main objectives: the concentration and simplification of freight 
traffic; improvements to the comfort, speed and regularity of passenger 
services; development of suburban traffic to increase revenues; 
rationalisation of the network by pruning uneconomic lines, and economy in 
manpower and equipment using new methods to increase productivity. 
There was no attempt to assess the economic return from the various 
schemes, or to validate them by any other criteria. No financial justification 
23 Re-appraisal of the Modernisation Plan, Introduction. 
24 Robertson to Stedford, 26 July 1960, AN13/2740. 
25 Re-appraisal of the Modernisation Plan, Appendix B. 
26 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 298. 
241 
had been made for major investment schemes, as physical planning for 
implementation appeared to be given the higher priority. Gourvish rightly 
observes that 'the defects inherent in the hurried BTC submission of 1954 
are perhaps excusable; much less so is the Commission's defence of its 
position during the process of revision and reappraisal in 1956 and 1959'.27 
lt might be added that had the initial Modernisation Plan been properly 
researched and constructed, with appropriate financial criteria and effective 
review procedures, then the re-appraisal exercise would have been 
unnecessary. 
Concern with the re-appraisal exercise resonated in the Treasury, 
which examined the calculations on the future size of the railway network, its 
financial implications, and the continued requirement for investment funds. 
This investigation found the cost of the Modernisation Plan had increased 
from the initial1954 estimate of £1,200m to £1,660m in 1957 and required 
continued investment of £150m pa. Not only that, but of the anticipated 
£68m reduction in operating expenses, only £5m were expected to be 
achieved through reductions in the size of the network.28 The Treasury's 
anxieties were soundly based, because the management had failed to 
achieve anywhere near the operating savings promised, something hardly 
surprising given that it was unable to control its total planned investment 
expenditure by as much as £460m. 
Another significant development occurred in October 1959 when 
Marples replaced Watkinson. Marples' background had been in business 
27 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 293. 
28 Joint Treasury/MOT memo, 8 July 1959, PREM11/3147. 
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where he had gained a reputation for energy and efficiency.29 After entering 
politics, he gained experience in government as Postmaster-General, where 
Macmillan recognised his effectiveness and considered that his approach 
was what was needed on the railways.30 Hardy considered him 'no ordinary 
Minister', on the basis that 'he led from the front and demanded results'.31 
Edward Heath described him as a man full of ideas, including different ones 
that might be the grain of sand that produces the pearl!32 lt is likely that this 
background prompted his use of outside commercial expertise to analyse 
the railway's problems. 
Marples and his MOT officials unsurprisingly decided that the re-
appraisal submissions from the BTC were insufficient, and insisted upon a 
further review of investment policy. Again, the response from the BTC was 
to reproduce essentially the same information. This provoked irritation in the 
MOT: 
lt is clear that the Commission's whole approach as reflected in this programme is 
wrong. The paper is fundamentally a rewrite of the original plan and the re-appraisal 
and there is no recognition of the Government's stated intention that a modernised 
railway system must be of the right size and shape and a foundation for financial 
recovery must be laid. The objective of the programme remains virtually the same 
and there has been little attempt either to assess the economic return of various 
schemes or to justify by other criteria. The present management seems unlikely to 
be able to re-orient their ideas to produce a realistic programme.33 
MOT concerns were intensified after the BTC Finance Department admitted 
that it was unable to calculate the returns on any particular investment: 
29 Marples had been joint owner of the road construction company Marples-Ridgeway. 
30 Home, Macmil/an, 1957-86, p. 250. 
31 Hardy, Beeching, p. 33. 
32 Ramsden, Making of Conservative Party Policy, p. 195. 
33 BTC Modernisation programme, MOT Railways 8 Division, 23 January 1960, MT132/32. 
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The benefits from modernisation spring from a combination of factors and are not 
solely attributable to any single feature of the plan in isolation. lt is not possible, 
since the various different measures are so largely independent, to specify how 
much benefit is attributable to a particular feature.34 
Disquiet with the Jack of financial precision in the BTC's investment policies 
increased still more when Robertson informed Marples that the whole of the 
1961 investment allocation of £125m and the reserve of £15m had been 
earmarked for the London Midland electrification scheme. Robertson even 
went on to predict that the Modernisation Plan would require increased 
investment of £175m each year from 1962 to 1964.35 
Such statements led to the intuitively attractive conclusion that 
Robertson and the BTC were financially naive. But this would be superficial; 
the reality is more complex. Robertson was almost certainly fully cognisant 
with the financial issues, but adopted an intransigent attitude as a holding 
tactic in the belief that the Modernisation Plan would ultimately deliver 
substantial operational benefits. If it did, and thereby secured widespread 
public approval, then the BTC approach would be exonerated and the public 
service concept applied more enthusiastically. Marples remained 
unconvinced. His understanding of the railway's financial position led to a 
conclusion that only fundamental change could resolve the issue. The result 
was the institution of a series of inquiries into railway management and 
governance which proved the precursor for far-reaching change. 
Ill 
Associated with these concerns about the abilities of railway management 
was a wider issue about the governance of all the nationalised industries - in 
34 BTC Finance Department to SAG, 29 July 1960, AN13/2741. 
35 Robertson to Marples, 19 December 1960, AN13/2741. 
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particular the long-term policy question of the best machinery for securing 
effective parliamentary supervision of what was an extensive element of the 
national economy under public ownership. Even in 1956, a great gulf 
between ministers and backbenchers still seemed to exist on nationalisation 
issues,36 particularly over the extent of political control. In effect, this meant 
a wish from back-benchers on both sides of the House to press for greater 
answerability to Parliament on matters of detailed operation. As a result, a 
sub-committee of the Cabinet Home Affairs Committee undertook an 
investigation into parliamentary accountability of the nationalised industries. 
This sought to identify machinery capable of serving the differing (and 
sometimes clashing) interests of the government, its own back-bench MPs 
and the opposition parties. lt concluded that the best means of using 
parliamentary time effectively was through the continuing use of the Select 
Committee on the Nationalised Industries, and this should focus on 
particular issues, such as general problems or aspects of administration. lt 
further recommended that the procedure should not allow the chairman of 
the industry concerned to use it as an opportunity to air policy differences 
with the minister. 37 
As a result, the select committee process continued unchanged. But 
an examination of railway activities was instituted after the re-appraisal 
exercise generated growing parliamentary concern. Although a major factor 
in this was concern about the continuing and increasing financial support 
from the taxpayer, there was also growing unease over the extent of informal 
36 Green, Ideologies of Conservatism, p. 245. 
37 Cabinet Home Affairs Committee, H.P. (N.I.) {56), 2 January 1956, CAB21/3853. 
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ministerial influence on management.38 A Select Committee on the 
Nationalised Industries to investigate the railway activities of the BTC was 
instituted in November 1959. Its membership comprised 13 MPs, with Sir 
Toby Low as chairman, and it took evidence between January and May 
before delivering its two-part report in July 1960.39 The first section dealt 
with the factual background, including the extent of the railway's financial 
deficit, while the second asked pertinent questions about future financial 
performance. 
The Select Committee Report was critical of the railway's commercial 
and operating strategy, in particular the BTC's expenditure on providing 
services which did not cover costs. This issue of social subsidy had not been 
previously resolved satisfactorily, and it would take some time to do so. This 
was because the Select Committee decided that the best initial test of what 
the public needed was what it was prepared to pay for; if further social 
considerations were involved then the government, not the BTC, should 
decide on them.40 The Select Committee concluded that confusion between 
economic operation and social desirability had been a causal factor in the 
railway's financial problems. lt calculated that current fares and charges 
were substantially lower in real terms than in 1938, and that passenger 
charges were still based on a standard charge per mile, although freight 
charges demonstrated a greater degree of flexibility. Staffing policy received 
criticism in that the railways showed an unwillingness or inability to recruit 
38 Cabinet Office, Select Committee on the Nationalised Industries, 17 November 1959, 
CAB134/2247. 
39 Select Committee on the Nationalised Industries, Report on British Railways, 11 July 
1960, (Parliamentary Papers 1959-60, vii. 233), see also Gourvish, British Railways, 
p.300. 
40 Select Committee, Report on BR, para. 415. 
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graduate engineers to supplement the railway's own apprentice training 
schemes. However, the main criticism was reserved for the lack of precision 
in calculating costs and returns for the London Midland Region's scheme to 
electrify the main-line from London to Manchester. Inexplicably, this highly 
expensive investment had not been subject to any form of critical appraisal, 
until Marples had ordered an assessment in 1960. Gourvish's defence of 
the BTC on this point is questionable. He blames the MOT and the Treasury 
for not making an assessment themselves, yet Robertson had successfully 
insisted that the BTC and not government were responsible for the 
Modernisation Plan.41 Nor is it entirely valid to argue that this lack of 
investment appraisal was characteristic of much of British industry at the 
time, and was not a feature of railway management.42 lt is accepted that 
investment appraisal had not been widespread before then. The first public 
cost-benefit analysis of British road development appeared in 1960 and 
according to Scott highlighted methodological difficulties rather than 
solutions.43 lt was not until the 1967 White Paper, Nationalised Industries, A 
Review of Financial and Economic Objectives that the recommendation was 
made for the use of discounted cash flow with a common test rate of 8%.44 
Even allowing for these considerations, given the extent of physical works, 
detailed planning and the massive cost implications of the project, a more 
comprehensive assessment should have been undertaken. Moreover, the 
BTC itself had argued in its evidence to the Select Committee that the 
41 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 566. 
42 Ibid., p. 304. 
43 Scott, 'Public Sector Investment', p. 408. 
44 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 518. 
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technical test of a project was its own responsibility, and that the expected 
return on future investment should be subject to examination.45 
Even so, the Select Committee recommended that the London 
Midland electrification project be completed despite projected low rates of 
returns - although according to Hardy this opinion was not universally 
shared.46 More generally, the Select Committee Report gave a severe 
verdict. lt notably quoted a Treasury assessment of the Modernisation Plan 
as 'merely a hotch potch of things that the Commission was saying it was 
desirable to try to achieve by 1970, ill qualified and not readily explainable'.47 
lt declared that increased labour costs due to higher wages had now brought 
the BTC's financial problems to a head. And it concluded that it had become 
essential to create a more compact railway network, allowing greater 
efficiency and economy of operation. 
Yet while the Select Committee Report proved a useful starting point 
for a phase of intensive investigation into the railways, it did not go far 
enough for Marples. He considered that it had not provided the detailed 
analysis and business awareness needed to plan the changes necessary to 
transform the railways. Indeed, the Select Committee itself held this view: 
'your Committee are not qualified to pass judgement on the Commission's 
organisation, nor are they qualified to do so'.48 Accordingly, Marples 
confided to Macmillan that he would 'like to get three wise men or something 
like the Herbert Committee to consider the future of the railways'.49 
45 Select Committee, Report on BR, para. 1 0. 
46 Hardy, Beaching, p. 31. 
47 Select Committee, Report on BR, para. 164. 
48 lbid para. 356. 
49 Minutes of Macmillan- Marples meeting, 14 December 1959, PREM11/3147. 
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Macmillan thereupon established the Special Advisory Group (SAG), 
chaired by Sir lvan Stedford (an associate of Macmillan from the war-time 
Ministry of Supply), to advise Marples and to examine the structure, finance 
and workings of the BTC's activities. 5° The membership of SAG51 was 
specifically selected to bring commercial expertise from outside government 
and the railways to bear on the problem. Stedford himself was now Head of 
Tube Investments Ltd, and other members were drawn from commercial 
concerns. They included Dr. Richard Beaching from ICI. 
The interim and final reports of the SAG were never published. 
Bonavia was unable to consult them because they were then still regarded 
as strictly confidential by the Ministry of Transport. 52 Gourvish had a similar 
difficulty: he was unable under the '30-year rule' to see the relevant MOT 
files and was therefore reliant upon the evidence contained in Beaching's 
and BTC papers lodged in the BRB archives. 53 Although the reasoning and 
the findings of the SAG can be gleaned from these sources, the response to 
them by the MOT, and its subsequent policy decisions cannot. So for 
example, Gourvish is impressed by the 'shocked surprise adopted by the 
civil servants in 1960',54 unaware that MOT officials had been deeply 
concerned over the financial condition of the railways ever since the early 
preparations for the Modernisation Plan in 1955. 
The relevant MOT files are now available for study in the National 
Archives at Kew. What these records make clear is the extent of the MOT's 
pressure for more detailed investigation into the affairs of the BTC, in 
50 Horne, Macmillan 1957-86, p. 250. 
51 Also widely referred to as the Stedford Group, after the name of its chairman. 
52 Bonavia, Organisation of British Railways, p. 79. 
53 The relevant citations can be found in Gourvish, British Railways, pp. 706-708. 
54 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 304. 
249 
particular, into its systems of financial control, notably towards investment. 
The MOT had difficulty in understanding the investment policies, and 
concluded that the BTC's Finance Department had an ambiguous and 
evasive attitude towards the various questions it had asked. This is hardly 
surprising given that Department's continuing insistence on the impossibility 
of attributing the benefits from investment in modernisation to any particular 
single feature of the Modernisation Plan in isolation. 55 
Of all the enquiries and investigations so far undertaken into the 
railways, that undertaken by SAG was the most thorough, detailed, and 
influential. SAG began reporting to Marples on a regular basis from 3 June 
1960, and later that month he reported their initial findings to a Cabinet BTC 
Reorganisation Committee chaired by Macmillan - an important policy-
making group to which Gourvish makes only scant reference. That the Prime 
Minister should set up and preside over a committee devoted to a particular 
nationalised industry is remarkable: it indicates the great importance now 
attached to solving the railway's problems. Its remit was twofold: to create a 
forum to consider the various reports and investigations then under way, and 
to develop policies designed to resolve the railway's problems. At its first 
meeting in June 1960, the committee was informed that SAG shared the 
Select Committee's criticism of the BTC's organisation and policies, above 
all its failure to give sufficient weight to financial issues. lt agreed that the 
railways could and should be run as a commercial operation, and that it 
55 BTC Finance Department to SAG, 27 September 1960, AN 13/2719. 
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needed to shake off its public-service mentality and revert to thinking 
reminiscent of conditions before nationalisation. 56 
After only its second meeting, SAG's concerns with BTC's financial 
position intensified to such an extent that it made a remarkable 
recommendation: the Modernisation Plan should be paused until a proper 
financial evaluation could be made of the costs and benefits of the various 
investments: 
Our enquiries have led us all to the same conclusion, that whatever the prospects 
of the Modernisation Plan might have appeared some six years ago, and officially 
endorsed, there are now serious doubts as to the financial merits of the 
modernisation programme that has emerged, both in the light of capital costs and 
likely returns. There is everything to be said from holding up for review those parts 
of the Modernisation Plan on which expenditure already started has not reached the 
point of no return, so that all can be looked at afresh. 57 
The only exceptions to this proposal were necessary replacements of worn-
out assets, or improvements in safety requirements. The moratorium was not 
to apply to projects where expenditure had been substantial and was 
essentially complete; these were to be finalised as soon as possible. All 
other individual schemes exceeding £10,000 were to be tabulated with 
details of their progress to date, in order to allow the MOT and SAG to 
decide whether they should be continued or not. Like the Select Committee, 
SAG expressed particular concern with the state of work on the London 
Midland electrification scheme and about the further investment required. lt 
added another concern: the anticipated cost of halting it. Stedford 
unsuccessfully sought details from Robertson on the costs, and requested 
an estimate of the potential expense involved in breaking contracts at that 
56 Cabinet BTC Reorganisation Committee, 29 June 1960, CAB134/1434. 
57 SAG Preliminary Report to Marples and Robertson, 17 June 1960, CAB134/1433. 
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stage. 58 Robertson strongly opposed such action because 'a major change 
in the Plan such as the one contemplated would bring in its train many 
consequences physical and moral which cannot be stressed in advance'. 59 
He remained insistent that despite the findings of the Select Committee, the 
re-appraised Modernisation Plan would ultimately bring financial stability to 
the railways. Robertson's further correspondence with Stedford is 
remarkable for his persistence in arguing that the railway's financial 
problems could be immeasurably eased by changes outside their own 
control. 60 These included the general level of interest rates, taxation on 
motor vehicles, and public opinion towards the railways. All this reinforces 
the impression that Robertson was prevaricating, in the belief that in the 
near future good returns on the Plan's investment would become apparent, 
in terms of increases in both traffic and revenue. 
The most compelling comments from SAG are found in the 
background notes: 'We have found the non-commercial outlook of almost 
everyone we have interviewed disturbingly impressive'. lt identified an 
'obscuring of objectives from the top downwards', and an 'absence of a 
satisfactory degree of personal responsibility- obscured at the top by a 
cumbersome complex of committees'. lt was critical of the narrow special ism 
and traditional railway conservatism of managers, considering this as a 
factor hindering modernisation and change. All tiers of management were 
found to be lacking commercial awareness and cost consciousness. But 
criticism was not confined to management: government social policy was 
58 Stedford to Robertson, 9 June 1960, AN13/2719. 
59 Robertson to Stedford, 21 July 1960, AN13/2719. 
60 Robertson to Stedford, 26 July 1960, AN13/2740. 
252 
diagnosed as a contributory factor towards the railway's disappointing 
financial results.61 
At an early stage of its investigations SAG emphasised that any 
remedy for the railway's financial deficit would mean that 'sweeping changes 
will be needed and the public will have to be prepared to face changes in the 
extent and nature of the services provided, and where necessary in the 
prices charged for them'.62 In effect, SAG gave early warning of the need to 
develop a political strategy for dealing with what was likely to become a 
contentious issue - that of public reaction to the implementation of the new 
strategy for the railways. lt correctly predicted 'unease as to the extent of 
these issues'. 63 This was almost certainly instrumental in the Cabinet's 
decision that the findings of SAG should not be published. Nevertheless, the 
recommendations made a significant contribution towards a major re-
assessment of policy. When the findings were considered in conjunction with 
the other inquiries, it was concluded that further legislation was essential. 
The Special Advisory Group's recommendation No. 8, on the future 
organisation of the transport industry, divided the SAG. Beaching was 
doubtful of Stedford's insistence of a decentralised structure comprising: a 
holding company and powerful regional boards. Beaching's view (supported 
by Henry Benson, an accountant from Cooper Brothers), was strongly in 
favour of a strong central authority with functional responsibilities.64 
Gourvish considered this 'indecisive' and doing 'nothing to relieve the 
61 SAG - Findings on BR, September 1960, AN13/2713. 
62 Cabinet BTC Reorganisation Committee, 6 December 1960, CAB134/1434. 
63 Cabinet BTC Reorganisation Committee, 14 November 1960, CAB134/1433. 
64 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 312. 
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uncertainty as to the future amongst the ranks of the BTC'.65 Yet this was 
hardly the fault of the SAG; the very reasons for the investigation were the 
BTC's lack of progress in resolving the railway's problems. And anyway, 
each of the two schemes the first, proposed by Stedford, was unacceptable 
to the Commission and, the second, proposed by Beaching was completely 
rejected by them.66 Indeed, the view of Thomas Summerton, Chairman of 
the North Eastern Area Board and BTC member, that recommendation No. 8 
was 'superficial and has not really been thought out', 67 is ironic, considering 
the BTC's own approach to the Modernisation Plan and the re-appraisal 
exercise. 
Marples responded rapidly to the SAG's various recommendations by 
creating a working party, the Ministerial Group on Modernisation (MGM), to 
formulate a new policy for the future of the railways. The records of the 
meetings of this key group also require some attention, because they too 
were unavailable to Gourvish. 68 
Marples himself was chairman of the MGM: the other members were 
MOT and Board of Trade representatives, and Beaching. Marples had two 
aims: not only to secure change in the railway management, but also to 
ensure that it was more receptive to departmental and ministerial control. 
The full terms of reference were to: 
Consider the size and pattern of the railway system required to meet current and 
foreseeable needs in the light of developments and trends in other forms of 
transport, changing industrial needs, social habits and other relevant 
considerations. In the light of the above and with particular regard to financial 
65 lbid., p. 317. 
66 Ibid., p. 318. 
67 Summerton, cited in Gourvish, British Railways, p. 317. 
68 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 302. 
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considerations and the resources available, to make recommendations on the 
modernisation of British railways.69 
The MGM minutes reveal a considerable lack of confidence in the ability of 
the BTC management to respond to changes in the transport market. lt very 
much doubted the BTC's view that 'extensive modernisation of the railways 
in conjunction with only minor reductions in services and a limited 
contraction of the network would lead to efficient, adequate and economic 
services and ultimately financial viability'.70 lt also criticised the BTC's lack of 
strategic planning, notably consideration of future traffic trends and its most 
efficient operational management. The MGM, like the MOT, was surprised 
at how little the BTC knew about the actual cost of carrying traffics, although 
it appeared to have a good deal of undigested information on the subject. lt 
recommended a proper examination of these costs, yet accepted that the 
MOT did not have the resources available to undertake it, and that the BTC 
did not have the right people for the job.71 
A further pressing need identified by the MGM was for a national 
transport strategy based on a searching assessment of the role of the 
railways in relation to the nation's transport requirements. lt considered such 
an analysis essential, because plans for British Railways could only be 
formulated effectively when allowance was made for changes in the pattern 
of transport as a whole. This recommendation ultimately led to a further 
study conducted in the MOT to ascertain the likely demand for transport 
facilities over the next ten years. The work was carried out under the 
chairmanship of Sir Robert Hall (economic adviser to Marples), with a small 
69 MGM minutes, Appendix, 1 0 August 1960, MT124/1 02. 
70 MGM minutes, 16 August 1960, MT 124/1 02. 
71 Dunnet to Grand, 29 August 1960, MT124/1 02. 
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group from within the MOT, assisted where necessary by other government 
departments. Gourvish makes no reference to this important study, again 
because the relevant MOT files were still closed. 
The Hall Report concluded that the growth of inter-urban traffic would 
be determined almost solely by private car usage, and that other factors 
such as railway provision would be negligible. lt did not share the BTC's 
confidence that it could recapture some of its lost freight custom, and 
correctly predicted further decline in coal and coke traffic. lt found that road 
transport offered faster and more reliable delivery. While such conclusions 
were hardly new, the Hall Report confirmed the long-held MOT view that the 
financial problems of the railways could not be resolved by increased traffic 
receipts in isolation. The findings pointed to the need for further research into 
two fundamental questions facing the MOT. The first was the level of 
investment required for transport as a whole, the second how this 
investment was to be apportioned between road and rail. The Hall Report 
identified a need to improve the criteria for investment planning, and for this 
to be developed in conjunction with a study of the nature of transport 
demands and costs incurred by transport operators. lt recommended that 
this information should be used to develop a long-term plan on the kinds of 
services provided, and where and when. 72 
While the Hall Report was not notably significant in itself, it was part of 
a wider movement in the MOT towards a more robust approach towards the 
railways, and particularly the need for greater accuracy and planning in its 
capital programme. An outcome of its conclusions was the setting up of 
72 The Hall Report, MT96/17 4. 
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another committee from the MOT- the Long Term Transport Policy Steering 
Group. This group had the remit to 'supervise the study by the MOT of the 
development of transport requirements over the next twenty years'. Given 
that it comprised members of the MOT, unsurprisingly its initial verdicts on 
finance and the size of the railways were very much in line with other 
findings being relayed to Marples: 'our own view is somewhat pessimistic 
about the problem which is now under consideration by yourself and Dr. 
Beeching'. 73 
lt was clear from the findings of the various reports that concerns 
about both the financial future of the railways and the strategic capability of 
its management were well founded. While MOT unease emanated from 
financial considerations, it had become clear that the BTC was ill-equipped 
to respond to the rapid changes taking place in transport as a whole. The 
MOT perceptively saw the difficulties of the railways as practical problems, 
requiring practical answers.74 These factors explain the thinking behind 
Marples' determination to appoint a commercial strategist from outside the 
railway industry. 
The impending retirement of Robertson gave Marples the opportunity 
to appoint a replacement whose thinking mirrored that of the Stedford 
Group. Marples believed change vital, for as Richard Lamb noted he 
regarded Robertson as financially and technically incompetent, and overly 
sympathetic to the trades unions?5 Moreover, the damning conclusions of 
SAG made change to both personnel and management structures inevitable. 
Marples was politically astute, and effectively nullified any opposition from 
73 Long Term Transport Policy Steering Group to Marples, October 1961. 
74 Serpell to Marples, 16 December 1960, MT124/566. 
75 Lamb, The Macmillan Years, p. 433. 
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the BTC with a substantial ex gratia payment of £12,500 and a generous 
superannuation entitlement to Robertson?6 Given the poor financial and 
strategic performance of the BTC under Robertson, and the need for an 
alternative approach to the railway's problems, it could be argued that this 
move represented a sound strategy. 
IV 
Gourvish argues that responsibility for the Modernisation Plan's failure lay as 
much with the 'villains in the corridors of Whitehall' as with 222 Marylebone 
Road, the BTC headquarters. He does accept that the BTC's handling of its 
investment programme had been amateurish and periodically complacent.77 
Nevertheless he offers a defence: 'the failure to spend more money before 
the mid-fifties had a long-term impact in influencing the attitude of railway 
managers once the investment brakes were released with the acceptance of 
the Modernisation Plan in 1955'?8 As a case for mitigation, this seems thin: 
members of the BTC had extensive experience in higher management, yet 
they still authorised a number of highly suspect investment programmes. 
Moreover, while it may have been convenient for the BTC to blame the MOT 
for the shortcomings in the Modernisation Plan, this too does not bear much 
scrutiny. The Plan's weaknesses lay as much in lack of a strategic overview 
as in the lack of investment appraisal. As a result it was heavily constrained 
by the implementation of modernisation on a piecemeal basis, which too 
often resulted in traffic losses rather than in the anticipated gains. 
76 Marples to Commons, HCDeb, 636, c.1401, 15 March 1961. 
77 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 303. 
78 Ibid., p. 90. 
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Gourvish is at pains to point out that 'many of the schemes 
implemented during the modernisation period were worthwhile and would 
have satisfied more stringent tests, had they been applied', and that 'even 
those schemes which were not really justified in purely commercial terms 
reduced operating costs and cut the railway's deficit' ?9 Marples would not 
have agreed, for he questioned the whole value of the Modernisation Plan, 
which required expenditure of £1 ,600m to generate savings of £28m pa.80 
More evidence can readily be added. There was the debacle over the 
introduction of dieselisation and braking systems, both of which proved 
enduringly expensive and disruptive. The 25 expensive new marshalling 
yards built, or in the process of being constructed, would almost certainly not 
have been sanctioned had trends in freight traffic been more effectively 
researched. Bonavia outlines how on the LNER in the 1930s the 'traditional 
staging of urgent traffic from one marshalling yard to another was being 
replaced by through trains between principal centres'.81 However, BR 
management took a different view, and it was not until the Beaching period 
that the traditional assumption that long-haul wagon loads required 
expensive and time consuming re-marshalling every 30 miles was rejected.82 
Even the conclusion by Gourvish that 'one or two gleams of light shone in 
this gloomy picture of freight investment before 1963', 83 is debatable. One of 
the gleams - the 'Condor' container train which offered overnight door-to-
door service from London to Glasgow, initially suffered a bad reputation from 
the regular failure of the diesel locomotives programmed for its haulage, with 
79 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 304. 
80 Marples-Macmillan meeting, 1 March 1960, PREM11/3147. 
81 Bonavia, History of the LNER 1934-39, p. 71. 
82 Thompson and Hunter, Nationalised Transport Industries, p. 176. 
83 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 290. 
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the result that by the end of 1959 loadings were just thirteen wagons.84 And 
anyway, it was hardly any improvement on the famously fast 'Glasgow 
goods' overnight service run by the LNER in pre-war years.85 
Furthermore, the lack of proper market research and accuracy in 
determining financial costs and potential results deprived the BTC of a major 
instrument of business analysis, and resulted in a substantial waste of 
resources. The Plan appeared to be founded on the change from steam to 
diesel traction, with a few additional electrification projects. Little emphasis 
had been placed on the need to improve passenger facilities in an era of 
rapidly changing economic and social expectations. No strategy had been 
formulated to clarify what the railways were for and what they should carry, 
by what operational methods and at what charge.86 lt appears that the BTC 
believed that the paradigm shift to commercial and financial success would 
be achieved through a combination of small detailed changes and technical 
advance. The Modernisation Plan was therefore seen by railway 
management as an opportunity to fund technical development in key areas, 
rather than to institute radical strategic and operational change. 
Failure to control the Modernisation Plan's costs led to scepticism in 
government, with large implications for the mechanics of state-industry 
relationships. In the MOT the view developed that general guidelines were 
ineffective in controlling or even influencing the BTC's investment 
programme. In addition serious doubts arose as to whether the investment 
was worthwhile, and Macmillan expressed sadness that money had been so 
generously provided for the railways yet proved to be of such doubtful 
84 Unattributed, 'Flight of the Condor', British Railways Illustrated, 11 (2002), p. 272. 
85 Bonavia, History of the LNER 1934-39, p. 70. 
86 Fiennes, I Tried to Run a Railway, p. 76. 
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economic value, when finances were so tight for new roads.87 lt was not only 
the amount of investment which raised concerns, but the apparent need for 
continued increases. These problems had been identified in the Treasury 
when it reviewed the railway's investment programme for the Economic 
Planning Committee (EPC), and found the initial1954 requirement of 
£1 ,200m had increased to £1 ,600m in 1957.88 The BTC had argued for the 
increase on the basis of rising prices and necessary additions to the 
Modernisation Plan, when as we have seen the reality was that major works 
such as the London Midland electrification scheme had never been properly 
costed and financially controlled. With investment requirements estimated to 
be £150m pa in the foreseeable future, but savings from station closures and 
a reduction in the network anticipated to be just £5m pa, it can easily be 
understood why the government felt compelled to act. This and the contents 
of the various reports led to the conclusion that only by significant changes 
to railway management thinking and by a more effective organisational 
structure could the problems be resolved. 
Gourvish defends the Modernisation Plan on the grounds that 'it is 
doubtful that the Treasury or the Ministry of Transport could have produced 
a clearly reasoned alternative to the BTC's approach'.89 This is perhaps 
debatable, but surely misses the point: the BTC were charged with railway 
management and robustly resisted government interference in the 
Modernisation Plan. Its attempt to plan and implement a new era for the 
railways had foundered on its own inability to develop the necessary 
commercial approach allied to a change operating mentality. The result of all 
87 Marples-Macmillan meeting, 1 March 1960, PREM11/3147. 
88 
'Secret Treasury/MOT memoranda' to EPC, 8 July 1959, PREM11/3147. 
89 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 272. 
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the various investigations, particularly the impressive and comprehensive 
work of analysis undertaken by Stedford's Special Advisory Group, was 
instrumental in confirming to Marples that only through fundamental change 
could the problems of the railways be resolved. Consequently, Marples 
developed a strategy which sought to resolve the issues through a 
combination of legislative action, and changes in the higher echelon of 
management of the BTC. The results of this approach proved enduringly 
controversial. 
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CHAPTERS 
THE BEECHING ERA 
Political Dynamite: The Beeching Report contains no surprises, it is a most clear, 
logical and concise analysis of the railways which has long been postponed. lt is 
sufficiently drastic to call for either great courage or a spirit of desperation on the 
part of a government which will have to decide to implement in whole or in part. 
(Railway Gazette, 29 March 1963, p. 345) 
Marples' strategy for the railways was to use the findings of the various 
investigations of 1959 to 1960 to legislate for a new and comprehensive 
organisational framework. This implementation of a new phase in 
government thinking towards resolution of the railway's financial and 
managerial problems required new leadership of the railway industry. As a 
result, Richard Beaching was appointed the new Chairman of the BTC. 
Moreover, this strategy was not undertaken in isolation, for by this time 
almost all the nationalised industries were experiencing problems, notably 
financial difficulties, and the government took the step of providing new and 
clear requirements of them. 
The result of all this was to prove highly controversial, and this period 
in railway history is here re-considered through an examination of Ministry of 
Transport files which were unavailable to earlier historians, including 
Gourvish, Bonavia and Hardy. In general, these files cover the findings of 
the various inquiries and the subsequent thinking within the MOT on the 
restructuring of the railways. In addition to the minutes of the MGM, 1 those of 
particular interest are the records of the Interdepartmental Working Party on 
1 MT124/1 02,which became available in 1991. 
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the railways,2 the MOT's response to the BRB's Traffic Studies and Future 
Plans,3 and discussions on financial targets for the BRB.4 
The focus of this chapter will be upon four inter-related questions. 
What was the reasoning behind the appointment of Beaching? What were 
the rationales for and the impact of the 1961 White Paper, The Financial and 
Economic Obligations of the Nationalised Industries, 5 and the 1962 
Transport Act? What factors influenced Beaching in formulating The 
Reshaping of British Railways? What did Beaching propose and achieve, 
and why were these so controversial? 
On 15 March 1961 it was announced that Beaching was to replace the 
retiring Robertson as Chairman of the British Transport Commission (and its 
successor the BRB)6 in June 1961. He had agreed a five-year contract after 
Marples arranged his secondment from ICI.7 Marples had judged Beaching 
to possess the necessary skills and experience from his impressive 
reputation at ICI, and his valuable contribution to the Special Advisory Group 
and to the Ministerial Group on Modernisation. Beaching was reported to 
possess strong powers of analysis and persuasion, allied to a formidable 
intellect. Macmillan considered him 'one of the most able and fertile brains 
2 MT124/929, closed until 1996. 
3 MT124/11 03, closed until 1996. 
4 MT132/51, closed until1993, and MT132/B9, closed until1995. 
5 The Financial and Economic Obligations of the Nationalised Industries (Parliamentary 
Papers 1960-61, Cmnd. 1337, xxvii, 975). 
6 The British Railways Board became responsible for the railways only from 1 January 1963, 
and separate Boards were created for Docks, London Transport, and Inland Waterways 
with a Holding Company for any residual parts. Each board owned their assets and was 
responsible for its own capital debt. 
7 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 322. 
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in the industrial and commercial world'.8 Those qualities were much required, 
because the extent of the challenge was considerable. Gourvish observed 
that like Robertson, Beaching 'came to the job with a reorganising mission, 
but there the resemblance ended'. 9 The two were very different in character 
and approach, and now for the first time the railways had a commercially-
minded chairman with experience of industrial management. Beaching's 
appointment was itself controversial, but his investigation into the industry 
and the proposals based on it became even more so; as a result, he was 
and has been subjected to sustained public denigration. 
Beaching's appointment was controversial for two reasons: his 
experience and his salary. Beaching had no direct experience of railway 
management; his reputation derived from a very different type of industrial 
concern - a private capital-intensive chemical company. Did that 
background adequately prepare him for leadership of a national railway 
system whose problems differed considerably from those of other industries, 
notably the size of operation, the dispersed nature of the business and the 
impact of government control?10 lt can be argued that this background 
provided more appropriate experience than those of the two previous 
chairmen, Hurcomb and Robertson. As a former civil servant and former 
army general, neither had previous experience of railway management 
either. Both had been widely regarded as competent administrators in their 
own fields, yet events had revealed that they lacked strategic vision, 
management flair, and the decisiveness required to successfully manage 
such a wide and diverse organisation as the BTC. In contrast, Beaching had 
8 Alistair Home, Macmillan 1957-1968 (London, 1989), p. 251. 
9 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 325. 
10 Hardy, Beeching, p. 1 04. 
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the advantage of experience not simply of business management, but 
additionally in the specific aspect of industrial re-organisation. 
Beaching's salary of £24,000 pa was, as Gourvish states, 'wholly 
exceptional for a leader of a nationalised industry, dwarfing the £10,000 paid 
to Robertson and the Chairmen of the Coal and Electricity Boards, and 
indeed public sector salaries as a whole'.11 lt caused consternation in the 
House of Commons, with The Times reporting a 'storm of indignation' from 
the Labour opposition,12 even though Marples reported that taxation would 
reduce the gross figure to £6,536 pa.13 Widespread media coverage led to 
dissatisfaction amongst the railway workforce, especially when comparisons 
were made with the £2,700 pa paid to the General Secretary of the 
Transport Salaried Staffs' Association, and with the average railway clerks' 
salary of £630 pa. 14 lt also had an adverse effect upon the regular rounds of 
wage bargaining, because during negotiations trades union representatives 
made frequent reference to Beaching's salary. Contemporary opinion was 
summed up with the description of 'salary de luxe'. 15 Indeed, Beaching's 
salary represented a watershed in political attitudes towards remuneration of 
members of the boards of the nationalised industries. Previously these 
salaries had not been determined by any reference to the private sector, and 
included an expectation of a contribution to public service. This, as we have 
seen earlier, had made recruitment of talented and successful businessmen 
almost impossible. But in this instance Marples considered it worth matching 
11 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 322. 
12 Times, 16 March 1961. 
13 Marples, HCDeb, 636, c.1408, 15 March 1961. 
14 Malcolm Wallace, Single or Retum- the Official History of the Transport Salaried Staffs' 
Association (London, 1996), p. 346. 
15 William Robson, Nationalised Industry and Public Ownership (London, 1962), p. 15. 
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the salary Beaching received from ICI. After extensive debate the Cabinet 
agreed on the basis that Beaching's appointment was necessary to attract a 
person of the right calibre, and it was not essential to preserve the principle 
of parity between boards of comparative importance.16 lt was considered sui 
generis, given the need for an unprecedented rescue operation - a decision 
in favour of special cases - later confirmed by a ministerial group reviewing 
salaries for members of nationalised industry boards.17 Yet Beaching's 
salary remained an isolated example, perhaps in view of the controversy it 
aroused; and in any event the policy proved short-term, because Wilson's 
Labour government decided in 1964 on a restriction on salaries for board 
members.18 The final comment on Beaching's salary should be reserved for 
Lord Lucas of Chilworth, who clearly agreed with Marples' thinking: 'if he is 
going to save £150m a year then £24,000 is not a bad bargain'. 19 
In the MOT his appointment was welcomed and seen as one of the 
three strands of policy designed to resolve the enduring financial and 
organisational problems of the railways. The other two, the 1961 White 
Paper and the 1962 Transport Act, imposed administrative and legal 
requirements, but without a new and powerful figure leading the BTC's 
management these were unlikely to be effective. lt was hoped that Beaching 
could introduce the commercial acumen into railway management, 
something which SAG had shown to be crucially lacking. A non-commercial 
approach had been apparent since nationalisation, because the creation of a 
16 Cabinet minutes (C (60) 61 51 Conclusions), 14 March 1961 ,T311/233. 
17 1t was confirmed by the Cabinet Working Party on Incomes policy and salaries of 
Chairmen and Members of Nationalised Industry Boards, 14 August 1963, T311/233. 
18 Ashworth, The State in Business, p. 72: full-time board members were restricted to a 
range between £7,000 and £9,500 pa. 
19 Lucas of Chilworth, HLDeb, 249, c. 233, 1 May 1963. 
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public corporation had altered the structure and nature of management of 
the railway industry. A long history of arms-length regulation had been 
replaced with public ownership, in effect government control, and the 
traditional and fundamental management priority of profit-making for 
shareholders was succeeded by a public-service obligation. 
At the same time the railways had been affected by challenges from 
the significant cultural, social and economic changes, from which even 
public ownership could not shield the industry. These changes included new 
and different life-style patterns which contributed to the decline in railway 
passenger traffic. Freight carryings had also significantly declined, owing, at 
least in part to the effects of industrial action on the railways and the 
consequent fall of confidence in their reliability. This was reinforced by 
another industrial trend -the widespread expansion of the consumer goods 
industry, which produced lighter and smaller products, able to be produced 
in more dispersed locations. At the same time there was a rapid decline in 
the heavy and basic industrial production. In addition, although energy 
consumption was greater than before, this was increasingly fuelled by gas 
and oil carried by pipeline, at the expense of coal carried by rail. These 
changes had become obvious in the early 1950s and accelerated during that 
decade, but the railway management's response was inadequate, with the 
result that by 1960 it had reached a financial crisis. This kept the railways at 
the forefront of activity in the MOT, and by 1960 there was firm intention to 
diagnose the root cause of the problems and take a determined approach to 
their resolution. The remedy from the BTC - massive investment under the 
Modernisation Plan had produced only very limited success and increased 
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the financial problems. As a result (and in common with other nationalised 
industries), it created ever-increasing demands on public spending. This 
heavy expenditure by the public corporations came under greater scrutiny, 
for nationalisation had made the industries 'necessarily accountable in a 
very open way for what they did and how they did it'. 20 Parliamentary 
questions and media publicity highlighted the inefficiency of these industries, 
fuelled by public opinion which perceived them as inefficient and dated. 21 
Marples and his senior advisers were fully aware of these changed 
conditions. They also possessed a wider perspective than the BTC and 
realised the growing and urgent need for a new frame of reference for the 
railways. Marples evidently had little confidence in the ability of the BTC to 
identify problems, or indeed even to subscribe to the view that fundamental 
change was needed. In addition, Marples' approach was consistent with the 
developments in Conservative industrial policy represented by a wider 
acceptance of corporatist ideas. The impact of this was increased state 
intervention at the micro-economic level of industrial management in 
response to the perceived need to engineer change in industry to promote 
its modernisation. For the railways, there was also the stimulus of the 
financial deficits, but Marples recognised that this was a symptom of a wider 
and more deep-rooted problem, the resolution of which was not 
straightforward and required fundamental change. Marples had set the 
scene for such change in January 1961, when during a debate in the 
Commons he stated that: 
2° Foreman-Peck and Millward, Public and Private Ownership of British Industry, p. 301. 
21 This scrutiny was often highly detailed and localised. A specific example is the long 
questioning of Marples by the local MP on why the Newcastle-Liverpool expresses no 
longer stopped at Durham: HCDeb, 634, c. 1369, 14 February 1961. 
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The Government propose an entirely new organisational structure because our 
experience showed that the present structure is unsuitable. We believe that it is 
outmoded and has been overtaken by events. Our underlying purpose is to 
separate the tasks and operations of the various national transport undertakings.22 
A further important issue was the relationship between the Chairman of the 
BTC, the Minister of Transport, and his department. With Robertson this had 
generally been cordial, but certainly not close, nor particularly effective in 
terms of developing a common approach between the BTC and MOT. 
Beaching's contribution to the SAG and MGM indicated that his thinking was 
much more in line with the MOT, and accordingly a more productive working 
relationship was anticipated. This was considered vital, given the expected 
extent of change to the railways and consequent need to handle its impact 
on public opinion effectively. The MOT was therefore concerned when 
without consultation, Beaching publicised a decision to impose central 
management on the railway workshops, because given the prospect of 
closures anything relating to the workshops was considered sensitive. 
Marples felt obliged to spell out to Beaching the implications of his actions, 
and to emphasise the need to work within parameters set by the Minister. 
The effect of this was to confirm the shift of authority from the BTC to the 
Minister, and to contribute towards increasing departmental authority over 
Beeching.23 
Marples' expectation that Beaching would introduce a fresh, more 
dynamic and commercial approach to the management of the railways was 
soon fulfilled. Beaching made it clear that new and more innovative 
approaches were necessary to resolve its problems. The first signs of 
22 Marples, HCDeb. 633, col. 615, 30 January 1961. 
23 Serpell, MOT, 30 April1962, MT87/113. 
270 
change came in April 1962 when he addressed the BTC Officers' 
Conference at York with the theme 'Organising the Railways as a Business'. 
His direct and novel approach surprised many of the delegates. He stated 
that the organisation was too lightly staffed at the top, and that most senior 
managers were trying to do far more than they could achieve. His solution 
to this problem of under-management at headquarters and in the regions 
was to recruit talent from other industries. He argued that the headquarters' 
commercial organisation had an outdated outlook and was ineffective, so he 
would introduce specialists in the financial and marketing spheres - a move 
which achieved considerable success. He also declared that railway 
management at every level was reactive, simply jumping from problem to 
problem, which precluded proper forward planning and the adoption of a 
constructive approach to future development.24 
Beaching proved ready to question traditional thinking in management 
and operational processes, and to introduce new initiatives and outside 
expertise. This was shown clearly when he addressed the Institute of 
Directors in 1962. 25 The business community's perception of the railways 
was clear from the conference programme, which described him as 'the man 
with one of the biggest loads of industrial troubles on his shoulders'. Again 
Beaching was forthright, declaring to the 5,000 delegates that 'there was 
already far too much opinion with too little understanding of the railway's 
problems'. He stressed that the only real solution was a proper evaluation of 
the right role for the railways as part of the transport system as a whole -
thinking which formed the basis of his Report. 
24 Beaching to BTC Officers' Conference, York, 6 April 1962, AN18/1 0. 
25 Beaching to Annual Conference of the Institute of Directors, 31 October 1962, AN18/11. 
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We have seen that the need for change on the railways had been 
appreciated in the MOT for some time, where it was felt that the problems of 
transport could only be resolved by radical changes to their management 
philosophy, financial structure, and statutory framework.26 By 1960 the 
financial position had deteriorated to such an extent that this change was 
considered urgent, and the government outlined its intentions in the White 
Paper, Reorganisation of the Nationalised Transport Undertakings. In it the 
financial difficulties were made clear: 
The railways are now in a grave financial plight. They are a long way short (by 
about £60m a year) of covering even their running costs. This is quite apart from 
the problem of meeting their interest charges, whether upon the price paid for the 
undertakings or upon the money since borrowed for modernisation and other 
purposes. These interest charges now total some £75m a year.27 
In addition, the White Paper pointed out that 'the commercial ability of the 
railways is circumscribed by outmoded statutory obligations and restrictions 
on trading operations'.28 lt therefore proposed new arrangements for 
management of transport, which included the creation of the British Railways 
Board to replace the railway operations of the BTC.29 
At the same time, concern with the BTC resonated in the Treasury, 
where the financial performance and costs of all of the nationalised 
industries had been under scrutiny. The pressures were not just the need to 
finance the substantial deficits, but the additional and growing demand for 
26 Serpell (MOT) to Marples, 16 December 1960, MT124/566. 
27 Reorganisation of the National Transport Undertakings (Parliamentary Papers 1960-61, 
Cmnd. 1248, xxvii, 991 ), para. 6. 
28 Ibid., para. 10. 
29 Ibid., para. 14. 
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increased investment funds. These amounted to over £800m pa, and more 
than half came from the Exchequer.30 Although the Treasury accepted that 
many of the investment proposals were desirable, these conflicted with other 
considerable pressures on public spending, notably the provision of social 
services and education. As a result Selwyn Lloyd as Chancellor of the 
Exchequer felt obliged in March 1961 to emphasise that 'collectively these 
demands were beyond what could be afforded'. 31 The combination of these 
pressures had led to a detailed examination of the nationalised industries 
undertaken by a group of officials under Sir Thomas Padmore, a Treasury 
Second Secretary. As might be expected from the Treasury, they assumed 
that organisational issues were secondary to the need to establish clear 
economic and financial objectives.32 The result was an attempt to clarify and 
codify their financial position in the 1961 White Paper, The Financial and 
Economic Obligations of the Nationalised Industries. 
Implicit in this document was the expectation that the public 
corporations would adopt a more commercial stance in pricing and 
investment. Furthermore, the acceptance of a public service obligation by 
the nationalised industries did not release them from the need for financial 
solvency: 
Although the industries have obligations of a national and non-commercial kind, 
they are not, and ought not, to be regarded as social services absolved from 
economic and commercial justification.33 
They were now expected to pay their way taking one year with another over 
a five year period, and to generate reserves to protect against such 
3° Financial and Economic Obligations of the Nationalised Industries, para. 23. 
31 Cabinet minute C (61) 47,27 March 1961, PREM11/3440. 
32 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 307. 
33 Financial and Economic Obligations of the Nationalised Industries, para. 2. 
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contingencies as premature obsolescence.34 This task was to prove beyond 
the railways, because the industry was simply unable to generate enough 
revenue even to cover replacement costs, producing heavy dependency on 
the Treasury. 
The MOT also wished to establish arrangements which would avoid 
repetition of the problems arising from the BTC's management of its 
investment programme, with its lack of even basic appraisal of costs and 
benefits accruing to investments. This prompted the MOT and Treasury to 
require more effective monitoring of capital expenditure. As a result 
arrangements for investment reviews were codified, the minister was to be 
informed of general plans for the next five years, and each year was to fix an 
upper limit on the amount spent on investment for the following two years. 35 
A further important modification sought to resolve the long-standing 
issue of conflict between minister and industry on issues such as pricing, by 
creating a new and obligatory process. The chairmen of the nationalised 
industries' boards were now required to ascertain the views of the minister 
before any proposed alteration to charges.36 The boards did, though, receive 
a safeguard, in that a revision of financial targets was allowed if subsequent 
ministerial action affected their ability to meet them. 
These financial targets varied according to the particular 
circumstances of each nationalised industry. That for the Coal Board was to 
break even in a five-year period, whereas in contrast the railways were 
required to break even as soon as possible. This divergence was owing to 
recognition that the railways faced problems beyond short-term resolution 
34 Ibid., para. 19. 
35 Ibid., para. 24. 
36 Ibid., para. 31. 
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and so not easily tied to a particular time-frame. A similar policy applied to 
unprofitable activities carried out at the request of government, where the 
board could as a consequence seek an adjustment to its financial objectives. 
The effect of these objectives was therefore to shift the main emphasis of 
the nationalised industries management from day-to-day running to financial 
targets. The role of the Treasury remained essentially unchanged: it was 
required to approve capital expenditure programmes, the borrowing to meet 
them, and the authorisation of payments to meet continuous deficits. 
The 1961 White Paper was the first real attempt to formulate a clear 
policy for the financial performance of the nationalised industries. However, 
the guidance was essentially about monetary requirements, and it soon 
became clear that calculations were complex. Despite the requirements, the 
performance of the industries showed little improvement; after all they 
continued to face the same problems, and the same financial constraints 
endured. This position was understood by the Cabinet, where it was 
accepted that despite the changes anticipated from Beaching's appointment, 
the railways (like the other nationalised industries) would be required to 
impose higher charges for their services. This was generally welcomed by a 
Cabinet concerned with the level of public spending, for it represented a shift 
in expenditure from the Treasury to the consumer. 37 The Cabinet further 
hoped that these changes would reduce the need for ministerial 
intervention. 38 
The third strand of policy was the 1962 Transport Act, which included 
measures specifically applying to the railways. This Act was substantially 
37 Cabinet minute (C (61) 47), 27 March 1961, PREM11/3440. 
38 Cabinet minute (C (61) 38), 20 March 1961, PREM11/3440. 
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based on the 1960 White Paper, Reorganisation of the National Transport 
Undertakings. Gourvish criticises the MOT and Cabinet for failing to take 
account of railway opinion when drafting this paper?9 While strictly true, in 
reality the verdict is overstated, because there had been considerable 
debate, discussion and correspondence on financial issues between the 
MOT and the BTC. In any event, as the conclusions of the various 
investigations had revealed, the BTC had shown a remarkable lack of 
perception and ability to understand that fundamental changes were needed, 
so it could hardly be expected to contribute to a major restructuring exercise. 
Other 'railway' input was hardly likely to be constructive either, for the unions 
frequently demonstrated a reactionary stance. Macmillan found when 
dealing with the NUR that they 'wanted to continue to build wagons which 
are not wanted and steam locomotives which are not required'.40 
Although the content of the 1962 Transport Act was dominated by 
MOT thinking, this did not preclude some wider consultation. In April1961 
representatives of the General Council of the Trades Union Congress (TUC), 
met with Marples and officials from the Ministry of Transport to consider the 
implications of the proposals. However, this proved unhelpful, for the main 
concern of the TUC delegation was not the proposals for changes in the BR 
management, but the question of co-ordination of wage bargaining in the five 
undertakings set to replace the BTC's executives. 
Although the BTC did not have any major input to the drafting of the 
1962 Transport Act, it did assist with a number of the details. This was 
achieved through a joint MOT-BTC working party on the Reorganisation of 
39 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 319. 
40 Horne, Macmillan 1957-86, p. 251. 
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Nationalised Transport, with the acronym RENT. This wide-ranging exercise 
was conducted on two levels with the higher (steering group) chaired by 
David Serpell. 41 While it may have been uncomfortable for members of the 
BTC to participate in RENT, the correspondence found in the various MOT 
files was courteous and detailed,42 and hardly supports Gourvish's view that 
this was a 'vexatious and comical interlude in the history of the nationalised 
railways'.43 
A significant feature of the 1962 Act concerned the extent of 
ministerial control by introducing new and far-reaching powers for the 
Minister of Transport. In order to avoid repetition of the waste of public 
funds experienced under the Modernisation Plan, the Treasury sought 
greater control over investment. In addition, there was a realisation that 
railway modernisation had long-term implications not just for BR but also for 
the rolling-stock manufacturing industry. Both suffered from excess 
capacity which required urgent remedial action, with the potential for creating 
unemployment problems in certain areas. In view of these concerns the Act 
introduced greater control not only over railway spending plans, but also on 
what was produced, where, and how. The BTC made a strong protest 
regarding this as a political invasion of its supervisory and commercial 
freedom, but the MOT justified the provision as necessary economic 
management in the wider national interest.44 The effect was that the Minister 
could approve proposals as they stood, or modify them in consultation with 
management. Given the experience of waste under the Modernisation Plan 
41 Deputy Secretary at the MOT. 
42 In particular MT132/38. 
43 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 321. 
44 BTC to MOT Railways 'B' Division, August 1962, MT87/9. 
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and the pressures on public spending, it can be legitimately argued that the 
government had no other option. 
One effort to generate commercial awareness was the modification of 
the operational status of the existing six regional bodies, turning them into 
railway-only operations. A Scottish Region was retained, but this was for 
political expediency rather than operational benefits, given that the main 
traffic flows in Scotland were actually those to and from England on the west 
and east coast routes. SAG had advised retention of this region on the 
basis that financial assistance would always be required there, and 'it would 
please the Scots'!45 
While the 1962 Transport Act reinforced ministerial control it also 
granted some commercial freedoms, in accordance with the 1961 White 
Paper recommendation that 'in the new circumstances it would not be 
reasonable to leave the railways subject to out of date restrictions on their 
commercial activities' .46 This view, which had emerged from the MOT's 
deliberations with the BTC,47 gave the BRB authority to fix certain freight 
charges and abolished restrictions imposed by the common carrier 
obligation. This second change was considered necessary if the railways 
were to compete effectively with the roads; and as the editor of the Railway 
Gazette recognised, the restrictions were 'ridiculous in modern times'.48 The 
MOT did contemplate the radical action of abolishing the Transport Tribunal 
entirely, but political expediency prevailed, and regulative control continued. 
45 SAG Report, September 1960, para. 77, AN13/2713. 
46 Reorganisation of the Nationalised Transport Undertakings, para. 55. 
47 MOT -BTC Working party on the Transport Bill, WP (61) 22, 10 March 1961, MT124/234. 
48 Railway Gazette, 10 August 1962, p. 149. 
278 
The result was that BRB remained obliged to refer proposed increases to 
passenger fares to the Transport Tribunal.49 50 
In addition to charges, a long-running problem was railway losses on 
the provision of uneconomic services for social reason. As already shown, 
the issue was identified in the 1961 White Paper,51 but it had wider 
implications both for the other nationalised industries, and for the railways. 
While the government proposed to formulate a wider policy in due course, in 
the interim, 'railway losses on any such services will in practice be covered 
by the contributions proposed from public funds'. 52 
However, the process of determining social cost and benefit became 
an area of controversy as the programme of line closures accelerated. As 
Gourvish pointed out (when referring to the early 1950s), 'public enthusiasm 
for its railway, however unprofitable, was an important factor to be 
considered, particularly since consumers were supported by an extensive 
appeals machinery'.53 In a number of cases this public zeal to maintain the 
railway created two problems: postponement or even cancellation of closure 
which frustrated the cost-cutting exercise, and lines that remained open on 
social grounds contributed to the wider problem of social cost. 
Whenever there was concerted and determined opposition to closure 
proposals, the appeals machinery was protracted, as exemplified in the 
attempt to close the Westerham to Dunton Green branch in Kent, where 
49 Gingell, Railways 'C' Division, 30 May 1961, MT124/313. 
50 The Tribunal comprised: a president, a 'transport member' and a 'commercial member' 
and was required to conduct a public enquiry whenever an application was received to 
alter charges. Gourvish, British Railways, p. 1 00. 
51 Reorganisation of the Nationalised Transport Undertakings, para. 50. 
52 Ibid., para. 50. 
53 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 119. 
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Marples and the BTC were frustrated by delays to the closure of a loss-
making branch. 
In an attempt to reduce these delays, the 1962 Transport Act 
introduced a significant change to the closure process. Before the Act, 
appeals against closure were heard by the relevant Transport Users' 
Consultative Committee (TUCC), 54 a body which made recommendations to 
the Minister of Transport. The MOT calculated that between 1950 and 1962 
these TUCCs had agreed to the withdrawal of 340 lines, saving a total of 
£6m pa.55 After the 1962 Act, the TUCC was still required to advertise 
proposed changes, and to receive evidence and objections, but it was only 
required to advise the Minister on the hardship which might result from the 
closure, after taking account of alternative transport facilities. The Minister 
was then able to decide and 'give to the board concerned such direction as 
he thinks fit with respect to the matter dealt with in the recommendation'.56 
In this the Minister was expected to take due account of any social argument 
for maintaining railway services where public transport was essential to the 
community, and where no satisfactory alternative was available. While this 
was designed to protect the interests of the community, the criteria used to 
determine the extent of social costs and benefits was considered to favour 
BR closure proposals, rather than retention of services. Gourvish explains 
why: there was little incentive for the regions to provide carefully formulated 
data, for the new procedures established by the 1962 Transport Act placed 
no obligation on British Railways to publish any financial information in 
54 The TUCCs were instituted under the 1947 Transport Act. 
55 MOT to Inter-departmental working party, 1962, MT124/929. 
56 Transport Act 1962, para. 57 (6). 
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support of its proposals.57 This resulted in much controversy in a number of 
closure proposals. 
Public opinion on line and service closures was mixed. The problem 
was to some extent summarised in The Guardian, where the editor declared 
that 'any form of social accounting was not an easy practice to undertake, 
but at least it should be attempted'.58 Furthermore, the BTC had long argued 
that the funding of unremunerative services -those which would have 
closed without government intervention - was 'a costly and unjustified 
inheritance which no other commercial undertaking was expected to bear, 
and that financial recompense should be given'.59 The Select Committee 
Report of 1960 effectively accepted this argument, by recommending that 
'uneconomic services which the railways were required to continue on the 
grounds of national economy or of social need should be met by specific 
grants from public funds'. 60 However, despite reference to proposed policy 
on the issue in both the 1961 White Paper and the 1962 Transport Act, it 
was not fully applied until 1968. Even so for the first time the nationalised 
industries operated with comprehensive financial guidelines as embodied in 
the 1961 White Paper. In addition the 1962 Transport Act further clarified the 
financial obligations of the railways, and indicated how they were to be 
managed. 
Ill 
The publication of The Reshaping of British Railways on 25 March 
1963 resulted in varied views: Pollins considers that 'it aimed to clarify the 
57 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 436. 
58 Guardian, 25 October 1962. 
59 BTC Annual Report and Accounts 1955, para. 74. p. 117. 
60 Report of the Select Committee 1960, para. 422-427, CAB134/1434. 
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principal characteristics of rail transport and to base the board's activities on 
them'.61 Bonavia concluded that 'the report was written with a clarity that 
made its logic seem irresistible' .62 Hardy considered it a constructive 
document, but also concludes that 'many people saw the Report as a 
personal attack of pure butchery on the railways of Great Britain in general 
and those in their own area in particular'. 63 Gourvish argues that while the 
Report was very much identified with Beeching himself, 'much of it rested on 
studies and initiatives rooted in the 1950s', including the Modernisation Plan 
of 1955 and its re-appraisal in 1959.64 Plainly Beeching was aware of these 
previous initiatives from his own membership of the SAG and MGM. 
However, to concentrate on the extent of the influence of previous works is 
to miss the point. lt was Beaching's approach rather than his conclusions 
which were fundamentally different. Many of his recommendations were in 
line with previous thinking, but Beeching moved the debate forward with 
clarity of analysis which placed the railways in a national transport context, 
and which considered the social consequences of closures. Arguably, as 
important as his identification of solutions, was a readiness and ability to act 
quickly upon the report's recommendations. All of this was required urgently, 
because after his appointment the scale of the railway's problems was again 
demonstrated by the publication of financial results which were worse than 
ever before. In 1961 the loss was £86-4m, which with the addition of interest 
charges rose to £118·4m, while net revenue had fallen by £10-8m.65 In 
61 Pollins, Britain's Railways, p. 176. 
62 Bonavia, British Rail the First 25 Years, p. 119. 
63 Hardy, Beeching, p. 69. 
64 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 402. Beaching's hand-written first draft of the Report is 
lodged in the National Archives at Kew, AN13/3. 
65 Confidential Report to BRB, December 1962, AN16/12. 
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addition to economic factors, the BTC now belatedly identified social change 
as one of the major contributors to this performance. A 3% fall in passenger-
ticket receipts was deemed to have been caused not just by fare increases 
but by changed public habits, such as watching television which reduced 
weekend and evening travel. Non-passenger travel had also declined, with 
freight receipts down by 4% and mineral traffic by 14%.66 This decline was 
not counterbalanced by any revenue improvements from the expensive 
investment in technical equipment. Even a reduction in staff numbers could 
not stop the increased working expenses of £7·4m. These figures yet again 
confirmed that only an extensive programme of closures could enable the 
railways to become financially viable. 
lt was the response to this need that resulted in the main and 
enduring criticism of Beaching: his part in planning and implementing line 
and station closures. Yet this issue- the size and extent of the network-
had been a recurrent feature of government thinking for some time. As early 
even as 1949 the Cabinet Investment Programmes Committee had raised 
the possibility of financial savings through closure of more branch lines.67 
Boyd-Carpenter related that the MOT had recognised a need for 
rationalisation and closures in 1955, when it was argued that heavy 
expenditure on modernising some routes had to be balanced by the closing 
of other lines which in the age of the motor car could never pay their way.68 
That view resurfaced in early 1959, when it was concluded that there was no 
prospect of the railways being financially viable at the size anticipated in the 
66 BTC Annual Report and Accounts 1962. 
67 Cabinet Investment Programmes Committee, IPC (49) 3, 12 May 1949, CAB134/212. 
68 Boyd-Carpenter, Way of Life, p.113. 
283 
Modernisation Plan.69 As GoUivish points out, it had also been implicit in the 
Re-appraisal of the Modernisation Plan and in the London Midland Region 
Passenger Plan,70 although it should be recognised that both of these 
initiatives were the result of pressure from government and from the MGM 
respectively. And, Macmillan, after acceptance of the Guillebaud Report, had 
publicly stated to the Commons in 1960 that: 
The railway must be of a size and pattern suited to modern conditions and 
prospects. Those working in the industry must accept this as the only way of 
bringing about conditions in which a fair reward not only in terms of money but with 
satisfaction with their job can be secured.71 
This view was reinforced in the 1960 White Paper, which stated that 
'sweeping changes will be needed' and 'a railway system of the right size 
was an essential element of a modem transport system'.72 So for a good 
number of years before the Reshaping Report, it had been accepted within 
government that a reduced railway network was the only way that costs 
could be effectively controlled. Financial investigations by the MOT 
concluded that greater efficiency in using labour and fuel would yield only 
marginal savings, and that a reduction of operating expenses on the 
required scale could be achieved only by elimination of complete lines, 
services, stations and depots. 73 The MOT also thought that closure of 
uneconomic services should be speeded up to a far greater extent than 
previously contemplated, a conclusion also reached by the SAG. Yet the 
eleven TUCCs admitted that they could deal with considerably more cases 
69 MOT, The future position of the railways, 16 January 1959, MT65/357. 
70 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 402. 
71 Macmillan to Commons, HCDeb, 619, c. 643, 10 March 1960. 
72 Reorganisation of the Nationalised Transport Undertakings, paras. 4, 5. 
73 Venning to Wardale, 4 January 1960, MT65/360. 
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than those put forward?4 This lack of progress is most apparent in line 
closures. Appendix 2 (p. 341) shows that in 1961 the index of route miles 
compared with 1948 remained at 94. More progress had been made in the 
closure of stations, as detailed in Appendix 3 (p. 342), with the index of 
change showing a fall to 65 by 1962; but thereafter progress became 
markedly more rapid as Beaching's proposals continued to be implemented. 
The MOT had also recognised the impact of the inexorable growth of 
road transport. An attempt was made to quantify the benefit of transfers of 
road traffic to rail, but its analysis of 'Current Trends and Future Traffics' 
hardly justified the argument for large-scale investment in the railways. lt 
concluded that even if the railways increased their goods traffic by 1 0% at 
the expense of roads, this would lead to a reduction in road traffic of only 
2%. Given the much higher annual increase in road traffic, this was 
considered insignificant.75 Furthermore, continued decline in freight revenue 
was expected, given that by 1963 road transport accounted for two-thirds of 
inland goods traffic compared to less than half ten years before?6 This 
continued decline of traditional railway business was instrumental in the 
MOT again concluding that a coherent long-term plan for investment was 
needed?7 In essence what the MOT was seeking became the foundation for 
the Reshaping Report; in other words, much of what Beaching was seeking 
to achieve, was influenced by the MOT and the MGM. 
Before Beaching's appointment it had appeared that the BTC were 
unwilling to reduce the system to an economic size. Their prevailing wisdom 
74 SAG, 45th meeting, 17 August 1960, MT132/88. 
75 MOT Current Trends and Future Traffics, 3 November 1961, MT65/360. 
76 MOT Statistics Division, minute S28/107, 15 May 1963, MT65/422. 
77 MOT Control of BTC capital investment, 5 July 1962, MT132/9. 
285 
was that the network would remain at essentially its 1960 size, albeit with 
modifications to operation, using modernised equipment. Reshaping 
questioned that view, and emphasised the existing MOT view that far-
reaching changes were required in the size of the railway network. Neither, 
however, went so far as Beaching in grasping the extent of closures needed 
to achieve financial viability. 
IV 
In order to understand more fully why Beaching's proposals were, and 
have remained so controversial, it is necessary to consider a series of 
associated factors. The first is the nature of the evidence base from which 
he identified the salient issues underlying his proposals. Soon after his 
appointment Beaching instituted a new analysis of the extent and nature of 
the railway's problems, using information collected in a widespread survey of 
routes and traffic. These statistics took just over a year to collect, and related 
to the railway's performance in 1961 . The Reshaping Report accepts that 
although the figures were not completely up to date, nor highly accurate, 
they were approximately correct, and formed a sound basis for decision 
making?8 
Furthermore, they constituted the first-ever comprehensive analysis of 
railway costs?9 However, the survey did not cover every aspect of 
operations, with a specific weakness relating to calculations of the revenue 
accruing to particular locations. Fares and charges were allocated to the 
point of purchase and departure, with no allowance given to the ultimate 
78 Reshaping of British Railways, p. 5 and p. 11. 
79 The MGM had concluded that the BTC knew 'lamentably little' about its traffic costs: 
16 August 1960, MT124/1 02. 
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receiving destination of the passenger or freight. Despite this statistical 
weakness, the findings of the survey were extensively used to justify the 
proposals in The Reshaping of British Railways. As Reshaping pointed out, 
'there had never before been any systematic assembly of a basis of 
information upon which planning could be founded, and without which the 
proper role of the railways in the transport system as a whole could not be 
determined'. 80 
Marples had stressed to Beaching that it would not be easy to get 
Reshaping accepted by Parliament and the country unless, in addition to the 
programme of closures, it included new and constructive ideas, 
demonstrated a sound economic basis, and offered the prospect of financial 
viability.81 Even so, the media response to the survey, published earlier than 
Reshaping, was received by the press with general approval. However, a 
note of warning about its implications was given by the Financial Times 
'sadly, relentlessly the BTC is conditioning the minds of the public to accept 
large scale closures.'82 The Guardian applauding the fact that 'the railways 
had at last taken a slow look at themselves and that drastic pruning of the 
antiquated relics of nineteenth century railway development was inevitable, if 
only to staunch the Exchequer's wounds'.83 
As to Reshaping itself, the journal Modern Railways expressed 
'surprise at the extent of media response given the circulation of extensive 
information on the issue during the past year', allied to a lament 'that the 
80 Reshaping of British Railways, p. 1. 
81 Marples to Beeching, 19 December 1962, MT124/928. 
82 Financial Times, 12 September 1962. 
83 Guardian, 12 December 1962. 
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Modernisation Plan had not been so well researched'.84 A Daily Mail survey 
found that the majority of those questioned considered Reshaping to be on 
the right lines with most people agreeing that uneconomic parts of the rail 
network should be closed. The Railway Gazette agreed, and reported that 
with some reservations the response of the press and the public reaction 
had been favourable. The Guardian asked 'what alternatives were there to 
Beeching'?85 The Times argued that it would bring some semblance of 
sense to the country's transport system, but asked 'can Beaching do it'?86 
In contrast to the national press, the view expressed by one regional 
newspaper was very different, and highlighted the vulnerability felt in 
particular areas from the closure of railway facilities and the subsequent loss 
of jobs, notably at the Darlington railway works. The Northern Echo used 
highly emotive language: it commented on 'where the axe falls', dubbed 
Beaching as 'the surgeon', described closures as 'stations marked for 
death', and reflected on the 'threat to 2,500 North-East jobs'.87 
Perhaps predictably, the Road Haulage Association welcomed the 
Reshaping proposals to 'put the railways' house in order'. However, the far-
reaching proposals generated great hostility from certain sections of public 
opinion, and particularly the railway unions. The Transport Salaried Staffs' 
Association predicted that its implementation would cause chaos in the 
industry. Unsurprisingly, the NUR questioned Reshaping's validity, and 
declared that it could not make the railways financially viable. Gourvish 
reports another perspective: 'academic critics pronounced themselves 
64 Modern Railways, 17 (May, 1963), p. 289. 
65 Guardian, 1 May 1963. 
66 Times, June 27 1963. 
67 Norlhern Echo, 28 March 1963. 
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dissatisfied with the inadequacy of the data-base provided, and drew 
attention to the fact that the Board's references to "direcr and "indirect'' 
costs were both inconsistent and misleading, since neither could be equated 
with ''fixed" and ''variable" costs as an economist would define them'. 88 
The Reshaping of British Railways came before the House of 
Commons in April 1963. After debate about its social consequences, it 
received parliamentary endorsement, and shortly afterwards the BRB began 
to implement its recommendations. Opposition to the proposals contained in 
Reshaping came from the Labour party, which organised a 'transport rally' in 
London on 25 June 1963, at which the report was attacked as a folly. The 
Labour party criticised it for aiming to have the railways directed solely on 
the basis of profit considerations, and called for a major survey of the 
nation's transport needs. However, the party's rhetoric was not matched in 
practice: on its return to government in 1964 it initially continued the policy of 
closures. Indeed, as Appendices 2 and 3 indicate,89 for at least two years it 
did so at an increased rate. 
Given such critical public comment, once the complete implications of 
Reshaping were fully appreciated, it is hardly surprising that some sections 
of the public developed resentment towards the proposals. Gourvish argues 
that much of the criticism emanated from the publication of a long list of 
service reductions and station closures, which served to stiffen public 
resistance.90 White agrees, arguing that this notification meant that 
'resistance to closure proposals increased and efforts to prevent their 
implementation became more widespread. Protests even came from those 
68 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 407. 
89 See Appendices 2, 3, pp. 335, 336. 
90 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 413. 
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who had deserted the threatened lines and thus hastened their closure'. 91 
Beaching had correctly predicted that line closures would be the most 
controversial aspect, because many would believe, often irrationally, that 
large areas of the country would be isolated from any form of public 
transport.92 However, in some cases (though certainly not all), it is clear that 
closure made little difference to mobility and life-style of those affected and 
'for most people the line rapidly became a forgotten railway'. 93 
While Reshaping recommended many station closures, in itself this 
was hardly new. As Patmore showed in his geographical survey, the closure 
of lines and services had been a feature of railway operations almost since 
inception.94 In April 1963 the MOT calculated that from 1948 to 1962 the 
number of stations losing passenger services was 2,350,95 and 1,850 were 
closed completely.96 lt was widely accepted that the railway system could 
not continue in its existing form, with its high cost base, and the number of 
closures was already increasing during 1962. But Reshaping accelerated 
the trend, because it changed the previous piecemeal approach into a 
coherent and consistent strategy. 
Something which magnified denigration of Beaching was that his 
Report listed numerous routes for which closure had already been agreed, 
or for which the pre-closure consultation had already begun. Indeed 234 
stations listed had already been closed by the time of publication. In other 
91 White, Forgotten Railways, p. 23. 
92 Beaching to Marples, 24 August 1962, MTB?/113. 
93 White, Forgotten Railways, p. 23. 
94 J. A. Patmore, 'The British Railways network in the Beaching era', Transactions of the 
Institute of British Geographers, 34 (June 1964), pp. 159-173. 
95 In Appendix 2, p. 341, it has been calculated as 2,339, the difference is likely to be 
through 'rounding up' in the MOT. 
96 MOT Statistics, April1963, MT65/422. 
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words, the Report created an exaggerated impression of the number of 
closures it was itself proposing. In a number of cases opposition was non-
existent or insubstantial, such as the closure of the twenty-seven mile long 
Kingham-Cheltenham route, where it was reported that passenger traffic 
using the services had been almost nil.97 On the other hand there were also 
cases where opposition was well-organised. The Gatesacre to Hunt's Cross 
and Liverpool Central service aroused such concerted opposition from the 
communities which it served that it took nine years before closure.98 
Nevertheless, Reshaping did in general terms propose a rapid 
number of closures, and as such it produced a very powerful response from 
certain sections of the public with the effect that Beaching became more 
than simply a public figure managing British Railways; he was regarded as 
responsible for the wholesale withdrawal of services and infrastructure. His 
name became synonymous with protest, and with rituals marking the 'final 
trains' that took place around Britain in the 1960s.99 In Countesthorpe, a 
road leading to the defunct railway station was even named 'Beaching 
Close'.100 Some of these line closures were resisted, and demonstrations 
against them were at times heated. Yet much of this criticism is unfair, for as 
Gourvish notes Beaching's successor, Stanley Raymond,101 presided over 
more closures, in terms of numbers, route miles, and estimated savings. 
Moreover, Beaching arguably presided over the most detailed and 
exhaustive re-consideration of specific closure proposals. As Gourvish 
noted, 'if there was a moratorium [on closures] it surely came in 1963 as a 
97 Railway Magazine (December, 1962), p. 871. 
98 Hardy, Beeching, p. 70. 
99 Loft, Re-appraisal and reshaping, p. 71. 
100 Railway Magazine (December, 1962), p. 875. 
101 Raymond was Chairman of the BRB from 1 June 1965 to 31 December 1967. 
291 
result of TUCC/Ministerial procedure. Of the 173 closure proposals 
published by British Rail from 4 June to 31 December 1963 only two came to 
fruition by the end of the year'. 102 Nevertheless, in Hardy's words 'in the eyes 
of thousands of railwaymen Beaching stood condemned'. 103 They were 
bitter because in their view he had sold them out to the all-powerful road 
interest, and they were unable or unwilling to accept the need for 
fundamental change. 
Beaching continues to suffer criticism from general historians, often 
expressing an emotional response more than specialist understanding. A 
typical example is Lamb's debatable conclusion that under Beaching 'public 
transport in rural areas was slashed to the bone'. 104 Sandbrook, who uses 
this same quotation, observes 'that in the sixties train-spotting began to lose 
its allure thanks to Or Beaching's ruthless cuts as thousands of rural stations 
had been shut down and much of the fun had evidently gone out of the 
spotting game'.105 Yet although the hobby did decline, this was not solely 
due to station closures. Rather, the reasons lay in wider changes, including 
altered living patterns and the rapid replacement of the spotters' beloved 
steam engines with less popular diesel locomotives. Home similarly 
concentrates on the emotive: 'it all meant a vast change in the quality of 
British life, with crumbling railway embankments shorn of rails and sleepers, 
with overcrowded roads epitomising the disappearance of the heritage of the 
Industrial Revolution that had made Britain great' .106 
102 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 440. 
103 Hardy, Beeching, p. 106. 
104 Lamb, The Macmillan Years. 
105 Sandbrook, Never Had lt So Good, p. 392. 
106 Home, Macmillan 1957-86, p. 252. 
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The specialist literature offers a very different interpretation, 
particularly when considering the most enduring complaint against Beaching: 
his contribution to the programme of line and station closures. Loft 
concludes that Reshaping was important not for its financial calculations, but 
in presenting the closure programmes as a plan explained for the public 
rather than the expert.107 Bona via described it as written with an irresistible 
logic.108 For Hardy it was a constructive document that prescribed the strong 
medicine essential for the railway's survival. 109 
V 
A full understanding of the railways during the Beaching period is not 
complete without examination both of how BR approached its closure 
programme, and the impact of this action. lt is accepted that large-scale 
closures were necessary for BR to reduce its financial deficit, but a vital 
question in assessing the success of this policy is: were the right routes 
chosen for closure, and was the process managed effectively? Were some 
potentially profitable lines closed in railway management's hurried attempt at 
re-appraisal? Gourvish accepts that there was a closure mentality in regional 
railway staff, at the expense of all other considerations.110 White argues that 
the railway authorities 'seemed bent not only on reducing the system to as 
small a mileage as possible, but on ridding whole regions of any memory of 
107 Loft, 'Re-appraisal and reshaping', p. 85. 
108 Bonavia, British Rail the First 25 Years, p. 118. 
109 Hardy, Beeching, p. 69. 
110 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 413. 
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the railway' .111 Were there other alternatives to closure? In short - was this 
closure programme itself another example of questionable management? 
In an attempt to answer these questions, an appropriate case study 
will be used: the Stainmore route from Darlington to Penrith via Barnard 
Castle and Kirby Stephen, which was closed on 20 January 1962. Although 
this resulted from a decision taken before publication of Reshaping, it does 
assist understanding of the approach used on closures. The decision on 
closure had been taken in 1960 in an attempt to rationalise cross-country 
routes as part of the hurried re-appraisal of the Modernisation Plan. lt was 
part of a proposed closure of all lateral routes between Carlisle and 
Newcastle to the north, and Lancaster and Skipton to the south. (lt included 
the plan to close the Settle to Carlisle line, although that survived after a long 
and ferocious battle).112 The Stainmore route was, however an unusual 
candidate for closure because it was not a branch line but a 42-mile trunk 
route linking the population centres of the north-east and north-west. lt was 
also a major freight artery in an area with a poor road system, and it was 
accepted that closure would impose great hardship on a number of 
people.113 BR justified the decision as a means to save substantially on 
costs; yet Allan Stobbs contends that the line generated substantial traffic, 
and in reality was not loss-making. Rather, the deficits were created by the 
actions of the operating manager during the campaign from 1958 to close 
the line.114 Examination of the BR accounts submitted to the two TUCCs (the 
NE and NW) supports this view that the line was not run economically. The 
111 White, Forgotten Railways, p. 23. 
112 Review of the Modernisation Plan, 1960, MT115n7. 
113 MOT, Unremunerative services, 19 July 1960, MT115/254. 
114 Allan Stobbs, Memories of the LNER (Penrith, 1989), p. 70. 
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operating policy was wasteful, and the timing and frequency of passenger 
train services was unlikely to attract passengers. An example was the last 
train from Darlington, which terminated at its destination, Kirby Stephen. The 
unusual step was taken of leaving the train there and returning the crew 
home to Darlington by taxi, rather than run a return service to connect with 
the popular overnight service to London.115 
As part of a general complaint to Marples that BR had been 
responsible for several recent closures because of its own gross financial 
mistakes, one MP, Colonel Sir Richard Glynn, made an issue of this 
Stainmore route. BR estimated the loss of revenue from the line at £2,463 
pa, but Glynn argued that the correct figure was actually £104,000.116 But 
the TUCC procedures did not allow tor any questioning of BR calculations, 
even though in many instances of closures these were strongly disputed. In 
addition, all freight was withdrawn from the Stainmore route from 1960, and 
diverted along another- which was 80 miles longer. Although this may have 
been an instance of BR's forward thinking, alternatively it may have been 
part of a strategy to support closure. A further development was that a local 
business (one of two which together dispatched some 2,500 tons of minerals 
each week) offered to rent the line from BR, believing that it could generate 
a profit. Yet this otter was refused, ostensibly on the basis that closure and 
immediate lifting of track could yield substantial scrap value. After a 
campaign of strong and sustained opposition to the closure, the two local 
TUCCs recommended a deferment of closure for 18 months to allow for 
further investigations. But this was not accepted by the BTC, and the 
115 Unremunerative services, North East Region, MT115/254. 
116 Glynn to Marples, 24 May 1963, MT65/422. 
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recommendations were overturned by the central TUCC and endorsed by 
the Minister.117 
The costly manner by which the Stainmore line was worked supplies 
evidence for the view that there was prodigious waste throughout the 
national network. St John Thomas argues that in operating the railways 
there were numerous opportunities for economies, but that 'management 
perceived no middle way between full Victorian paraphernalia and 
closure'.118 lt was not prepared to consider such alternatives as the light-
railway concept adopted on a number of lines today. This was widely used 
outside Britain, it had long been extolled by railway enthusiasts, and even 
The Economist accepted that it had potential - noting that 'railway 
management appeared unable to think beyond main-line terms using main-
line methods'.119 Even Beaching did not consider this light-railway 
alternative, with Reshaping raising, but then peremptorily dismissing the idea 
of rail buses on the basis that they were more expensive than the road 
equivalent.120 
This view of short-sighted management even under Beaching's 
regime is supported by other evidence. MOT files show that on lines under 
review for closure BR adopted a policy which prohibited the issue of any 
reduced fares without permission from Headquarters - an approach clearly 
designed to reduce the attractiveness of rail travel. No credit was given to 
stations which sold few tickets yet received passengers or freight, a situation 
117 MOT minute RIW 3/6/013, 2 February 1961, MT115/254. 
118 David St John Thomas, The Rural Transport Problem (Plymouth, 1963). 
119 Economist, July 4 1964. 
120 Reshaping, p.18. 
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relevant to many terminal branch lines.121 The Stainmore example of 
reduced frequency and convenience of services as a means to precipitate 
closure was used elsewhere. For example, on the Bristoi-Portishead line 
which came under review in 1962, BR cancelled all evening, mid-day and 
Sunday services.122 A rush-hour provision remained, but was undermined 
by the lack of convenience from these restrictions, with the result that the 
line closed to passengers in September 1964. 
These management and financial issues were important, because the 
whole purpose of closures and indeed Reshaping was to generate cost 
savings while at the same time maximise revenue from the remaining parts 
of the system. Yet this goal of reducing the railway network to a 'profitable 
core'123 proved elusive. In part this was because the extent of cost savings 
from closures was highly contentious and rarely straightforward, as the 
Statistics Division of the MOT found when it attempted to quantify the likely 
impact of Beaching's proposals. lt proved almost impossible to make 
accurate estimates of savings, because of the interdependence of operation 
between the various parts of the railway system. Furthermore, past line and 
station closures had produced far from encouraging financial savings, 
indeed they generally proved to be disappointingly small. No back checks 
had ever been made to assess how far projected savings could be 
substantiated. A further constraint on the financial benefits from new 
closures was the very fact of earlier closures: these had been applied to 
lines and services where savings were likely to be most substantial and 
121 BRB Statistics of rail closures, 26 February 1965, MT65/425. 
122 Modem Railways, 15 (April, 1962), p. 217. 
123 White, Forgotten Railways, p. 90. 
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which caused the least risk to revenue.124 The effectiveness of the Beaching 
approach to closure must therefore be measured not only on terms of cost 
reductions, but also in revenue reductions. While the policy was undoubtedly 
successful in terms of the former, any assessment must also take account of 
the impact of revenue losses from the reduced feeder services to the 
remaining parts of the system. 
The programme of line closures had a further financial implication: the 
extent and cost of subsidies for the provision of replacement bus services. 
This issue was controversial and had a long history. Churchill had vetoed 
any such expenditure in 1952 on political grounds. Later, in 1956, Robertson 
had clarified the whole question with this statement: 
lt is essential that the country should make up its mind whether public transport 
should be run as a commercial enterprise, self-supporting and financially free to run 
its affairs as any company under private ownership: or, on the other hand, whether 
it is to be regarded as a service, bound to minister to every want of the community 
however inconvenient that might be. That mentality would mean subsidy from 
taxation. 125 
Despite the precision of this analysis the issue was not pursued, probably 
owing to other pressures, notably implementation of the Modernisation Plan. 
However, by 1960 the BTC's enduring financial problems brought the matter 
to the fore, with the potential requirement for extensive open-ended 
subsidies. lt became an issue in the closures of lines where there was 
particularly strong opposition, with questions raised in Parliament and the 
media. Although Reshaping sought to clarify the issue, it continued to be 
controversial. Unsurprisingly, Herbert Morrison, the architect of railway 
124 MOT Statistics Division, S/28/107, 17 May 1963, MT65/422. 
125 Sir Brian Robertson, The British Transport System (London, 1956), p. 18. 
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nationalisation, was one of the first to question government action. While 
conceding the difficult financial position of the BRB he asked, somewhat 
ironically, 'how the government could come to the rescue without giving 
away the principle of unlimited subsidies and spreading the doctrine that it is 
alright for the state is behind you' .126 Other viewpoints tended to polarise 
and concentrate on cost. As The Guardian argued, the subsidisation of 
obsolete railways was a waste of resources which could be better used 
elsewhere.127 
The extent of these subsidies became an issue for the MOT. Its 
concern centred on the length of time necessary for the BRB to continue to 
pay them. In certain instances it appeared that some subsidies might be 
required indefinitely, and even raised to allow for increases in services for 
passengers who had never previously used the railway. 128 This unwelcome 
prospect did arise when, fourteen months after withdrawal of railway 
services, bus operators applied for increased support for their services 
covering the Brecon-Moat Lane and West Drayton-Yiewsley-Staines routes. 
After that passage of time it was impossible to determine who was, and who 
was not, a displaced rail passenger, yet the BRB was still expected to pay 
the subsidy.129 This effectively meant that in certain instances the solution to 
the financial problem of providing rural bus services represented a 
continuing cost to the railways, and given the extent of planned closures 
required urgent resolution. 
126 Morrison, HLDeb, 227, c .72, 7 December 1960. 
127 Guardian, 1 May 1963. 
128 Scott-Malden, MOT, 16 March 1964, MT87/61. 
129 Margetts (BRB) to the MOT, 11 March 1964, MT87/61. 
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TABLE 5: PAYMENT OF SUBSIDIES BY BRB 1963 
REGION NO OF SUBSIDIES £PAYMENT 
EASTERN 6 9,600 
LONDON MIDLAND 17 27,500 
N. EASTERN 1 1,700 
SCOTTISH 1 50 
SOUTHERN 5 13,000 
WESTERN 22 40,500 
TOTAL 52 92,600 
SOURCE: BRB ANNUAL REPORT AND ACCOUNTS 1963, para. 6, p. 2. 
The extent of this problem can be seen from Table 5 where the 52 
alternative transport services received subsidies at an annual cost to the 
BRB of £92,600, a substantial increase from £86,300 the previous year. 130 
The widespread closure programme was expected to increased the problem 
and further contribute to the railways' financial position. 
This concern led the MOT to commission the Jack Report to examine 
the whole question of subsidies for rural bus services. This Report 
concluded (in common with previous government thinking) 131 that 
uneconomic services which were continued on the grounds of social or 
national economic needs should be met by specific grants from public funds. 
lt also recommended that support should be given partly from local sources, 
and partly from the Treasury.132 Although the Jack Report may have been 
low profile, and is rarely referred to in the historical literature, it represented 
an important step towards clarification of policy for rural transport and its 
essential ideas instituted. 
130 BTC Annual Report and Accounts 1962. 
131 BTC Reorganisation Committee minutes, 5 December 1960, CAB134/1434. 
132 The Jack Report on Rural Bus Services, March 1961. 
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VI 
While line and station closures proved the most controversial element of 
Reshaping, it also proposed other significant radical changes. One, the 
decision to abandon seasonal passenger traffic operations was 
understandable in the light of continued growth in coach and bus services 
and private car ownership, but the policy had further long-term 
repercussions. The problem for the railways was straightforward: in 1938 
there were fewer than two million cars on British roads, a figure which 
increased to three million in 1954 and six million in 1961. From a political 
perspective, as Loft argues, supporting the railways through a policy of 
restrictions on car ownership and road building was simply not practicable. 
No party could have stood on such a platform during a period of increasing 
demand and production of cars.133 This increased road use contributed to a 
BR decision which superficially appeared to make little commercial sense, 
given the extent of the seasonal operations business. The ending of these 
operations was justified on the argument that major savings would be 
secured by reducing the stock of carriages used for these services. Much of 
this rolling stock was old, and stood idle for prolonged periods of time. Even 
so, according to estimates in Reshaping, the cost of providing these 
carriages was £3-4m in order to generate earnings of £0·4m.134 Both of 
these figures appear unduly pessimistic, particularly that for earnings in the 
light of the comprehensive programme of seasonal operations. The decision 
represented a fundamental change in traditional railway marketing, and 
began a run-down which effectively signalled the end of special trains 
133 Loft, 'Re-appraisal and reshaping', p. 82. 
134 According to Reshaping of British Railways, p. 15, of the stock of 15,500 carriages, 5,500 
were constantly utilised and 6,000 were used on average for only 14 hauls a year: 
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catering for holiday and excursion traffic. Such traffic had been an important 
contributor to railway revenues for well over a century, 135 and had become 
even more important in the early 1950s when personal incomes began to 
rise and holiday entitlement increased. Traditionally, northern mill towns and 
industrial cities co-ordinated their factory closures or 'Wakes Weeks', when 
huge numbers of holiday makers journeyed by special trains to resorts such 
as Scarborough and Blackpool. Although the numerous special trains 
frequently created operating difficulties, they also provided substantial 
additional revenue. 
Also affected by the retreat from the special traffic market was the 
long British tradition of travelling by rail to major sporting occasions. Indeed, 
many racecourses, notably Newbury and Aintree, had their own individual 
stations. The demands of football supporters created more special trains 
than for any other type of event. Arguably the most lucrative was that to the 
Empire Stadium at Wembley, which had its own station and railway loop 
facilities, constructed for the Empire Exhibition of 1924. This railway and 
station had remained in use until the war, when they became dilapidated. 
But they were refurbished for the 1948 Olympic Games, and were then used 
extensively for schools specials for a variety of sports. However, as road 
transport became the favoured medium for visitors in the early 1960s, they 
were allowed to decline. Only intermittent use was then made of the railway 
for cup finals. By the mid 1960s all railway facilities were removed, and 
135 Although there are numerous other claims, the first excursion train appears to have been 
that chartered on 16 September 1830 by the Society of Friends in Liverpool to convey 
130 members to a quarterly meeting in Manchester. 
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redevelopment resulted in the removal of all traces of what had been an 
extensive infrastructure.136 
A further factor in the decision to discontinue special train services 
was the impact of a cultural change which ended special excursions 
organised by major employers for their workforce. Large companies such as 
ICI, the Northern Rubber Company, and the Raleigh Cycle Company of 
Nottingham had all generated important business for the railways. Typical of 
this was the running for Raleigh of eleven special trains from Nottingham to 
Morecambe on 24 May 1952. Although the frequency of such excursions 
had begun to decline by the time of Reshaping, many of them continued -
but now the companies were obliged to use road transport. 
Special train services also served other types of regional or national 
events, such as the Durham Miners' Gala. In this instance it had been 
traditional for whole mining communities to travel together on special trains. 
Again, changing social mores and the convenience and flexibility of road 
transport undermined this pattern, and the railway's dominant position 
disappeared. During the 1950s Elvet station at Durham, with its associated 
railway infrastructure, was dismantled and the area converted into car 
parking.137 
As disposable income and holiday entitlement increased during the 
early 1950s, a new social development had emerged: the holiday camp, 
developed by such businessmen as Billy Butlin. This form of holiday became 
hugely popular, and benefited the railways because almost all travel to the 
camps was by rail; indeed, in some instances they provided the only means 
136 British Railways Illustrated, 3 {1994}, p. 418. 
137 Elvet station was last used on 18 July 1953, although special trains continued to use the 
main station for some time after. 
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of access.138 These arrangements started to decline in the late 1950s, with 
the spread of car ownership. 
The difficulty for all these special services was that they suffered from 
the general perception of the railway as old-fashioned and inefficient. They 
frequently experienced severe delays which tended to be caused by the use 
of poor-quality carriages at times of excess demand, such as peak summer 
weekends and bank holidays. Consequently the travelling public rarely took 
much persuading to switch to more preferable forms of personal transport 
when these became available. 
Another alternative mode of transport which began to undermine 
passenger railway usage rapidly during the early 1960s was the growth of air 
travel. Ironically, this competition was often on routes and services 
historically developed by the railway companies before nationalisation, 
although by now operated by other publicly-owned companies. Reshaping 
recognised the impact of air transport on three main routes from London: to 
Newcastle, Manchester and Scotland. lt accepted that air transport made 
serious inroads on the loading of day trains to Scotland and expected it to 
continue to do so.139 Yet initially, it was on passenger shipping that air travel 
made the greatest inroads, as advances in aircraft technology and 
production allowed transatlantic journeys to be completed in hours rather 
than a week. This rapid collapse of ocean passenger transport in the early 
1960s had a substantial impact upon railway traffic. Most liner passengers 
had travelled to their embarkation point by rail, using the harbour stations 
which were a feature of most ports. The Mersey Docks and Harbour Board 
138 Filey, Minehead and Pwllheli had sizeable, specially-constructed, stations to serve the 
holiday camps. 
139 Reshaping, p. 13. 
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maintained a sizeable station at Liverpool Riverside, constructed especially 
for boat trains. Even bigger was the massive Ocean Terminal at 
Southampton, while Newcastle had its Tyne Commission Quay and Tilbury 
was an important embarkation point for Australia and New Zealand. These 
facilities had generated extensive railway revenues, but the success of air 
travel led to their rundown as passenger trade concentrated at airports 
where road transport dominated. 
The extent of this decline can be seen from the details of special 
traffic. In 1949 the BTC ran a record 18,200 special trains carrying 
6,800,000 passengers worth £2-4m in receipts. A further 4,400,000 
passengers were carried on ordinary trains at special excursion fares. 140 In 
contrast, the 1963 BRB Annual Report made no reference to any special 
services. Instead the emphasis had moved to a different marketing 
approach, the sale of reduced fares or 'travel bargains' on scheduled 
services to attract additional traffic and fill vacant seats.141 The decision to 
reduce coaching stock was outlined in Reshaping, where it predicted that by 
the end of 1965 coaching stock would not be available at peak times for 
special services, in other words at the very time they were most required.142 
This policy -to withdraw special and excursion traffic - did bring one 
kind of benefit to BR: it allowed the scrapping of a large number of old 
coaches without the need to finance replacements. Yet while this may have 
had a beneficial short-term impact on finances, its effect was 'one off'. In the 
longer term the decision was perhaps damaging. lt had a deleterious impact 
in reducing potential carrying capacity and operating flexibility. lt also 
140 BTC Annual Report and Accounts 1949, para. 212. 
141 BRB Annual Report and Accounts 1963, para. 33. 
142 Reshaping, p. 15. 
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reinforced the perception of rail as outmoded, and meant that many children 
never experienced rail travel and so as adults were less likely to be attracted 
to use the railways. 
VII 
The Reshaping Report also proposed similarly significant changes in freight 
services, because it was estimated that general merchandise traffic failed to 
cover its direct costs by £31·8m each year.143 In order to remedy this, 
uneconomic services were to be withdrawn, a process which signalled both 
closure of numerous small stations and goods depots, and the end of the 
pick-up freight train. Again, this policy was not without controversy, for as 
Gourvish observes 'in 1962 and 1963 Beaching, Margetts, Shirley and 
others had encouraged railway managers to think chiefly in terms of cutting 
out traffics, sometimes with scarcely any examination of costs' .144 One 
specific casualty was the traffic in carrying fish which historically had 
provided much business. However, by the mid 1960s with reduced catches 
from the impact of the 'Cod Wars', train-load traffic became uneconomic. BR 
did not contemplate a policy of handling the business more cheaply. As a 
result, rail carryings ceased completely as road transport offered the more 
cost-effective single truck-load to the British Fishing Fleet. 
Even if the railways sought to pursue more general merchandise 
traffic, this was thwarted by the design of many of the new industrial estates, 
which were often located on green-field sites without access to rail services. 
Nevertheless where a rail link did exist, this often disappeared in the rail 
143 Reshaping, p. 148. 
144 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 425 
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closures of the 1960s, with ambivalent effects. A typical example was the 
Portrack Industrial Estate at Stockton, where the single-track branch line was 
closed to save costs, yet resulted in further lost merchandise carryings. 
According to Reshaping other freight business which was judged to 
be worth keeping was to be operated more effectively and efficiently, by 
means of the introduction of full-train load workings, a move strongly 
supported by the National Coal Board (NCB) and the Central Electricity 
Generating Board (CEGB). Both boards were under similar pressures to the 
railways, with a need to reduce deficits and costs. For the NCB the 
importance of these freight changes was considerable, as these were the 
only costs not under its own control. The proposed rationalisation promised 
substantial savings, through the closure of numerous small stations and their 
associated coal-handling depots in favour of concentration of traffic in 
mechanised depots, and to end the marshalling of numerous single wagon-
loads. However, as Gourvish observes progress was slow and the financial 
results disappointing, and there was even consideration of withdrawal from 
the household coal market altogether. Success depended upon a 
sophisticated control of the commercial and operating environment, and this 
was lacking.145 The first new concentration depot was opened at West 
Drayton in 1963, and it then took until 1970 before there were 60 fully-
mechanised depots in operation.146 Similar economies were also sought by 
the CEGB, because transport charges for coal, its major fuel source, 
represented 15-30% of its total costs. 147 Economies were achieved by using 
145 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 489. 
146 Lord Robens, Ten Year Stint, p. 65. 
147 CEGB to SAG, 29 August 1960, MT132/88. 
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the merry-go-round system of train operation, which greatly increased the 
efficiency and reduced costs. 
However, attempts to promote increases in rail use through more 
efficient operation encountered serious opposition from a labour force 
attached to its traditional restrictive working practices. The plan to introduce 
railway freight terminals with open access to all road hauliers was thwarted 
by trade union intransigence towards acceptance of new working 
arrangements. Hardy reports that Beaching himself accepted in later years 
that he should have taken a stronger line on this 'Freightliner' concept, and 
risked a head-on confrontation with the unions.148 That he did not do so 
effectively meant a lost opportunity for integrated freight working. 
A further issue also proved damaging and resulted in loss of 
confidence in the railway's ability to handle merchandise traffic. This was the 
widespread theft of merchandise during rail transit. The BTC reported to the 
SAG that during 1959 a total of 1 ,500 BR employees had been convicted of 
theft. lt was also observed that there was an abundance of opportunities for 
this, particularly with parcels traffic.149 Hardy, with personal experience of 
working on the railways, concluded that: 'The Reshaping Report stressed 
the need for change, but did not specify a need to examine working 
practices and the racketeering that went on behind the scenes'.150 In view of 
this it is hardly surprising that so much of the general merchandise trade 
turned to road haulage, because this offered more direct delivery without the 
risk of loss and damage through costly and time-consuming trans-shipment. 
148 Hardy, Beeching, p. 106. 
149 Warnsbrough-Jones (Secretary-General BTC) to SAG, 8 July 1959, MT132/88. 
150 Hardy, Beeching, p. 104. 
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A further major element of cost saving outlined in Reshaping was the 
generation of financial savings through greater labour efficiency. As 
Beaching recognised, in 1962 the railways retained a traditional operational 
philosophy which was highly labour intensive. However, the ability to 
analyse labour costs and calculate potential savings was weakened by the 
way in which BR produced its labour statistics and as Gourvish notes, 'by 
frequent changes in the grade structure and by the application of successive 
stages of pay and productivity agreements' .151 The approach showed a lack 
of detailed financial information on wages and salaries, a failing described in 
the MOT in 1961 as 'extraordinary' and 'a deficiency which must be 
remedied'. 152 1t was redressed, but this had to be done not by BR but by the 
MOT itself, which had to laboriously calculate specific labour costs from the 
1960 staff census. This exercise revealed that wages and salaries 
consumed 64-65% of total operating cost. During this period of close 
financial analysis by Beaching, 'it is perhaps ironic that railwaymen should 
have made their greatest real gains [in wages] when cost-consciousness 
was high'.153 
Historically, a large proportion of labour reductions had been 
achieved through natural wastage, because the railways generated a high 
turnover of staff. Beaching estimated these to be over 80,000 each year.154 
The age profile of the workforce also helped, because many were near 
retirement age, with 30% over 55 years and 15% over 60.155 Even so, 
151 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 529. 
152 Venning to Osborn, 15 December 1961, MT65/360. 
153 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 530. 
154 Reshaping, p. 51. 
155 MOT - BTC Current Trends and Future Traffics, 3 November 1961, MT65/360. 
309 
redundancies were envisaged, with a revised procedure and more generous 
settlements. 
However, one of Beaching's greatest challenges in the management 
of change was the well-known and long-established problem of the railway 
workshops. Although strictly speaking this issue was not part of Reshaping-
plans for reduction in workshop capacity preceded the report - the process 
was intrinsic to Beaching's overall approach. The extent of the problem was 
substantial and had considerable social implications. In 1961 the railway 
workshops employed 61 ,900 people in 28 different works. 156 These facilities 
were effectively industrial factories organised on a massive scale, 
constructing and maintaining almost everything required by the railways. 
Yet technical advances had made much of what they did, and their 
equipment and techniques obsolete. Consequently BR possessed a massive 
production and maintenance capability which had become increasingly 
unnecessary to the operation of the railways. Modern diesel and electric 
traction were designed to accumulate much higher mileages between 
periodic overhauls, required fewer and more specialist works facilities, and 
relied on a limited number of highly-qualified technicians. The Modernisation 
Plan had first cast the shadow over the workshops, but it was the re-
appraisal of 1959 which proposed specific changes. Of the 22 works 
engaged on the construction and repair of locomotives in 1959, re-appraisal 
anticipated that only 12 were to remain by the end of 1963.157 
In addition, Reshaping planned large-scale reductions of the wagon 
and coaching stock, which further diminished the requirement for works 
156 Closure of railway workshops, 8 August 1962, MT87/113. 
157 Nationalised Transport Reorganisation Policy, Appendix B, MT132/39. 
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capacity and its associated large labour force. Elimination of these was 
technically and economically necessary, but the potential impact on railway 
towns such as Horwich,158 Darlington, and Shildon was likely to be 
substantial in terms of the social impact of large-scale redundancies. This 
fact had been appreciated in the MOT, and the implications were reported to 
Beaching and other government departments in a co-ordinated attempt to 
mitigate the impact of the issue.159 Such was the level of concern that in 
August 1962 the proposed reorganisation was discussed in the Cabinet 
Committee on Population and Employment, which agreed in principle with 
the plans for reorganisation.160 
Beaching was fully aware of the implications of all of this and realised 
the need for a coherent, transparent, and effectively managed strategy. He 
had therefore appointed Sir Steuart Mitchell161 to join the BTC and to lead a 
new Workshops Division, with a specific remit to oversee the reorganisation 
of the workshops. Mitchell produced a highly detailed analysis, which 
unsurprisingly recommended a considerable reduction in workshop facilities, 
a process predicted to have the most severe effects in north-east England. 
There, unemployment had already been increasing through the impact of 
structural change in the local economy. For example in 1962, the closure of 
the Sir William Gray shipyard at West Hartlepool had resulted in the loss of 
1,700 jobs, and now the closure of Darlington railway works was predicted to 
lead to the loss of 2,580 more. In the light of this, a working party from the 
Ministry of Labour was set up to examine the alternatives. This considered 
158 Harwich is now effectively part of Bolton in Lancashire. 
159 Serpell (MOT), 8 August 1962, MTB7/113. 
160 Cabinet Committee on Population and Employment, 22 August 1962, MT87/113. 
161 Controller of guided weapons and electronics at the Ministry of Aviation. 
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the possibility of shutting the Doncaster railway works instead. However, its 
conclusion supported the BTC view that any advantage here would be more 
than offset by the additional cost of closure of a more cost-efficient and 
modern facility. 162 
The social impact of BTC workshop closures was increased by the 
difficulties facing the private firms which manufactured railway equipment. 
They faced the loss of a home market, and for the North British Locomotive 
Company it led to collapse and voluntary liquidation in April 1962.163 The 
company had been unable to convert successfully from building steam 
locomotives, and its attempts at diesel traction proved to be disastrous. In 
contrast, the English Electric Company was more successful in designing 
and building diesel units; yet intense competition forced it to rationalise 
production, resulting in closure of its Darlington (Robert Stephenson and 
Hawthorn) factory in 1963. Other companies such as Metropolitan Cammell 
were sustained by their ability to serve export markets, but even so intense 
overseas competition meant that they required assistance from the 
favourable financial terms offered by the Export Credit Guarantees 
Department. 
Unsurprisingly, the railway unions were critical of the prospect of a 
reduction in the number of workshops, and their stance became even more 
hostile when BR continued to follow the policy of procurement from outside 
contractors. There was an angry union response to the news in the 
Yorkshire Post during September 1962, that BR had placed a £23m order for 
162 MOT to PM, 30 August 1962, MT87/113. 
163 The Company built 239 diesel locomotives for BR but their performance was so poor that 
had it not gone into voluntary liquidation, compensation would have been claimed for 
shoddy workmanship. Most were scrapped after very short working lives. 
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294 diesel locomotives with outside contractors. 164 Thereafter, the unions 
demonstrated a co-ordinated, vociferous, and persistent opposition to 
closure plans, and it was this as much as anything which swayed public 
opinion on the Beaching proposals. Union anger at BR's policy of outside 
procurement of diesel locomotives was heightened when it was reported that 
machine tools (used in the construction of diesel locomotives) were to be 
transferred from Darlington works to the privately-owned Beyer Peacock's 
Manchester plant. Such was union indignation at this move that there was 
an unsuccessful attempt to block the transfer.165 In the main, resentment at 
the use of outside firms was based on the unions' belief that the railway 
workshops could produce parts and equipment cheaper than commercial 
competitors. 166 
While the potential impact of unemployment was substantial, 
given the circumstances there was no alternative to shutting some of the 
railway works, and this was generally accepted by the general public. 
Closure plans were detailed, including long advance notice, and consultation 
was extensive - even though decisions were rarely altered. Furthermore, in 
many areas the consequences of closure often proved less disastrous than 
predicted, because the early 1960s was a period of full employment offering 
possibilities of work in other industries. This was true of the closure of the 
Darlington works, where the popularity of compensation payments for 
redundancy produced more voluntary redundancies than expected, creating 
a shortage of appropriate workers which compromised its planned three-
164 Yorkshire Post, 14 September 1962. 
165 Yorkshire Post, 12 June 1964. 
166 W. G. Ellis, Secretary NUR Darlington No 2 Branch to Marples, 3 June 1963, MT87/28. 
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year run down.167 Before the plans to close the works, Darlington employed 
2,580 in its workshops, a number which fell to 1 ,682 in 1963. This reduction 
of the workforce by 898 required 226 redundancies, yet 672 opted to leave 
voluntarily. 168 As a result the enhanced compensation payments were 
withdrawn in order to avoid acceleration of the run down and avoid 
premature closure. Examination of the Ministry of Labour employment 
statistics for Darlington in 1961, before closure of the works, reveals the 
reasons for so many volunteers for redundancy: 758 were unemployed, but 
there were alternatives as 472 vacancies were reported. The overall 
unemployment rate was not bad: 1·6%, compared with a national average of 
1·3%.169 These figures hardly sustain an argument for retention of the works 
on social grounds, especially given that the earlier closure of Darlington's 
smaller railway works at Faverdale, with the loss of 380 jobs, created fewer 
problems than anticipated. Even so, on the planned closure of Darlington 
works the Northern Echo reported 'threat shakes historic rail town', 170 and on 
9 March 1964 1 ,800 men marched through Darlington in protest at the plans 
for closure of the railway works. 
This opposition was probably instrumental in the decision to retain 
Shildon works for wagon construction and overhaul, and remarkably these 
works continued until 1982. The Shildon site and part of Darlington's North 
Road Station continue to offer at least some employment as railway 
museums. Moreover, Darlington was declared a 'Development District', a 
designation which offered companies tax and other incentives for location or 
167 Newcastle Journal, 18 September 1964. 
168 MOT- Darlington railway workshops, MT87/28. 
169 Ministry of Labour Statistics, Darlington unemployment, 15 May 1961, MT115/258. 
170 Northern Echo, 28 March 1963. 
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re-location in the area. This proved instrumental in attracting some firms; for 
example, Cummins built a large-scale diesel engine factory there. 
Hardy reports that some workers who left the railways felt bitter at 
what they considered to be shabby treatment, and placed the blame on 
Beeching.171 But the larger picture is that a high natural wastage of labour 
and good redundancy settlements assisted the run-down of the works, while 
the consequences on employment prospects were less severe than 
anticipated. Moreover, the majority of the public accepted works closures as 
making good sense in the context of general railway policy. 
Closure of the railway workshops represented only one, admittedly 
significant, element of reconstruction. A second strategically important 
requirement was a fundamental change of operating mentality. As shown 
earlier, the overwhelming size of BR contributed to what proved to be a 
debilitating attitude, under-estimated in the historical literature. lt was clear 
to Beaching from his experience of SAG that without development in this key 
area, any possibility of real change would be limited. Although the MOT was 
well aware of the problem, it was unable to act because day-to-day 
management was legally in the hands of the BTC and later the BRB. 
Nowhere was the traditional approach of railway management better 
illustrated than in the organisation of passenger traffic. Until the advent of 
the Beaching approach to marketing (which sought to identify who wanted to 
travel, where and when), the operating department made the major 
decisions on how the railways ran passenger services by determining 
routes, timings, and intermediate stops. Furthermore, on the North Eastern 
171 Hardy, Beeching, p. 60. 
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Region the Passenger Manager was traditionally a sub-section of the Freight 
Manager's department. lt was only after the Beaching Report that the first 
market research survey was undertaken in the autumn of 1965, and the 
operating and marketing departments began to confer.172 
Although management began to recognise the need to become more 
responsive to its customers needs, other attempts by Beaching to introduce 
fundamental change in labour practices proved difficult to implement. As 
shown earlier, the introduction of single-manning of diesel locomotives took 
many years to introduce, and there were many other examples of groups of 
workers resisting change. A major issue was job demarcation, and attempts 
to improve labour flexibility often floundered on this point. Typical was the 
strike of goods guards at Crewe in January 1962, protesting against 
changes designed to generate greater efficiency but which required them to 
couple freight vehicles to their train rather than use shunters. 173 Beaching 
may have started to implement change in these areas, but it took at least a 
decade before real progress was made. 
By August 1964 the changes engineered by Beaching had generated 
a spirit of financial optimism in BR. lt was now able to report a reduced 
working deficit of £82m for 1963, compared with £104m in 1962. This 
performance led BR to believe that it had 'turned the financial corner', 
achieved by reducing operating expenses in train working and on 
maintenance and servicing of locomotives, rolling stock, signalling and track. 
Recruitment was also strictly controlled, producing a staff reduction of 
172 Norman Blackstock, 'The management of the East Coast Main Line in time of change', 
NRM Review (Spring, 2005), pp. 28-29. 
173 BTC minute 15/31, 7 February 1962, AN85/16. 
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38,417 to a total of 464,286, with 87% of this decline achieved through 
natural wastage.174 
Given these wide-ranging cuts in the labour force and extent of 
operations, it would have been surprising had there been no improvement in 
financial performance. However, the improvement was short-lived, for as 
with line closures the greatest cost-saving measures were implemented first, 
with the effect that further savings were not achieved so readily. Similarly, 
although sales of surplus materials for scrap raised £20m and significant 
sums continued to be raised from the sale of withdrawn steam locomotives, 
this process had a strictly limited life. Consequently, although BR's losses 
were reduced after 1963, this proved to be a short-term phenomenon and 
the MOT's predictions about the difficulties of achieving a financial balance 
proved accurate. Opinion in the MOT had now concluded that the railways 
were in a worse state than even Reshaping had stated. Indeed, in December 
1963 - less than a year after publication of Reshaping, and despite the short 
term progress - the MOT considered that the Report would not achieve 
anywhere near its aims, and it even went so far as to predict that rail goods 
traffic was set to decline further. 175 All this was based on statistics which 
showed that half of all route miles accounted for 4% of passenger miles, half 
of all passenger stations produced less than 2%% of total passenger 
revenue, and 57% of all stations produced only 1% of total parcels 
receipts. 176 Consequently, the MOT concluded that the railways would 
struggle to achieve financial viability and that there seemed no prospect of 
174 BRBAnnual Report and Accounts 1963, para. 17, p. 4. 
175 Smethurst to Fogarty ('B' Division), S/28/1/021, 12 December 1963, MT65/425. 
176 MOT, Sheaf to Scott-Malden, 24 June 1963, MT65/422. 
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the BRB wiping out its deficit by 1970: even halving the deficit would be a 
major achievement.177 
The reality is that despite the achievement of short-term success in 
financial terms, Beaching's concept of a commercial railway operation was 
never achieved. In effect Beaching provided the foundation for further 
development of the railway industry, rather than a final solution to its 
problems. Moreover, the thorny question of subsidy remained controversial 
even after the acceptance of a social railway concept in the late 1960s, and 
after what Gourvish describes as the rather cumbersome funding of 
specified services introduced by the 1968 Transport Act. He further 
concludes that the adoption of the comprehensive Public Service Obligation 
after the 1974 Transport Act 'marked an important step forward in the 
relationship between the government and the BRB' .178 
Beaching also produced a second less well known report- The 
Development of the Major Railway Trunk Routes- designed to build on 
Reshaping. This was intended to identify a basic network of major trunk 
routes which it was felt worth developing through intensive investment. lt 
raised the possibility of further rationalisation of railway routes and facilities, 
and sought to determine which should be developed and which should be 
downgraded or even closed. Understandably, the preparation of this second 
report generated great concern and debate within the regions, a process 
which slowed its publication. Although a necessary corollary to Reshaping, it 
differed in two important respects: it concentrated on the major routes, and 
provided the basis for long-term planning, rather than a plan for immediate 
177 MOT- Prospect tor financial viability of the railway system, 17 May 1963, MT65/422. 
178 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 574. 
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action. Preparation of Trunk Routes began under the Conservative 
government, but its replacement by Wilson's Labour government in October 
1964 raised the question of whether to accept a scheme set up under the 
previous administration, however basic and helpful it might be. The new 
Minister of Transport, Tom Fraser, was unenthusiastic on the basis of its 
origin, despite an acceptance in the MOT that the proposed report would be 
valuable, particularly on such matters as the amount of investment required 
and its priorities. Wilson also had reservations, 179 but after strong MOT 
pressure on Fraser, it was eventually published, on 16 February 1965. 
The impact of the Trunk Routes was very limited. Perhaps its greatest 
influence lay in that it effectively signalled the start of further re-thinking by 
railway management. And this led, as Gourvish observes, to a move from 
cost control through line closures, to policies which embraced movement 
costs, and to retention of some traffic by an assault on total operating 
costs.180 
The Labour government then attempted to produce its own transport 
plan covering all inland transport. As Gourvish notes, this became a 'sorry 
tale'. Beaching was invited by Fraser, with Wilson's encouragement, to 
undertake a Stedford-type exercise, but after Cabinet opposition imposed 
limits to the job, Beaching decided to return to ICI.181 According to Pryke, his 
medicine was far too strong and unpalatable for a Labour party recently 
returned to power.182 Crossman explained why: any proposals from 
179 PM to Layman (MOT), 25 January 1965, MT124/11 03. 
180 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 424. 
181 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 344. 
182 Richard Pryke, Nationalised industries, policies and performance (Oxford, 1981), p. 74. 
319 
Beaching would be discredited among trade unions by the very fact that he 
had produced them, because they considered him the enemy of public 
transport. 183 
What can one conclude about the Beaching era? Gourvish notes that 
'whatever its shortcomings, Beaching's Reshaping did represent the clearest 
statement to date of the dilemma facing this nationalised industry'. He 
quoted Freeman Alien's conclusion that it made 'the public face up to the 
question of striking a balance between the social necessity of public 
transport in areas where it cannot pay its way and the financial burden on 
the rest of the community of providing such transport' .184 Bona via observed 
that for line and station closures, Reshaping 'speeded up and gave 
coherence to a process that was already at work', and that by 1963 'the 
decade of really intensive change had got well under way.'185 Even so, 
despite the impact of Reshaping in leading this conversion of the railways, 
as Gourvish noted the changes while real were far from complete.186 Pollins 
concludes that at first things seemed to be going well but after five years 
increases in the cost of factors, especially labour, had largely wiped out any 
reduction in costs.187 According to Hardy, Beaching accepted the need for a 
stronger line towards the unions.188 However, the enduring legacy of 
Beaching remains his attempted reconceptualisation of the role and scope of 
the railways and The Reshaping of British Railways is correctly described by 
183 Crossman, Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 1, p. 101. 
184 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 414. 
185 Bonavia, British Rail- the First 25 Years, p. 120, 123. 
186 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 579. 
187 Pollins, Britain's Railways, p. 178. 
188 Hardy, Beeching, p. 1 06. 
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Gourvish as one of the most important single publications on transport in the 
post-war period.189 
The Beaching Report did fundamentally change the organisation, 
structure, thinking, financial performance, style of management, and 
corporate planning of the railway system. Piecemeal attempts had been 
made earlier to overcome some of its shortcomings, but these had proved 
unsuccessful. Not even the Modernisation Plan had anticipated the need 
for such a fundamental re-conceptualisation of operating mentality. 
While Beaching introduced a new way of thinking, it took some years 
to permeate fully into the management process. One example of this was 
the response to a new insistence on back-checking, a process formally 
written into the criteria for capital investment which had been agreed by the 
BRB and the Minister of Transport in December 1963. Only three reports 
were produced by May 1967, and even these were strongly criticised by the 
MOT as lacking any detailed analysis. Even the report on the hugely 
expensive London Midland electrification appeared to comprise just a 'half 
sheet of paper'.190 This deficiency is all the more remarkable given the 
railways' desire for government to provide further large-scale investment for 
additional electrification projects, such as the East Coast main-line. 
Perhaps the most enduring and inaccurate perception of Beaching is 
that he introduced the policy of closure of loss-making lines. In reality, line 
closures had been occurring for at least a century. However, these had 
never been pursued effectively enough to secure economic levels of 
operation. The BTC could and should have accelerated the closure of 
169 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 401. 
190 MOT - Follow up of investment on approved projects, 23 May 1967, MT124/921. 
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uneconomic lines, but it was unwilling to do so. As a result, Beaching's 
name became synonymous with closures. lt even generated a BBC 
situation comedy in 1997, when the audiences clearly understood the 
implication of Oh! Dr Beaching what have you done? 191 Even today the 
name remains linked to a policy of cutbacks in services, and the term 
'Beaching axe' is frequently used in the media whenever there is threat of 
closure. 
Beaching was not prepared to operate in the emasculated role 
envisaged by the Labour government, and he relinquished the BRB 
Chairmanship on 31 May 1965 to be succeeded by Stanley Raymond. 
Beaching was granted a life peerage, and at his final meeting the BRB 
recorded their warm appreciation for the way he had conducted 
proceedings, and their gratitude for the vital leadership that he had given the 
railway industry. 
191 Reference was even made to the 'Beaching cuts' in the TV drama 'Midsomer Murders' in 
August 2007. 
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CONCLUSION 
Nothing in the past is dead for those who seek to understand how the present has 
come to be what it is. (anon) 
The history of the management of British Railways between the vesting of 
the railway companies' assets into a public corporation on 1 January 1948 to 
the resignation of Richard Beaching on 31 May 1965 has proved enduringly 
controversial. The historical literature is marked by a lack of understanding in 
the general surveys, and by partisan accounts and interpretations in many of 
the specialist works. An attempt has been made in this thesis to achieve a 
fuller empirical understanding, and a balanced analysis of the influences on 
BR management during the period. 
Any investigation into the performance of railway management and 
the development of state-industry relations is most effective if approached 
with an understanding of how these structures developed. Behind the Attlee 
Labour government's rationale for public ownership was a disposition to 
dirigisme coupled with a determination to institute a truly mixed economy, 
which was considered a necessary pre-requisite for the creation of the 'New 
Jerusalem'. An important element was the economic argument that creation 
of a publicly-owned monopoly of transport would automatically lead to 
greater efficiency. This was accepted without question within the Labour 
government, which also contended that only through public ownership could 
a necessary reconstruction and modernisation of the railways be achieved. 
Underpinning this was a confidence in the commonly held, but never tested 
view, that a large-scale undertaking would automatically bring operational 
advantages. The research undertaken by the Labour Party Executive 
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Committee to support these claims was superficial, lacked proper 
consideration of the management of large-scale industry, and appeared as 
much designed for propaganda purposes as planning for the future. 
The accuracy of an assumption in the historical literature that the 
change to public ownership was uncontentious has also been challenged. 
The Big Four did fight tenaciously to retain their independence, and even 
offered a far-reaching alternative compromise proposal which would have 
allowed the Labour government to fulfil its manifesto pledge of railway 
nationalisation, but at the same time retain elements of private ownership. 
There was also stronger and more extensive opposition to railway 
nationalisation from the Conservatives, particularly in the House of Lords, 
than is usually acknowledged. 
The performance of the nationalised railway after 1948 fell far below 
the expectations of its creators. lt is unlikely that the management of the Big 
Four could have done worse. Indeed, the record of the railway companies 
during and after the war indicates that they possessed the requisite 
management structures and skills to undertake the post-war challenges. 
Even more revealing is the extent to which the LNER was prepared in 
planning terms to move forward and embrace technical change by 1948. 
Had their plans proceeded after nationalisation, modernisation of the 
railways would have been significantly accelerated. Furthermore, the record 
of the Big Four in terms of post-war reconstruction was impressive, despite 
the constraints placed on them by government planning policy and the state 
of the national economy. lt has also been argued that had the railways 
received their full entitlement from the war compensation fund, finance would 
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have been available to make substantial progress in modernisation. 
Ironically, the nationalised railway eventually reverted to a regional system of 
organisation strongly reminiscent of the Big Four. 
A further consequence of the first Attlee government's preoccupation 
with rapid progress towards public ownership was that of limited 
consideration to assist in the design of suitable management structures. 
This, and hastily drafted legislation, resulted in the creation of an ineffective 
structure of governance and management by the Cabinet Committee for the 
Socialisation of Industry. The CCSI did not investigate alternative 
management structures fully, relying instead on the Morrisonian model 
developed for a very different form of organisation, the London Passenger 
Transport Board. This template was then applied to the new public 
corporations, so that despite the major differences in extent and operation, 
all were given broadly similar structures. For the railways, this deficiency was 
compounded by the absence of meaningful consultation between the CCSI 
and the railway companies; that which did occur was limited to the 
clarification of certain basic administrative procedures. The outcome of all 
this was the creation of a giant national monopoly, the BTC, formed to co-
ordinate and manage all forms of inland transport. 
The haste with which the legislation was drafted produced other 
unintended consequences, notably lack of precision over the roles of 
management and minister. These flaws were compounded by inability to 
attract those with the necessary business skills to work in the politically-
dominated environment of a public corporation, because much poorer 
remuneration was offered than in the business world. Arguably the most 
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significant flaw in the management structure was Bames' decision to 
institute a two-tier management structure of Commission and Executive. 
From the outset this generated friction, which would have been lessened if 
the Commission had been allowed to appoint its own Executive. lt led to 
problems of management efficiency and difficulties in working relations 
between the BTC and the RE, problems which continued until the demise of 
the latter under the 1953 Transport Act. 
Unlike the coal industry, where the period between the end of the war 
August 1945 and the implementation of nationalisation has been described 
as 'wasted months', 1 the railway companies made great strides in rebuilding 
their infrastructure from the impact of war damage. Much was achieved, 
notably in the replacement of track and other capital equipment, although the 
process was not fully complete by nationalisation. Despite this positive start 
given to public ownership, it did not take long for problems to become 
apparent. Other public corporations also experienced difficulties with their 
management and performance, and although this generated serious concern 
within government, Morrison's initial response was to describe them as 'birth 
pangs'.2 However, it soon became apparent that the problems were deep-
rooted and enduring. 
lt also became apparent that the use of the nationalised industries as 
instruments of micro-economic control and macro-economic policy was 
nowhere near as effective as anticipated by the advocates of public 
ownership. Consequently during the remainder of the Labour government's 
tenure, the Cabinet was driven back to a strategy of 'consolidation', in an 
1 Tookey, 'Three's a crowd?' p. 508. 
2 Morrison to CC SI, 29 June 1948, CAB 134/688. 
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attempt to overcome the management and organisational problems of the 
nationalised industries. 
Both Hurcomb and Robertson, as chairmen of the BTC, were aware 
of the limitations of ministerial and parliamentary control, with the result that 
Hurcomb ran the railways almost as a department of the civil service, 
demonstrating no entrepreneurial flair or business acumen, with the 
emphasis on procedure and protocol. Little progress was made in the 
modernisation and operating efficiency of the railway system. Nowhere was 
the ineffectiveness of management more apparent than in a reactionary 
approach to traction demonstrated by Riddles, when he introduced the range 
of standard steam locomotives. Traction was fundamental to the operating 
capability of the railways, and public ownership offered an opportunity to 
embrace comprehensive technical advance using diesel traction, as already 
envisaged by the LNER in its pre-war planning. This opportunity could, and 
should, have provided the impetus to introduce a clean, efficient, modem 
system. Instead the decision to perpetuate outmoded steam technology 
constrained modernisation for at least a decade, and was a vast waste of 
resources. 
Financial issues are central to this investigation, because concerns 
about these were responsible for much of government action towards the 
railways. Initially, it was anticipated that the new public monopolies would 
create surpluses: it was the disposal of these, rather than concern about 
deficits, which received attention from the CCSI. However, anxiety about 
deficits rapidly came to the fore and continued to be a problem for 
management throughout the period covered here. One element of this was 
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the payment of compensation to the shareholders of the Big Four. At the 
time this was accepted by all those concerned as reasonable and fair, but 
several historical commentators have pronounced it an unfair burden on the 
railway's financial position. However, almost all industrial concerns are faced 
with the need to finance borrowing; moreover, a significant proportion of the 
interest burden actually related not to the railways, but to the purchase of 
road haulage undertakings after nationalisation. 
The BTC argued that its disappointing performance could, at least in 
part, be explained by circumstances which lay outside their control. lt is 
accepted that the state of the national economy, the balance of payments 
crises, the need to prioritise on exports, national reconstruction, and later the 
Korean War all influenced the ability to provide investment resources. 
Nevertheless the railway's position might have been much worse, especially 
from restrictions on steel allocation and labour shortages. During the period 
1948-52 the BTC received over 80% of its planned steel requirements, and 
although there were difficulties in finding adequate labour, the impact was 
often localised and in some areas there was even evidence of over-
manning. Furthermore, the labour shortages did not appear to promote a 
management drive for greater productivity or more efficient use of labour. 
The level of investment as a percentage of- the UK total received by 
the railways and highways and roads is shown in Table 6. lt can be seen 
that overall the railways fared better than roads, but railway investment was 
historically low between 1948 and 1955. Although investment increased 
under the Modernisation Plan, it nonetheless fell again in the early 1960s. 
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TABLE 6: GROSS DOMESTIC FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION IN HIGHWAYS 
AND BRIDGES AND IN RAILWAYS, AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE UK 
TOTAL 1928-38 AND 1948-60. 
Years Highways/Bridges Railways Total 
1920-29 3·7 4·2 7·9 
1930-39 3·2 3·5 6·7 
1948-51 0·6 2·6 3·2 
1952-55 0·7 2·3 3·0 
1956-58 1·3 3·5 4·8 
1959-60 2·1 4·3 6·4 
Source: C. H. Feinstein, National Income, Expenditure and Output of the United 
Kingdom1855-1965(Cambridge 1972), Table 41, from Scott, 'Public Sector 
Investment' p. 412. 
These 'phases' in railway investment can also be seen from Table 7 which 
clearly reinforces the view that criticism of management in the 1950s can, to 
some extent be mitigated by the low level of investment resources available. 
TABLE 7: DEPRECIATION AND NET INVESTMENT 1948-64 AT 
CONSTANT 1948 PRICES (£M) 
YEAR 
1948 
1949 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
DEPRECIATION 
26·3 
27·9 
28·5 
27·7 
32·8 
30·6 
30·6 
30·7 
33·8 
37.3 
42·7 
53·0 
59·7 
55·6 
53·9 
60·1 
64·2 
NET INVESTMENT 
14·0 
14·6 
10·8 
7·1 
-3·0 
8·8 
13·9 
16·2 
22·0 
38·3 
41·1 
45·4 
34·5 
23·8 
6·8 
-13·2 
-14·0 
Source: Gourvish, British Railways Appendix B, p. 602 
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However, an alternative view is that in periods of low investment opportunity, 
it becomes all the more important to use what is available most effectively. 
Whichever perspective is adopted, these figures illustrate that high levels of 
investment were only made available from the mid 1950s onwards and it has 
been shown that management made questionable decisions on its use. In 
particular, it has been argued that this investment was not used as efficiently 
as it could have been, because in areas such as traction policy there were 
ineffective management strategies, prevarication and a waste of resources. 
While nationalisation was popular initially with those working in the 
industry, this rapidly changed. The unions were disappointed that worker 
representation on the boards of the nationalised industries was so lacking. 
Combined with the obvious lack of improvement in working conditions and 
wage levels, this created disenchantment in the labour force, something 
which became very apparent by 1951. By then the performance of the public 
corporations generally had come under increased scrutiny, because it had 
become clear that nationalisation per se had not improved operating 
capability, nor enhanced the progress of modernisation. Indeed, it is argued 
here that the performance of the railways had deteriorated since 
nationalisation. However, the opportunity for Labour to implement 
'consolidation' was curtailed by their defeat in the close General Election of 
1951. 
The new Conservative government faced even greater problems. By 
now management of such a large and geographically wide-ranging 
organisation as the railways appeared beyond the capability of the BTC. Nor 
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had it achieved the intended integration of all forms of inland transport. In 
practice the BTC had made little attempt to achieve such co-ordination. 
The Conservative government was also concerned that Britain was 
experiencing slower growth rates than many other countries, and that 
consequently standards of living and investment capability were falling 
behind international competitors. This created pressures for an economic 
policy capable of boosting faster growth. The key elements were an end to 
wartime controls, increased competition within the domestic economy, and a 
drive for greater efficiency and productivity. Competition was restored in the 
transport industry, to the extent of privatisation of long-distance road 
haulage, but the poor financial position and operational weaknesses of the 
railways ensured that they had to remain in public ownership. 
An attempt was made in the 1953 Transport Act to improve 
operational efficiency through the stimulus of a simplified management 
structure and decentralisation through the establishment of area boards. The 
Railway Executive was abolished, although surprisingly almost all its 
members retained posts in the reorganised structure. The one major change 
was the replacement of Hurcomb by Robertson. However, this did not 
provide the strategic leadership anticipated, despite Churchill's reasoning 
that if anyone were capable of developing and carrying out strategy it should 
be an army general. But Robertson's strategic skills could not be transferred 
to the business environment. He introduced a labyrinthine organisation 
which proved confusing to all involved. This debilitating management 
structure allowed a further waste of resources through the debacle of the 
introduction of dieselisation, where the BTC appeared unable to implement 
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its own policies on standardisation. This was compounded by the waste from 
decisions made on braking systems, which again resulted in modernisation 
taking longer and costing far more than it should. Both management and 
workforce were imprisoned in backward-looking, 'nostalgic' attitudes which 
also hindered the progress of modernisation. 
By 1955 the improved economic situation led the Treasury to sanction 
large-scale capital expenditure for the railways, and the BTC was allowed to 
develop its Modernisation Plan. Confidentially the MOT and the Cabinet 
expressed serious reservations, but publicly they welcomed the Plan and 
allowed it to proceed. The BTC then implemented a series of expensive 
technical improvements, without proper financial appraisal, which ultimately 
proved to be of varying value. As these problems emerged, it became clear 
that the Modernisation Plan had been inadequately researched and hastily 
prepared. 
A number of issues exemplify this lack of strategic planning. Despite a 
huge loss of merchandise traffic,3 market research was only undertaken after 
the Minister of Transport arranged meetings between Robertson and 
representatives of manufacturing industry to ascertain the latter's 
requirements. Similarly, standardisation was not pursued in traction, and the 
regions were allowed to develop in very different directions. Even the 
implementation of the 24-hour clock for timetable purposes in 1962, was 
initially only introduced on the Western Region, a move which simply 
confused the traveller and indicated a lack of consistency. 
3 The MOT calculated that between 1952 and 1955 industrial production increased by 20%, 
and road goods traffic increased 15%, yet railway general merchandise traffic fell by 11 %, 
MT65/357. 
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The costly debacle over the introduction of diesel traction can be 
illustrated by the stock position at the end of 1962. There were a total of 30 
different types, with 14 of these consisting of 1 0 or less units: this created 
excessive and costly maintenance problems. Experience in Britain with the 
standard steam locomotives had shown that only a few types were required, 
while US practice showed that only three types were sufficient. The 
opportunity to revolutionise speed and frequency of services was also lost 
when steam locomotives were replaced with diesels of lesser power ratings. 
Not only that, but the Modernisation Plan failed to supply adequate 
investment for modernising facilities for passengers. At a time of increasing 
public expectation and wider access to private transport, this was a crucial 
omission. On all projects there was a lack of proper investment appraisal, 
most apparent on the increasingly expensive London Midland electrification 
scheme. 
Labour issues were a further area where the BTC was unable to 
alter traditional operating practices, which often negated the effect of the 
introduction of more advanced and highly expensive technical equipment. 
An example is the agreement with the trade unions on the introduction of 
single-manning of freight trains, something which took years to negotiate, 
and then proved of doubtful value owing to the number of union conditions. lt 
was not until the findings of an outside inquiry, the Guillebaud Report, that 
the problems of over a hundred wage grades was identified, and the 
recommendations made for simplification in the interests of more coherent 
management. 
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Although some of the historical literature has blamed government for 
instituting continual change, that charge cannot be sustained in the years 
between the 1953 and 1962 Transport Acts. During that period, the 
government maintained support for the BTC and its Modernisation Plan, 
despite clear misgivings from the outset. This support is exemplified by the 
finance advanced from the Treasury to the MOT for the use of the railways. 
The scale of this is shown in Table 7. lt can be seen that the government 
actually increased its support for the Modernisation Plan's schemes until 
1959, by which time it had become obvious that the investments were being 
accompanied by deterioration, not improvement in the railway's financial 
position. 
Table 8: ADVANCES TO THE BTC ON CAPITAL ACCOUNT 1956-59. 
1956 - 40m 
1957 - 64m 
1958 - 117m 
1959 - 123m 
Source: Financial position of the BTC, 4 January 1960, MT115/77. 
This led to a series of investigations into the railways. First was the 
instruction to the BTC for a re-appraisal of the Modernisation Plan in the light 
of the increasing financial deficits, and the need for substantial additional 
investment from the Treasury. As far as the MOT was concerned this 
exercise proved futile, increasing its scepticism about the ability of the BTC 
to undertake effective management. Second was the use of the select 
committee process to improve parliamentary scrutiny and accountability in all 
the nationalised industries. The result was the 1960 Select Committee 
enquiry into the railways, the conclusions of which identified a number of 
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serious concerns with management, and reinforced the MOT's view of the 
weaknesses in the BTC investment policy. lt quickly identified the poor 
record of stock utilisation on British Railways as fundamental to improved 
operating efficiency. Yet the problem had been known from the outset; it had 
simply not been a management priority. In all areas of rolling stock 
utilisation, BR performance compared badly with other national railway 
systems. 
The impact of one particular change - the appointment of Marples as 
Minister of Transport- should not be underestimated. This brought a 
minister with a real determination to find the solutions to the BTC's financial 
problems. Not only was Marples influential in organising working parties at 
Cabinet and MOT level and forming the SAG, but he was determined to act 
on their findings and recommendations. His thinking was congruent with that 
of his MOT officials, and there can be little doubt that they were crucial in 
stimulating the production of Beaching's Reshaping Report. Marples had 
been determined to secure the appointment of Beaching, which he 
considered essential to secure change in the railway's management 
thinking. Although Beaching's approach was certainly different, it has been 
argued here that in fact little was new in his Reshaping Report as most of 
the recommendations were based on previous research and thinking. In 
particular, focus on the size of the system pre-dated nationalisation, and had 
been an element in MOT thinking for at least a decade. What Beaching did 
achieve in his Reshaping Report was to offer a clear and coherent plan for 
the reconceptualisation of the railways, and to provide the determination 
needed to implement it. 
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The appointment of Beaching, the 1961 White Paper, and the 1962 
Transport Act represented a three-pronged strategy to resolve the railway's 
financial problems. lt offered a comprehensive approach based on the 
financial implications implicit in the 1961 White Paper, which clarified 
responsibilities and introduced the idea that the industries should be given a 
new and broadly common financial framework. Following this the 1962 
Transport Act attempted to remedy the managerial weaknesses and thereby 
resolve the enduring financial problems. This Act altered the nature of the 
relationship between the BTC and the Minister of Transport, who assumed 
wider powers of direction in the affairs of the railways. 
These changes provided the necessary foundation for the 
development of a new strategy for the railways, set out in The Reshaping of 
British Railways. The factual basis underpinning this Report was a 
comprehensive survey of railway cost and revenue upon which the planned 
changes were justified. This received considerable disparagement, despite it 
being the most comprehensive (indeed only) survey to date. However as the 
closure of lines using this raw data accelerated, criticism of its accuracy and 
validity increased on the basis that Beaching allocated proportions of indirect 
costs in an arbitrary way. To a certain degree the Beaching proposals were 
an exercise in public relations, designed to prepare the nation for the far-
reaching changes proposed. Whatever the criticisms of Beaching, his impact 
on railway productivity was considerable: Pryke estimated that transport 
productivity of which the railways were a prominent part increased by 32% 
from 1963 to 1968.4 Home concluded that even though decades later 
4 Pryke, The Nationalised Industries, p. 251. 
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Britain's railways were still in the red and still not competitive with their 
continental rivals, this was probably not the fault of Beaching, Marples or 
Macmillan.5 
Fundamental to this thesis is recognition of cultural shifts and 
especially the effects of the development of motor transport. This aspect, 
little explored in the historical literature, was highly significant. Clearly, 
railway trade was considerably affected by the development of road 
transport, particularly the motor car. This and the rise of the consumer 
society during the 1950s underpinned the development of new consumer 
industries in highly dispersed locations which required the flexibility of road 
transport. 
Motor cars not only provided the convenience of door-to-door travel at 
any time, but opened up travel to areas the railway did not reach. They also 
had profound cultural meanings: an indicator of prosperity, conferring status 
and bringing pride of ownership; an expression of freedom, individual privacy 
and spontaneity. lt was all these features which contributed to rail transports' 
loss of its dominant position in carrying people for holidays and travel to 
sporting events. With air travel also contributing to the railways losses, 
Beaching concluded that special traffic was a loss-maker and had to be 
discontinued. 
This thesis began with a determination to assess the traditional view 
typified by Ashworth 6 that the railways suffered as a result of a series of 
organisational designs and redesigns. This criticism of government policy 
was reinforced by Gourvish's view that management of the railways was 
5 Home, Macmi/lan 1957-86, p. 252. 
6 Ashworth, The State in Business, p. 23. 
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hampered by regular interference from the dead hand of government. 
However, it has been argued here that this view is an oversimplification, and 
the evidence shows that successive governments generally acted in support 
of the railways, often despite considerable misgivings. Indeed it can be 
argued that they were too supportive at times, and that speedier intervention 
would have been justified. When government did act it was usually in an 
attempt to protect the public interests through regulative legislation and in 
pursuit of wider economic issues, such as the control of inflation. At times 
the effect was to reduce the railway's capacity to increase revenue, and this 
was a constraint on profitability. However, overall it can be argued that 
government investment and financial support of deficits more than matched 
any shortfall. The essential financial problems facing railway management 
were not effectively addressed, and not until Beaching was there an attempt 
to reduce operating costs in line with the reduction of business. The largest 
responsibility for the railway's difficulties lay not with government, but with 
railway management. Those charged with running the industry never 
effectively identified management strategies to cope with the sheer physical 
size and geographical extent of the railways. Their record on investment left 
much to be desired in terms of strategic planning and cost-effectiveness. 
However, any criticism must be qualified. The goal of achieving commercial 
success and fulfilling a public-service commitment proved elusive. lt can be 
argued that these two conflicting aims were incompatible anyway. A 
consequence of this is that later historical analysis might, in some instances, 
conclude that at that time railway management was insufficiently commercial 
when presented with these conflicting requirements. 
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Even allowing for this, management weaknesses had been apparent 
from the start of nationalisation, and resulted in a signal failure to develop a 
coherent, modem and efficient railway network with a common corporate 
culture. Beaching bravely attempted a reconceptualisation of railway 
mentality, but the result was enduring denigration of his work from a wide 
range of interest groups. Although his reforms initiated change, there was 
resistance, and it therefore took longer for the railways to adapt and 
reconstruct adequately. Indeed, it took until the mid 1980s before the 
lessons on modernisation were wholly effective, and the railways began to 
make fundamental changes to operating practices and to appreciate fully the 
commercial nature of a modern transport system. However, by the mid 
1970s the position began to alter radically, and the appointment of Peter 
Parker as Chairman of the BRB in 1976 introduced a period when railway 
management proved to be of a very high standard. This success continued 
under the two Robert Reids and substantial progress was made in many 
aspects of railway performance, exemplified by the outstanding operating 
and financial achievements of Inter-City, British Railways passenger 
transport sector. A combination of modernisation and effective management 
had finally arrived! 
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APPENDIX 1 ROAD TRANSPORT STATISTICS: NUMBER OF VEHICLES AND INDEX OF 
CHANGE 1948-1957 
CATEGORY OF LICENCE 
YEAR A 8 c TOTAL INDEX 
1948 54,391 26,722 85,839 166,952 100 
1949 39,037 26,869 100,301 166,207 99 
1950 34,129 27,915 124,903 186,947 112 
1951 32,718 28,612 139,931 201,261 121 
1952 33,494 29,861 148,796 212,151 127 
1953 34,936 31,471 157,854 224,261 134 
1954 45,208 33,389 169,366 247,963 149 
1955 58,330 36,244 183,302 277,876 166 
1956 64,481 38,994 195,982 299,457 179 
1957 68,280 41,087 206,737 316,104 189 
SOURCE: Report on industrial rail traffic by the President of the National Union of 
Manufacturers and the Chairman of BTC, 24 March 1959. 
'A' licence vehicles carried for reward only. 
'8' licence for own goods and reward. 
'C' licence for own goods only. 
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APPENDIX 2 BRITISH RAILWAYS: ROUTE MILES AND INDEX OF CHANGE 1948-1970. 
YEAR ROUTE MILEAGE CHANGE INDEX 
1948 19,361 100 
1949 19,573 +212 101 
1950 19,471 -102 101 
1951 19,357 -114 100 
1952 19,276 -81 99 
1953 19,222 -54 99 
1954 19,151 -71 99 
1955 19,061 -90 98 
1956 19,025 -36 98 
1957 18,965 -60 98 
1958 18,848 -117 97 
1959 18,565 -283 96 
1960 18,369 -196 95 
1961 18,214 -155 94 
1962 17,471 -743 90 
1963 16,982 -489 88 
1964 15,991 -991 83 
1965 14,920 -1071 77 
1966 13,721 -1649 71 
1967 13,172 -549 68 
1968 12,447 -725 64 
1969 12,098 -349 62 
1970 11,799 -299 61 
Index calculated using data from BTC and BRB Annual Reports 1948-1970. 
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APPENDIX 3 BRITISH RAILWAYS: CLOSURE OF STATIONS AND INDEX OF CHANGE 
1948-1970. 
YEAR STATIONS CHANGE INDEX 
1948 6,686 100 
1949 6,628 -58 99 
1950 6,513 -115 97 
1951 6,214 -299 93 
1952 6,026 -188 90 
1953 5,867 -159 88 
1954 5,753 -114 86 
1955 5,595 -158 84 
1956 5,474 -121 82 
1957 5,410 -64 81 
1958 5,264 -146 79 
1959 5,060 -204 76 
1960 4,877 -183 73 
1961 4,712 -165 70 
1962 4,347 -365 65 
1963 4,145 -202 62 
1964 3,574 -571 53 
1965 3,161 -413 47 
1966 2,869 -292 43 
1967 2,750 -119 41 
1968 2,616 -134 39 
1969 2,509 -107 38 
1970 2,423 -86 36 
Index calculated using data from BTC and BRB Annual Reports 1948-1970. 
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